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ABSTRACT 
This work has examined the implication the proliferation of identical econOITllC 
groupings portends for the east and southern Africa region. The thrust of the study here 
has been to interface and interrogate the incidence of the configuration of integration 
regimes in the east and southern Africa region. The work has investigated the question as 
to whether the proliferation of trade regimes has prepared a fertile ground for greater 
and deeper integration in the region. 
The thesis has also interrogated the proposition that such proliferation is the very anti-
thesis of the desired goal to promote trade harmonization and reach out for deeper 
integration in the region. Importantly this work has ventured to query the confluence of 
identical trade regimes in view of the compatibility imperative as enshrined in the wro 
legal framework. We have examined the implication this configuration of integration 
regimes portends for the wro disciplines. 
This work conunenced with an extensive examination of current works on regional 
integration regimes in general and integration initiatives within the east and southern 
Africa region in particular. The interrogation exercise was premised on works, both 
economic surveys and legal treatises undertaken on the recently concluded EU-SA free 
trade agreement, the SADC Trade Protocol, the COMESA Treaty and the Cotonou 
Agreement. The actual texts of these instruments form the bulk of the sources. 
We note that without exceptlon, significant and to that extent costly restructuring 
programs will have to be undertaken by States in the east and southern Africa region in 
response to the disruptive EU-SA trade partnership. We have established that these 
integration regime scores well on the imperative of wro compatibility. We gather that 
the present wro structures are not malleable enough for the cash strapped sub-Saharan 
Africa trade regimes to reconfigure themselves in such a way as to deepen the integration 
agenda. We have urged for more flexibility in the wro framework on this score to 
augment integration processes currently crowding the regional landscape. 
Mataywa W Busieka - 10th July, 2003 
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1.1 Introductory Statement 
Change is ubiquitous in the contemporary global economy. World markets have set their 
sights on the fast shrinking global commerce. It is certainly an animated race against time 
as each trading block restructures to cut out a niche of influence on the coveted global 
market. The sheer breadth and depth of the global competition for capital, skills, 
technology and products dictates that the hitherto conservative economies quickly make 
room for considerable adjustment. In the context of the east and southern Africa region, 
these measures have assumed a sense of urgency as seen in the recent ambitious tariff 
dismantling programmes. I The numerous multilateral and bilateral illstruments 
concluded by the different economic entity attest to the seriousness with which this 
venture is attended. 2 
The incidence of regional economic arrangements is a political, econonuc, social and 
legal reality. Nothing sums up this broad subject than a politician's viewpoint captured 
below. In a recent seminar for Trade, Investment and Infrastructure Co-operation within 
the SADC region organized by the African European institute, a delegate from Malawi 
posed some rather vexing questions. He expressed his enthralling dilemma with the 
imperatives of globalization thus; 
" What do we do when the influx of cheap foreign goods result in the closing down 
of local industries and therefore unemployment for our people? How do I, as a 
politician explain to these people who have just lost jobs as a result of foreign 
competition that globalization and trade liberalization are good for them? How can 
we, as politicians preach the virtues of great productivity when some of our policies 
appear to discourage local initiatives?") 
Most disturbing questions indeed. Much has been said about the wind of globalization 
and the attendant North-South polar divide. It appears that the wind of globalization is 
being played in sub-Sahara Africa in a most vicious and puzzling manner. 
/ I It has been noted that sub-Saharan Africa competes only with Latin America in the high concentration of 
regional groupings in the developing world. Whilst some of the groupings in the sub-Saharan 
/ 
region date back to the colonial times, most integration schemes have been adapted after 
independence. 
2 The fact that cross-border economic partnership is the fashion of global commerce is evident in the UN 
data on the issue. The 24-year period from 1947-1971 witnessed the creation of eighteen such 
trading instruments of which fourteen were adapted. The following 24-year period from 1972-
1996 witnessed a tripling to 55 of such instruments 45 of, which have been adapted2. 
J The joint initiative by the South African Chief Whips Forum and A WEPA, Cape Town South Africa 
2 
The globalization conundrum that is taking root in the eastern and southern Africa 
region has been partly triggered by the complexity attending the recently concluded EU-
SA free trade partnership. This complicated integration equation is exacerbated by the 
proliferation of preferential trade regimes in the region. Most countries in this region 
have overlapping membership and objectives that vary from limited co-operation to full-
fledged economic integration. With the addition of the de-facto EU-SA free trade area in 
the region, the legal and economic ramification of this regional economic polarity is of 
such complexity as would defy any concerted effort at quantification. 
The build-up chronology to regionalism in the eastern and southern Africa region has 
some interesting patterns. In many instances, the groupings comprise countries, which 
~1ad shared colonial ties to the same foreign power due mainly to the fact that the 
colonial ties had created a host of common institutions, a common official language, and 
a common currency. In other instances, the regional groupings, notably the larger ones, 
were more in line with the geographic proximity of the member countries.4 But as we 
shall demonstrate later on, this is not all there is to the motivation for regionalism in the 
eastern and southern Africa region. Other equally important, but new developments have 
given impetus to the pace and shape of regionalism in this region. 
What will interest this work most is the fact that many of the SADC member states are 
parties to the Cotonou protocol. As pointed out elsewhere in this inquiry, the EU-SA 
partnership has as one of its principal objects the desire to foster closer ties with the 
ACP countries. The unique integration configuration created thereby is that on the one 
hand is the SADC, COMESA, SACU and EAC member States contracting separately 
with the European Union under the Cotonou whilst South Africa is only admitted as an 
institutional member. On the other hand, South Africa, which has prior commitments to 
the SADC regional grouping, has contracted separately on special terms with the 
European Union. 
The configuration of this triangular instrument would tempt one into entertaining the 
idea that there is indeed a possibility of all these trade regimes -namely the EU-SA, 
4 This thesis argues, in the main, that sub-Saharan States did well to bite the bullet of trade liberalization. 
The time to open up the domestic markets was, after all, long overdue. This is the way forward 
the debilitating ravages of external competition notwithstanding. The upside, in the long run, far 
outweighs the downside. 
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SADC, COMESA, SACU, the EAC and the Cotonou Agreement eventually coalescing 
into one huge market. The unmistakable reality is that, despite the benchmark of 
regionalism being trade liberalization, there is a marked difference between the economic 
caucus within the eastern and southern Africa region as contrasted with those in 
developed economies. This can be explained. The dynamics driving these two systems 
differ both in substance and setting. 
The question perennially nagging the mind can best be framed this way: granted that sub-
Saharan countries strive to realize the level of development that developed economies 
have achieved, how then would one explain the disparity between these two sets of 
economic arrangements? One would have expected these developing countries to design 
their trade agreements in line with that of the developed countries such as the European 
Union. But is that possible? This thesis will seek to demonstrate that the disparity in the 
level of development and therefore the different economic structures obtaining in the 
two hemispheres operate from a copy cat model of the developed countries integration 
arrangements. 
There is a complex array of overlapping regional trade liberalization schemes taking 
shape within the east and southern Africa region, each of which will have a bearing on 
the other. In a sense, therefore, South Africa's opening up of its market to external trade 
must have caught many economic interests completely off-guard. Its entry into the 
crowded global commerce has, for good measure captured the mood of the principal 
players in this competitive plane. This would explain, in part, the flurry of activities that 
are currently crowding South Africa's external commerce. This flare of activities has in 
turn thrown the entire southern Africa region into a sudden economic stampede. This, 
then is the background scenario from which we build the case for the validity of this 
work. 
1.2 Justification for the study 
The spread of regionalism is no doubt one of the most important recent developments in 
the global system. Nearly every developing country is in, or about the process of 
discussing a regional integration arrangement. The depth and rapidity characterizing 
these changes compel a reassessment of the ability of various governance structures to 
cope and adapt to the beckoning global imperatives. An understanding of the nature of 
4 
the changes that are taking place call for a re-appraisal of the paradigms of regional 
integration and their ability to inform, respond to and even shape change. 
This work exanunes, ill some detail, the implication the proliferation of identical 
economic groupings portends for the east and southern Africa region. The thrust of the 
study here would be to investigate the impact of these economic blocs and measure the 
findings to the desire expressed in the EU-SA free trade agreement to encourage closer 
trade ties among the ACP countries in sub-Sahara Africa. How would such proliferation, 
as aforesaid seat in with the shift in policy by the European Community to do business 
with regional economic blocks in place of individual countries? Other questions we seek 
to interrogate in this area would be whether this proliferation would prepare a fertile 
ground for greater and deeper integration in the region. 
On the other extreme, should the point be taken that such proliferation is the very anti-
thesis of the desired goal to promote trade harmonization and reach out for deeper 
integration in the region. Importantly, the confluence of these identical trade regimes 
begs the question of the compatibility with the world trading system as enshrined in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) legal framework. On the legal front, therefore, the 
germane question that is begging is namely: what implication does the configuration of 
these integration regimes convey for the WIO disciplines. 
1.3 The context 
This thesis sets out to define the legal form that regional economic groupings forge in an 
effort to enhance a region's and ultimately a country's welfare gains. The work, to that 
extent, encompasses a great measure of economic activity. It does, too, in view of the 
legal expression that is given to the integration initiatives under review, contain 
considerable legal terminology. After all, law by itself does not exist in a vacuum. It is 
therefore important to clarify that the erudition and deep interdisciplinary understanding 
find their true expression in this work. 
The concept of the rule of law which expresses, inter alia, the overriding and dominating 
power of abstract norms, may at times dim the real contours of those factors which are 
the subjects and objects of the application of the law, namely the individual human 
endeavour. The accentuation of the fact that human endeavour is composed of a 
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multitude of variegated extra-legal features has always had a balancing effect and aids in 
the creation of the right proportion in our outlook. The in-depth exploration of 
especially of the interface between law and economics in all its aspects broadens our 
frame of reference and enriches our knowledge on the applicable horizons of the law. 
It is a tnte fact of life that the law essentially defines and explains away legal 
relationships. In this very breadth one cannot begrudge the truism that lawyers stand at 
the interface of commerce, industry, human relations and government. They are properly 
characterised as lubricants that ultimately facilitate the smooth meshing of these cogs of 
human existence. What is certain, therefore, is that there is much room for improvement 
and advancement of the frontiers of the law. This work is a concerted effort, albeit 
modest, to make a contribution towards this noble goal. 
Having said that, it is important to underscore the fact that this thesis is not an economic 
survey. The subject under review has received a good measure of in-depth scholarly 
economic treatment from authoritative academic quarters. This work is not about to 
upstage the immense analytical contribution carried out and accomplished in this 
direction. It is expedient, however, to note that between the economist and the legal 
scholar, there is a neutral meeting ground about which neither of the two would be aware 
that he/she has crossed over to the other discipline. Put in another way, there are legal 
matters in regional economic arrangements which an economist would not quickly put in 
perspective. Likewise, there are economic issues that so often get entangled III the 
labyrinth of legality that a legal scholar would want a quick fix escape root to get 
extradited from the rigmarole of economic detail. 
It follows that the availability of a work, which bridges these two important disciplines, 
would come in handy to those who are accustomed to exploring the mountains of such 
trans-national instruments. This work hopes to supply that urge while at the same time 
creating a forum for both the economist and the legal practitioner to meet on topical 
issues without being unnecessarily encumbered by the logjam technicalities which so 
often obscure issues from either perspective of the two disciplines. The work IS, 
therefore, an economist friendly as much as it is a lawyer friendly. It is important to 
reiterate that the work is not an economic analysis. We would, nonetheless, endeavour, as 
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much as would be within the strictures laid-out in our outlined methodology heavily 
draw from recent economic surveys and data analysis carried out in this particular area. 
1.4 Data analysis and field work surveys 
This research project commences with an extensive examination of current works on 
regional integration regimes in general and integration initiatives within the east and 
southern Africa region in particular. Special focus has been paid on works, both 
economic surveys and legal treatises undertaken on the recently concluded EU-SA free 
trade agreement, the SADC Trade Protocol, the COMESA Treaty and the Cotonou 
Agreement. 
This being a textual research endeavour, the basic sources for the project are regional 
integration instruments, International trade law instruments and treatises, The wro data 
bank on regional integration regimes, and consumer reviews. Other sources are seminar 
and symposia reports, governmental reports and documents, archival documents, 
historical books and documents, Acts of Parliament, draft bills, Parliamentary Committee 
proceedings, law reports, speeches and policy documents. We have also consulted 
unreported cases, conference reports, workshops and symposia documents, journal 
articles, books and texts on international trade law and public international law. 
1.5 Themes and organizational logic 
This work consists of nine chapters, which are divided into three parts. Chapters one to 
three comprise of the introductory part. Part one essentially lays a firm foundation on 
which the thesis is built. Free trade areas, customs unions and the common market are 
the main solid expression of regional integration. It extensively examines each of these 
trade instruments in sufficient detail. These trade instruments are the central features in 
this work and for that very reason its theme resonates throughout the entire thesis. 
In a nutshell, part one treats these trade instruments to an extensive introductory detail 
to clear any iota of ambiguity about them. This part of the thesis explains the nature, 
character and application of the different structures which regional trade regimes assume. 
This exercise would help to shed some light on the reality of regional integration and 
thereby bring clarity to these important tools of regionalism. This clarity is crucial to the 
subsequent discussion on integration regimes in the east and southern Africa region. 
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The role of the World Trade Organization as the guarantor of a rule based international 
trade system is explained in this introductory part of the thesis as well. Part one also takes 
a continental examination of regional trade instruments further afield. This comparative 
study seeks to explain their character and applications. This exercise is necessary for 
purposes of setting the stage for the eventual analytical work that is subsequently 
undertaken specifically on trade regimes in the east and southern Africa region. Special 
attention is given to the detail about the motivation for these trade instruments and their 
legal standing with the multilaterally designed General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
System (GA TIS). It should be noted here that the aim is to merely explain the character 
and dynamics of regional trade instruments. This exercise is essentially an eye opener to 
the debate on regionalism, which is our focus area. 
Part two is the analytical part of the thesis. This part critically examines the implication of 
the interface of regional trade instruments in eastern and southern African region. 
Concomitantly, this part does examine the compatibility of these trade instruments with 
the WTO disciplines on regionalism. The trade agreements that would be examined in 
this part are namely; the EU-SA free trade partnership, the SADC - SACU construct the 
Cotonou Agreement and the SADC-COMESA free trade confluence and its implication 
for deepening integration in the east and southern Africa region. Each of these principal 
trade regimes is closely examined in the context of the implication for deepening 
integration in the region and adherence to the WTO disciplines. 
Part three of the thesis will report on the findings and at the same time offer some 
recommendations on the way forward for the momentous pace of trade integration that 
is fast gaining speed in the region. This part will report on findings by examining each of 
the regional trade patterns as laid out in part two. The suggested recommendations cover 
the entire spectrum of the examined trade regimes. Having laid out the general picture of 
the thesis, we now move to briefly out-line the pertinent features that define each chapter 
of the thesis. The foregoing planning is elaborated in the chapter layout provided below. 
1.6 Chapter design and thematic flow 
(a) Chapter One 
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This chapter is essentially an introductory phase that rolls out the program for the entire 
work. The chapter unveils the subject matter, sets out the limitations of the work and 
outlines the structure of the thesis. 
(b) Chapter T 7.W 
It is important to understand the dynamics that inform the urge for regional integration 
and the creation of free trade areas. Chapter two is structured to achieve just that. This 
chapter seeks to excavate deeper into the imperatives attending custom unions and free 
trade areas. This chapter is basically an exercise to extensively review the past and 
present literature on free trade areas, customs unions and common markets. These 
Instruments are the solid expreSSion of regional integration. The chapter 
comprehensively reviews the characteristics, historical development and application of 
these trade instruments and the attendant controversy regarding their efficacy or 
otherwise in trade promotion. Special attention is given to the detail about the 
motivation for these trade instruments and their legal standing with the multilaterally 
designed General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade System (GA TIS). 
Significantly, the chapter will demonstrate the fact that when properly structured, 
regional integration initiatives do create a fertile ground for global commercial 
networking. Where haphazardly concluded, however, such instruments can and do in 
most cases achieve no more than a negotiated stalemate. The latter spawns unnecessary 
trade wars that give way to endless strife. This state of affairs saps valuable energy that 
would otherwise have been channeled toward fostering trade co-operation through the 
deepening of integration. In the main, however, this chapter introduces terminology and 
concepts that go with the fascinating phenomenon of regionalism. 
(c) Chapter Three 
This chapter is in the nature of case studies. The chapter takes a continental tour and 
samples out some of the notable regional integration regimes notified to the WTO 
elsewhere around the globe. This survey will be an eye opener as to the dynamics of 
integration regimes and thereby serve as a yardstick for the performance of regimes in 
the eastern and southern Africa region. This part helps to shed more light on the North-
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South interface as depicted in the EU-SA partnership within the sub-Saharan sphere. In 
this respect we look at integration regimes in North America, South America, the 
European Union and East Asia. 
The EU has been touted as the best model of a successful integration initiative. On the 
other hand, the EU is in many ways an active player in the regional integration processes 
that are taking root in eastern and southern Africa in particular, and in Africa as a whole. 
For these two reasons, the chapter dedicates more time on the integration experience of 
the European Union as a true model of a successful integration agenda. It goes without 
saying that a clear understanding of some of the striking features in the EU's integration 
efforts is most valuable to this work. The net result is that this discourse explains the 
important lessons and challenges integration regimes in eastern and southern Africa 
region have to contend with on their way to maturity. 
(d) Chapter Four 
The chapter makes the point that the WTO structure supplies the legal framework for 
the regional integration processes. Of course, the character and content of different 
regional blocs may, as is expected, differ significantly. The WTO manages the transition 
from the tariff barrier extremity to tariff dismantling regime. States under the WTO are 
urged to commit themselves to drastically phase-out the tariff barrier regime on trade 
with third countries. Suffice to say that the WTO is the principal guarantor of 
regionalism and multilateral talks. The chapter then takes a critical view of the WTO 
mandate on regionalism generally and towards the developing world in particular. 
What is clear is that Article XXIV is the enabling clause for all regional integration 
regimes. There is a whole range of requirements that regional blocs must comply with 
under the WTO. This chapter examines the jurisprudential disposition of the WTO 
framework vis-a.-vis the regional integration phenomenon. It is important to point out 
that the main caveat the GAIT law invokes against regionalism is the requirement that 
these regimes must at no time contradict the WTO disciplines on multilateral trade. One 
of the main issues which this thesis has had to grapple with concerns the level of 
compliance which trade regimes in eastern and southern Africa have so far achieved and 
whether this effort is consonant with the WTO edict on regionalism. 
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It is essential to investigate and uncover to what depth the eastern and southern Africa 
trade regimes have structured their trade regimes in their quest to comply with the 
principal regulator of the integration law - the WTO. There are certainly some interesting 
areas of conflict between the multilateral obligation and member states' fidelity to 
regional integration disciplines. This chapter highlights some of these vexing areas of 
conflict and affords some guarded views thereon. Emphasis is, in particular, on the 
enabling clause provision, the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principal, the whole 
spectrum of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the tariff barrier and non-
tariff barrier regime and the rigmarole that is the regime of the rules of origin. 
The WTO's legal framework for free trade areas and customs union is dealt with in 
greater detail with a view to position regional integration processes in the right legal 
perspective. The chapter identifies some of the vexed issues which free trade agreements 
must address to ensure proper compliance with the WTO disciplines on regional 
integration. To delve into these complex issues, it is necessary to look into the guidelines 
on regional integration detailed in the WTO framework. This discourse lays a strong 
foundation for the in-depth discussion of the germane issues underlying this work. 
(e) Chapter FirR 
Chapter five supplies the momentum to the focal issues of this survey. In this chapter, 
we take a critical view of the principal features of the EU-SA trade agreement and put 
them in the regional integration perspective. We closely examine what the EU-SA 
agreement portends for the nascent democratic institutions in South Africa. We then 
interrogate how the EU-SA agreement fares on the score of compatibility with the WTO 
disciplines on regional integration. In this respect, we take the decided view that the EU-
SA agreement has paid good tribute to the multilateral trade imperatives. 
The chapter also demonstrates that the motlvatIOn for the deliberate move by the 
European Union to single out South Africa from the ranks of other SADC members for 
a special trade partnership is no coincidence. The motivation for the EU-SA partnership, 
we argue, differs both in substance and intent from the motivation for the 
SADC/Cotonou axis. We undertake an in-depth investigation into some of the 
considerations that gave impulse to the European union's differential treatment of South 
Africa away from the mainstream SADC/ Cotonou partnership. 
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The chapter, too, undertakes an analytical appraisal of how the free trade agreement 
proposes to go about cementing its relations with other SADC member countries. 
Whether this effort would be inimical to deepening integration in the eastern and 
southern Africa region is another issue that calls for further investigation. The nagging 
question is the one seeking to understand how South Africa would take over the mantle 
of regional leadership without reneging on the trade commitments made to the 
European Union. There is the other question regarding the viability of the EU-SA 
agreement in view of intensified integration activities in the eastern and southern African 
region. We conclude that it is expected that the EU-SA agreement will have a disruptive 
effect for integration processes in the region and that the EU will therefore be called 
upon to offset the resultant distributional and adjustment costs. 
(j) O;apter Six 
Chapter six carries with it the theme of chapter five to the SADC-SACU frontier and 
seeks to investigate the implication of EU-SA agreement on the fledgling integration 
process in southern Africa. The chapter commences with a background review of the 
evolution of SADCC to SADC and traces the tortuous way to a free trade area. To give 
clarity to integration issues that would ensue, the chapter gives a brief rundown on the 
SADC economic profJe, which helps to highlight the teething issues that weigh heavily 
on regional integration initiative. 
The chapter takes a critical view of the SADC Trade Protocol in the light of the 
imperatives of the WTO integration disciplines. We make a few exceptions but in the 
main argue that the SADC Trade Protocol has fared well in its compliance with the 
WTO disciplines. The chapter then examines the implication of the EU-SA agreement 
on both SACUs common market and the SADC Trade Protocol. We take the view that 
the implementation of the EU-SA agreement would result in dire economic, social and 
legal consequences for the fledgling integration process in southern Africa. The chapter 
concludes that though the effects of the EU-SA agreement on the economies of 
individual SADC and SACU members are difficult to quantify at present, these will 
become clear in the implementation phase of the agreement. 
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(g) Chapter 5eu?n 
This chapter examines some of the penitent features of the Cotonou and how such 
features reflect on regional regimes within the eastern and southern Africa region. The 
chapter traces the development of various Lome instruments and makes a general 
commentary on the main features of the Cotonou agreement. The chapter then 
investigates the implication of the Cotonou Agreement on the EU-SA agreement. This 
we do in the context of the configuration of preferential regimes in the eastern and 
southern Africa region. To clarify this important development, the chapter critically 
examines the implication of the Cotonou agreement for the SADC Trade Protocol and 
its declared intention to achieve a free trade area in the short term. 
The chapter carries the argument further and affords a critical Vlew of authoritative 
commentaries that have been made regarding the shape and character of the successor to 
Lome. These arguments are faulted for being too pessimistic and failing to take 
cognizance of the obtaining scenario in the region, which is set to subsist for some time 
to come. We then call in question the Cotonou's congruence with the WTO disciplines. 
This area is steeped in intractable controversy about which we take the view that since 
the Cotonou is a transitional instrument its successor would no doubt strive to measure 
up to the WTO disciplines. 
Our thinking is that the combined force of the ACP and the EU is enough to alter the 
WTO rules to give legal expression to suit this uniquely designed trade partnership. We 
espouse the view that the only downside is the absence of political will on the part of the 
EU to travel this extra mile. We conclude with a cautionary remark to the SADC and 
COMESA signatories to the Cotonou. That these states must tread carefully lest they 
forego so easily, their special and differential benefits under the WTO framework, which 
to a greater extent were accommodated within Lome's none-reciprocal preferences. 
(h) Chapter Eight 
The chapter undertakes a critical analysis of the implication of the confluence of the 
SADC-COMESA integration process. There is definitely a serious jostling and shifting of 
trade alliances within the eastern and southern Africa region. This activity will no doubt 
be complicated by the EU-SA free trade partnership. This thesis seeks to throw more 
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light on the dilemma of trade alliances exercising the wits of the east and southern Africa 
regional players. 
Chapter eight seeks to speculate on how intra-bloc co-operation could be realigned so as 
to address the latent weaknesses in the regional trade regimes. This discourse forms the 
basis of our suggested proposition for future partnership between the regional players 
consisting of the EU-SA, SADC, COMESA, EAC and SACU. Indeed, this thesis' 
analytical work will be concretized in this chapter. 
Our firm view is that the EU-SA-SADC-COMESA trade prism presents an excellent 
opportunity for resource pooling initiative that carries all the parties on board. The 
ultimate goal, we argue, should be to redefine regional economic ethos in an effon to 
achieve congruence of trade objectives. The current isolationist policies obtaining in the 
region do not augur well for the proposed grand match to the African Economic 
Community at least not as far as the sub-Saharan regional trade regime conglomeration 
stands. 
(U Chapter Nine 
Chapter nine is appropriately our epilogue under which we make our fmdings and craft 
some necessary recommendations on the way forward for the fledgling integration 
process pervading the entire eastern and southern Africa region. This chapter 
acknowledges the bare fact that the issues that can be gleaned from the foregoing 
discussion render one line of conclusion irresistible. That is to say the EU-SA 
partnership sends mixed and confounding feelers to her eastern and southern Africa 
regional partners. From the look of things, this is not a far-fetched characterization of 
the obtaining scenario. 
The chapter notes that without exceptIOn, significant and to that extent costly 
restructuring programmes will have to be undenaken by states in the eastern and 
southern Africa region in response to the disruptive EU-SA trade partnership. Here, 
then, lies the bitter pill which regional states have dreaded all along. Yet the reality is 
unavoidable. We also urge that the WTO structure should be revisited with a view to 
cater for greater flexibility. This is a necessity for the fledgling integration regimes in 
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developing countnes In general, and in particular the ACP states to find a savory 
economic bearing in the world trading system. 
We gather that the present WTO structures are not malleable enough for the cash 
strapped sub-Saharan Africa trade regimes to reconfigure themselves in such a way as to 
deepen their integration processes. We reconunend that these states should be given a 
free hand under the WTO legal framework to enter into unique but economically 
beneficial partnerships so as to stage a meaningful claim on the ever-elusive global 
market. 
Chapter Two: The Development, Dynamics and Characteristic of 
Regional Integration Regimes 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis is about regional integration regimes. These instruments take different shapes 
and have distinctive characteristics. It is, therefore, important to identify, introduce and 
define the subject matter of this survey. It is also important to locate and explain various 
forms of regional integration regimes with a view to achieve clarity regarding their legal 
standing. This chapter seeks to achieve just that. It is to this extent a foundational 
chapter. Like we pointed out in the note on caveats, this work avoids the snare of 
digressing into the complex regional integration theories. An avalanche of literature 
abounds in that regard. This must be made absolutely clear, that ours is not an economic 
survey. This chapter then acts as a bridge between the interface of legal and economic 
issues that form the basis of this work. We, however, must lay bare the main tools of our 
work before we delve into the substance of the thesis. 
In a nutshell, this chapter seeks to identify and explain the dynamics of the regional 
integration phenomena that would supply clarity to the substantive discussion. The 
chapter explains what regional integration entails and looks up this identity with a brief 
historical treatment of its development. The dynamics of regional integration and its 
impact on regional economies are also examined. The chapter further interrogates the 
motivation for regionalism and outlines lessons learned thereby. The effects of regional 
integration are outlined in the light of its failures and success. The complex dilemma of 
regionalism versus multilateralism is also closely examined. This is the kind of dilemma 
that has exercised the wits international trade scholars for decades. It is an important 
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dilemma in view of the hegemonic role played by the USA as the world's market leader. 
This dilemma also features prominently in the enigmatic north-south polarity. 
Free trade areas, customs unions and common market regimes are the main conveyors of 
regional integration arrangements. This chapter undertakes an analytical examination on 
each of these instruments and outlines the pertinent characteristics in sufficient detail. 
Special attention is given to the detail about the motivation for these trade instruments 
and their legal standing with the multilaterally designed General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade System (GAITS). It is important to reiterate here that the aim is to merely 
explain away the character and dynamics of these regional trade instruments. These 
trade instruments are the central features in this work and for that reason these themes 
reverberate through the entire thesis. This chapter, therefore, treats these instruments to 
an extensive introductory detail to place these regimes in their true perspective. 
2.2.1 The phenomenon of economic regionalism 
In today's world, no nation exists in economic isolation. All aspects of a nation's 
economy - its industries, service sectors, levels of income and e~ployment, and living 
standards - are linked to the economies of its trading partners. This linkage takes the 
form of international movements of goods and services, labour, business enterprise, 
investment funds, and technology. Indeed, national economic policies cannot be 
formulated without evaluating their probable impacts on economies of other countries. 
In the late 1980's regional integration, often termed as regionalism, emerged as one of 
the most important developments in world politics. 
Regional integration has been defined as the institutional combination of separate 
national economies into larger economic blocks or communities. 5 A less technical 
definition is the merging of countries by forming free trade zones and customs or even 
economic unions. Examples of Staatenbunde, Bundersstaaten, Eidgrenossenschaften, 
leagues, commonwealths, unions, associations, pacts, conferences, councils and the like 
are spread throughout history. Many were established for defensive purposes, and not all 
of them were based on voluntary assent. Like we pointed out before, this work is 
confined to regional economic integration efforts within the eastern and southern Africa 
region. This analysis therefore encompasses regimes that involve the voluntary linking in 
5 Peter Robson: The Economics of International Integration 4th ed.( Routlegde: London, 1998) at p. 1 
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the economic and political domains of two or more states to the extent that authority 
over key areas of national policy is vested in the competence of a supranational body. 
2.2.2 Early development 
An early voluntary regional integration initiative appeared in the nineteenth century. In 
1828, for example, Prussia established a customs union with Hesse-Darstadt. The 
Bavaria Wurttemberg Customs Union, the middle German Commercial Union, the 
German Zollverein, the North German Tax Unions, the German Monetary Union, and 
finally the German Reich followed this successively.6 
This wave of integration spilled over into what was to become Switzerland when an 
integrated Swiss market and political union were created in 1848. It also brought 
economic and political union to Italy in the rise of regiments' movements. Integration 
fever again struck Europe in the last decade of the nineteenth century when numerous 
and now long forgotten projects for European integration were concocted.7 In France, 
Count Paul de Leusse advocated the establishment of a customs union in agriculture 
between Germany and France, with a common tariff bureau in Frankfurt. 8 
Other countries considered for membership in the European integration were Belgium, 
Switzerland, Holland, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Spain. In Austria, the economist and 
politician Alexander Peez forged a plan for middle European Zollverein that included 
France. 9 And Count Goluchowski, the minister of foreign affairs of Austria-Hungary, 
passionately advocated the idea of a united Europe in his public speeches. Many other 
politicians, economists, and journalists made proposals for European Union, which 
circulated through the European capitals during the decade. lo Ultimately, however, all 
the projects came to naught. Half a century later, the idea of European integration was 
6 Walter Matdi: The logic of Regional Integration; Europe and Beyond, (Cambridge University Press: 
2000) at p. 1 
7 Matdi, The logic of Regional Integration at p.l 
8 See Paul de Leusse; "D'Union Docaniere Euroeenne" Revue d'Economic Politique 4C (1890), 393-40l. 
9 Alexandre Prez. "A propes de la situation Douaniere en Europe", Revue d'Economic Politique 5 (Feb; 
1891) 121-139; see also his Zur Meuesten Handelspolitik (Vienna: Conunisionslag V.G. Szeiinski, 
1895) 
10 See, for example, Paul Leroy - Beaulieu. "De la Necessite de Preparer Une Federation 
Europeenne", \'Economiiste Francois 2(September 1898), 305-307; Gustave de Molinan, "A 
Zollverein in Central Europe, U Gunters Magazine 12 Q"anuary 1897), 38-46 
17 
reinvented and the process of merging the European nations into a prosperous economy 
and stable policy began. ll 
2.2.3 The character of regional integration 
Regional arrangements are normally classified under two broad categories. First, those 
that have modest aims at integration and seek only either a preferential trading 
arrangement (PTA) - lower tariffs on imports from the partners than from the rest of 
the world. Or a free trade area, which involves zero tariffs among partners and positive, 
but not necessarily identical, tariffs with the rest of the world. Second, those that aim at 
'deep' integration with either a custom union (CU) which imposes a common external 
tariff (CET) by partner countries. Or a Common Market as in the case of a single market 
that is to be established by the European Union with tne so called four (4) freedoms that 
is to say movement of persons, goods, services, and capital. 
Ultimately, however, whichever character a regional arrangement assumes, increased 
intra-regional trade ranks high among the priorities. With regard to the coverage, in the 
majority of agreements it was mainly the 'first freedom', which was exchanged, that is, 
for trade in goods, through complete abolition of tariffs, and also of quotas, after a 
certain transition period." Regional economic integration can and, therefore, loosely be 
defined as a process of eliminating restrictions on international trade, payments and 
factor mobility." Economic integration thus results in the uniting of two or more 
national economies in regional trading arrangements. It is important, before, proceeding 
further, to distinguish and explain the features of the types of regional trading 
arrangements. The most prominent and increasingly resorted to regional arrangements 
are the customs union and the free trade areas. This work will examine the two in some 
detail- unlike the more restrictive common market and economic union. 
(a) Common Market 
This consists of a group of trading nations that permit 
• the free movement of goods and services among member nations, 
IIMardi, The logic of Regional Integration, supra at p. 2 
12 First within the European Communi1:}', (now the European Union), and subsequently in the treaty 'With 
EFTA on the European Economic Area, all four freedoms were agreed on those for goods, 
services, capital and people, although with some exceptions, especially for agriculture. 
U MatclL defines regional imegration as a process of providing common rules, regulations, and policies for a 
region. See Manli, the logic of Regional Integration supra, at p. 44 
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• the initiation of common external trade restriction against non members, and 
• the free movement of factors of production across national borders within 
the economic bloc. 
The common market thus represents a more complete stage of integration than a free 
trade area or a customs union. 14 
To explain the nature which regional integration regimes assumes, it is appropriate to 
review some of these features separately. The following sub-section will examine the 
characteristics of an economic union, a common market, a customs union and a free 
trade area. This design is deliberate in that it moves from the deepest form of integration 
to the more loose structure based on preferential treatment. 
(b) Economic Union 
Beyond a common market, economic integration could evolve to the stage of economic 
union, in which a national, social, taxation, and fiscal policies are harmonized and 
administered by a supranational entity.15 
Belgium and Luxembourg formed an economic union during the 1920s. The task of 
creating an economic union is much more ambitious than that of achieving the other 
forms of integration. The reason for this lie in the fact that whilst a free trade are, 
custom union or common market results primarily from the abolition of existing trade 
barriers, an economic union calls for an agreement to transfer economic sovereignty to a 
supranational authority. 16 The resultant degree of economic union would be the 
unification of national monetary policies and the acceptance of a common currency 
administered by a supranational monetary authority. The economic union would thus 
include the dimension of a monetary union. 
Carbaugh says that the USA serves as an example of a monetary union. Fifty states are 
linked together in a complete monetary union with a common currency, implying 
14The EU single market builts on the previous common market and most of the remaining barriers to trade 
on the former common market were removed paving the way for the single market. See, for 
example, the detailed discussion on the development of the EU integration at chapter three 
below. 
15 Robert I Carbough: International Economics 7th ed. (South-Western College Publishing: 1998) at p.270 
16 Ibid. 
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completely ftxed exchange rates among the 50 states. 17 Also, the Federal Reserve serves 
as the single central bank for the nation. It issues currency denominations and conducts 
the nation's monetary policy. Trade is free among the states, and both labour and capital 
move freely in pursuit of maximum returns. The federal government conducts the 
nation's fiscal policy and deals in matters concerning retirement and health programs, 
national defense, international affairs and the like. State and local governments conduct 
other programs, such as police protection and education, so that states can keep their 
identity within the union. 
(c) Customs Union 
A customs union is an agreement among two or more trading partners to remove all 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade among them. In addition, however, each member 
nation imposes identical tariff restrictions against non-partlclpants. The effect of a 
common external trade policy is to permit free trade restrictions imposed against 
outsiders to be equalized. A well-known example is Beneluxls formed in 1948. In effect, 
therefore, a customs union entails the formation of a single customs territory in place of 
two or more customs territories with the result that: 
• duties and the restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated with 
respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of 
the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products 
originating in such territories; and 
• substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are 
applied by each of the members of the union to the trade with outside 
countnes. 
A customs union is characterized by the adoption of a common external tariff toward 
non-members. The theory of the customs union has been said to be of recent origin. 19 
The pre-Vinerian literature on customs union has been found to be sparse in the 
twentieth century and that some of it suggests that before the publication of Viners 
study, economists simply regarded customs unions as a step on the road to free trade.20 
17 Ibid. 
18 This consists of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
19 Robson, The Economics of International Integration supra p. 7. 
20 Ibid. 
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This is not to say that some of the more sophisticated ideas underlying current 
onhodoxy cannot be found in earlier writings. Since as many as sixteen customs unions 
were formed between 1818 and 1924, it would be surprising if this were not the case, for 
it is hardly to be imagined that the classical and neo-classical economists would have 
been wholly blind to their implications. O'Brian21 (1976), however, takes a more extreme 
position and has contended that the central feature of the Vinerian analysis of customs 
unions - namely, trade creation and trade diversion were a matter of essentially correct 
analysis by classical economist in the nineteenth century. 
Classical economists cenainly discussed at length the effects of preferential commercial 
treaties such as the Methuen Treaty of 170322 and the Cobden (Anglo-French) Treaty of 
1860. In their turn, Adam Smith (1776), Ricardo (1817) and McCulloch (1832) each 
attacked the Methuen Treaty, essentially on the grounds of its trade divening effects. 23 
The Cobden Treaty also generated lively debate on its trade effects, and trade diversion 
was an issue in that debate. 
Moreover, when the German Zolverein, the most notable example of a customs union to 
be formed in the nineteenth century, was established in 1834, McCull024 and others 
subjected its diversionary trade effects to a critical analysis. In a different analytical 
tradition, the German economists (1883) clearly viewed customs unions as protective 
devices for promoting infant industries, and in this way he can be said to have anticipated 
a stream of modern customs union theorizing initiated by Johnson (1965) and Cooper 
and Massell (1965). O'Brien25 has sought to explain Vinerian position - by stating that all 
Viner did was to stan from the position of the classical economists of Hawtrey and Lord 
Robbins. He explains that Viner then simply added to this logical possibility of some 
trade creation, depending on the relative height of the pre-union tariff and the common 
external tariff, and (or the possibility) that both countries in the union were producers of 
the goods in question. 
21 Robson, the Economics of International Integration supra, at p. 8 
22 Which admitted Portuguese wines into Great Britain on preferential terms in retum for the removal of a 
prohibition on British woolen exports to Portugal 
23Robson, the Economics of International Integration supra, at p.8 
24Robson, the Economics of International Integration supra at p. 8 
25 Ibid. 
21 
Other econorruc commentators express the VIew that strictly speaking the Vinerian 
postulation may be true, but that the apparently simple addition embodying the concept 
of trade creation is crucial to the orthodox theory of customs union. This is so, they 
argue, owing to the fact that it is the sole source of benefit in that context. It is not clear 
that earlier economists appreciated its significance, as distinct from the idea of trade 
expansIOns. In any event, the discussions of customs unions by classical and neo-
classical economists were largely incidental to their consideration of broader issues, and 
any theory was largely implicit.26 Robson/7 on the other hand surmises that it is fair to 
say that historians of economic thought like Machlup, 1977 have failed to disclose any 
adequate treatment of the allocation effects of customs unions in the literature prior to 
the studies of Viner. 
(d) Free Trade Areas 
A free-trade area is a group of two or more customs territories in which internal duties 
and other restrictive regulations to trade are eliminated on substantially all trade in 
products originating in such territories. However, each member keeps its own tariffs and 
other restrictions against non-partners and in consequence, continues to conduct its own 
trade policy.28 In other words each member, however, maintains it's own set of trade 
restrictions against outsiders. An example of this stage of integration is the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), consisting of Canada, Mexico and the USA. 
It has been argued that a free trade area would make the world better off in the short 
term if, roughly speaking, the amount of trade it creates exceeds the amount it diverts. 29 
In principle, a free trade area eliminates barriers to trade at the border between the 
partner countries. Unlike customs unions, however, each country maintains its own 
restrictions against trade from third countries. As a result, free trade area partner 
countries receive preferential access to each other's market at the expense of non-
members. To protect those preferences, such agreements usually set rules of originJO to 
prevent goods from non-members being transshipped through a partner free trade area 
country with low external trade barrier to another with higher barriers. The subsequent 
26 Robson, the Economics of International Integration supra at p. 9 
27 Ibid 
2sDickson Yeboah: "Regional Integration and the GA TI", 17 World Om[x!tilion 1, Septeml:er 1993, at p.38 
29 The controversial subjects of trade creation and trade diversion effects of regional integration would be 
gone into presently. 
30 See the note on the mechanics of the rules of origin below 
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chapters will argue, for instance, that the confluence between SADC and COMESA 
trade regimes runs counter to the spirit of a free trade area since transshipment between 
non-member states is impossible to put in check. Such agreements are more 
complicated to negotiate than a product or sector specific pact, but they can 
accommodate cross- sectoral linkages and thus expand the breadth and depth of 
potential liberalization. 
Free trade areas are considered to be consistent with the WTO disciplines, when they 
meet the three-part test of Article XXIV31 relating to notification, trade coverage, and 
level of barriers to third country trade.J2 These provisions require that free trade area 
obligations affect "substantially all" the merchandise trade between the partner 
countries.JJ Free trade areas can be self-contained or open to additional signatories. New 
members can be added either under the same terms of entry as the original partners or 
subject to negotiated protocols of accession.34 Given the potential of dilution in the 
value of preferences received by the existing free trade area members upon introduction 
of new members, there are few examples of open-ended free trade areas. Most of the 
free trade areas, invariably make provision for new entrants to make additional 
concessions to compensate for such potential effects. 3S 
The post war period has been marked by numerous attempts to construct free trade 
agreements. Some have been notable successes such as the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) while many others have not worked. The idea for two or more 
developing countries being prepared to abolish all trade barriers among themselves and 
though, not wishing to construct a common tariff toward the rest of the world, 
originated with a proposal put forward by Lebanon at Geneva in 1947. 36 
31 GAIT Article XXIV is the enabling clause. 
32 See, for example the discussion on this item below 
JJFor sectors such as services that have now incorporated into the WIO framework, the GAIT test do 
not apply and free trade area coverage need not be comprehensive in this respect. Article XXIV 
of the GAIT, See also Article V of the GATS 
34 Most free trade areas have provision for entry of new members - see for example the terms of free trade 
agreements in chapter three 
JS Indeed, to guard against such 'delusion' of benefits, the 1988 Trade Act forbids the extension of the free 
trade agreement benefits to additional countries without new congressional approval. 
36 EPCT/W/184-The symbol "EPCT" was used for documents in the second session of the Preparatory 
Commirree at Geneva 1947). This was formerly discussed until it was resubmitted jointly by 
Lebanon and Syria at Havana. E/CONF.2 (and 31 A/3 (The symbol "E/CONF.2" was used for 
documents of the UN conference on Trade and Employment, Havana (1947-8). 
23 
At Havana, the proposal was referred to a sub committee, together with the Geneva 
draft customs union provisions. A wide range of proposals was also submitted by 
developing countries. These were for the right to exchange new preferences among 
neighbouring countries, among countries within an economic region, among countries 
having close historical or economic ties and in promoting economic development among 
other propositions. 
As the principal consequence of the work of this particular sub-committee, the text was 
dramatically broadened to allow for the formation of "free-trade areas". This, it was 
suggested, would involve the elimination of duties and restrictions on "substantially all 
the trade,,37 between the constituent territories or interim agreements "subject to the 
safeguard of "plan and schedule" and reasonable length of time" but not reqUlrmg a 
common external tariff or harmonization of foreign trade regulation. The new text as 
recommended by the sub-committee was approved without substantive debate. 38 
Initially framed for developing countries, some delegates at Havana reasoned that this 
measure could be useful to developed countries as well.39 Indeed the French 
representative credited with having thus developed and refined the Lebanon-Syria 
proposal, said it would be of great interest to Europe, which it turned out to be. The EU 
has, for instance, made full use of this facility to forge unique trade relations with 
developing countries - the most notable showcase of this pattern being the defunct Lome 
Convention.40 Not many delegates envisioned these provisions being used, as they are 
today, for fostering closer commercial ties between developed and developing countries. 
Haight muses that such a colonial-type pact belonged to the past. 41 He adds that for a 
backward territory to give better treatment to imports of manufactures from one or more 
industrialized countries than to those from other possibly cheaper sources of supply was 
an arrangement sometimes imposed by colonial powers. He regards such ties as neo-
37 As the discussion of this item in chapter four demonstrates, this particular yardstick is notoriously 
susceptible to abuse by states hell-bent on maintaining protectionist trade barrier regimes. Such 
regimes are thrown around the so-called 'sensitive sectors' of the economy. The EU for example 
has consistently crafted a way around this provision to hold unto the loathsome Common 
Agriculture Policy that maintains expensive subsidy regime that offends both the letter and spirit 
of the GATT law. 
38 E/CONF.2/C. 3 SR44 and 47 
39Ibid. 
40 The Lome Convention has since been replaced by the Cotonou Agreement, which is in essence a 
transitional mechanism. See the discussion of the Cotonou at Chapter Seven 
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colonial arrangement and wonders how an independent developing country could enter 
voluntarily thereby limiting their freedom to protect their own industrial development. 
Attempts to bring about reciprocal free trade between sovereign states were not 
unknown, but it was a grave departure in policy to include provision for such 
arrangements in commercial treaty and to place them substantially on par with customs 
unIon. 
Although there is some resemblance, in form, between the customs union and the free 
trade areas, there is less affinity in substance or purpose.42 The insertion of the free trade 
area provision was undoubtedly a sincere effort to allow measures, which would be 
helpful in the post war reconstruction of world trade without seriously detracting from 
fundamental rules in the multilateral trade system.43 
In the light of 25 years experience, however, a free trade area should be seen for what it 
is - a preferential arrangement that does not confer the rights and obligations available to 
a customs union or an economic union. It is important to note that the record of free 
trade areas among developed countries has been far better than among developing 
countries.44 The early years of the Central American common market and the Andean 
Pact are, however, the sole examples of qualified successes and even these free trade 
areas later failed. 45 
2:2:4 The impetus for regional integration 
The question as to what fuels regional trade integration has been a subject of intense 
academic debate and correctly SO.46 The obviously fascinating issues highlighted in these 
debates are, however, largely beyond the scope and reach of this work. We will only 
confine our discussion to the main arteries that have directly been linked to a flood of 
regional integration regimes. In our case we consider that the simplest was in which to 
explain away the impetus underlying the shift from the once revered multilateral system 
to regionalism is through the historical development of this phenomenon. The 
conversion of the US from an ardent, nay fanatical multilateralist to a regionalism 
41 F.A. Haight: (1972) Cusums Unions and Frre-Trade Areas under GATT: A Reqpraisal4JWTL. 
42 See the discussion on these regimes above 
43 Ibid 
44 See chapter three for a detailed examination of north-north regional integration experience 
45 Some of the successful South American integration regimes are outlined at chapter three below 
46 See the discussion on 'Regionalism: a veritable vehicle to multilateralism below to gain an insight into 
some of these arguments 
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apologist and the attendant enthusiasm that has fueled the animated match to 
regionalism are all important matters that are clarified in the historical build-up to these 
events. 
We will now briefly review these historical events so as to properly trace the roots of 
regionalism and hereafter be in a position to explain the motivation for the relentless 
clamour to go the regional integration way. Regional trading arrangements, be they 
vehicled through the customs unions, free trade areas or common markets or even 
interim arrangements, are pursued for a variety of reasons.47 A motivation of virtually 
every regional trading arrangement has been the prospect of enhanced economic growth. 
It is hoped that an expanded regional market would allow economies of large-scale 
production, foster specialization and learning by doing, and attract foreign investment.48 
Commentators have offered a variety of reasons as to what gives impetus to the 
proliferation of regional blocs. 49 There is, however, general agreement that the defining 
movement for the move from multilateralism to regionalism was the abrupt change of 
policy by the US in favour of regionalism.so In spite of the multiplying number of 
countries adopting trade liberalization and the growing globalization of markets, the 
1990s saw a shift of emphasis away from global trade negotiations towards regional 
groupings. 51 The weakening of multilateralism, or at least the emergence of compelling 
modes of association, can be prbna facie attributed to the metamorphosis of the United 
States. s2 
From being a brazen one-track multilateralist adopting regionalism as a second timer 
strategy, American policy has indeed made a big U -turn.s} This shift in the US policy has 
triggered recommendations for more free trade areas elsewhere.s4 Some commentators 
47 Ibid 
48 See for example the views espoused on regionalism and the external effects below 
49 See, for example, Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya: The New dimensions in regional integration, 
(eds.)(Centre for Economic Policy Research, Cambridge University Press: 1995) at pp. 5-6, See 
also Schott (1989), infra, at p. 2 
50 Ibid 
51 See the arguments advanced on regionalism and multilateral ism below 
52 Ibid 
5} It started with the negotiations for the US-Canada Free Trade Area (CUSFTA) and then the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) - see chapter three below for a discussion of NAFTA 
54 This point has been made often by EU officials and commentators alike; see for example, Giovanni and 
Mayer (1991: 1-2) and Geoffrey Fitchew (Director General AG XV: Financial Institutions and 
company law, commission of European Government studies, University of Edinburgh, 15 
January 1988. 
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opine that it has created the breathing space that had orren been lacking in multilateral 
talkS.55 It ought to be kept in mind that before this change of policy, regionalism and 
integration everywhere save for Europe were at best a dream in the face of the blinding 
military and economic opposition from the United States.56 
Again the transmutation of the US is, however, the last response to a chain of long-
standing factors. Particularly significant to the gravitating forces of regionalism is that the 
present multilateral system has lost spirit. Pundits have pointed out that by and large, 
despite the successful ending of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO, 
the feeling has been that multilateralism is pedaling very slowly against the backdrop of 
very rapid changes.57 In a nutshell, regionalism is being resorted to because the old 
multilateralism did not satisfy the expectations of many of its members. 58 
For instance, the European Union has concentrated its energIes In the creation of a 
single European market. For the EU members, the elimination of trade barriers within 
the EU seems to overshadow in importance the gains likely to be achieved in the WTO 
framework. This, in spite of the fact that there are specific linkages in specific areas 
between the common market incentive and the Uruguay Round negotiations. Meanwhile 
Japan focuses on ways to better manage its bilateral trading relationship's with the United 
States and with other countries in the Pacific Basin.59 
The US, the sponsor of the Uruguay Round, threatens to pursue bilateral or plurilateral 
trade pacts with 'like-minded countries' if it's objectives for the GATT talks are not 
met.60 If indeed the recent Quebec summit of the Americas is anything to go by, then 
this threat seems to have taken root. In essence, the United States has been using 
55 Panagariya, et al - The New Dimension in regional integration Ibid 
56 The hegemonic influence of America in fueling regionalism in the world trading system is clearly 
understood given its prominent role as the promoter and guarantor of the staggering process of 
multilateralism. As a leader of multilaterilism in the 1960s and 1970s, the US worked assiduously 
to resist any efforts at closer regional ties, particularly in Larin America and Asia, which were seen 
as potential challengers to American predominance. 
57 Panagariya et al, The New Dimension in regional integration supra, at p. 6 
58 The major trading nations appear to be distracted from the task at hand in the GATT talks in Geneva. 
Many countries have sought to complement the multilateral GATT process with a variety of 
bilateral and regional trade initiatives. Concern about the efficiency of the GATT process has led 
some countries to focus more on regional arrangements than on their participation in the 
multilateral negotiations. 
59 See the discussion on the trade frolics that Japan has been making in the Asian markets in Chapter Three 
below 
60 Schott]J: More Free Trade Areas, infra 
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bilateralism as both a carrot and a stick to further the process of trade liberalization. 
Bilateralism has been used to close the leaks in the multilateral system until solutions 
could be negotiated in the GATT and to establish building blocks for broader 
multilateral accords that could be negotiated in the new round of GATT negotiations. 
If the GATT talks falter, however, the United States has threatened to resort to bilateral 
agreements as a substitute rather than a complement to the GA TT.61 Critics charge that 
the current US policy, based on the open trade principles of the GATT, has failed 
because US ftrms have faced stronger and stronger foreign competition at home and 
abroad, as evidenced by the string of record US trade deftcits in the 1980s.62 These 
concerns have led to increasing calls - particularly in the Congress, the US labour 
movement, and the US business community - for a more aggressive trade policy 
involving both unilateral actions and bilateral negotiations, to try to "level the playing 
field" and remedy the persistent trade deficit.63 
The role of multinational enterprises with global, rather than national network in fueling 
regionalism and multilateralism cannot be under-estimated. The character of these 
multinationals has exposed the limitations of nationally based policies and increasingly 
confronts governments with the urgency to liberalize and characterize policies, standards 
and regulations with other countries, including but not limited to trade and trade related 
areas. 
Over the years the GATT system has been eroded by excessive use of rights and 
disregard of obligations emerging from the set of rules originally agreed on. So far the 
GATT has been seriously weakened in dealing adequately with the changing patterns of 
world trade and retaining control of the policy tools resorted to by national governments 
or regional blocks in pursuit of their national objectives. Thus the multilateral trading 
system is viewed to be in jeopardy in the light of the creation of regional blocks - a move 
that seems to be brought about by the following reasons. 
61 Schott JJ: More Free Trade Areas, (Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC May, 1989) 
at p. 2 
62 See for example Schott]]: More Free Trade Areas, Ibid. 
63Schott]]: More Free Trade Areas, Ibid. 
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Due to concerns about the efficiency of GATT rules and procedures 64, the founding of 
regional units has been promoted as a complement, if not a su bstitute, for 
multilateralism. It is in this context that numerous changes have been introduced against 
exceptions to agreed rules.65 Most of these changes, it has been alleged, run counter to 
the spirit if not the letter of the GATT treaty. Second, the increased weight of the EU, as 
the core unit of the EEA on the one hand, and Japan on the other, have brought about 
the relative decline in the role of the US exports on a world wide scale. This 
restructuring among the main actors in world trade may have an impact on the kind of 
trading system that evolves. 
An excessively long period of multilateral talks in the Uruguay round has only brought 
limited results. The thrust of protectionism has not been curtailed, and the erosion in 
multilateral trade disciplines will probably continue. This state of affairs is encouraging 
unilateral actions for survival and hence the replication of regional integration trade 
blocs. 
The completion of the single European market (SEM) and the signing of the NAFTA 
have given support to the positive connotation of regional trading blocs and negative 
gesture to the multilateral forces. Consideration of national arrangements in East Asia 
and the Pacific has been vigorously promoted. This campaign is adding to the concerns 
of third countries and causing them also to propose new or seek membership in the 
existing regional integration agreements. Ironically, however, and as pointed out earlier, 
third countries, in particular, have a crucial stake in the multilateral system. 
Harmonization and liberalization in response to the challenges posed by globalization is 
in some instances being conducted in the context of regional arrangements. Finally, one 
other reason for regionalism can be glimpsed from Article XXIV of the GATT, which 
provides as follows: -
"The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing 
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary 
agreements, of closer integration between the economics of the 
64 Complexity of talks, cwnbersome decision-making process, consensus rule, tardy implementation, soft 
enforcement measures among others. Schott]]: More Free Trade Areas, supra at p. 2 
65 Some of these changes are; Multi-Fiber Arrangements (MFA), the sequences of language with respect [Q 
regulations affecting sensitive items (agriculture, subsidies), and the inventiveness with regard to 
'new instruments' and their proliferation voluntary export restraints (VER). 
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government were unable to agree on who was to produce what. The very same 
conditional dilemma doomed industrial development projects within the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEANt. 
Examples, too, abound of how an absence of market pressure for integration leads to 
failure. For instance, members of ASEAN export the bulk. of their primary commodities 
and manufactured goods to the same world markets. Most of their economies are not 
complementary. Excluding Singapore, intra-ASEAN exports have amounted to only 5 
percent of total ASEAN trade since the late 1960s.72 
Similarly, members of the Andrean Pact send most of their exports, consisting primarily 
of agriculture and mineral products, to the United States and Europe. The share of intra-
regional trade in total trade of Andrean countries amounted to only 1.2 percent in 1970 
and to 2.5 percent in 1988. 73 Indeed, the major success stories all satisfy the two strong 
conditions espoused by Mattli. They include the European union and the Zolverein; 
their respective leaders being German and Russia. NAFTA, led by the United States, 
stands a good chance of succeeding as well. It has been suggested that integration 
schemes that satisfy these conditions stand a good chance of survival. 74 
SACU is one excellent example where South Africa has been on hand to bankroll and 
offer leadership to the fledging union. 75 Compared to the EU, however, South Africa's 
intervention has not been developmentally speaking that much rewarding. This is partly 
due to similar social-economic pressures weighing heavily on South Africa's fiscal budget. 
For the EU, Germany played the leading role and apart from supplying the much-needed 
strong leadership to the union, it swiftly and relentlessly moved in to allay distributional 
pressures that plagued the union from time to time. At the polar end are very many 
integration prospects, most of, which are examples of what Mattlf6 calls "second 
integrative response." He points out that in this group, none that failed to satisfy the two 
strong prerequisites of integration process has ever succeeded. 
70 See chapter three 
71 See Chapter three 
72 See the discussion on these regimes at chapter three below 
n See chapter three below; indeed, as shown in the following chapters, this situation is reflected in many 
cases 
74 See the following empirical discussion on the experiences of various leading regional arrangements duly 
notified under the GA TI system. 
75 See Chapter Six for the detailed treatment of this trade regime 
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No doubt, the point about strong leadership and demand for integration as prerequisites 
to a successful integration initiative cannot be gainsaid. One has to look at the numerous 
challenges that integration regimes in the east and southern Africa region have to grapple 
with to applaud this crystal reality. 
2.3 Regionalism: a veritable vehicle to multilateralism 
The crisp question here is whether; indeed, regional trading arrangements are building or 
stumbling blocks to a multilateral trading system? This question becomes important in 
view of the pre-eminent perception that the world trading system is geared and aspires to 
the goal of contracting into a global market place. The hope and desire of all trading 
nations is to see a shrinking world market devoid of trade barriers and open to all and 
sundry.77 Are these concerns really justified? 
Under regional trading arrangements, nations scale down trade barriers only for a 
selective small group of partner nations thus discriminating against the rest of the world. 
Yet under the WTO framework, trade liberalization by anyone nation is extended to all 
WTO member states on an unconditional MFN basis. In the latter framework, there is 
essentially no discrimination. The recent proliferation of regional integration 
arrangements and proposals, and the difficulty of concluding the Uruguay Round, has 
fuelled fears that international trade is becoming more of a regional affair in ways that 
will diminish global welfare.78 
Intense debate has been generated between those who take the view that there is a 
constructive and creative tension between regional economic integration efforts and the 
multilateral liberalization and those who opt for the opposite view. The latter take the 
view that regional integration efforts can be corrosive and even cancerous to the 
multilateral trading system. 79 The other school of thought thinks otherwise. 
76Marcli, The Logic of Regional Imegration, supra, at p. 65 
77 Traditionally, economists have expressed concerns that increasing the emphasis on regional integration 
might detract from the realizarion of the trade imperatives of a global village, which is the stated 
destination for the multilateral talks. Trade liberalization under a regional trading arrangemem is 
very differem from the multilateral liberalization embodied in the World Trade Organization 
(WIO). 
78This fact is underscored by Lorenz who describes the regionalism approach as the outcome of 'a natural' 
location phenomenon leading to closer economic ties while multilateralism is seen as the creation 
of preferemial trading arrangements. See Lorenz D (1993): 'Europe and East Asia Economics, 
Vol. 26, No.1, Hamburg: Weltarchiv 
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In general, regional trading blocs that decrease the discretion of member natIons to 
pursue trade liberalization with outsiders are more likely to become stwnbling blocks to 
multilateralism. For, instance, members of a customs union or common market are 
unable either to negotiate tariff reductions with non-members individually or to reduce 
external tariffs unilaterally 80. Moreover, as a regional trade block expands, its bargaining 
power in international negotiations and its market power in global commerce grow, 
especially if it imposes a common external tariff (CET). The trade bloc may thus 
consider it beneficial to increase barriers to outsiders thereby raising a stwnbling block to 
multilateral trade liberalization.S! 
Two other factors suggest that members of a regional trading arrangement may not be 
greatly interested in global liberalization. First, trade blocs members may not realize 
additional economies of scale from global trade liberalization, which often provides only 
modest opening to foreign markets. Regional trade blocs that often provide more 
extensive trade liberalization may allow domestic forms sufficient production run to 
exhaust scale economies.S2 
Second, trade bloc members may want to invest their time and energy in establishing 
strong regional linkages rather than invest them in global negotiations. That was true for 
the European Union in the 1980s when it wanted to complete the common market stage 
of integration and considered the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations to be 
of secondary importance.S) 
Proponents of regional trading arrangements maintain that blocs of nations with many 
similar interests are more likely to liberalize trade dramatically than large, heterogeneous 
groups of nations involved in multi lateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).S4 That may be true. One should keep in mind, however, that regional trade 
arrangements might be beneficial or harmful to their members as well as to outside 
79 See for example Lloyd, supra, at p.29 
80 This accepts South Africa, which reduced tariffs with the EU without formal approval by the other SAU 
members. 
8lCarbough, International Economics, supra, at p. 301 
82Dissatisfied with the looseness in Adam Smith's theory, it was David Ricardo (1772-1823), who, however, 
developed a principle to show that mutually beneficial trade can and do occur even when one 
nation is absolutely more efficient in the production of all goods. David Ricardo, The principles 
of Political Economy and Taxation {London: Cambridge University Press, 1966) Chap. 7 
8) Robson, The Economics of International Integration, supra, chapter four 
84 Check 
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nations. Ultimately, it all depends on the welfare gains derived by a state from such trade 
regimes. A regional trading arrangement is unlikely to be beneficial unless it has 
significant trade-creating effects. 
The case in point here is integration regimes in eastern and southern Africa region that 
are the focal area of this work. As we shall demonstrate in the subsequent chapters, 
despite the proliferation of trade regimes in this region, there is very little intra-regional 
trade generated thereby. Due to the colonial legacy that has structured the production 
factors in these nations to favour exports mainly to Europe, not much structural changes 
have taken place to reconfigure these structures to spur intra-regional trade. 
Carbaugh85 argues, and forcefully so, that when structured according to principles of 
openness and inclusiveness, regional blocks can be building blocks rather than stumbling 
blocks for global free trade and investments. There are, he continues, several ways in 
which regional blocs can foster the opening of global markets. In the first instance, 
regional agreements may achieve deeper economic integration among members than do 
multilateral accords because of greater corrunonality of interest and simpler negotiating 
processes. This position is, of course very much debatable. 
Second, a self - reinforcing process is set in place by the establishment of a free trade 
area as the market encompassed by a free-trade area enlarges. It becomes increasingly 
attractive for members to join to receive the same trade preferences as member nations. 
Third, regional liberalization encourages partial adjustment of workers out of import-
competing industries in which the nations comparative advantage is weak and into 
exporting industries in which it's comparative advantage is strong. As adjustment 
proceeds, so goes the argument, the portion of the labour force that benefits from 
liberalized trade rises, and the portion that loses falls: this promotes political support for 
trade liberalization in a self-reinforcing process. 
For all of these reasons, when regional arrangements are formed, according to principles 
of openness, they tend to overlap and expand, thus promoting global free trade from the 
bottom up. Some innovative corrunentators have drawn up the map to multilateralism 
85 Carbaugh, International Economics, supra, at p.269 
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via the regional integration route.86 It has been suggested that if America's regionalism is 
not to turn into piecemeal, world trading system - fragmenting force, it is necessary to 
give it a programmatic world trade system unifying format and agenda.87 One possibility, 
it is suggested, is to encourage, not discourage, Japan to line up the Asian countries into 
an Asia Free Trade Area (AFTA), with the US bringing up the South Americans into the 
NAFrA, on a schedule, say of 10 years. Then Japan and the United States, the two 
'hubs' would meet and coalesce into a larger free trade area at that point 88. 
Finally, so goes the theory, the enlarged US-Japan economic bloc would negotiate with 
the European Union and its associate countries to achieve the ultimate objective of a 
multilateral free trade for all in Geneva.89 It is suggested further that only such 
'programmatic' regionalism, in one of several possible variants, would ensure that the 
United States' newly found regional momentum is not perceived by Asia to be hostile 
and fragmenting. 90 No doubt such an initiative would make regionalism less harmful to 
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) and the GATT and more supportive of the 
cause of multilateral free trade for all. 
2.4 Regionalism and the external effects 
Historically, the most important is relative loss of market access. Countries outside an 
integrated group may face temporary or lasting discriminatory trade policies. Even in the 
absence of a high conunon external tariff (CET), discrimination may become lasting 
because rules of origin associated with a free trade area can give protected firms a vested 
interest in maintaining protection. As a result this would reduce the ability of members of 
a free trade area to engage in external trade liberalization. However, there is a simple 
argument why the negative effects of discrimination may be temporary. If trade 
liberalization within a group has dynamic effects enhancing economic growth, or if scale 
economies stimulate the demand for imports from outside the region. The sum total of 
86Schott JJ: More Free Trade Areas, supra, pp.49-54 
87Ibid. 
88 This would require discarding the extreme J apanophopia that characterizes the so called 'revisionist who 
are really 'regionalist' twice over: they simple-minded regressions to condemn Japan for its closed 
markets (e.g. that Japans manufacturers import share is stagnant and or low compared to other 
and they also wish to return the US to the Japan basking of the pre war period that had given way 
to sense and sensitivity in the post war years - see Schott JJ infra 
89Schott JJ: More Free Trade Areas, supra, at pp,34-39 
90 Ibid. 
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this eventuality is that income effects in liberalization may more than offset trade 
diversion, thus helping outsiders to raise their welfare. 91 
Another effect is investment diversion. Its importance has grown with the liberalization 
of capital markets. Rapid economic growth in a union may illcrease the share of 
international investments directed to union members at the expense of outsiders. 
Furthermore, improved competitiveness of the industries in a union could lead to 
increased production and lower prices, thus putting at a competitive disadvantage 
products outside the union that do not experience comparable productivity gains and 
resulting in a reduction of external trade within the union.92 The EU, upon integration 
pursued an aggressive Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) that later came to haunt it in 
the form of surplus production. The incidence of surplus production has given way to 
lower prices forcing the EU to opt for an expensive subsidy regime to protect Its 
farmers. This regime is a heavy drain on the EUs taxpayer.9J 
Again, whenever a partner country contracts a bilateral new free trade area, this would 
undercut the value of concessions obtained by partner countries in previous free trade 
area because the preferences in the partner market will have to be shared, and thus 
diluted, by the new free trade area partner. For instance, Canadians were concerned when 
the USA proposed to contract a free trade area with Mexico. To safeguard its interests, 
Canada opted to join NAFfA. Canada does have the right under the US-Canada free 
trade agreement- to consult with the US if such a pact adversely affected Canadian trade 
interests, but Canada's recourse is unclear except to initiate a bilateral dispute procedure. 
Alternatively, or concurrently, Canada could negotiate new pacts with third countries that 
trade in both markets, as is now being considered between Canada and Australia-New 
Zealand.94 The same should be said of the EU-SA partnership, which has adversely 
affected the economies of other Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU).95 The EU-SA 
free trade partnership has effectively imposed a de/acto membership unto other SACU 
states.96 
91 Lawrence Roberts, Regionalism Multilateralism and Deeper lntegraticn, (Washington: Brookings Instirution, 
1996) at p.26 
92Mattli, The Logic of Integration supra, at pp.46-50 
9} See chapter three for a detailed discussion on the CAP policy instrument 
94 Holmes et al 1988. 
9S SACU's Common Market is discussed at chapter six 
96 See chapter five for the discussion of this complicated trade relations 
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Regional trade pacts could also generate trade frictions when perceived that the new 
partner got a better deal than the other did in the regional arrangement. Such problem 
has already occurred with Israel, which deems the provisions on trade in services and on 
dispute settlement in the Canada - US free trade agreement to be much more desirable 
than the benefits accorded in its free trade area with the United States. The Aa states 
97 are wary about the commutative effects of the EU-SA free trade partnership and for a 
good measure.98 
Scholt suggests that one solution to this problem would be to negotiate an open-ended 
regional arrangement, that is, an arrangement whose rights and obligations could be 
extended to any country willing to pay a common entry price.99 He adds that the US 
congress has not favoured such an approach because of the uncertainty about which 
countries would join and thus what the anticipated adjustment pressures and trade effects 
would be. In fact, under US law only self-contained free trade agreements may qualify 
for "fast-track" implementing provisions. It is instructive that when South Africa applied 
for membership to the Lome Convention, this application was turned down. South 
Africa was instead allowed an amorphous status of a qualified membership. Opposition 
came especially from developing countries, which feared that South Africa, given its 
advanced level of economic structures would wipe out their benefits under the Lome 
Convention. 100 
Finally, to the extent that integration requires a dominant state to assume the role of 
paymasterJ01 dispensing funds to ease distributional frictions within the union 102, fewer 
funds may flow to needy outsider states. In other words, integration could have the 
effect of aid diversion. As the value of integration outgrows its price, rational outsiders 
will seek to become insiders. In the early eighties the EU was composed of only nine 
states. Owing to its meteoric growth, it has spread its empire to the rest of Europe. 
There is a long list of applicants seeking membership with the EU predominantly from 
the former Soviet domain of Eastern Europe. 
97 The new agreement signed between the EU and the ACP countries is the Cotonou - see Chapter Seven 
98 See chapter seven for the detailed treatment of this issue 
99 Schon J]: More Free Trade Areas supra, at p.25 
leJ See the full discussion at Chapter Seven on the South African membership 
101 See also chapter three on the role played by Germany in the EU integration 
102 A detailed account of this feature is given at chapter three on the EUs integration experience 
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One of the maJ1l arguments advanced in chapter eight to explain the overlapping 
membership of the east and southern Africa states in eOMESA and SADe is the 
scramble for the donor pegs these regimes attract. The lure of free project money drives 
states in the east and southern Africa region to stamp their presence in both 
organizations with a hope tap on the benefits of project aid that accrue to either of these 
regunes. 
It is trite that regional integration process is like a bush-fire. It sets a chain reaction that is 
often times difficult to predict wither way the shape will assume. It would, therefore, be a 
gross case of over-simplification to attempt to confine integration effects to a specific 
regional bloc. The truth of the matter is that the impact resulting from the creation of 
one regional bloc reverberates across the trade regimes' borders. 
2.5 Regionalism and developing countries 
It has been said that in view of the importance of the multilateral system for developing 
countries, it is not clear why they are scrambling for preferential and reciprocal trading 
arrangements among themselves and with the predatory inclined developed countries. It 
would appear that developing countries see important elements of economic and political 
co-operation in regional trade arrangements. Regional trade arrangements, for example 
cover broad areas like foreign direct investment hitherto not provided for under the 
wro framework. Secondly, for developing countries that have already liberalized trade 
substantially on a unilateral basis, regional trade arrangements might serve to 'lock-in' 
liberalization and protect them from domestic protectionist pressures at home. 103 Mexico 
and the NAFTA are the case in point here. 104 
Thirdly, developing countnes might enter these arrangements defensively to hedge 
against the risk of rising protectionism in industrial countries. That is why, in this 
context, the reciprocity of trade preferences is most puzzling. Industrial countries with 
which developing countries might wish to enter into preferential trade arrangements in 
most cases account for a major share of the latter's trade. This implies that a free trade 
area - that is comprehensive 105 would be tantamount, from the developing country point 
103 Or as Schott figuratively put it, "free trade areas are seen as a way to goad other countries to the 
negotiating table in Geneva and to 'keep their feet to the fire' dwing the GAIT negotiations". See 
Schott]]: More Free Trade Areas, supra, at p.l2 
104 Of course, this objective can also be achieved by "binding" such liberalization in the GAIT 
lOS as required by Arti.de XXIV of GAIT 
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of view, too broadly based unilateral liberalization. In these circumstances, there would 
seem no reason for a developing country to circumscribe its reciprocal concessions by 
making them available only to the industrial partner in the free trade area rather than 
extending them on a most-favoured nation basis. 106 
There are political undercurrents that explain regionalism as well. Governments are, 
therefore, pursuing regionalism for different reasons, which of course, differ in substance 
depending on the position of their economic structures as measured to the global 
economy. In South Africa, for instance, regional integration is seen as a strategy to 
redress the gross imbalances within the region, but also between the region and the rest 
of the world. Some commentators hold the view that southern African governments in 
general are hoping to create an interim 'breathing space' within which to develop and 
diversify their economies. 107 
Regional integration dynamics in the Asian markets are driven by a desire to counter the 
dominance of Japan in this region. South East Asian governments have formed a 
pragmatic grouping, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in response 
to actual or potential domination of the region by industrialized countries such as Japan 
and Japanese multilateral enterprises. In North America, the Mexican government has 
actively pursued membership of the NAFTA to benefit from potential dynamic effects 
such as 'lock-in' its economic policy reforms and thus anracting more investment into 
Mexico. 
Keet is of the view that globalization is not a superhuman process created by abstract 
and unchangeable market forces, or by intangible and uncontrollable technological 
forces. lOS Regionalism is therefore practiced differently throughout the developing world 
and arises from 'policy-makers' assessment of the needs and interests of individual 
countries. It also stems from groups of countries such as those in southern Africa, which 
have mostly drawn on the short end of economic globalization. 
106 Dickson Yeboah Regional Integration and the GA TI supra at p 43, this discussion is captured in detail 
at chapter four below 
107 Dot Keet, Globalization and Regionalism: Contradictory Tendencies, Counteractive Tactics, or Strategic 
Possibilities? FGD Occasional Paper No. 18, Braamfontein 2017, South Africa, April 1999, at p.2 
108 Ibid. 
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A more cunous view that Keet espouses goes that the emergmg global system is a 
societal construct, driven and shaped by national, international and transnational 
processes. These processes, she argues, are economic, technocratic and political. As 
such, the new global order, as manifested in regionalism, is characterized in the economic 
sphere, by unrelenting competition between enterprises, utilizing diverse economic and 
political strategies and not only 'market place' struggles for pre-eminence. Keet contends 
that in the political sphere, intensive pressures, and lobbying and financial aid to 
governments by powerful corporations characterizes it. To our mind, Keet's observation 
is solid reality in the momentum of regionalism. 
True, the global system is also characterized by the determined defense of business 
interests usually in the name of national economic interests by governmental 
representatives. This is increasingly being carried out, although not solely, through the 
actIve championing of their national, sectoral, or corporate advantage III 
intergovernmental negotiations and multilateral institutions. This is why, Keet concludes 
that such institutions are sites of complex tactical maneuvers, alliances and continuous 
political battles, both overt and covert. I09 
The seminal views expressed by Keet find confirmation in the fact that the dynamics 
driving the new wave of integration among developing countries. This new wave that 
began in the 80s, is taking place in the context of the widespread adoption of trade 
liberalization initiatives as these countries move to outward-looking and competitive 
oriented trade policies. That context, together with a better understanding of the sources 
of benefit and of the operational issues of integration, suggests that the schemes of the 
new wave have the potential to perform far better than the earlier ones. 
The question whether developing countries achieve their economic potential through 
regionalism is a hard school altogether. It is, however, safe to state that success of 
regionalism in the developing world would depend, to a considerable extent on the on 
the ability of the new initiatives to implement policy-deepening measures in regional 
integration. Such measures would ultimately contribute to cost reduction and investment 
creation in these markets. This is the area where the thrust of this work truly resides. The 
109 Keet Globalization and Regionalism, supra at pp.6-7 
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subsequent chapters will explore the implication of the confluence of integration regimes 
in east and southern Africa in the context of the quest to deepen trade integration. 
The process of deepening integration in the main seeks to achieve enhanced economic 
welfare for the participating countries. The begging question is, however, whether indeed 
such initiatives operate within the parameters set by the WTO framework. In a nutshell, 
how will regional regimes in east and southern Africa strike a balance between deepening 
integration and ensuring fidelity to the WTO disciplines? The welfare creating effects of 
regional integration has been questioned on a large scale. Some argue that economic 
welfare benefits spurned by regional integration - particularly for developing countries 
are dismal hence not worth the effort. llo The following section reviews these searching 
Issues. 
2.6 Regionalism and the quest for economic welfare 
One of the most powerful arguments advanced against regionalism is that it creates 
isolationist clubs of closed economies. In the first place, a union may simply have no 
interest in accepting new members. If an outsider is not a desirable candidate in the 
sense of being able to make a net positive contribution to the Unionll l, the union is 
unlikely to accept it, unless, of course, exclusion of such a candidate is costlier to the 
Union than accepting it. 112 
Secondly, the price of membership of the EU, for example, requires that an applicant be 
willing and able to accept the so-called acquis ccmmunan1aire. l13 Membership of the 
LAFTA is similarly costly. A Latin American applicant must accept what John 
Williamson dubs the "Washington consensus", which includes reducing fiscal deficits, 
shifting expenditure priorities, tax reforms, interest - rate reform, exchange rate 
110 See the discussion on the quest for economic welfare below 
111 Such as through net payments into the common budgets, or by offering obvious commercial 
advantages) 
112 Richard Baldwin, U A Domino Theory of Regionalism ", Working Paper no. 4465 (Cambridge, mass: 
NBR,1993) 
113 Matdi, explains that this is a body of rules that comprise not only union law as enshrined in the Treaty 
of Rome, but also a very extensive body of secondary laws as defined in the European Union 
Directives and Regulations, see MattE The Logic of Integration, supra, at p. 63 
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adjustment, liberalization of rules goverrung foreign direct mvestment, privatization, 
deregulation, and protection of property rights. 114 
Or consider the nineteenth-century example where Russia required prospective members 
of the Zollverein to adapt Russian customs law, tariffs and auditing procedures. In some 
cases Russia - even demanded that a newcomer agree to restrict its participation in future 
changes of the common legislation as well as in negotiations of Commercial treaties 
between the Zollverein and neighbouring states. liS Historically, therefore, both rejection 
by a union and prohibitive membership price have led outsiders to experiment with their 
own regional schemes. Remarkably, however, the overwhelming majority of these 
schemes have failed. 116 
The negotiation of more free trade areas would also have important implications for 
non-participating "third countries". Many third countries are likely to be debt-ridden 
and/ or developing countries that would be less able to take advantage of the trade-
creating effects of the free trade areas. As the weaker members of the GAIT system, 
they would stand to lose the most from erosion in the discipline of the multilateral 
system. 
In principle, these countries would continue to receive benefits under the GATT, but the 
value of the MFN concessions as well as applicable preferences under the GSP, would 
diminish as more countries receive discriminatory preferences under the free trade area 
or the customs union. Matdi is of the view that such affected outsiders can pursue two 
integration strategies. III First, they can seek to merge with the area generating the 
external effects. Second, outsiders can response by creating their own regional group. 
Indeed, like we pointed out earlier, the establishment of the EC triggered nwnerous 
integration projects, most notably the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the 
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). Likewise, efforts to keep integration 
114 See John Williamson (ed.) Latin American Adjustment. How much has happened? (Washington: 
Institute for International Economics), p7; quoted in Stephan Haggard, Developing Nations and 
the Politics of Global Integration (Washington, D.C. Kings Institute 1995) p.79. 
liS MauL The Logic of Integration, supra at p.b3. 
116 Accordingly to MattL, this result can be explained in all cases by the absence of the two strong 
integration conditions which he has espoused. These are undisputed leadership and strong market 
pressure for integration, see MattJi, ibid 
117 Ibid. 
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through the single European Act raised fears of a "Fortress Europe", triggering, in the 
process, a veritable tidal wave of integration projects throughout the world in the late 
1980s. 
The proliferation of regional arrangements does, again, create the problem with regard to 
the sequencing of trade concessions and the elaboration of rules of origin. In other 
words, how would the rights and obligations of subsequent free trade areas affect the 
provisions of existing agreements? liS And how would one deal with the transshipment 
of goods through free trade area partners to determine which goods are eligible for the 
free trade area preferences, especially when these preferences differ among the various 
partners? The east and southern Africa states' overlapping membership in both SADe 
and eOMESA discussed in chapter eight brings shades more light on this problem. 
Given that the two blocs draw membership from one pool of states in the region, it 
becomes almost impossible to check the problem of transshipment of goods from one 
regime to the other. 
Mattli argues that the failure to insure transactions against the vagaries of foreign market 
exposure can stifle growth in many ways.1l9 For example, technological change may 
involve new production techniques that make products cheaper to produce. Holding 
constant the product valuation by marginal buyer and the delivery cost per unit distance, 
cheaper goods will cover larger markets. Mattli argues further that an inadequately 
integrated governance structure will deter firms from expanding production to the full 
potential of new production methods. 120 In other words, the new production technology 
will not be able to operate to capacity. This may even deter the adoption of new 
techniques and result in the deterioration of economic conditions as compared to 
integrated countries. 121 
liS This item forms the gem of this work,. It features prominently in the subsequent analysis of the sub-
Saharan regional arrangements. 
119 He adds that the costs of these externalities increases as new technologies raise the potential for gain 
from market exchange, thus increasing the pay-off to regional rules, regulations and policies 
Supra, at pp. 44-58 
120 See, for example, Joel Mokyr, The lew- 0/ RidJes: Ta::Jm:logical Creativity and Econanic Progress (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), at p. 245 
121 For excellent discussion of the relationship between the size of a country, new technologies, and 
economic growth, see essays by Simon Kuznets and Tiberschitovskiin E.A.G. Robinson (ed) 
Econanic consequeno?S 0/ the size 0/ relations (London Macmillan, 1960). 
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In Mardi's view the ensuing growth gap may widen for two reasons. First, firms in 
competitive industries will leave inhospitable jurisdictions and settle where the 
institutional environment is most conducive to profitable trade and investment. For 
such firms to exit is not just an option but is a question of survival. Exit of capital, 
entrepreneurship, and tax base will naturally depress economic growth. 122 
Secondly, foreign investors deciding whether to operate in the large and well-integrated 
market of a community or the functionally insufficiently integrated economy of a non-
community country are likely to opt for the former, ceteris paribus. Mattlim is of the view 
that such capital inflows strengthen the competition - enhancing effects of market 
integration and thus help economic growth. Indeed robust growth, in turn may attract 
further capital investment, thereby accelerating growth. 
Regional and multilateral negotiations are time-consuming and skill-intensive. They both 
compete for the scarce - and often the same human and administrative resources. The 
obvious concern is that the current proliferation of regional trading arrangements that 
have high priority in governments agendas may be diverting these scarce resources away 
from multilateral negotiations, precisely when concentrated negotiating energy and 
political commitment are required to complete the Uruguay Round successfully. 
Moreover, an excessive number of preferential trading arrangements would lead to 
significant fictions, political pressures and practical problems. Each new arrangement 
would inevitably undermine the value of the preferential access and lead to increased 
tenslOn. 
Chapter five would demonstrate that the EU-SA free trade partnership has taken its toll 
on the already strained human resource capacity in the latter's nascent democratic 
institutions. Whilst the more battle hardened EU negotiation machinery was up to the 
task, their South African counterpart had to contend with novel trade negotiation 
challenges that were simply mind-boggling. Equally, SADC and COMESA states are 
involved in numerous regional, bilateral and multilateral trade talks. It is in fact due to 
concerns about trade negotiation capacity that under the Cotonou instrument, provision 
m Matdi The Logic of Integration, supra, at p. 58 
123 Supra, at p. 59 
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is made for donor assistance to ACP countnes to address the perennial problem of 
capacity building. 124 
The trade diversion effects of regional arrangements may also lead non-participants to 
retaliate with preferential arrangements of their own, possibly triggering a damaging 
chain reaction. A proliferation of preferential trading arrangements would give rise to a 
host of technical problems including mismatches in the phasing of tariffs reductions 
under overlapping arrangements. There would also be inconsistency of rulings under 
different dispute settlement mechanisms and confusion and conflicts in implementing 
and enforcing different rules of origin under separate free trade areas. 125 
Theoretically, rationalization could have adverse spill over effects since it may induce 
"subsidies" who bear the brunt of trade diversion to retaliate by seeking preferential 
trade arrangements among themselves so as to offset their loss of markets and 
strengthen their bargaining power. This process of competitive rationalization may 
undermine the multilateral trade regimes similar to those that prevailed in the 1930s. In 
reality, however, the bargaining power of the affected countries outside the emergmg 
groupings is quite limited.126 
Free Trade Areas are by definition discriminatory. They affect the multilateral system in a 
number of ways. One concern is that they could lead to retaliatory actions or even to 
trade wars. Larger countries (or economies) or blocs could start off trade wars at the 
expense of small countries. Another aspect is the possible spread of preferences to third 
countries. Schultz 127 warns that these systematic effects may be the most serious 
consequence of the spread of regional arrangements. As a consequence, one would have 
to resist them on the argument that regional negotiations will lead to a weaker set of 
multilateral trade institutions and will produce exclusive and inefficient solutions 128 
124 See chapter five and seven for a detailed treatment of this item 
125 All these issues are identified and discussed in the analytical part of this work starting at Chapter Five 
126 For a good review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the growth effects of market integration, 
see Richard Baldwin and Anthony Venable, "Regional Economic Integration," in G. Grossman 
and K. Rogoff (eds.), Hcmdlxok of Intemationd Ecananics 3 (New York: Elsevier, 1995), pp.1597-
1644; See also Paolo Cecchini, The European ~ 1992 . The Benefos of a Single Markee 
(Aldershot, UK: Wildwood House, 1988); and Commission of the European Community, 7he 
Impact and Effer::tiw1ess of the Single Markee (Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publication of the 
EC,1996) 
127 Supra at p. 31 
128 This issue is captured in detail in the subsequent chapters reflecting on regional arrangements within the 
sub-Saharan Africa region. 
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2.7 A critique of regional integration theories 
Robson 129 is of the view that, ultimately, international economic integration has to be 
viewed as a state or process for enabling its participants to achieve a variety of common 
goals more effectively by joint or integrated action than they could by unilateral 
measures. In this light, he notes that as Tinbergen's pioneering contribution emphasized, 
it is concerned with the problem of policy optimization in a broad sense within the 
integrated area. Robson adds that the contribution of international economic integration 
to the more effectual anainment of policy objectives can thus be appraised only in terms 
of a cost-benefit analysis. This, he says reflects the weight anached to all relevant 
dimensions of welfare and the terms on which they can be traded off against one 
another. The role of economic integration in that context in any case must be viewed in 
its proper dimensions. 
The question of the static effects of preferential trade arrangements such as FT A's and 
CU's is quite simply, the question raised by Viner. DO Would not such discriminatory 
arrangements be trade diverting rather than trade creating? 1Jl It is important to raise this 
question because as Viner132 taught us, free trade areas and customs unions are two faced. 
They liberate trade (among members), but they also discriminate (against outsiders). The 
important issue, therefore, is which aspect of a free trade area or a customs union is 
dominant?1J) Or, to put it in an economist's language, is a particular free trade area or 
customs union trade divertingD4 or trade creating. 135 
The first premise is that a regional arrangement is more likely to create trade and thus 
raise welfare. Given a country's volume of international trade the higher is the 
proportion of trade with the country's regional partners and the lower is this proportion 
with non-member countries.D6 The second premise is that countries sharing borders, or 
129 Robson The Economics of International Integration, supra, at p.6 
130 Discussed by Robson The Economics of International Integration, supra, at pp.39-49 
13 1 Defined in Vinenian fashion , a trade-diverting free trade area can still improve member country welfare 
but will generally hann outside countries. This appears to be the intention of Article XXIV's 
injunction not to raise the average external tariff . 
. :. Krueger Robert (1990) liberalization and con3!XJUena:5; Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978. 
1)2 Viner, J (1950) The Customs Union issues, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
IJ) See a detailed discussion of this aspect by Bhagwati, J (1992): Regionalism and MultJateralism: An 
Overview, Columbia University Discussion Paper Series, No. 603; New York 
1)4 That is, taking trade away from efficient outside suppliers and giving it to inefficient member countries 
1)5 That is, generating trade from one more efficient member at the expense of another less efficient 
member? 
U6 Robson The Economics of Imernationallmegration, supra at p. 8, supra 
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closer geographically to one another, have higher proportions of trade with one another 
than countries further apart. 
It should, however, be noted that for specific regional arrangements, the actual welfare 
effects would depend, not merely on the trade and expenditure shares but also on the 
substitution at the margin between commodities. 137 Save, however, for isolated 
successful integration regimes like the EU all the foregoing premises have been proven 
wrong. This is more so in the east and southern Africa region where despite a sustained 
campatgn to promote regional trade the volume of external trade far outstrips intra-
regional trade. 
Thus, for instance, the substitution between non-member goods and domestic goods 
may be very high, so that the costs of discrimination would tend to be high as well, ceteris 
paribus. lJS In short, it is important to guess at substitution elasticity. This would be among 
goods as well as trade shares, with and between members and non-members of custom 
union and free trade area, to arrive at a better picture of the likely affects of specific 
customs union and free trade area that may be proposed.lJ9 
Compare, for instance, the trade throughout the 1960s between India and Pakistan with 
that between India and the United Kingdom or the then USSR. The trade volume for 
the former has been smaller than the latter. Borders can and do breed hostilities and 
undermine trade, just as alliances among distant countries with shared causes can 
promote trade. 140 Bhagwati 141 puts it more succinctly when he posits that the flag follows 
trade; and trade equally follows the flag, which, at least in the 19th century European 
expansion was not directly across the European national borders. The best illustration of 
this postulation is the effects on regional trade on the onset of democratic rule in South 
Africa. We indicate in chapter five that South African trade with the region more than 
dou bled after the 1994 democratic elections. 
137 See Bhagwati, (1992) on the analysis of converting preferential customs unions and free trade areas into 
(geographically) regional blocs, in J De Melo and A Panagariya: New Dimensions in Regional 
integration, supra, at pp. 34-35 
138 Bhagwati New Dimensions in Regional integration (1992) Ibid., at p 34 
139 Ibid. 
140 Gowa J and E. Mansified (1991) 'Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade', paper presented to the 
American Political Science Association Meetings, Washington, DC (mimeo) 
141Supra, at p.35 
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Bhagwati argues further that presumptions to confine custom unions and free trade 
areas to geographically proximate countries only are not defensible. 142 This is to the 
realization, he adds, that both premises have unique problems. The former is, at best, a 
likelihood proposition that should not be opted to specific situations where the welfare 
impact depends initially on other variables as well, whereas the latter does not have a 
firm empirical or conceptual basis. 
Bhagwati opmes that the most damaging CntlClsms that one can make of such a 
presumption is that it concentrates, at best, on the static impact effect question and 
ignores the more important dynamic time-path question. 14} By prescribing that we must 
rule out 'distant' country unions, as between the US and Chile and Israel, we would make 
the custom unions and free trade areas more exclusive and less open to new members. 
This would be undercutting the objective of moving speedily towards the shared 
objective in multilateral free trade for all. That would be tragic indeed. 
It has been said that regionalism is preferred because it is quick footed and that unlike 
the unwieldy negotiations at the GAIT it offers an opportunity for more manageable 
discussions. Indeed regionalists have coined the GA IT as the General Agreement to 
talk and talk. Bhagwati counters this criticism by explaining that, historically, at least, the 
first Regionalism failed whereas the GAIT oversaw the effective dismantling of fewer 
tariffs. 144 This was in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(0 ECD) countries and the enlargement of the descriptions over non-tariff barriers 
(NTB) at the Tokyo Round and beyond. 
Bhagwati sites the experience of the EU to fault the regional protagonists who claim that 
regionalism is much faster. The European Union started almost four decades ago (1957) 
and is now into 2001. 145 The 'transition' has not, therefore, been instantaneous any more 
than negotiated reductions of trade barriers at the GAIT Rounds. And this happens 
too, despite the enormous political support for a United Europe. Before, however, we 
are gone further into these intractable issues, it is a timely measure to catch a glimpse of 
the general disposition of the GAIT edict on regional instruments. This is what the 
following section is all about. 
142 Ibid. 
14) Ibid. 
144Bhagwati New Dimensions in Regional integration supra, at pp.40-41 
48 
2.8 Concluding Remarks 
The object of this chapter was to gain a broad insight into the advent, characteristics and 
general debates concerning regional economic integration processes. Giving clarity to 
and thereby understanding the fundamentals underpinning integration regimes would, no 
doubt, lay a good foundation upon which the forthcoming analytical work on these 
regimes could be built and fortified. This discussion has highlighted a number of features 
that are attributable to regional integration patterns. These features will replicate 
themselves in the forthcoming discussions on specific regional integration regimes in the 
global commerce and ultimately those straddling the eastern and southern Africa region. 
We have in the main established that regional integration consists of regimes that involve 
the voluntary linking in the economic and political domains of two or more states to the 
extent that authority over key areas of national policy is vested in the competence of a 
supranational body. We have traced the roots of regional integration to the early 
ninetieth century. We have identified two broad categories of regional regimes - that is 
free trade areas and customs unions. 
We have also established that the spirit of regionalism lies in the promotion of trade 
through liberalization and rapid dismantling of trade barriers. It has, however, been 
shown that there are other factors that have fueled the unending stampede to go the 
regional integration way. The discussion has, in particular, demonstrated that the main 
reasons for regionalism fever are twofold. The snail motion characterizing the 
multilateral process and the conversion of the US from an ardent multilateralist to an 
active participant in regionalisation are the main reasons behind the renewed integration 
processes. 
The discussion has noted that in fact the regional integration processes, where well 
structured, would facilitate progress in the multilateral talks. In the same breadth, the 
discussion has demonstrated that the impact resulting from the creation of one regional 
bloc reverberates across the trade regimes' borders and multiplies its effects into the 
global realm. 
145Bhagwati New Dimensions in Regional integration supra at p. 41 
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This discussion has shown that regionalism, in spite of its many advantages is not a 
smooth running affair and that it has its own muted challenges to contend with. We have 
also noted that in spite of the clear conflict between the premier MFN rule with regional 
arrangements, the GAIT allows the latter under specific conditionalities. We have, 
however, argued for more flexibility in the wro framework to create space for more 
innovative arrangements between the north-south and south-south economic divide. By 
so doing, we have argued, the struggling developing economies would be fully integrated 
in the world trading system hence fulfill the wro agenda. 
We have also argued that one area that must be revisited is Article XXIV - the enabling 
provision for regional agreements. This discussion has shown that the vagueness of this 
provision is the root cause of chaos in the character assumed by the different integration 
regime vis-a.-vis the wro disciplines. This discussion has examined the difficult issue of 
economic welfare benefits that regional integration process brings forth. We have 
established that such welfare benefits are not easy to quantify and that only time would 
tell whether the new wave of regionalism has hit the free trade jackpot or is off the mark 
once agam. 
We had the occasion to examine the validity of the charge that creates isolationist clubs 
of closed economies. In this regard we noted that, in fact, regionalism has a great 
potential to spread preferences to third countries. This discussion has, nonetheless, 
demonstrated that whether the emergence of regional trading blocs leads to more or less 
effective global negotiations is an open question. Existing empirical evidence is limited 
with respect to coverage and thus inconclusive. With regard to the other key aspects of 
the regionalism - multilateralism debate, that is, the 'value' of regional blocs, it looks like 
they are a reasonable answer to the prevailing difficulties in the multilateralism trade 
talks. 
Chapter Three: A Continental Review of Regional Integration Experience 
3.1 Introduction 
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There are many regional arrangements notified to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Some are alive and running whilst others have long lost the steam of functionality and yet 
others have for all intents and purposes fallen into disuse and been abandoned. Regional 
arrmgements within the east and southern Africa region are at the core of this work. 
These regimes are examined, in depth, in separate chapters and, therefore, they are not 
included in this chapter. This chapter identifies and examines some of the prominent 
integration initiatives in the world for purposes of highlighting their main organisational 
features and characteristics. 
This chapter, therefore, basically chronicles regional integration arrangements in a brief 
empirical survey. The chapter singles out some of the high profile regional integration 
arrangements that have been notified to and registered with the WTO. In particular, the 
EU has been lauded as a model of a successful integration initiative. Again the EU as an 
economic bloc plays a central role in the integration process that is taking root in the east 
and southern Africa region. It is noteworthy, too, that the EU is the main trading partner 
with the countries in the region. In this regard, and by that marked distinction, the E U 's 
trade policy directly affects the interests of countries in the east and southern Africa 
region. For the stated reasons, the EU's integration experience is given deliberate 
prominence in this chapter. 
The rest of the regional blocs are of minimal significance to our survey and hence a brief 
mention of them by way of identification and introduction would suffice. Notably 
NAFTA, ASEAN and the APEC are treated to an introductory brief due to their mixed 
experience and strategic importance in the world trading system. Our main objective in 
looking at the other regional blocs is to highlight some of the features that define the 
north-south and south-south trade partnerships. The wealth of experience accumulated 
in these partnerships would go along way in placing our forthcoming analysis in a global 
context. This chapter is, therefore, significant in so far as it gives a glimpse into both 
failed and successful regional integration efforts across the globe. The experience of 
regional integration schemes elsewhere would, no doubt, argument the analytical work 
on the fledging integration efforts within the eastern and southern Africa region. 146 
146 This chapter will not cover all the regional integration effons that have come into being in the world 
trading system. There are multitudes of them to be conveniently treated in the limited scope of 
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3.2.1 Integration in Europe: The European Union 
The creation of the European Community is not easily captured by any simple theoretical 
argument. It appears as a phenomenon sui g:neris. The beginning of European integration 
is taken as given. It is commonly thought that the community's main function is to 
preserve peace and security in Europe. After the Second World War, there was deep-
seated opposition to restoring sovereignty to West Germany- a country blamed for 
aggression in 1870, 1914 and 1939. 
Policy makers in the west, however, faced a quandary in the 1950s as the cold war 
intensified. The Soviet Union had just acquired the atomic bomb, Euro-Communism 
was on the rise, and in 1950 the Korean War broke out. A strong Germany was essential 
for the security of the West. But would a revitalised Germany not pose a renewed 
political and military threat to ItS neighbours? To pre-empt this possibility, a new 
European institution needed to be created which could cement the economies of its 
member countries into an inter-dependent maze out of which independent aggressive 
action by a single country would be impossible. 
The Schuman Plan of 1950 constituted the first step in this direction. It proposed to 
place the entire French and German coal and Steele industry under a common High 
Authority and to abolish all tariffs restricting free exchange of coal and Steel products. 
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) for fifty years in 1951. The 
preamble to the treaty stresses the concern for peace as a driving force of European 
integration. It reads: 
"The six governments considering that world peace may be safeguarded only by 
creative efforts equal to the dangers which menace it; convinced that the 
contribution which an organised and vital Europe can bring to civilisation is 
indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations; desirous of assisting through 
the expansion of their basic production in raising the standard of living and in 
furthering the works of peace; resolved to substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of 
their essential interest (and) to establish , by creating an economic community 
dus work. Some are high proftle while others dimly obscure. A compressed table will be crafted 
at the end of this work to summarise these instruments as notified to the World Trade 
Organisation. 
among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts... have decided to create a 
European Coal and Steel Community". 147 
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Past plans designed to bring peace to Europe, however, have been many.148 None came to 
fruition. The peace motive was insufficient to assure success for these plans. It may explain the 
establishment of the ECSC and has certainly helped European integration in the way suggested 
by Robert Jervis when he wrote that; 
"Expectations of peaceful relations were a necessary condition for the formation of 
the European Common Market. .. Had the Europeans thought that there was a 
significant chance that they would come to blows, they would not have pennitted their 
economies to grow so interdependent" .149 
Other motives were also important in accounting for the creation of European 
integration. Consider, for example, external developments in Europe. Once the world's 
focus, Europe found itself in danger of being eclipsed to the point of insignificance after 
the Second World War in a universe controlled by two superpowers. The Suez crises 
provided a particularly sobering demonstration of how limited the freedom of action of 
European States had become.lso The 1956 Spaak Report which served as a blueprint for 
the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Communities, contain the following 
nostalgic note in its forward: 
"Europe, which once had the monopoly of manufacturing industries and obtained 
important resources from its overseas possessions, today sees its external position 
weakened, its influence declining and its capacity to progress lost in its divisions."lsl 
Even more revealing is the following statement by Walter Hallstein, first president of the 
European Commission: 
"It may be said, in all frankness that an essential factor in the establishment of the 
European Community has been egoism, European insistence on self-assertion ... The 
Old World has awakened; it is shaking off its feeling of second-rate and is ready to 
147 Treaties Establishing the European Communities {Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1987} 
148 These include the Abbe de St. Pierre's Project of Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace, 
Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi's Paneuropa, and Aristide Briand's projects in the 1920s and 
the 1930s for lasting European peace. 
149 Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will it resemble the Past". International security IS, no.3 
{Winter 1990/1991}, at p.51 
150 It was felt that if Europe were to become something more than a footnote to history, the individual 
nations would have to combine their power and speak with a united voice. Laurence Krause 
{ed.}, the GmrrmMarket: fuygress and Contrmersy {Englewood cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1964}, p.4 
151 Cornite Intergouvernermental vee par la Conference de Messine, Rapport des Chefs de delegation aux 
Ministres des Affairs Etrangeres {Brusels, Secretariat, April 21, 1956}, p.9 
play the game of world econorrucs according to the rules of Its traditional 
liberalism." 152 
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To restore its influence, Europe had to unit and creates a "third force" between the two 
superpowers. IS) This reasoning applied not only to the political realm but particularly to 
trade relations. A united Europe was bound to be in a stronger bargaining position in 
trade negotiations. Pierre Uri, a long time collaborator of Jean MOIlllet and presumed 
authorlS4 of the economic section of both the Schuman plan and the Spaak Report 
acknowledged as much. He proclaimed that; 
"We could not conceal the fact that one reason for setting up the Common Market 
was to enhance the bargaining power in tariff negotiations of all member countries 
taken together. It was all to the good that bargaining power of "the six" would match 
the power of the United States in tariff negotiations and would make more likely the 
lowering of the US tariff which would be trade creating. We should think, not in static 
terms, or of effects on paper, but of reality".155 
3.2.2 The US factor in the EU integration 
The US role as a security guarantor was a crucial factor in the beginning of European 
integration. The US presence in Europe contained Germany, giving France sufficient 
confidence in their security building bilateral relationship with Germany, and allowed 
West European governments to avoid questions of West European foreign policy and 
defence letting them be absorbed into the Atlantic Alliance Under American 
leadership.ls6 
Why, then, did the US support plans for European integration? There are three main 
reasons. First, it was thought that only a strong ally is a good ally. Economic integration 
would strengthen the United States' European partners and thereby improve the overall 
military position of the West vis-a.-vis the Soviet bloc. Second, Americans assumed that 
152 Foreword by Walter Hallstein in Elizabeth Marting {ed.}, 1h European Canmunity Market: New Frontier 
for American Business {New York: American Management Association, 1958}, p.12-13 
151 This thinking was particularly prevalent in the writings of Jean Monnet, the pro-American "founding 
father of the European Community. See Sophie Meunier, "The Paradox of Unity: European 
Integration and US-EC Trade negotiations, 1958-1993," dissertation in progress {MIT, 
Department of Political Science} 
IS4 See Richard Mayne, The Community of Europe {London: Victor Gollancz, 1962}, p.90 and pp.117 
ISS Pierre Uri made this statement during a conference of economist held in Lisbon in 1958. The 
proceedings of the conference are collected in E.A.G. Robinson {ed.}, Ecancmic Consequem:es 0/ [Ix? 
Sizeo/Nations {London: Macmillan, 1960}, pp 430. For an excellent account of the effectiveness 
of the united European bargaining front during the Kennedy Round negotiations, see Thomas 
Zeiller, American Trade and Power in the 1960s {New York: Columbia University Press, 1992}. 
156 William Wallace, Regional Integration: The West European Experience {Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 1994}, at p.9 
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integration would produce economic growth in Europe and thus increase the demand for 
American products and investments. 
Third, the United States hoped that a prosperous and United Europe would accept a 
larger share of common defence spending, increase aid to developing countries, and take 
a more active role in solving international currency and commodity problems. It was 
expected that member States would merge their economies and develop their capacity 
for acting as a unit. They will for the ftrst time be able to play the role of an equal 
partner, sharing equitably in the responsibilities and burdens which have hitherto rested 
mainly upon the United States. 157 What emerged from this unique conference of security, 
political, and economic motives was an ambitious blueprint for merging individual 
European economies into an "ever" closer wllon.,,158 
3.3.1 The Treaty of Rome 
The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Communities came into force on January 
1, 1958. It committed the six founding members namely: Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgiwn and Luxembourg to a far-reaching exercise in economic 
integration which envisaged free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour, aided 
by common policies in agriculture, transport, regional development and external 
commerce, economic cohesion and other domains. By the end of the transition period in 
1969, the basic ingredients of the customs union, elimination of internal tariffs and 
quotas and erection of a common external tariff - were established. 159 
William Wallace 160, a perceptive student of European integration has made a helpful 
distinction between formal and informal integration. 161 Formal integration, he says, refers 
to the institutional framework established by the various treaties of European 
Integration. It is by deftnition a discontinuous process, preceding treaty by treaty. 
157 Robert Bowie and Theodore Geige, The European Community and the United States, Report of the 
sub-comminee on Foreign Economic Policy of the joint Economic Comrninee, Congress of the 
United States { Washington, D.C: US Government Printing Office, 1961}, p. 12 
158 Objectives as stated in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome of 1957. See European Communities, 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities {Brussels: Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, 1978}, p.2113 
159 The member States agreed to deepen integration on two further occasions: in the mid-1980s by signing 
the Single European Act, and in the early 1990s by agreeing to the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union 
160 Wallace: Regional lnugralion p.22. see also Jacques Pelkmans, Alan Winters, and Helen Wallace, Europe's 
Domestic Market (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 22 
161 Wallace, Regional Integration {supra} 
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Informal integration, on the other hand, refers to the patterns of interactions and 
exchanges triggered by the formal framework and amplified by technological advance 
and market dyna.rnics. 
Wallace argues that informal integration, in turn, "creates pressure for further deepening 
of the formal structures of rules and institutions in order to manage their impact." 162 This 
idea is akin to the "logic of demand" elaborated in the previous chapter. The 
phenomenon of 'logic of demand' would become clearer when we examine the 
ingredients that oil the demand for deepening integration, which is what the next section, 
is all about. 
3.3.2 The customs union and the common external tariff 
The customs union and the common external tariff did not come lIlto eXIstence 
immediately after signing the Treaty of Rome. Some tariffs were cut on January 1959 but 
a long transitional period was necessary to negotiate and implement the full programme. 
Differences in national interest- especially between France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany- ensured that this was a troublesome process, but it was successfully completed 
in 1968, eighteen months ahead of schedule. 163 
In retrospect, it seems that the dismantling of tariff barriers was assisted by favourable 
external circumstances. 164 There was a global economic boom in the 1960s. This meant 
that if some of the industries of member states proved to be uncompetitive in the single 
market for products, there were favourable opportunities for national resources to be 
switched into other growth sectors. In other words, the unemployment implications of 
restructuring rarely had to be faced in the 1960s. 
Secondly, despite some divergence, the six founder member states had broadly similar 
competitive positions and trading interests in 1958. The exception was Southern Italy, 
but it was expected that this region would benefit from special assistance programmes. 
162 Ibid. , p. 5 
163 Allan Williams, The European Community: The Contradictions of Integration; Blackwell Oxford UK 
& Cambridge USA at p. 32 
164 The efficiency view of integration also holds that the extension of the Union's rules and enforcement 
mechanisms through EU membership will mitigate the risks of investing in the periphery. And as 
these institutional safeguards lower the risks, the flow of transactional capital into the periphery 
should increase. What is the evidence? Is EU membership positively related to growth in capital 
inflows holding other factors constant? 
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This commonality of interest greatly assisted the process of political compromise. 165 
Finally, the broad consensus of economic interests was under laid by a strong 
international convergence of tastes and culture during the consumer boom of the 1950s. 
Of course, the creation of the customs union did not remove all barriers to trade 
between the Six. Most importantly, it only applied to industrial goods. 166 
Article 59 of the Treaty of Rome had also specified that there should be progressive 
abolition of restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the Community, 
especially with respect to finance, insurance and banking. Yet 'for more than twenty-five 
years after the EEC Treaty was signed, progress in the financial integration was 
discontinuous, uneven and on the whole modest'167 Furthermore, the liberalisation of 
trade was restricted even with respect to industrial goods, for there were still non-tariff 
barrier to be overcome. 
Unlike the EO's experience, differences in competitive positions in the east and southern 
Africa region have put a tremendous strain on the integration process. The current 
external factors do not favour a smooth integration exercise either. Add to this handicaps 
the disastrous effects of dislocation such as job losses and one begins to see why 
integration regimes in the east and southern Africa region proceed haltingly in 
comparison to the EO's experience. 168 
3.3.3 The Common agriculture policy 
The European Community was conceived of as more than a customs UllIon and a 
common market for capital and labour. There was also a commitment to developing 
common policies. As these were not specified in detail in the Treaty of Rome, they were 
to be worked out in practice during the early years of the Community's existence. As the 
common policies would have to be forged in the contest of inter-governmentalism and 
entrenched national interests, it was inevitable that the process would be characterised by 
165 See Williams; The European Community supra at p.32 
166Ibid 
167 Williams; The European Community supra at p.32 
168 Failure is attributable to either because regional economies lack complimentarity or because the small 
size of regional markets does not offer significant economies of scale. Matt!i (2000) offers 
examples of such failed European counter·unions, which include the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), of 1960. Its members traded primarily with the Community rather than with 
each other. The group was neither compact nor contiguous. MattE explains that its members were 
strewn in a loose circle around the Community. Further, EFTA's cohesion was repeatedly 
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political compromise. This was clearly evident in relation to the Common Agriculture 
Policies (CAP), the most politicised as well as the most important of the common 
li · 1&9 po Cles. 
However, nothing underlines the importance of the CAP as much as the significance that 
de Gaulle attached to it. Soon after his election to French presidency in 1958, he called 
an executive meeting to decide whether France should remain a member of the EC. The 
critical argument, accepted by de Gaulle, was that the potential benefits of the CAP 
would compensate for any industrial trade losses, especially with Germany.l70 The 
detailed CAP negotiations were fraught with difficulties. 
The Treaty of Rome had set down the aims of the CAP as to increase productivity, to 
provide a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, to stabilise markets, to 
assure the availability of supplies and to supply consumers at reasonable prices. l71 These 
aims were contradictoty and had numerous ways in which they could be implemented. 
However, the three main features of the policy framework were quickly identified. These 
were free trade within the EC and common customs barrier against the rest of the world, 
guaranteed prices and structural reforms. This division, however, still left considerable 
detail to be finalised. 
Probably the major obstacle was the vel}' different national farm policies, which had 
evolved in the member States since the nineteenth cenruryY' The inter-war depression 
had led to greater protection throughout Europe, but there were still major differences in 
the agricultural interests of the member States in the 1950s. The Netherlands wished to 
expand a modern, exporting farm sector whilst Belgium wanted defensive farm subsidies. 
Germany, France and Italy, on the other hand sought to protect their marginal, 
fragmented farms. III 
weakened by successive defections of members [Q the Community, most notably when [he UK) 
the group's potenrialleader, left in 1973. 
169 It is noteworthy [hat when the Treaty of Rome was signed, agriculture was still a major industry in most 
of [he European scates. For example, it accounted for 35 percent of aJl employment in Italy, and 
25 percent in France. 
170 Williams; The European Comrrn.m.ity supra at p.4l 
1711 bid 
172 For example, France, Germany and Italy had highly protectionist policies, while the Netherlands and 
Belgium had liberalised trade, which had resulted in increased specialisation and competitiveness. 
See Williams; The European Comrmmity supra at p.41 
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The diverse interests within each of these countries further complicated the negotiations. 
The French government, for example, had to balance the requirement of large-scale 
farming in the Paris basin against those of still predominantly peasant agriculture in the 
South and West. Negotiations became quickly embittered, especially between the two 
leading members of the Community. By 1961, de Gaulle was threatening that France 
would not agree to the proposed cuts in industrial tariffs until the framework for the 
CAP had been established. Not for the last time, the CAP seemed to threaten the very 
existence of the EC l " 
By January 1962, the EC had to engage in 'clock-stopping' to maintain the deception that 
it was still adhering to the agreed timetables for the CAP negotiations. However, the 
general principles of a price system were eventually agreed in January 1962. 175 The 
guarantee system established target prices for farm products, and if these were not 
achieved in the market, then the EC would buy up the surpluses at interventional prices. 
There were also thresholds to bring the prices of imports up to the guarantee levels, and 
export restitution to subsidise exports. 
By 1965, the Community was again in political crisis as France refused to accept the 
principle of majority voting by the member states, especially in relation to the thorny 
question of the CAP. This let to the 'empty chair policy', as France refused to sit at the 
negotiating table until qualified majority voting was accepted in the 1966 Luxembourg 
compromise. Thereafter, rapid progress was made in finalising the CAP. The cereal price 
regime came into existence in 1967 but with prices set much higher than both the EC 
average and current world levels. l76 
Common agricultural markets were then established in rapid succession for milk, sugar 
beet, fruit and vegetables. However, the political compromise, which had established 
such high prices for cereals, had set an important precedent. High prices would also have 
to be set for all other farm products, if only to maintain price differentials. The last major 
171 Williams; The European Commwllty supra aI p.42 
174Ibid 
175 The] anuary 1962 agreement covered about 40 percent of the product of the EC including dial}' and 
pigment products. However, in order to secure Germany acceptance of the CAP, prices had been 
set close to those prevailing in its national system, and these were much higher than world market 
prices. The CAP saga was still nor yet over, for individual prices and intervention mechanisms 
had to be agreed for each separate fann product. 
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price agreement-covering wine-was reached in 1970 so that in total, it took almost a 
decade to flesh out the CAP. The CAP policy, therefore, came into existence as a high 
cost policy, and this has been a constant feature subsequently.177 
3.4.1 The impetus for deeper integration 
Mattlil78 contends that a first illustration of the demand logic is provided by the critical 
role played by private firms in bringing about legal integration in Europe, that is, in 
constitutionalizing the Treaty of Rome. This was the process by which the Treaty of 
Rome evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding upon sovereign state, into a 
vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially enforceable rights and obligations 
on all legal persons and entities, public and private, within the European Union. These 
actors were assisted by what Mattli refers to as key "commitment institutions" on the 
supply side, notably the European Court of Justice (ECD.179 
A quick perusal of the Treaty of Rome articles suggests that the founders intended the 
court and its staff to interact primarily with other community organs and the member 
States. Articles 226 (169) and 227 (170) provide for claims for non-compliance with 
community obligations to be brought against member States by either the commission or 
other member States. 
Article 230 (173) gives the court additional jurisdiction over a variety of actions brought 
against either the commission or the council by a member state, by the commission, by 
the Council, or by specific individuals who have been subject to a Councilor 
Commission decision directly addressed to them. Almost as an afterthought, Art 234 
(177) authorise the court to issue "preliminary rulings" on any question involving the 
interpretation of Community law arising in the national courts. Lower national courts can 
refer such questions to the ECJ at their discretion. 
176 This reflected, above all, the interests of Gennany farmers, although they still had to accept 15 percent 
price cuts -see Williams; The European Community supra at p.43 
177 Indeed, the CAP has been a major source of headache for the EU in the multilateral trade talks. This 
policy is a veritable a bunching bag conveniently available for countries with frivolous grievances 
to shoot a broadside against the EO. See Williams; The European Community supra at p.43 
178 See Walter Matdi: The Logic of Regionallntegration Europe and Beyond; Cambridge University Press 
2000 at p.73 
179 Ibid 
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In practice, Article 234 (177) procedure served as a charmel of corporate pressure and 
demands for deeper integration. It established the framework for the constitutionalizing 
of the Treaty by providing links between the court and sub-national actors - private 
litigants, their lawyers, and lower national courts. Referrals to the ECJ under Article 234 
(177) rely on the initiative of private actors who deem governmental regulation 
incompatible either with existing Community rule or with the spirit of the Treaty or 
Rome. Without individual litigants, there would be no cases presented to national courts 
and thus no basis for legal integration. The various identities, motivations, and strategies 
of litigants have inevitably influenced the nature and pace of integration. 
An early example of this influence is provided by the famous Van Gend & Loos case 0/ 
1963. Through an Article 234 (177) reference, a private Dutch importer raised the 
question whether he was entitled to invoke directly the Common Market provision of the 
Treaty of Rome against the Dutch authorities from Germany. Over the explicit 
objections of the Member State, the court proclaimed that: 
"the Community constitute a new order.. . for the benefit of which the states have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which 
comprise not only member States but also their nationals ... Community law, therefore, 
not only imposes obligations on individuals but it also intended to confer upon them 
rights which became part of their heritage". 180 
The effect of this case was that firms and private individuals who stood to gain from the 
European integration could now push their governments through the Article 234 (177) 
procedure, to live up to paper commitments by pointing to treaty provisions that 
supported an activity they wished to undertake. A national court would then certify the 
question of how community law should be applied to the European court of Justice, and 
if the court's interpretation of a Treaty obligation implied a conflict between national law 
and Community law, national courts would have to set aside the offending domestic rule. 
Another example of the importance of business in pushing legal interpretation is given 
by the role played by big French firms in forcing the Conseil d'Etat, the politically 
influential supreme administrative court in France, to accept the judge made doctrines of 
180 Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport & Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos V. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen, ECR, 1963 p. 12 
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direct effect and supremacy of Community law. 181 Until the beginning of the 1980s, the 
French Counceil d'Etat felt little pressure to endorse direct effect and supremacy. 
Two of its major partners, Germany and Italy, had supreme courts that refused to 
comply fully with the ECl's jurisprudence. In 1984, however, the Italian Constitutional 
Court authorised lower national judges to declare national law incompatible with treaty 
obligations without having to refer the case to the Constitutional Courts. 182The German 
Federal Constitutional Court announced in 1986, in tlx! Solang: II case, that it would no 
longer control the Constitutionality of Community legal acts. 
The legal context in which corporate interests in France now found themselves put them 
increasingly at a competitive disadvantage relative to firms operating in member States 
where supremacy and direct effect doctrines were fully accepted. According to Jens 
Plotnerl8} , 
"solid economic reasons [existed rendering]. .. full integration of Community law into 
French law paramount. How could the project of 1992 become effective of the almost 
three hundred directives intended to transform it into legal reality were not to be 
directly enforced by the Couceil d'Etat?" 
Plotner184 adds that the impossibility of referring to certain community regulations was 
bound to represent a serious economic disadvantage (to French firms) in comparison to 
their European competitors. In the long run, this could have led to a movement of 
forum shopping, combined with some delocalization of head offices. 
To remedy this situation, major import-oriented and export-oriented comparues 1ll 
France launched systematic attacks on government decisions that they felt were contrary 
to Community law. Their aim was to provoke a chain of verdicts by the ECJ condemning 
France for breach of Community law. These sustained manoeuvres increased the 
pressure on the French government and the Counceil d'Etat to comply with Community 
lSI Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter: "Revisiting the European Coun of Justice" lnternationd 
Organisation 52 {1998}, 177-209: "Direct effect" means that EU law can confer on individuals 
legal rights that public authorities must respect and national courts protect. The supremacy 
doctrine states that in any conflict between community and national law, the former must be 
given pnmacy 
182 Italian Constitutional Court decision 170/84, Granital, [1984] CML Rev 756 
IS} Jens Plotner, The European Court and National Courts - doctrine and jurisprudence: legal change in its 
social Context - Report on France, Working Paper, RSC No. 95/28 { Florence: European 
University Institute, 1996, pp. 29 and 24 
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rule, It is no coincidence that the decision by the Counceil d'Etat to comply with 
Community directives in France was initiated by Phillip Morris and Rothmans, firms with 
sufficient resources to engage in repeat litigation strategies,185 
Stone and Caporaso have confirmed the importance of A nic!e 234 (177) as a channel of 
corporate pressure and demands for deeper integration in recent studyl86 The study 
examines whether the pressure by private litigants for supranational rule increases as the 
number of cross-national transactions rises_ They conclude their study by noting, based 
on their evidence, that governments do not control the integration process in any 
determinative sense, Governments behave reactively rather than proactively, They act to 
ratify transfers of governing authority from the national to the supranational level that 
have already begun or to slow down the pace at which these transfers are made, In other 
words, this behaviour can be seen as a response to sub-national level demand for 
integration, 187 
3.4.2 Corporate pressure and the single European Act 
The introduction of computers, microelectronics, fibre optics, satellites, cable television, 
digital switches, lasers, electronics reproduction, and many other innovations deeply 
transformed the economy of Europe and the developed world in the 1970s and 1980s, 
The consequences of these advances has been, in a sense, to "shrink" distances and put 
pressure on governments to adjust the scale of political and economic organisation to the 
level implied by the new technologies, Major manufacturers who began in those years as 
IS' Ibid 
115 See Jens Plotner, Ibid at p, 27 reporting on the Netherlands, Claes and de Winee note similar pressures 
by Dutch business companies seeking to enforce in the early years of the CommWlity the 
competition n.t1es of the T reary of Rome before national courts. See Monica Claes and Bruno de 
Wine, The European court and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in 
its Social Context - Report on the Netherlands, working paper, RSC No. 95/26 {Florence: 
European University Institute, 1995). p.7 
I'" Alec Stone and James Caporaso, From Free Trade to Supranational Policy: The European Court and 
integration, Working Paper No. 2,45 { Berkeley: Centre for Gemlan and European Studies, 
University of California, 1996); see also Alec Stone and Thomas BnlfleU, "Contracting a 
Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in [he European Community," 
Ame>U:an Political Sciem? Rerkm The data set comprises 2,978 Arride 177 references by national 
COurtS to the European Court of Justice, Strikingly, the authors find that the relationship berween 
references and intra-EU trade is nearly linear, with litigants in countries that trade more wtth 
other EU countries generating higher levels of references 
187Second, Stone and Caporaso exacn.ine whether there is any rehnionship berween these references and 
CommWlity legislation {regulations and directives}. They find that the relationship is positive and 
significant, suggesting that references lead to legislation. More refined tests rem,un to be done. As 
(he authors note, funher impucation of their main proposition is that levels of integrarion are 
expected to vary across economk sectors, depending on the differential rates of Trans·national 
exchange, 
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produce and market on a European rather than a nation-by-nation basis were confronted 
with burdensome obstacles. 188 
Impediments to free trade gave European big business, struggling to compete with their 
American and Japanese rivals, reason to think of ways to reduce the cost of producing 
and transacting in Europe. One solution promoted by big business was the completion 
of a truly single European market. 189 To increase its clout in European economic affairs, 
a group of the largest and most influential corporations, including Philips, Siemens, 
Olivetti, GEC, Daimler, Volvo, Fiat, Bosch, ASEA formed the Round Table of 
European Industrialists. 
This remarkable flurry of initiatives notwithstanding, the political will in the EU to carry 
out plans for further integration cooled markedly in 1995. Mattli identifies two reasons, 
both of which are consistent with the logic of the externality argument for this lull in 
integration activities. 19o First, the early market concessions of the EU were successful in 
warding off the threat of mass migration. The Union's share of the former COMECDN 
countries' exports and imports rose from 20 percent in 1988 to almost 50 percent in 
1992 and has grown continuously ever since. 191 Increased trade, in turn, led to a brisk 
export-led economic growth that helped to re-establish a semblance of order and stability 
in the East. Second, in view of this success it was not clear why the EU would have had 
an incentive to deepen integration with the East. 
The price of continuing the process of enlargement no longer appeared worth the 
marginal benefit. The European COnurllssion calculated that it would cost an enormous 
sum of $ 47 billion in aid to extend regional and social policies of the EU to the 
countries of the east and central Europe. l92 This meant that Greece, Ireland, Spain, and 
Portugal risked losing generous payments from Brussels, and that taxpayers, particularly 
in Germany, would be asked to foot the additional bill for the enlargement. The cost 
188 Different narional rax regimes rhar necessirared derailed paper work and check on fuel and goods ar 
each frontier, resuhing in iengrhy border delays for rracks moving parts from pianr [Q pianr, and 
different regularion on axle weighr, rruck safety, vehicle exhausr emissions, and hours permined 
behind rhe wheel. Wallace: Regimallntegration p.22. see also Jacques Pelkmans, Alan Winters, and 
Helen Wallace, Europe's Domesric Marker (London: Roudedge, 1988), p. 22 
189 Sandholrz and Zysman, "1992: Recasring rhe European Bargain," 116-120. 
190 See Mardi, Logic of Integrarion supra ar p.99 
191 See Eurosta, Balance of Paymems, Momhly Sraristics, various issues 
192 Lionel Barber, "Brussels Keeps Shur rhe Gares [Q rhe Easr," Financial Tim6 {Nov. 16, 1995}, p.17 
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promised to increase significantly if the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) were 
extended, because subsidies would have to be paid to farmers in the Eastern Europe. 
Alternatively, the EU would have to reform the CAP, reducing farmers' reliance on price 
support before proceeding with enlargement. However, such a move was likely to be 
foiled by powerful farmer's lobbies in the west. Enlargement would also necessitate 
institutional reforms including the widening of majority voting, a change that was 
vehemently opposed by Britain. None of these steps were politically palatable. 
Unsurprisingly, senior Commission officials noted in the mid-1990s that "the [current] 
level of seriousness about enlargement is not minimal, it simply does not exist. 193 The 
enlargement scenario has taken a rapid turn with a wave of new members having been 
admitted to the Union for the period 2004/5. 194 
3.4.3 Supply for regional integration 
Mattli195 argues that there are two primary supply conditions for integration processes. 
First, "conunitment institutions" such as centralised monitoring and third-pany 
enforcement enhance the chances of sustained co-operation by acting as constrains on 
member states in circumstances where self-help measures alone are insufficient to 
prevent reneging on contractual obligations. Second, the presence of an indisputable 
leader state among the group of countries seeking closer ties as a focal point in the co-
ordination of rules, regulations, and policies. Such a hegemon does help to ease 
distributional tension by assuming the role of regional paymaster. 
According to Mattli the European Union satisfies these conditions. l96 The EU possesses 
the most far-reaching commitment institutions of any recent regional integration scheme 
and it benefits from the presence of Germany, which, in the process of deepening, has 
provided critical institutional leadership and has been willing to ease distributional 
tensions through generous side payments. Two EU institutions, in panicular, are 
193 See Matdi, Logic of Integration supra at p.99 
194 Six countries (Belgium, Gennany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) joined from the very 
beginning. Today, after four waves of accessions (1973: Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom; 1981: Greece; 1986: Spain and Portugal; 1995: Austria, Finland and Sweden) the EU 
has 15 Member States and is preparing for the accession of 13 eastern and southern European 
countries. The candidate countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuana, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Turkey. See 
http://europa.eu.intlabc-en.htm 2003-02-14 
195 The Logic of Integration supra at supra, at pp. 99 - 102 
196 Ibid 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing Community obligations. These are the 
Corrunission and as noted earlier, the efficacious European Court of Justice. 
(a) The European Canmission 
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An important task of the Corrunission is to see that inclividuals, companies, and member 
states do not act in ways, which run counter to the treaties or EU secondary law. Treaty 
and secondary law has been considerably broadened in scope over the years. It was 
originally confined ro issues dealing with trade in a narrow sense. Today it regulates a 
wide range of areas, including competition, intellectual and commercial property, public 
procurement, state aid, telecommunications, banking, financial services, company 
accounts and taxes, indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, consumer protection, 
health and safety, transport, and even political participationl97 
For example, if firms enter into an agreement that restricts competition, the Corrunission 
may seek a voluntary termination of such an agreement or issue a formal decision 
prohibiting it and inflicting fines on the parties to the agreement. It can also take member 
States to task by demancling termination of an infringement, or by taking the matter to 
the Court of Justice for final decision'" Besides the Corrunission, member states also 
have the right to bring cases to the Court. In practice, however, legal proceeclings 
initiated clirectly by member States against each other are relatively rare. 
(b) The Europemz GJurtofJustia: 
The court also plays a key monitoring and enforcement role in the integration. Most 
notably, it has improved the effectiveness of the EU enforcement mechanism through 
twO judge-made doctrines: supremacy and direct effect".l" The supremacy doctrine 
holds that EU law has supremacy over national legislation; and the direct -effect doctrine 
provides that the EU law is directly applicable to the citizens of the member States 
without prior intervention by their governments. Direct effect authorises private parties 
both firms and inclividuals to seek enforcement of treaty obligations against member 
197 See Matdi the Logic of Integration supra at p. 100 
'98 Swan, The Economics of Common Market, p. 50. See Ulrich Everling, The Member States of the 
European Community Before their Court of Justice," European LawRe<.iew 9 (1984), 215-24l. 
199 See Burley and Matdi, "Europe before the Coun; A Political Theory of Legal Integration". 
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governments ("vertical" enforcement) and agamst pnvate partIes ("horizontal" 
enforcement).200 
This direct participation of private parties in the enforcement of the Treaty of Rome, a 
treaty of intemationallaw, is without precedent. It has greatly improved the court's role 
as central monitoring agent. For the same reason, it has increased the Court's caseload. 
In response, the EU, in 1988, added a new institution, the court of First Instance, to its 
enforcement system. This new court was established to hear and give judgement on a 
number of specific types of legal action, particularly on complaints or disputes arising 
from the EU's competition policy.201 Finally, in a notable step to further the Court's 
effectiveness, the EU empowered the ECJ to impose heavy penalties upon member 
states that fail to comply with Court rulings. 
3.4.4 Gennany's exemplary leadership 
The second supply condition identified by Mattli for deepening integration refers to 
institutionalleadership.202 Here Germany has played a key role, particularly since the mid-
1970s. By then Germany had begun moving into the league of world economic powers 
of which the only other members were the United States and J apan.20J Germany had 
withered the economic crisis triggered by the oil-shocks considerably better than any 
other European economy. The picture that emerged was one with Germany firmly at the 
top rather than one of an association of more or less equal states progressing 
harmoniously and happily towards a Union.204 
Germany played a central role in the initial outline of the budget compromise at the 
Stuttgart Council summit in June 1983. It also gave leadership in re-Iaunching the EMU 
at the Hanover summit in June 1988 and in calling for an inter-governmental conference 
200 See case 36/74, BN.O. Walrave and L. J. N. Koch v. Association Union Cydiste Internationale, 
European Court Reports, {ECR}{1974}, 1405; and case 149/77, Cabrielle Defrenne v. Societe 
Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, ECR {1978}, 1365. However, the EU has 
recently, has empowered individuals, through its secondary legislation, to pursue legal action 
against member States that fail to implement community directives correctly or in a timely 
fashion. See case 152/84, Marshal v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority (TeachiniJ, O:mrnm Market Law Review 1 (1986), p.688; and case 152/84. ECJ (1986), 
737 
201 Clive Archer AND Fiona Buder, The European Community Structure and Process {New York St. 
Martin's Press 1992}, p. 37. 
202 See Mattli the Logic of Integration supra at p. 101 
20) Peter Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System {London: Butterworth, 1982}, p.8. 
204 Ibid. 
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(IGC) on polincal union paralleling the proposed EMu.zos Germany's contribution to the 
institutional architecture of the Union further includes the strengthening of common 
macroeconomic, social, and envirorunental policies, as well as the introduction of 
concepts such as s ubsidi~ and muttered governance. 
Germany's leadership has largely been gentle rather than imposing.zo7 Germany strongly 
prefers to build consensus from within the Union and, if necessary, offers concessions to 
preserve that consensus.108 To avoid the risk of political isolation in Brussels, Germany 
has been careful [0 launch nearly all its initiatives in tandem with other major EU 
20' partners. . 
It however, goes without saying that Germany depends economically on its European 
partners as much as [hey depend on Germany, and thus any measure [hat improves 
stability and security in trade and investment in Europe is likely to suit Germany.2JO 
Leadership is also expressed by Germany's willingness [ 0 ease distributional tensions and 
act as regional paymaster. German is by far the largest net contributor [0 [he EU 
budget'" It redistributes substantial resources, notably through the European Regional 
Developmen[ Fund. The primary beneficiaries of these funds are [he poor EU 
members.212 
205 Perer Karzennstein, "Uniced Gennany in an Integratlng Europe," in Peter Katzenstein {ed.}, Tamed 
Power: Germany in Europe {Ithaca: Cornell Univers''Y Press, forthcoming}. 
206 Subsidiary means that the Communi'Y should take action only if the objective of the proposed acrion 
cmnO[ be sufficiemly achieved by the member stares at the domestic level 
207 "Gentle giant'" is how Simon Bulmer charaaerises Germany in his writings. See p.lO), nOte 116. 
20S For inStance, Chancellor Helmut KoW's lener of April 1990 to the Irish pres.dency, calling for an IGC 
on political muon, was co-s igned by the chen French President Minerand . 
209 Jeffrey Anderson, "Hard Interests and Soft Power, and Gennany's Changing Role in Europe", in 
Katzenstein {ed.}, T aJ17f.fi Pauer . The EMS was presented as a Franco-Gennan project, as were 
proposals for an imergoverrunental treaty On foreign policy co-ordination. tabled at the 1985 
Milan Council SurnmiL The German initiative for reviving the integratio n project. originally put 
fonh by Foreign Minister Hans·Dietrich Genscher in 1981 , became ,he Genscher-Colombo 
initiative. once Italian support was canvassed. Bulmer, .. United German and European 
Imegrmio n: Toward EcnonUc and Political Dominmce?" 
210 For Instance. in the late 1970s. GermiVl industrialistS expressed serious concern over the continuing 
appreciation of the Deutsche Mark against other European currencies. Such a trend posed serious 
risk to GemlaJ1 exports. The EMS, however, cLd promise to rid the European economies of 
monetary disturbances that tend to give rise to prmeCtiOfuSt pressures, hurting German export 
intereSts. Ludlow, The Making of ,he European System, pp.35-47 and 73 
2 11 Measured both in absolute and per capita terms 
212 The co-existence of funds depends much on cominuing Germany prosperiry and generosiry. Germany's 
net contribution to ,he budget has increased from OM 10.5 bll.lion in 1987 to OM 22 billion in 
1992. It is estima,ed to exceed OM 30 billion by the end of ,his decade. 1n 1996, Germany's 
financial contriburion to the EU amounted to about ["9.Io-thirds of the net income of the Union, 
double the relative size of the German GDP in the EU. Katzenstein) "United Germany in an 
Integrating Europe", at p. 32. See also Michael Shackleton, "The Budge, of the European 
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Later, participation in the deepening process of integration reinforced conunitment ro 
values such as support for basic human rights, democracy, social justice, and the rule of 
law.211 Interestingly, Germany has been promoting these same values vigorously of late at 
the supranational level, pressing for greater transparency and accountability, insisting that 
human and social rights be respected, and pushing for greater empowerment of the 
European Parliament. 
No doubt, and appropriately so, integration features discussed above the very themes 
that are resonating in similar regimes in the eastern and southern Africa region. It is, also, 
no coincidence that the premier Africa economic revival blue print - Nepad - has fully 
embraced these very key values. Obviously South Africa has a lor ro learn from the 
leadership genius that Germany has displayed if it expects ro take the leadership mantle 
in the region - which in any case it is obligated to should. 
3.5.0 Integration in Latin America 
3.5.1 The first wave of integration 
Commercial Unions have been established in Latin America as collective responses ro 
external shocks that threatened to inflict severe damage on the economies of the region. 
One such external event was the creation of the European Community. The EC's 
common external tariff and protectionist agricultural policy sent shock-waves through 
out the Latin America a continent that heavily depended on free access ro the markets of 
industrialist countries for its primary commodity exports.'H 
Anorher discriminating feature was the EC's extension of preferential arrangements of 
individual colonial powers to the whole Community. As a result, the dependant 
ternrones of France, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands in Africa and Asia had 
preferential market access to all the member States of the community after 1958.'15 
O:munurucy," in Juliet Lodge {ed.} The European o,nunurucy and the Challenge of the Future 
{London: Primer, 1989}, pp. 129-147 
2ll Rudolf Hrbek and Wolgang Wessels, "Nationa-Imeressen der Bundersrepublik Deutschland und der 
Imegrationsprozes", in R. Hrbek and W. Wessels {eds.}, EG-Mitgliedschaft: Ein Vitales Interesse 
der BundesrepublikDeutschland? {Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1984}, pp. 29·69 
114 See Matdi the Logic of lntegration supra at p. 140 
215 Sidley Dell, Trade Blocs and Conunon Markets {New York: Alfred Knopf, 1963} , p.187. Thus for 
example, cocoa and coffee exported from French colonies tD Africa were adnuned dury free to 
the entire common market after [he creation of the Ee, while cocoa supplied by Honduras or 
coffee supplied by Brazil now faced a un;fonn external tariff. 
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This threat of trade diversion caught Latin America at a particularly inopportune 
moment. Latin America's trade gap with industrialised countries had been rapidly 
widening and its terms of trade deteriorating.216 The president of the Uruguay captured 
the general sense of panic well when he noted that: 
" the fonnauon of a European Common Market... constitutes a state of near war 
against Latin American exports. Therefore, we must reply to one integration with 
another one, to one increase of acquisitive power by internal enrichment by another, 
to inter-European co-operation by inter-Latin American co-operauon."217 
Successive econOffilC integration, It was hoped, would improve Latin America's 
bargaining power and thus raise the price of its exports. Some countries urged the 
formation of a Latin American economic bloc not only to face the European threat more 
effectively, but also to have greater leverage in dealing with the United States. 218 Chile's 
president called for a powerful and progressive union that would contribute to import 
su bstitution industrialisation at the regional level by forcing national economies to 
specialise within the framework of the expanded and protected regional market.219 
3.5.2 The Latin American free trade association (LAFTA) 
A ftrst Latin American respond to the European Common Market was the creation of a 
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). The Treaty of Montevideo, which was 
signed in February 1960 by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and 
216 The terms of trade of developing countries declined from 1950 to 1962 by 12%; Latin America's terms 
of trade dropped 21 percent in the same period, due in great part to adverse movements in coffee 
prices. See Sidle Dell, A Latin American Ommm Market? {London: Oxford University Press, 
1966}, p.9. Furthermore, the average annual growth rate of Latin America economies had fallen 
from approximately 5 percent between 1950 and 1955 to only 1.7 percent between 1956 and 
1959. 
217 The Observer {London: Oxford University Press, 1966}, p.9 
218. Grunwald, Wionczek, and Carnoy; for example, noted that Very few Latin American leaders were ready 
to speak openly. The feeling of many were, however, echoed by Chile's president Eduardo F rei in 
1964, when he called for' the twenty poor and disunited [Latin American] nations [to] form a 
powerful and progressive union which can deal with the United States as an equal". See Joseph 
Grunwald, Miguel Wionczek, and Martin Carnoy, Latin American Ecorumic Integration and US Policy 
{Washington, D.C: Brooking Institution, 1972}, pp.8-9 
219 Miguel Wionczek, "The Rise and Decline of Latin American Integration," Jounud oj Ommm Market 
Studies 9 {September 1970}, 49-66. The idea of import substitution industrialisation at the 
regional level was most forcefully propagated by Raul Prebisch, the executive secretary of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. Policies of import substitution at the 
national level had already been implemented after the Second World War in countries such as 
Australia, Brazil and Chile. See RAUL Prebisch, the Econanic Deudopnau oj Latin America and us 
principal problens (New York: United Nations Economic Commission For Latin America, 1950) 
Uruguay, established this bloc. Ecuador and Colombia joined LAFT A in 1961, 
Venezuela in 1966, and Bolivia in 1967.220 
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The signatory governments expressed their determination "to establish, gradually and 
progressively, a Latin American common market" and "to pool their efforts to achieve 
the progressive complimentarity and integration of their economies on the basis of an 
effective reciprocity of benefits". 221 In pursuit of these gaols, the treaty provided for the 
establishment of a free trade area. Tariff reductions were to be effected according to two 
schedules. First was the common Schedule listed products whose tariff rates were to be 
eliminated by 1973. The National Schedules, on the other hand, included products on 
which individual member States granted concessions in annual bilateral negotiation 
sessions.222 
The treaty permitted temporary trade restrictions in case of payment imbalances or if 
import competition damaged an industry of strategic importance to a member's 
economy. Special provisions were made to assist the development of the more backward 
members of the Association. The LAFT A agreement also encouraged closer co-
ordination of industrial policies. The implementation of the treaty provisions, however, 
was arduous and remained unfinished. Chile's president, Eduardo Frei, complained in 
early 1965: "The advance towards economic integration has become slow and 
cumbersome. The possibilities of making further headway ... seem to be exhausted".223 
Trade expansion failed to materialise while the average share of intra-regional trade in the 
total trade of LAFTA countries was 8.7 percent from 1952 to 1960, the average from 
1961 to 1964 was only 7.9 percent, despite a slight increase in total trade from 1960. 
Intra-regional trade ceased to grow in 1967 while extra-regional trade continued to 
boom. This is pretty much the same pattern regional regimes in the east and southern 
220 See Mattli the Logic of Integration supra at p. 141 
221 The text of the Treaty of Montevideo is reprinted in Dell, A Latin Arnerimn Cannxn Market?, pp228-256. 
Dell's book is an excellent early description and analysis of LAFTA. See also Miguel Wionczek 
{ ed.}' Latin Arnerimn Ecorumic lraegration {New York: Praeger, {1966}; Ernst Haas and P hillipe 
Scnuner, the Politics of Ecorumic in Latin American &giondism, Monograph Series in World Affairs 
{Denver: University of Denver, 1965}; Edward Gale, Latin Ameriatn Free Trade Association: Progress, 
Problems, Prospects {Washington: Office of External Research, US Department of State, 1969}: 
Edward Milenky, the Politics of Regiond Organisation in Latin Amerit:a.· Th: Latin Arnerimn Free Trade 
Association {New York: Praeger, 1973) 
222 See Mattli the Logic of Integration supra at p. 141 
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Africa have taken. Whilst there has been much activity to regionalise, extra-regional trade 
still outstrips intra-regional trade.224 
Anempts to revive the process of integration by creating a LAFTA Council of Ministers 
proved unsuccessful. Failure was publicly acknowledged at LAFTA's 1969 Annual 
Conference. The ensuing Carcass Protocol postponed the deadline for free trade from 
1973 to 1980. It also suspended the Common Schedule, and made only token references 
to the idea of a common market. For all practical purposes, LAFTA was shelved.22S In 
1980, LAFTA was replaced by the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), a 
considerably more flexible trade liberalisation arrangement that granted tariff preferences 
to only about 10 percent of all goods traded. 
Another stubborn problem emerged over industrial policy. Brazil wanted a higher 
common external tariffs, in order to protect its high technology and capital goods 
industries. Argentina, which is less industrialised, insisted on low tariffs. 226Distributional 
concerns have been voiced particularly in the context of investment. As capital flows into 
richer and larger Brazilian economy, smaller and less developed members will demand 
assistance to cope with dislocational and payment imbalances.227 
Like is the case with South Africa in the SADC region,228 Brazil is the dominant economy 
boasting approximately 75 percent of total regional GDP and for 80 percent of its 
industrial manufactures. Unlike South Africa, however, Brazil has been reluctant to use 
its economic and political position to assume active regional leadership. Whenever short-
term national interests have been at stake, Brazil has relegated regional issues to second 
22J Quoted from a letter by Frei dated January 6, 1965, addressed to Raul Plrebisch, Jose Antonio Mayobre, 
Felipe Herrera, and Carlos Sanz de Santa Maria; reprinted in Dell, A Latin America Canrnrn 
Market?, Appendix II, p.280 
224 See, for example, chapters six and eight below 
225 On LAnA's demise, see Miguel Wionczek, "The rise and the Decline of Latin America Economic 
integration". Especially 54-58; "Latin American Integration in United States Economic Policies," 
in Robert Gregg {ed.}, JrUerndtimt:tl Organisation in Western HffTlisphere {Syracuse University press, 
1968}, pp91-156, especially pp.l05-125: Keith Grifftn and Ricardo French-Davis," Customs 
Unions and Latin America Integration," Journalo/CanrnrnMarket Studies 4 {October 1965}, 1-2; 
and Bela Balassa, "Regional Integration and Trade Liberation in Latin America," Journal 0/ 
CanrnrnMarket Studies 10 {September 1971}, 58-77. 
226 John Barham and Agnes Forester, "Teething Troubles Continue to Nag at Mercosur Market" Financial 
Times {January 7, 1994}, see also "Mercosur Deadline Slips By", Latin- American Monilor- Souchem 
Cone 11 {January 2, 1994}, 2 
227 Canute James, "American Free Trade Area Easier Said than Done", Financial Times December 21, 
1994}, at p. 3 
22S See chapter six below 
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place.229 In addition, Brazil has staunchly opposed plans to establish an EU style 
Co .. . al 230 mrrusslOn or supranatlon court. 
3.5.3 The Andean common market (ANDEAN Pact) 
Besides LAFT A, there was another major integration scheme launched in the late 1960s, 
known as the Andean Common Market (also called the ANDEAN Pact). 231 Displeased 
with the laissez-faire attitude of the three "giants"m the countries on the western coast 
of South America began in 1967 to contemplate the creation of their own commercial 
grouping. By uniting, they hoped to increase their voices in Latin American affairs.2JJ 
Two years later, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador signed the Cartagen 
Agreement establishing the Andean Common Market. Venezuela joined in 1973.234 The 
Cartagena Agreement called for free trade, a common external tariff by 1980, joint 
planning and execution of industrial projects, harmonisation of economic and social 
policies, improvement of regional transportation, and a regional foreign investment code. 
The founding countries were intent on avoiding mistakes and shortcomings - particularly 
with regard to the thorny issues of redistribution and co-ordination.235 
229 For example, it has decreed investment incentives with little regard to their effects on the other 
members States, and has unilaterally imposed tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports whenever 
domestic developments demanded such actions. See Mattli the Logic of Integration supra at 
pp.147-151 
230 Similarly, it has refused to pay heed to calls for regional redistribution schemes, which may be of little 
surprise in a country that is used to one of the world's least equitable distribution of domestic 
wealth. 
231 For the studies on the Andean Pact, see the analysis by Kearns, Avery, and Cochrane mentioned above, 
and Edward Milenky, "From Integration to Development Nationalism: The Andean Group 1965-
1971," Inter·American EconcmicAffairs 25 {Winter 1971}, 77-91; Kenneth Switzer, "The Andean 
Group: A Reappraisal," Inter-Arnerit:an Econcmic Affairs 26 {Spring 1973}, 69-81; Jose Luis Galvez 
and August Llosa, Dinamica de fa Imegration Andina {Lima: Edicionnes Banco Popular del Peru, 
1974};Rafael Vargas-Hidalgo, "The crisis of the Andean Pact: Lessons for Integration Among 
Developing Countries, Journd o/Omnrn Markets Studies 27 {March 1979}, 213-226: Elisabeth 
Ferries, "Foreign Investment as an Influence on Foreign Policy Behaviour: The Andean Pact," 
Inter American Econcmic Affairs 33 (Autumn 1979), pp 45-67; and George Koopmann, "Ten Years 
Andean Pact: ARe-examination," Intermmanics (May IJ une 1979), 116-122 
232 Referring to the semi-industrial countries of Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico 
233 The bargaining power motive is highlighted in Grunwald, Wionczek, and Camoy, Latin American 
Ecorumic lmegration and US Policy, p. 56. Avery and Cochrane also acknowledge its importance but 
note that it was "not... emphasised in the public statements of the [Andean Pact] member-
governments" {Avery and Cochrane, "Innovation in Latin America Regionalism,"p.l83} 
234 Mattli is of the view that the creation of the Andean Pact does not folJow the "logic of the second 
integrative response" and thus must be viewed as an exception to the general integrative logic. He 
contends that it is a response to the internal failings of LAFT A, not a response to negative 
externalities of integration elsewhere. See the Logic of Integration supra at p. 148 
235 To this purpose, they set up the Andean Development Corporation (Corporation Andina de Fomento). 
Despite its good intentions, the Andean integration came to naught. 
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The pact was afflicted by structural weaknesses similar to those of LAFTA. The Andean 
countnes were not natural trading partners, and thus the potential for gain from 
integration was relatively limited.236 The bulk of their exports consisted of agricultural 
and mineral products such as bananas, sugar, coffee, copper, and iron ore. Eighty percent 
of these exports went in approximately equal share to the United States and Europe.237 
Most of their imports, in tum, originated in the US and Europe and consisted 
overwhelmingly of machinery equipment, manufactured goods, and chemicals. This is 
the very same malaise that afflicts integration regimes in the eastern and southern Africa 
region. Like we have argued below, these regimes' economies are not complementary 
and being net agricultural producers their economies are not well diversified to cater for 
the matrix of economies of scale.238 
The share of intra-regional trade in total trade for Andean countries amounted to a very 
modest 1.2 percent in 1970. By 1988, the share had grown to only 2.5 percent.2J9 
Naturally high transactional costs in the region were another reason why the potential for 
mutual gains, and thus the demand for integration, were weak. 240 
Indeed, our treatment of integration regimes in eastern and southern Africa shows that 
lack of functional infrastructure is the biggest handicap that obstructs the smooth 
progression to integration efforts. It is apparent that the Andean integration also failed to 
satisfy supply conditions. Most notably, he says, it lacked a regional leader. This led to 
insurmountable problems of policy co-ordination.241 A case in point is the failure to agree 
on common external tariff. Peru favoured an effective protection rate no higher than 40 
236 See Matdi the Logic of Integration supra at p. 148 
237 The source of the data is International Monetary Fund, Dinrtions 0/ Trade, Year book 1960/70 
{Washington, D.C :IMF} 
2J8 See, for example, chapters six, seven and eight below 
239 OECD, Regional Integration and Developing Countries, p.46, table 5 
240 Geographer Kevin Kearns wrote: "In theOlY ... integration ... and free flow of trade work well, but in 
practice it is somewhat more difficult- and especially so in the Andean region. Nowhere can the 
resistance to sub-regional cohesion been seen more lucidly than in the physical realm. The unerly 
discordant physiography of Western South America is among the most stringent and restrictive 
on earth. The land is fraught with barriers. The high ranges of the Andean cordillera, heavily 
forested selva plains, and broad and treacherous rivers work at keeping people and resources 
apart rather than joint." Kevin Kearns, "The Andean Common Market," 239. 
241 See Rafael Vargas-Hidalgo, "The crisis of the Andean Economic Integration," 213-226 and Kevin 
middlebrook, "Regional Organisation and Andean Economic Integration, 1967-75" J Jcumal 0/ 
Gmrrm Market Studies 17 {September 1978}, 62-82. 
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percent, Colombia proposed a 60 percent tariff. Ecuador and Venezuela, however, 
insisted on a rate lower than 80 percent.242 
No country was willing to compromise or able to bribe the others into acquiescence on 
the tariff differentials.243 As a result, the Protocol of Arequipa was signed on April 21, 
1978, postponing the deadline for completing the customs union lmtil December 31, 
1989.244 The region's share of foreign investment in Latin America dropped from 34 
percent to 20 percent between 1967 and 1975.245 A fmal factor contributing to the co-
ordination difficulties of Andean cOlmtries was the unending political instability plaguing 
political regimes in the area. Newly formed governments frequently reversed the policies 
of the previous administration, thereby jeopardising regional consensus. 
The question of political stability has been given more emphasis in trade instruments 
establishing integration regimes in the east and southern Africa region. This is entirely 
expected in view of the political volatility of the region. At present, some countries are 
still enmeshed in intractable civil strife whilst others are slowly emerging from the sordid 
woods of a debilitating internal conflict and coming to terms with the resultant 
devastation of war.246 
3.5.4 The Central American common market (CACM) 
Launched in the early 1960s, the CACM was established by the Treaty of Managua 
signed in December 1960 by EI Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.247 Costa 
Rica joined CACM in 1963. The treaty provided for immediate free trade in all products 
242 David Hojman, "The Andean Pact: Failure of a model of Economic Integration?" Journal 0/ Comrm 
Market Studies 20 {December 1981}, 147. 
243 Another example is the Andean Pact's Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development (Spins). 
Governments could not agree on who was to produce what, and they were unwilling to close 
down existing plants, fearful of drawing the ire of entrenched local interest or worried about the 
political consequences of rising unemployrnent.243 In light of these problems, it may seem 
surprising that the member governments of the Andean Pact were able to agree on a regional 
investment code 
244 "Decision 24", as the code was called, provided for the transformation of foreign subsidies into mixed 
companies and national firms according to a fixed timetable. New foreign investment projects 
had to give local partners an equity share of at least 51 percent and participation in the 
management of new firms. Stringent restrictions were placed on profit remittances and 
reinvestment. But the success of the investment code proved ephemeral. Individual countries 
relaxed the restrictions on foreign investment when foreign capital became scarce. 
245 See Elizabeth Ferries, "Foreign Investment as an influence on Foreign Policy Behaviour: The Andean 
Pact," 67. 
246 Angola and Mozambique are smarting from the aftermath of civil strife and the DRC is still tum apiece 
by an unending civil war. 
247 The text of the Treat}' can be found in Dell, A Latin American Clmrnm Market?, pp.256-269 
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originating in the region except for those listed. Trade in the excluded products, which 
comprised approximately 50 percent of intra-regional trade, was to be free byl966. 
The signatories also agreed to adopt a conunon external tariff without specifying the 
dateline, to establish a Central American Bank for Economic Integration to serve "as an 
instrument for financing and promotion of... regional balanced ... economic growth." 
And to ensure as soon as possible a reasonable equalisation of the relevant laws and 
regulations in force with a view to establishing uniform tax incentives towards industrial 
development" .248 
Like LAnA, before it, the CACM was triggered by external events: fear of protectionist 
conunon market in Europe and deteriorating terms of trade.249 Another event of 
importance was Fidel Castro's victorious revolution in Cuba. Schmitter notes that" the 
pervasive fear of Castroide subversion after 1959 added a desperate sense of urgency, 
making the elite much more willing to experiment with policy innovations.,,25o 
Unlike LAFTA, but like the East African Conununity,251 CACM proved highly successful 
during its first decade. It quickly set up a Permanent Secretariat, directed by a Secretary-
General, and other bodies including the Central American Economic Council, an 
Executive Council, the Central American Integration Bank, a Monetary Clearing House, 
and an advisory Central American Monetary Council. 
248 See chapters 7 and 8 of the Treaty of Managua 
249 See Matdi the Logic of Integration supra at p. 143 
250 Phillippe Schminer, Autonany or Dependem:e as Regional Outa:mes: Ceru:ral America {Berkeley: Institute of 
International Studies, University of California [Berkeley], 1972}, p.18. Studies on CACM indude 
Rodger Hansen, Ceru:ral America: Regional InltgraJion. and Econanic Deudopnmt, Studies in 
Development Progress, no. 1 { Washington: National Planning Association, 1967}; James 
Cochrane. The Politics of Regional Inltgration; The Ceru:ral American Case {New Orleans: Tulane Studies 
in Political Science, 1969}. Alberto Fuentes Mohr, La Creacion de un Mercado Comun; Apurues 
historims sobre fa experiencia de Centroameric.a {Buenos Aires: Institute Para la Integracion de America 
Latin [intal], 1972. Stuart Fagan, Ceru:ral America Econanic Inltgration; The Politics of l..Jnequd. Benefos, 
Research series, no 15 {Berkerly: Institute of International Studies, University of California 
[Berkeley], 1970; Carlos Castillo, Grauth and InltgraJion. in Ceru:ral Ameriam Inltgration {New York: 
Praeger, 1966}; Joseph Nye, "Central American Regional Integration," International Cmiliation 562 
{March 1967}, 1-66. The studies by Hansen, Cochrane, Castillo, and Nye were reviewed in Gary 
Wynia, "Central American Integration: The paradox of success," International Organisation 24 
{Spring 1970}, 319-334. 
251 See chapter eight below for a note on the EAC Integration experience 
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By 1966, tariffs were removed on 94 percent of intra-regional trade, and 80 percent of 
extra-regional imports were covered by a common external tariff.251 The dramatic change 
in intra-regional trade between 1958 represented 5.9 percent of the total trade then. In 
the span of only ten years, the number had increased to 24.2 percent, a stunning 18.3 
percent leap.253 In the same period, the relative importance of CACM's two major trading 
partners declined. 
Trade with the United States decreased by 8.7 percent, from 47.8 percent to 39.1 percent, 
in 1968, and trade with Europe fell from 29.8 percent to 20.8 percent.254 Equally 
significant was the change in the composition of intra-regional trade. In the late 1950s, 
most trade was in food products and raw material. A decade later, two thirds of regional 
trade consisted of manufactured (mainly consumer) goods and chemicals.255 
The CACM's success story came to an abrupt end when EI Salvadorian army attacked 
neighbouring Honduras on July 14, 1969. Some commentators point out that this attack 
cannot plausibly be attributed to the integration process but appears to be the result of 
other and more complex causes.256 The ensuing "Soccer War,,257 lasted only 100 hours 
but left several thousands dead on both sides, turned 100,000 into refugees, and 
destroyed half of EI Salvador's oil refining and storage facilities. Attempts to renew 
economic integration in the following years were thwarted by lingering hostilities.258 The 
share of CACM states' integrational trade represented only 11.9 percent in 1988 a sharp 
decline from the 24.2 percent twenty years earlier.259 
3.6.0 Integration in North America 
252 OECD, Rtgiond lmegration and Deu10ping Countries, p.56. See also Sebastian Edwards and M. Savastano, 
ULatin American's Intra·regional Trade: Evolution and Future," in David Grenaway, Thomas 
Hyclak, and Robert Thornton {eds.} Ecoru:mic Aspats of Rtgiond Trading Arrang:mems {New York.: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989}. 
253 See Mattli the Logic of Integration supra at p. 143 
254 See Mattli the Logic of Integration supra at pp. 143-145 
255 See W.T. Wilford and G. Christou, U A Sectoral Analysis of Desegregated Trade Flows in the Central 
American Common Market, 1962-1970". Journal ofOmrnt:n Market Studies 12 {December 1973}, 
159-175 
256 See Mattii the Logic of Integration supra at p. 145 - 146 
257 For a good account of the causes of the Soccer War, see William Durham, 'Scarcity and Survival in 
Central America: Ero/qjcal origins of the Soca.>r War { Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979}, p.1 
258 For example, in 1993 Argentina boasted a growing economy with inflation running at an annual rate of 
7.4 percent. Brazil, however, was plagued by annual inflation of 2,500 percent and an under 
valued currency. As a result the trade gap quickly widened in Brazil's favour and the ensuring 
tensions between the two countries brought trade negotiations to the brink of collapse. See Marrli 
the Logic of Integration supra at p. 147 
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3.6.1 The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
In essence, the NAFTA is a new, improved, and expanded version of the Canada-U.S 
free trade area. In large part, the agreement involves commitments by Mexico to 
implement the degrees of trade and investment liberalisation promised between Its 
northern neighbours in 1988. However, the NAFTA goes further by addressing 
unfInished business from the free trade area, including protection of intellectual property 
rights, rules against distortions to investment,260 and coverage of transportation services. 
The NAFT A provides for the faced elimination of tariff and most non-tariff barriers 
(NTB) on regional trade within 10 years, although a few import sensitive products will 
have a IS-year transition period.'61 In addition the NAFT A extends the innovative 
dispute settlement procedure of the free trade area to Mexico. This is in return for a 
substantial revamping of Mexican trade laws that injects more transparency into the 
administrative process and brings Mexican anti-dumping and other procedures closer to 
those of the U.S and Canada. Quite clearly the NAFTA boosts of precedent-setting 
rights and obligations regarding services and investment and takes an important fIrst step 
in addressing cross-boarder environmental issues. 
The agreement contams notable comrrutments on the liberalization of trade and 
investment. First, the NAFTA establishes within IS years free trade in agricultural 
products between the U.S and Mexico.2" The accord immediately converts key US and 
Mexican agricultural restrictions into tariff-rate quotas and sets a maximum IS-year 
period for the phase-out of more than a quota of the tariff which is an impressive 
achievement considering the dismal track record of other trade talks in reducing long-
standing farm barriers.''' 
Second, the investment obligations of the NAFTA and the related dispute settlement 
provisions accord national treatment to NAFTA investors, remove most performance 
requirements on investment in the region, and open up new investment opportunities in 
259 For a detailed study of CACM's evolution in the 1980s, see Juan Alberto Fuentes, Desafios de La InWaaon 
C£ntroarneria:o {San Jose, Costa Rica: Ins([uto Centroamerinano de Ad.minjstration Publica [icap], 
1989. 
260Local-content and export perfonnance requirements 
261 US-Canada bilateral tariffs were to continue to be phased out according to the free (rade area schedule, 
thar is, by January 1988. 
262 JJ. Scott et al NAFTA An Assessment: Institute for International Econom.icsj Wshington, DC Feb. 
1993 at p. 2 
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key Mexican sectors such as petrochemicals and financial services. The investment 
provisions provide a useful model for future GAIT trade accords despite the notable 
exceptions for primary energy and Canadian cultural industries.264 Third, the pact sets 
important precedents for future regional and multilateral negotiations by substantially 
opening the financial services market in Mexico to US and Canadian participants and by 
removing significant obstacles to land transportation and telecommunication services. 
Finally, the NAFTA offers a comprehensive result in textiles and apparel. On the one 
hand, the pact calls for the elimination of all tariffs and quotas on regional trade in 
textiles and apparel products.265 Schott 266 notes that this is the first time in this heavily 
protected sector that imports from an important developing-country supplier have been 
significantly liberalised by the US and Canada. He, however, faults the rules of origin 
established to qualify for duty free treatment, which he terms as being highly restrictive. 
Indeed if these rules are coupled with prospective GAIT reforms, the cumulative result 
could be strongly trade diverting. 
3.6.2 Implications for Mexico 
For Mexico, the NAFTA reinforces the extensive market-oriented policy reforms 
implemented since 1985. These reforms have promoted real annual growth of 3 to 4 
percent in the 1990s and a falling rate of inflation.267 The NAFTA portends a 
continuation of this fast pace of change in the Mexican economy by extending the 
reform process to sectors such as autos, textile and apparel, finance, telecommunications, 
and transportation. Mexican exporters will also benefit in two distinct ways: the relatively 
unfettered access to the US Market they already enjoy under various unilateral US 
programs will be sustained, and the few remaining US trade barriers will be liberated. 
The prospect of NAFT A implementation has already generated a strong expectational 
effects, with capital inflows to Mexico estimated at about $18 billion in 1992 of which 
26J Ibid. 
264 The Cotonou Agreement makes fairly extensive provisions on investment promotion matters - See 
Chapter Seven below. 
265Except for a special US quota for Canadian apparel producers that do not meet the strict regional rules 
of origin. 
266 JJ. Scott et al NAFTA: An Assessment: supra at p. 3 
267 Ibid. 
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about $5 billion was probably foreign direct investment.268 These large inflows are the 
financial counterpart to the growing Mexican current account deficit generated by 
imports of machinery, equipment, and other capital goods- all essential ingredients for 
the sustained development of the Mexican economy. 
3.6.3 Implications for the United States and Canada 
For the US, the NAFTA reforms should enhance an already important export market. 
US exports to Mexico have grown sharply since 1986 and now run at an annual rate of 
about $42 billion.269 US suppliers of intermediates, capital goods, and high-technology 
products should continue to reap large benefits as prime suppliers of the growing 
Mexican market. Over time, the NAFTA should impel industrial reorganisation along 
regional lines with firms taking advantage of each country's ability to produce 
components and assembled products and thus enhancing competitiveness in the global 
market place. 
As for Canada, the NAFT A reinforces, and in some cases strengthens, its free trade area 
preferences in the US market. Canada achieved many of its specific objectives in the 
negotiations, such as clarifying the method used to calculate the regional content for 
autos and retaining the Canada-US free trade area provision that exempts Canadian 
cultural industries from external competition.270 In addition, the NAFTA improves 
Canada's access to the Mexican market. Although Mexico is a relatively small export 
market for Canada under $1 billion at present, the NAFTA will expand export 
opportunities for Canadian firms in several key sectors, such as financial services, 
automobiles, and government procurement. 
3.6.4 A brief critique of the NAFTA 
Despite its attraction, the NAFTA is not entirely without shortfalls. 271 While the Clinton 
administration was busy pushing for a new GAIT agreement globally, it was 
simultaneously helping to support the NAFTA and Asian Pacific Economic Co-
268 Investment has anticipated trade reforms in Mexico, just as it did in Europe after the passage of the 
Single European Act in 1986, which presaged the internal market reforms of the EC 1992 
process. 
269 JJ. Scott et al NAFT A:. An Assessment: supra at p. 4 
270 Ibid 
27J Commentators have, for example, sited basic energy as an area that remains immune to free trade, 
progress on labour and environmental issues proceed in half steps, and the accession clause is no 
more than a hortatory statement. 
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operation (APEC) economic trade blocs. This he did so that the two blocs could counter 
the European Union and to benefit from bloc privileges within the GAIT. Some 
commentators have argued that this two-tier strategy was the trade equivalent of the 
Clinton strategy of attempting to reduce nuclear arms proliferation globally, while 
supporting the rapid increase in all other kinds of weapon sales to the Third World.272 
NAFT A negotiations began under the Bush administration in 1991. The aun was to 
counter the clout of the European Union by creating a free trading bloc of 364 million 
consumers in the United States, Canada, and Mexico with a total output of $6 trillion 
which is 35 percent more than the EU's output.273 In the NAFTA initiative, President 
George Bush saw NAFT A as a way to support the open economic reforms and trade 
liberalisation of Mexican President Carlos Salinas that were initiated in 1987.274 
Proponents of NAFTA viewed the agreement as a natural evolution of an emergmg 
architect of North America that was happening anyway and as the first step toward a 
larger North American bloc.275 Opponents of NAFTA, on the other hand, argued that 
after the initial upsurge in exports of the three countries with tariffs removed, factories 
would be tempted to move from the U.S. (and eventually Canada) to Mexico, which 
would result in lower wages and looser environmental regulations.276 
Although the Clinton administration inco-operated side agreements to help equalise 
environmental standards and enforce existing labour laws, sceptics noted that the money 
allocated for these activities was minimal- particularly in the case of labour law 
272 It is noteworthy that during this period the US share of arms sales in the third word meteorically shot 
from less than 13 percent in 1987 to 57 percent in 1992.272 The aim in both cases was to boost 
American economic growth and employment in the short-term post-cold-war era regardless of 
the long-term negative consequences for the world conununity. The potential trade bloc wars and 
conventional regional wars in other countries were equally ignored. 
27J Since Canada's trade with Mexico was but 1 percent of its trade with the US., the controver~y 
surrounding the final passage of NAFTA in the US Congress in November 1993 centred on 
trade-offs between the US and Mexico. In 1992, the US had a $5 billion trade surplus with 
Mexico, in contrast, for example, to a $75 billion trade deficit with East Asia. About 70 percent of 
Mexico's imports came from the US. See David Hale, "The Trade Revolution," The Wall Street 
Journal, November 3, 1993 
274 Moreover, without the international investor confidence generated by NAFTA, it is hard to imagine 
how Mexico would have covered an unusually heavy external savings deficit of 5-6 percent of its 
gross domestic product in 1993 
275 See, for example, Stephen Blank, "The Emerging Architecture of Northern America," 1k North,SOUlh 
Agenda, Paper One, March 1993 (Coral Gables, FL.: North-South Centre, University of Miami , 
276 Ibid 
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enforcement.277 The incidence of unskilled labour is widely expected to shift to Mexico, 
hitting hardest those in the U.S who need the work most. Americans have probably 
underestimated the existing training and skills of Mexicans who could fill high level jobs 
as well. 
Even if not, so goes the argument, it is undoubtedly cheaper to train and retrain workers 
in Mexico than in the U.S. Another problem is that many Mexican corn farmers will be 
put out of work as the lowered tariffs let through a wave of highly competitive 
agricultural goods from the U.S and Canada.278 Larger companies, particularly fmancial 
services, benefit inunensely from NAFTA. And NAFTA may help to stem the tide of 
Mexican seeking to emigrate to the U.S. The ultimate question is who will benefit the 
most from the redistribution of benefits, both short-term and long-term? Or will it be a 
positive-sum game of greater benefit to all? 
The main area, however, where the NAFTA is open to cntlCIsm 1S 1tS enunciation of 
restrictive rules of origin. These arcane trade provisions have been aptly labelled "tools 
of discrimination.,,279 Origin rules are used to determine which goods qualify for 
preferential treatment under the NAFTA and to deny NAFTA benefits to those goods 
that contain significant foreign-sourced components. 
Rules of Origin are an integral part of all free trade pacts. The NAFTA provisions have, 
however, been faulted on two counts. First, to an undue extent, they penalise regional 
producers by forcing them to source from less efficient suppliers located in the region, 
thereby undercutting the global competitiveness for the buying firms. Second, the 
NAFTA rules could establish an unhappy precedent for other preferential trading pacts, 
which may choose to emulate the restrictive practices articulated in the NAFT A to the 
disadvantage of the original perpetrators.280 
277 JJ. SCO[[ et al NAFfA supra at p. 7 
278 See Timothy KoecWin and Mehrene Larudee, "The High Cost of NAFfA," Ch:dlenf}?, September-
October, 1992, pp. 19-26. Also see Sheldon Friedman, "NAFf A as Social Dumping," in the same 
issue, pp. 27-32 
279 JJ. Scon et al NAFf A An Assessmem: supra at p. 5 
280 The impact of the Rules of Origin in limiting trade liberalisation is suggested by comparing actual and 
hypothetical duty collections on US imports from Canada.2BO Based on 1991 data, duty collections 
from Canada will evemually drop [0 about 18 percent of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) duty 
rates rather than the zero level that would occur without rules of origin. In other words, about, 18 
percent of US impons from Canada will not benefit from the free trade area. 
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Clearly, the stricter the rules of origin, the higher this residual percentage on trade terms 
would be. In general, the NAFT A adopts a standard rule that goods containing foreign 
components qualify for preferential treatment only if they undergo a "substantial 
transformation" in the region that results in a change in tariff classification of the 
product. 281 In addition, however, complex value-added tests and requirements that 
products should not be contaminated by key components sourced abroad have 
encumbered the NAFTA rules of origin for several key sectors.282 
The intense lobbying that prompted these restnctive NAFT A rules presages the 
industry's counterattack against the proposed global reform of the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement in the Uruguay Round of GAIT negotiations. The reform would phase out 
all quotas over 10 years. For autos, the NAFTA adopts a "net cost" approach for origin 
calculations. By itself, this method is an administrative improvement.283 However, the 
NAFT A value-added test is much higher than, and supersedes, the 50 percent 
requirement of the Canada-US free trade area.284 
Moreover, the NAFT A includes tracmg reqwrements to ensure that the foreign 
component of engines, transmissions, and other specified parts are subtracted when 
determining whether a vehicle meets the new content requirements. Together these rules 
substantially raise the overall regional-content requirements for preferential trade in 
automotive products.285 
In the whole, NAFT A is a noteworthy achievement, but its implications for Mexico, 
Canada and the United States should not be exaggerated. By widening the scope of the 
market and enlarging the range of available labour skills, the NAFTA enables North 
2S1 Concerns about restrictive NAFfA rules of origin arise most prominently in two sectors; textile and 
apparel and autos. In textile and apparel, the agreement establishes a triple transformation test 
that makes the already-protectionist rules of origin in the Canada-US free trade area seem liberal 
by comparison. 
2S2 For most products, the NAFf A establishes a «yam fOlWard" rule, which requires an item to be 
produced from yam made in a NAFfA country to qualify for regional preferences. The impact of 
this rule is somewhat softened, however, by the exemption of a small number of fabrics. Such 
products only need pass a single transformation test to qualify for preferential treatment and by 
special quotas under which products that do not meet the origin requirements would still qualify 
for preferential tariff treatment. 
2S3 The net cost approach subtracts specified administrative expenses from the transaction price to 
determine the base for calculating the ratio of foreign to regional content. See JJ. Scott et al 
NAFfA: An Assessment: supra at p. 6 
284 62.5 percent for autos, light trucks, engines, and transmissions; 60 percent for other vehicles and parts 
ibid 
285 JJ. SCOtt et al NAFf A:. An Assessment: supra at p. 6 
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American firms and workers to compete more effectively against foreign producers both 
at home and in the world markets. But the ability of the NAFT A partners to gain 
maximum benefits from the pact with minimum adjustment cost depends, as is the case 
with countries in the east and southern Africa importantly on maintaining domestic 
economic policies that ensure growth. Firms will still look first and foremost at the 
macroeconomic climate in each country in setting their investment priorities. 
3.7.0 Integration in Asia 
3.7.1 Early integration schemes 
The early history of the Asia-Pacific region confirms that many proposals for integration 
are triggered by external events that threaten to undermine economic prosperity in the 
region. One such attempt was Japan's proposal in the 1960s for a free trade pact with the 
developed economies of the Pacific rim, namely the United States, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand. The project was motivated by the fear that the fledgling European 
Community and American ideas for an Atlantic Community" would shut Japan out of 
the export markets it needed in order to rebuild its war-wrecked economy.286 The project 
failed on American opposition. 
3.7.2 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
The most notable example of regional grouping in Asia is the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Unlike most other integration attempts in Asia, particularly 
those of the latest wave, it is not an example of the second integrative response.287 The 
ASEANS creation was triggered by a war in neighbouring Indochina that threatened the 
stability in the area. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand 
founded this group in 1967.288 ASEAN defined its main tasks as ensuring the members' 
stability and security from any external interference and laying down "the foundation for 
a prosperous and peaceful community of South East Asian Nations.,,289 Concrete steps 
to promote intra-ASEAN co-operation were only taken, however, some eight years later, 
when the Americans were defeated in the Vietnam War. 
286 See Kiyoshi Kojima, Japan cmd a Pacific Frre Trade Area (London: Maani/lan, 1971); Pekka Korhonen, Japm 
cmd the Pacific Frre Trade Area (New York: Routldge, 1994) 
287 Mattli is of the view that this aspect points to a limitation of his analytical framework, that is, it cannot 
be explained as an integration effort triggered by negative externalities that arise from 
community-building elsewhere. He adds that his framework, nevertheless, remains useful for 
understanding the fate of ASEAN. See Mattli the Logic of Integration supra at p. 163 
288 The oil rich Sultanate of Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984; Vietnam joined in 1995; Burma and Laos 
joined in 1997 
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The Security threat posed by the Vietnam War and the threat of communist insurgency 
confronting all ASEAN members galvanised the group into action.290 Economic 
prosperity through closer commercial links was seen as the most promising way to deal 
with the new challenge to regional stability.291 At their first summit conference held in 
Bali in 1976, the ASEAN leaders decided to accelerate the process toward regional co-
operation in the economic and political domains. 
To this end, these approved the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs) one 
year later, under which ASEAN member States agreed to exchange tariff preferences on 
approved imports. The Bali summit also brought about the ASEAN Industrial Projects 
(AIPs),292 large-scale, capital-intensive public private sector projects in which all ASEAN 
members held equity stakes. The outputs of these projects enjoy tariff preferences within 
the ASEAN.293 
Most of these initiatives, have, however, made very little progress.294 ASEAN's 
Preferential Trading Arrangement have had a minimal impact on intra-ASEAN trade 
because most member states exclude products deemed "sensitive" from the PTA list.295 
Agreements to extend PTA coverage to a broader range of goods remain a dead letter. In 
the early 1990s PTA products accounted296 for less than 1 percent of total intra-ASEAN 
trade.297 Likewise out of the five initial ASEAN industrial projects, only two have 
become fully operational, and much of their success is due to Japanese financing and 
technology.298 The AIC has so far succeeded only for automotive parts and components 
289 Matdi ; The Logic of Integration, supra at p.164 
290 Matdi ; The Logic of Integration supra at p. 165 
291 Matdi ; The Logic of Integration supra at p. 166 
292 Matdi ; The Logic of Integration supra at p. 167 
293 Other projects for regional industrial co-operations adopted over the years include the ASEAN 
Industrial Complementation (Ale) and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture {AlJV} SCHEMES. 
The Ale sought to promote complementary trade in selected manufactured products within the 
ASEAN.29J The ATJVs were introduced in 1983 to provide tariff reduction of up to 90 percent 
for products from joint ventures in which ASEAN firms held at least a 40 percent share and 
representative firms at least one other ASEAN country hold a 5 percent share. Mattli; The Logic 
of Integration, supra at pp. 163 & 165 
294 Matdi ; The Logic of Integration, supra at p. 170 
295 ibid 
296 Matdi ; The Logic of Integration supra at p.171 
297 Ibid 
298 Matdi ; The Logic of Integration supra at p.l72 
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under the brand to brand complementation scheme approved in 1988.299 As for the 
AJlV s, it had approved only twenty-three projects by the end of 1994. 
Excluding Singapore, intra-ASEAN exports amounted to approximately 5 percent of 
total ASEAN trade in 1990.300 This number actually represents a slight decline since the 
late 1960s. Similarly, interregional investment accounts for only a very small fraction of 
total foreign direct investment in ASEAN countries. Apart from Malaysia, intra-ASEAN 
investment amounts to less than 10 percent of total foreign investments, with over 90 
percent of this coming from Singapore alone.30l 
3.7.3 The Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) 
As soon as NAFT A was passed in November 1993, President Clinton went to a meeting 
of the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) group in Seattle . .His mission was 
to counter the overselling of NAFTA as an exclusive North American trade bloc and to 
keep the U.S. from being excluded from an emerging Asian bloc. APEC as a consultative 
forum is made up of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S plus the Asian 
nations, of Japan, the Republic of Korea, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. 
Soon the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (or "China Taipei") 
joined the organisation. It has an annual budget of $2 million and a small secretariat 
based in Singapore (paid for largely by the government of Singapore) . .High-level 
ministerial meetings are held once a year according to the APEC charter, aimed at trade 
liberalisation and co-operating on issues such as investment regulations, technology 
transfer, telecommunications, and energy.302 Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of 
Malaysia boycotted the APEC meeting in Seattle advocating an exclusive all-Asian 
grouping called the East Economic Caucus he devised in 1990.303 He envisioned the 
299 Mattli ; The Logic of Integration supra at p.173 
)ee Ibid 
)01 Mardi; The Logic of Integration supra at p.176 
)02 See Frank B. Gibney, "Creating a Pacific Community," Foreign Affairs, Nov.!Dec. 1993, Vol.72, no. 5, 
pp.20-25 
)0) More recently, Mahathir successfully organised a group of fifteen developing nations to block a U.S· 
European move to link preferential access to their markets to workers' rights. 
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caucus, which has failed to develop suppon, as a countelWeight to the EU and NAFT A 
blocs.304 
APEC's November 1994 meeting in Jakarta consolidated an investment code drafted by 
APEC subcommittees -common rules for investing in eighteen nations around the 
Pacific Rim. As a South Korean Diplomat put it, abolishing protective laws is "a 
necessary evil" in order to expand the trade of the East Asian countries. Although APEC 
is a thin, young, and fragile organisation, it may assume growing imponance as a trading 
group, particularly since more than 40 percent of U.S trade is with the Pacific region. 
Given the commonality of the Chinese written language (upon which Japanese is based) 
in many of the APEC countries, it could easily be that a core Chinese-language based 
trading bloc will emerge. In this regard, it is well to keep in mind that the major source of 
direct foreign investment in China is offshore Chinese in other countries.305 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this chapter was to survey and analyse some of the notable integration 
regimes that have cropped up in different locations of the globe. One objective was to 
highlight the pertinent features attending these trade regimes and the challenges they 
have had to grapple with in their integration experience. The other object was to 
demonstrate that regional integration experiences all over the world are coupled with 
similar dynamics which mayor may not work for their success. 
What has come out clearly in the foregoing discussion is the indisputable fact that for the 
most part, external integration processes trigger the creation of regional regimes. Such 
processes tend to jolt regional partners into self-preservation counter unions. In this 
respect we have seen that trade blocs may perhaps be best understood as buffer zones in 
the turbulent process of creative destruction that characterises global capitalism. This 
discussion has shown that such buffer zones provide time for political-economic 
adjustment for member nations inside the zone. The security zone also helps members to 
304 Phillip Shenon, "Boycot in Order, Malaysian Says," The New York Tunes, Nov.21, 1993. And see 
"Malaysian's Mahathir: Leading A Crusade Against the West," Business Wa:>k, April 25, 1994 
)05 Rong-pin Kang, "Technology Import Policy of China in 1990s", Paper presented at International 
Symposium on Nerworking of Human Relations and Technology, at Tokyo Keizai University, 
Tokyo, October 25,1993 
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co-ordinate policies in order to maximise the advantage of members in the economic 
competition with nations outside the bloc. 
Most importantly, the chapter has identified two characteristics that mark out a 
successful integration initiative. One of these elements is the availability of commitment 
institutions such as centralised monitoring and third party enforcement mechanisms. 
These institutions, we have noted, help to enhance the chances of sustained co-operation 
by acting as constrains on member states in circumstances where self-help measures 
alone are insufficient to prevent reneging on contractual obligations. The second central 
feature is the presence of an indisputable leader state among the group of countries 
seeking closer ties as a focal point in the co-ordination of rules, regulations, and policies. 
We have seen that such a hegemon does help to ease distributional tension by assuming 
the role of regional paymaster. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the extra-ordinary success of the EU and the OPEC 
were preconditioned by unusual sets of fortunate historical circumstances. This fact 
reinforces the proposition made in the previous chapter that for integration regime to 
succeed there must be demand factors for such an initiative. We have seen that in the 
case of the EU, a long and deep educational, cultural, and technological infrastructure 
was not difficult to resurrect after World War II, particularly given the Marshall Plan aid 
aimed to shore up Western Europe against the cold war threat from the Soviet Union. 
The chapter has established that the US and the UK over-learned a lesson from the 
settlement of World War 1- not to break the back of Germany economically, but to help 
the country reconstruct and be accepted in the family of nations. In the main, however, 
this chapter has clearly demonstrated that the challenges which integration efforts have 
had to grapple with elsewhere in the world are replicated in the integration experience 
within the eastern and southern Africa region. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether the freeing up of trade globally will help to 
stimulate economic growth in both developed and developing countries. Meanwhile, the 
post-liberal trading blocs will determine which regime benefits most from this growth 
and which gets the lion's share of the global market. In the following chapter, we shift 
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the focus to examine the legal framework within which integration regimes operate in the 
world trading system. 
Chapter Four: The World Trade Organisation's Mandate for Regionalism 
4.1 Introduction 
The WTO structure supplies the legal framework for the regional integration 
arrangements. Of course, the character and content of different regional blocs may, as is 
expected, differ significantly. What is clear is that Article XXIV and the so-called 
enabling clause form the juridical basis for all regional integration regimes. There is a 
whole range of requirements that regional blocs must comply with under the WIO 
framework. This chapter examines the jurisprudential disposition of the WTO 
framework vis-a.-vis the regional integration phenomenon. It is important to see how, if 
at all, the eastern and southern Africa regional blocs operate within the enabling ambit of 
WIO framework. 
Knowledge of Article XXIV and the problems associated with its application are 
important inputs into the discussion of both the compatibility of regional integration 
agreements with the world trading system, and the possible improvements in the rules 
and procedures that have been suggested by trade experts. 
There are certainly some interesting areas of conflict between the multilateral obligation 
and fidelity to covenanted regional integration disciplines. This chapter will highlight 
some of these pointed areas of conflict and afford some guarded views on them. 
Emphasis will be placed on Article XXIV, the enabling clause, the MFN principal, and 
the whole spectrum of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) -which facility is 
specifically reserved for the utility of developing countries. Other important areas this 
chapter covers are tariff barrier and non-tariff barrier regime and the critical question of 
government procurement processes. The chapter will examine the background and 
operational efficacy of the WTO framework on regionalism. The relevant law regarding 
free trade areas and customs union will be dealt with in greater detail with a view to 
placing regional integration processes in their proper legal perspective. 
The chapter will deal with some of the vexed issues that the free trade agreement must 
grapple with to ensure proper compliance with the WIO protocol on free trade areas. 
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To go into these begging issues, it is necessary to look into the guidelines promulgated by 
the WTO on regional integration regimes. This discourse aims to lay a sound legal 
foundation upon which an in-depth discussion of the germane issues underlying 
regionalism in the east and southern Africa region would take shape. After all, free trade 
instruments and customs unions do not operate in a vacuum. The WTO is the legal 
vehicle by which these instruments are vested with international competence. It is, 
therefore, of critical importance to cover as much ground of the principal law so as to lay 
a solid foundation upon which to examine the relevant regional integration instruments. 
4.2 The WTO's roots from Havana to Marrakech 
The GAIT agreement helped establish a strong and prosperous multilateral trading 
system that became more and more liberal through rounds of trade negotiations. But by 
the 1980s the system needed a thorough overhaul. This led to the Uruguay Round, and 
ultimately to the birth of the WTO. From 1948 to 1994, the GATr06 provided the rules 
for much of world trade and presided over periods that saw some of the highest growth 
rates in international commerce. It seemed well established, but throughout those 47 
years, it was simply a provisional measure?07 
The World Trade Organisation has now replaced GATT the institution. GAIT - the 
agreement - has been amended and incorporated into the new WTO Agreements. GAIT 
deals only with trade in goods. The WTO Agreements now cover services and intellectual 
property as well. The GAIT is now subsumed in the WIO and represents one of its 
important pillars. 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is the main multilateral institution dealing with the 
rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by 
the bulk of the worlds' trading nations. These documents provide the legal ground-rules for 
international commerce. They are essentially contracts, binding governments to keep their 
trade policies within agreed limits. Although negotiated and signed by governments, the goal is 
to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business with 
less restrictions. 
306 One would wonder whether the WIO and the GA TI are not one and the same thing. The answer is no 
they are nOL The WIO is GA TI plus a lot more. GA TI (the institution) was small and 
provisional, and was hardly ever recognised in law as an international organisation. 
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The WTO began life on 1 January 1995, but its trading system is half a centwy older. 
Since 1948, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA 11) had provided the rules 
for the system. Before long it gave birth to an unofficial, de-facto international 
organisation, also known informally as GA TI, and over the years GAIT evolved 
through several rounds of negotiations. The latest and largest round was the Uruguay 
Round, which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and led to the creation of the WTO'. 
Whereas GAIT had mainly dealt with trade in goods, the WTO and its agreements now 
cover trade in services, and in traded inventions, creations and designs (intellectual 
property). Given its disposition in the international econo-political arena, the wro has, 
no doubt, assumed the status of one of the most powerful legislative and judicial body in 
the world. Legislative through the enactment of international trade rule and judicial 
through its powerful dispute settlement organ. Unlike United Nations treaties, the 
International Labour Organisation conventions, or multilateral environmental 
agreements, WTO rules and rulings can be enforced through sanctions. This gives the 
wro more power than any other international body and even national governments. 
The WTO is said to be both new and 01dJ08 • It is new in the sense that the Marrakech 
Agreement establishing the WTO only entered into force in January 1995. However, the 
wro is the continuation of an old idea that originated in the 1940s and was fonnalised 
in 1947 in the form of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - the GATI. The 
creation of the WTO on 1 January 1995 marked the biggest reform of the regime of 
international trade since after the Second World War. It also brought to reality - in an 
updated form - the failed attempt to create an International Trade Organization in 1948. 
Up to 1994, the trading system came under GAIT, salvaged from the aborted attempt to 
create the ITO.J09 
4.2.1 The centrality of the WTO Jurisprudence 
The WTO is premised on the rationale that an open and liberal trading system, 
underpinned by mutually agreed and legally binding rules, is the sure recipe for the 
growth of the global economy. The underlying principle is that an open and liberal 
trading system is the foundation of economic development. This would ensure the 
J07 Saleem, er al infra 
J08 Saleem, e[ al infra: "The WIO: Irs Origin, Basic Principles, and Main Rules" The OPEC Fund 
Pamphlet Series; Vienna, Austria, April, 1999 pp. 9-21 
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expansion of investment and production, job creation and, consequently, of an increase 
in global living standards and greater prosperity. This has, however, not been the case 
more so for the economically limping developing world. 
To realise these objectives there must, of necessity be the stability and predictability in 
the trading environment. These are the conditions pursued by the WTO through its 
various built-in mechanisms. In a stable and predictable trading environment, businesses, 
investors, traders, importers and exporters can and do plan their activities on a long-term 
basis. These merchants rest in the knowledge that conditions governing competition and 
access to markets will not change suddenly. An open trading system is based on a free 
market philosophy. In such a scenario, government intervention in trade is considered 
undesirable. It is important to caution, however, that economic theory has to face the 
stark practical realities that are played on the ground. Thus, while the WTO system 
basically frowns upon government intervention in global commerce, it does not totally 
disallow it. 
The intervention by government is ordinarily to be avoided where, however, it is 
considered essential to national economic interests, it has to be subject to certain agreed 
disciplines. What needs to be acknowledged here is the fact that the WTO rules do 
constrain the freedom of governments to use specific trade policy instruments. A 
number of simple, fundamental principles run throughout all the WTO agreements. They 
are the foundation of the multilateral trading system. The basic WTO norms are the 
principles of non-discrimination the "most-favoured-nation" treatment and "national" 
treatment, more free trade, predictable policies, encouraging competition, and extra 
provision for less developed countries. The bottom-line for these norms is to reduce 
protectionism in global commerce. 
Briefly summarised, the WTO contains two general principles, which are part of the 
background essential to understanding the discussion on regionalism in east and 
southern Africa region. One of the WTO's overriding preoccupation is the reduction of 
the level of protectionism, notably through the prohibition of quantitative restrictions, 
and the decrease of existing tariff rates via reciprocal tariff reductions. In this context, 
A nick II introduces the concept "schedule of concessions". 
309 Ibid. 
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Each Contracting Party has a schedule of concessions that lists the detailed item-by-item 
tariff concessions negotiated during the wrO's rounds of tariff negotiations. In 
accordance with Article II, the wro Contracting Parties undertake the corrunitment to 
levy no more than the tariffs listed in the schedule. Anicle II has been referred to as the 
wrO's "central obligation" since it ensures the solidity of the tariff reducing agreement 
concluded during the negotiating rounds.310 Hence it also fosters the ability of the 
Contracting Parties to make credible corrunitments in the first place. 
Two principles govern the negotiation rounds3!! one is that of 'Reciprocity' and the other 
the 'Most Favoured Nation' (MFN) treatment. The former is under A rticle XXVII, 
which means that a contracting State concedes to a third State's preferences of the same 
order as preferences such a State has obtained for itself. This also means that, for 
mstance, after acceding to the wro, new contracting States have the benefit of 
preferences already in existence but must in turn also grant preferences to the other 
contracting States. The MFN principle is covered under Article 1 and it has as a 
consequence that every tariff concession granted by one contracting State to another 
contracting State must unconditionally apply to other Contracting States. 
The system's overriding purpose is firstly to help trade flow as freely as possible - so 
long as there are no undesirable side effects. That partly means removing obstacles. It 
also means ensuring those individuals, companies and governments know what the trade 
rules are around the world, and giving them the confidence that there will be no sudden 
changes of policy. In other words, the rules have to be "transparent" and predictable. 
Since the agreements are drafted and signed by the community of trading nations, often 
after considerable debate and controversy, one of the WTO's most critical function is to 
serve as a forum for trade negotiations. 
A third important side to the wro's work is dispute settlement. Trade relations often 
carry interests that conflict. Contracts and agreements, including those painstakingly 
negotiated in the wro system often call for interpretation. The most harmonious way to 
settle these differences is through some neutral procedure based on an agreed legal 
310 John H. Barton and Bart S. Fisher, International Trade and Investment: Regulating International 
Business, Boston: Little, Brown, 1986, p. 143 
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foundation. That is the purpose behind the dispute settlement process written into the 
wro agreements. 
4.2.2 The tariff restrictions debate 
The WTO does not prohibit the imposition of customs duties. It merely states that 
duties which are applied to imported goods must be in the form of customs duties and 
not, for instance, in the form of discriminatory internal taxes (A rticle II!), exorbitant 
import fees (Article VII!) or quantitative restrictions (Article XI: para.3.26). However, the 
wro does impose an obligation on the contracting States to negotiate regularly on the 
reciprocal granting of tariff concessions, i.e. on the lowering of customs duties (A rticle 
XXVIII bis). So far eight trade negotiations rounds have been held in this regard. 
The main regional and multilateral agreements in the field of trade have very largely the 
same policy agenda in the sense that they cover tariffs, non-tariff barriers and the 
regulatory barriers to trade. The degree of coverage differs in every pact. Tariffs were the 
first trade barriers to be addressed and are covered by all regional agreements and by the 
wro. The result has been that there has been a major reduction in tariffs in 
international trade. Tariff reduction and removal are the main component of regional 
arrangements as well. To this extend, one is inclined to say that regional agreements have 
contributed to reductions in tariffs whilst the multilateral negotiations have by and large 
kept up with the pace. 
4.2.3 The Mechanics for the Rules of Origin 
The final task in calculating the appropriate duty on imported goods is establishing the 
country of origin of imports. Tariff treatment is often dependent on the country of origin 
of the imports. In order to qualify for a particular tariff treatment an importer must 
establish the product's origin. Establishing origin is often difficult. Goods may be 
processed, assembled, packaged or finished in a variety of different countries, or shipped 
to the importing country via another country where they mayor may not enter the 
commerce of that country. 
311 See imer alid M.Broszkamp, Meistbegunstigung und Gegenseitigkeit in GA TI (Carl Heyman, 1990, 
Cologne 
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The determination of origin rules is a particularly controversial issue in the examinations 
of free trade areas has been the Rules of Origin.312 This is the criterion established for 
products to receive free trade area treatment in instances in which intermediate goods 
imported from third countries are used in the production process. Since there are more 
and less restrictive ways of designing and administering Rules of Origin, third countries 
have been concerned that such rules create new trade barriers to their trade with member 
countries. J 13 
There are presently no comprehensive multilateral rules that govern the determination of 
rules of origin. Moreover, in many countries, rules of origin are not internally 
harmonised. That is, there are different rules for establishing origin within the country 
depending on the context, for example, for tariff purposes or during dumping 
investigations. This could and does often subject Its exporters to considerable 
inconvenience and expense. For instance, goods that originated from country A may pay 
the tariff rate for country B, where it was processed, but face anti-dumping duties levied 
against goods from country A. Even within one context, rules are often imprecise as 
exemplified by the rules of origin laid out in a free trade agreement. For the purposes of 
the free trade area, goods are deemed to originate in the territory of a Party if they are 
wholly produced or obtained in that particular country.Jl4 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Rules of Origin contains a similar approach to the 
free trade area with some important differences. First, the agreement sets out plans for 
transition to a harmonised system of origin determination to be developed by a 
Committee on Rules of Origin and Technical Committee assisting it within three years of 
the acceptance of the agreement. The first step requires all countries to harmonise their 
) 12 Members of free trade elaborate rules of Origin due to the fact that each retains its own external trade 
policy in contrast to members of customs unions. See full discussion on this item below 
}l} Third country members of the working parties on the 1973 free trade agreements between the EC and 
individual EFTA member States, for example, indicated that the effect of their Rules of Origin 
would be to raise barriers to third country trade in intermediate products. Third countries, too, 
argued that the Rules of Origin were too complex and cumbersome as to present a barrier to 
trade in and among them. Another view was that the absence of the GAIT guidelines on Rules 
of Origin for regional integration agreements left Contracting Parties free to adopt whatever rules 
they may deem appropriate. See also BISD 20S/145. 20S/171. 20S/183. 20S/196 
)14 See the discussion on NAFTA at Chapter three above 
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own rules of origin.315 During this period the rules applied by each country must be 
based on a positive standard - what confers origin not what does origin confer. 
Once this harmonisation is achieved countries will be required to base determination of 
origin either on the country where the goods were wholly obtained or the country where 
the goods underwent its last substantial transformation. This rule of last substantial 
transformation is not fully defined in the Agreemen2 16 but it combines the change in 
tariff classification method with supplementary criteria based on percentage of value 
added or specific manufacturing or processing operations. The NAFT A also contains a 
number of new and complex rules of origin designed to clarify and harmonise 
determination of content.3I7 This has, however, been criticised for being too unwieldy 
and complicated.3I8 
Rules of origin are different from subsidies and technical barriers, in that they are a direct 
consequence of the trade preferences in general and of regional integration agreements in 
particular. Non-preferential rules of origin, which are used to apply special trade 
instruments, also raise problems but much less acute. The various regional or national 
rules of origin have retained common elements. They all built on the foundations of last 
substantial transformation and use a combination of value-added, change-of-tariff 
heading and process-based determination of origins. It does not, therefore, seem 
impossible to achieve some approximation of those rules at the multilateral level. This 
was illustrated by the progress achieved in the Uruguay Round. 
The issue was whether stronger GAIT provisions could be developed and whether they 
could prevent the misuse of the flexibility, which is necessarily built into these rules of 
origin. It establishes a work programme on common rules of origin. Possibly more 
important, it requires all Contracting Parties to have effective speedy review 
proceedings3J9 . Enhancing transparency could considerably help to contain the abuse of 
rules of origin as an instrument of trade policy. The strengthened GAIT dispute 
315 This provision applies to all rules of origin used in non-preferential commercial policy instruments 
including application of : MFN treatment, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, safeguard 
measures, origin marking requirements and any discriminatory quantitative restrictions 
316 A Technical Corrunittee was established to develop a definition of this and other terms. 
)17 See Jon Johnson, 'The NAFTA Rules of Origin - A New Approach?' Canadian Law Newsletter, 
American Bar Association, OCT. 1992. 
318 See the discussion of the NAFTA trade agreement at chapter three above 
319 These do not currently exist in the EC 
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settlement 32°mechanism will also apply to rules of origin. The EU-SA trade partnership 
makes provision for an elaborate regime on rules of origin. The anticipated complexity, 
here, has been avoided by cumulating products from the SACU and to some extent 
tolerating inputs from the ACP countries. Trade regimes in the east and southern Africa 
region make extensive provisions on origin rules. The problematic area of the confluence 
between SADC and COMESA as far as the implementation of the rules of origin is one 
very pointed issue treated at chapter eight below. 
4.2.4 The Most Favoured Nation principle 
The MFN principle in Article 1 (the Article), is the premier WTO rule upon which all 
other trade regulations derive their competence. This principle has its clearest application 
to tariff concessions. Under the Article any concessions made by one country to another 
must be immediately and unconditionally extended to like products originating from 
other Contracting Parties. Although the MFN rule has a long history controversy still 
dogs the purpose served by the rule.J21 At one level, it seems to encourage rampant free-
riding by countries on concessions negotiated between other countries, and at the limit 
might encourage every country in turn to withhold concessions made by others, thus 
paralysing the process of trade liberalisation.322 
On the other hand, it could be argued that trade or specifically tariff concessions could 
be more readily negotiated between country A and country B. This is only so if each 
country is assured that the other country will not subsequently negotiate more generous 
concessions with third countries and thus undermine the benefits associated with the 
initial exchange of concessions.J2J This scenario is more prevalent in free trade area 
arrangements. Like we have pointed out in chapter seven below, the EU-SA vis-a-vis 
Cotonou configuration is one such example.324 Whatever the strength of these offsetting 
arguments, the bargaining structures which the WTO member countries have employed 
in negotiating tariff concessions clearly reflect sensitivity to the free-rider problem. And 
the imponance, at least politically if not economically, of extracting reciprocal 
)20 See the discussion on this item below 
J2\ See ].M. Finger, "Trade Liberalisation: A Public Choice Perspective', in R. Amacher, G. Haberler and T. 
Willett (eds.) 0Jttllenff!s to a LiJ:erai /ntem£ttiond Order (Washington DC: American Institute 
Enterprise, (1979); See also Richard Snyder, the Most Fawumi Nation Clause (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1948) 
J22 TrebJcock et al supra, at p. 75 
J2J Ibid 
)24 See the discussion at chapter seven below 
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concesslOns from other countnes who stand to benefit from importing countries' 
concessions is clearly apparent. 
There are a number of significant exceptlOns to the MFN rule, which should be 
highlighted here. Foremost, the historical preferences in force at the time of coming into 
effect of the GAIT are grand-fathered under Article 1. These are, however, made subject 
to the requirement that the margin of preferences cannot subsequently be altered in such 
a way as to exceed the differences between the MFN rate and preferential rates existing 
as of the 10,h April, 1947. The provision contemplates that absolute, not proportional 
difference between the MFN and preferential rates must be maintained when the NlFN 
rates are reduced or raised.J25 
4.2.5 Exceptions to the MFN Principle 
The Generalised System of Preferences (GSp?26 provided for in Part V of the GAIT, 
which are in favour of developing countries obviously entails preferences that wouki 
otherwise violate the MFN rule. Though an exception to the MFN rule, they are to be 
phased out under the Uruguay Round negotiated progranune. Another exemption is in 
the area of Antidumping and Countervailing duties imposed by countries pursuant to 
A rticle VI of the GAIT. This measureJ27 clearly involves duties that are selective and 
discriminative thereby going against the MFN grain. 
Quantitative restrictions328 imposed pursuant to A nicle XII or A nicle X VII of the GA IT 
for balance of payment reasons may, by virtue of Article XIV, temporarily deviate from 
the NIFN principle. This is so in respect of 'a small part of a country's external trade' 
where the benefits to that country substantially outweigh any injury which may result to 
the trade of other countries. Also National Security exceptions, recognised in Article XXI 
of the GAIT, may justify the imposition of trade restrictions on a discriminatory basis. 
Again, where retaliation is authorised under the nullification and impairment provision of 
the GAIT under Article XXIII or the safeguard provision under Article XIX, such 
325 For example, if the MFN rate is 20 percent and the preferential rate one is 10 percent on imported 
widgets, and the MFN rate is subsequently reduced to 15 percent (a 25 percent reduction). The 
preferential rate can be reduced to 5 percent and not merely 7.5 percent (which would be a 25 
percent reduction). 
326 See the discussion on this item below 
m See the discussion on this item below 
328 See discussion below 
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measures would typically be selective and hence running counter to the MFN rule. The 
various non-tariff codes negotiated at the Tokyo Round were essentially bargained on a 
Conditional MFN basis. This means that only Contracting Parties who were prepared to 
become signatories to the codes and thus accept the obligations so entailed were entitled 
to the correlative benefits. Under the Uruguay Round Agreements, these codes would be 
fully integrated into the GAIT, and membership in the WTO would entail adherence to 
themJ2'. 
It is generally recognised that the Enabling Clause"o and Article XXIV are the most 
fundamental exception to the MFN principle. Subject to the conditions set under these 
provisions constituent territories are permitted to establish more favourable duty and 
other arrangements amongst themselves that pertain to trade with non-member 
countries. The avalanche of literature that is committed to this item underscores the 
importance of the exception."1 The MFN principle does, however, derive support from 
the National Treatment (N1) under Article III of the GATT as far as tariff concessions 
go. In the absence of the National Treatment it has been observed that negotiated tariff 
concessions could be easily sabotaged. The next section examines this secondary 
principle albeit in brevity. 
4.2.6 National Treatment 
The second component of the MFN principle, the national treatment principle, outlaws 
discrimination between domestically produced goods and those, which have been 
imported. The opposite view would suggest that the country of import may be pursuing 
protectionist measures, in aid of its firms, so as to avoid competition from foreign firms. 
This rule centres on fixing the same conditions for domestic goods as well as foreign 
imported goods so that the latter are not discriminated against at the expense of the 
former 
Artide III (4), in this respect provides that "the products of the terntory of any 
Contracting Party imported into the territory of any other Contracting Party shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national 
origin in respect of all laws, regulations, and requirements affecting internal sale, 
'" T rebJcock e[ al supra a[ p.77 
)}O See [he discussion [hat follows below 
JJI The Enabhng Clause is discussed in detail below 
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purchase, transportation, distribution or use." Reaffinning this view, Hercules Booysen 
states that in this clause, "a state promises to apply to another State and its citizens the 
most favourable import charges applicable to imported goods from other countries".}}2 
What this position means is that levying a sales tax on imported goods while locally 
produced goods were not subjected to the same tax would be tantamount to 
discrimination and therefore a violation of the national treatment principle. Allowing 
domestic producers of alcoholic beverages, for instance, to establish their own 
distribution schemes while requiring that imports of the like product be distributed 
through a state- managed scheme, would amount to a violation of this principle. 
Protectionist measures such as unnecessary internal tax and regulation affecting internal 
sales are governed by this principle. 
In a nutshell, the principle forbids discrimination between foreign products and locally 
produced goods. So that here, non-discrimination is promoted, as advocated by this 
principle, which abhors discrimination between domestic and foreign goods. Thus, in 
April 1949, France lodged a complaint against Brazil for the latter's discriminatory 
internal taxes against imported articles at inordinately excessive rates for like domestic 
products. These products were brandy and watch industry products. After a series of 
lengthy and complicated consultations held by the then GAIT Dispute Settlement Board 
(DSB) in 1955, Brazil was found to contravene the MFN A rtide 111 of the GATT. 333 
4.3.1 Regionalism and the WTO disciplines 
Like we noted in the previous chapters, most countries in the world, on all continents, 
are now members of regional trade agreements - customs unions, free trade areas or 
other preferential arrangements. Overall, more than 200 Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTA's) have been notified to the GAIT or WTO over time. Currently over 130 
agreements are in force334 • Most have been concluded in the past 10 years. Since 1995, 90 
agreements covering trade in goods or services, or both, have been notified to the WTO. 
The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements has the task of monitoring 
developments.335 
m International Transactions and the International Law Merchant (1995), at p. 87 
m Booysen, International Transactions and the International Law Merchant supra, at p. 100 
}34 Ibid. 
m The committee's duties are to examine individual regional trade agreements; to consider the systemic 
implications of these agreements for the multilateral trading system, and the relationship between 
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The network of regional trade agreements throughout the world is now highly complex 
and many countries are members of several agreements, sometimes with very differing 
rules. One of the most frequently asked questions is therefore whether the growth of 
regional groups helps or hinders the development of the WTO's multilateral trading 
system336• When a WTO member enters into a regional integration arrangement, it grants 
more favourable conditions to its trade with other parties to that arrangement than to 
other WTO members as a whole. This is definitely a departure from the guiding principle 
of non-discrimination defined in Article I of GAIT and Article II of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). WTO members are however permitted to 
enter into such arrangements 337under specific conditions, which are spelled out in three 
sets of rules. 
Paragraphs 4-10 of Article XXIV of GA TJ'-l38 provide for the formation and operation of 
customs unions and free-trade areasJ39 • On the other hand, the so-called Enabling 
Clause340 refers to preferential trade arrangements between developing country Members 
and Article V of GATS governs the conclusion of regional integration agreements in the 
area of trade in services. All notified customs unions and free-trade areas, as well as some 
of the regional trade agreements in the service area and of the preferential arrangements 
concluded among developing countries, undergo in-depth examination by WTO 
members. Such reVIews are undertaken in the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements.341 
There is a wide range of views on whether the world is moving inexorably towards 
integration on a global scale. And that there is evolving a geographic concentration of 
trade, with the attendant risk of trade conflicts among the regional groups. In the face of 
them. In February 1996, the WTO General Council established the Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements. Its duties include examining individual regional agreements and considering 
the systemic implications of the agreements for the multilateral trading system and the 
relationship between them. Once the examination of an agreement is concluded, the committee 
prepares a report on it, which is submitted to the relevant. At present, 81 regional agreements are 
under examination in the committee superior body for adoption 
JJ6 See Chapter two for a detailed discussion on this item 
JJ7 Regional trade agreements, or RT As 
J38 as clarified in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 
m A section on the Enabling Clause is outlined below 
340 i.e., the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries) 
341 In the GAIT years, these were conducted in individual working parties. 
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all these speculation the only sensible course of action is to accept that there is 
movement along both tracks. The factors that favour global integration and co-operation 
have, nonetheless, come out with definite winners with the success of the Uruguay 
Round on trade talks. 
The seamless and mutually supportive coeXlstence of regionalism and multilateralism 
requires, however, an improved understanding of their relationship. There is also need 
for understanding on how the GA IT /WTO provisions can best contribute to that 
mutual support. Moreover, even if there is an affirmative answer to the question of 
whether regional integration agreements have been complimentary to the multilateral 
process, experience cautions against assuming that the post Uruguay Round rules and 
procedures will be sufficient to guarantee that this will be the case with future 
agreements. Or indeed, for that matter, with the evolution of current agreements. 
Through such examination, members seek to obtain from the parties to such individual 
RTA information on legal and procedural aspects of the implementation of the 
agreement, and on the economic and the trade magnitude involved in the arrangement. 
Members also endeavour to gauge the agreement's conformity vis-a-vis the relevant 
wro rules. The basic rules for trade in goods Text of GAIT is Art XXIV and its 
updates, including the 1994 "Understanding" Enabling Clause for developing countries 
Text of 1979.342 The following section will examine the wro jurisprudence on 
regionalism in some detail. This treatment will set out clearly the legal requirements for 
the establishment and thereby help to vindicate our analysis on the compatibility of 
regional regimes in the east and southern Africa region to the WTO disciplines. 
4.3.2 The development of Article XXIV 
Article XXIV is the principle instrument authorising the establishment of customs unions 
and free trade areas. It should, therefore, be seen in the context of the general 
342 Examples of regional trade agreements among the best known are the European Union (EU), the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFT A). Others are the Southern Conunon Market (MERCOSUR), the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area (ASEAN), and the Conunon Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA). See chapter three for a detailed discussion on these regional 
arrangements 
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elimination of trade preferences, which the US government was aiming at, when it put 
forward its Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment (1945). And with 
the suggested Charter for an International Trade Organisation (1946), the exception 
made in Article XXIV deserves an explanation. Firstly, the customs union exception had, 
already, dwing the inter-war period, been generally accepted. As the League of Nations' 
Economic Committee stated in 1929, " ... customs unions constitute exceptions, 
recognised by tradition, to the principle of most favoured nation treatment.,,343 
Secondly, after Secretary of State George Marshall's famous "Marshall Plan" speech on 
5th June 1947, the unification of Western Europe became one of Washington'S central 
policy goals. As a result, banning customs unions became inconceivable. This was 
considered as an adequate means by which Europe could achieve econOffilC 
integration.344 Thirdly, as Clair Wilcox, the Director of the Department of State's Office 
of International Trade Policy explained, America's refusal to accept new preferential 
arrangements on the one hand and its encouragement of customs union on the other 
hand had an economic reason too. 
A customs uruon, Wilcox said, creates a wider trading area, removes obstacles to 
competition, makes possible a more economic allocation of resources, and thus operates 
to increase production and raise planes of living. He added that a preferential system, on 
the other hand, retains internal barriers, obstructs the economy in production, and 
restrains the growth of income and demand. It is set up for the purpose of conferring a 
privilege on producers within the system and imposing a handicap on external 
competltors. In summary, Wilcox said, " ... a customs union is conducive to the 
expansion of trade on the basis of multilateral and non-discrimination, a preferential 
system is not.,,345 
343 Cited in Customs Union: A League of Nations Contribution to the Study of Customs Union Problems, 
New York: United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, 1947, p.3l. Although the United 
States was not a member of the League of Nations, it, too, had accepted the customs union 
exception during the inter-war period, see The Policy of the United States with respect to 
Customs Unions and Regional Preferential Trade Arrangements, Washington, DC: Advisory 
Committee on post-war Foreign Policy, Trade Barrier Subcommittee, 1943 
)44 Minutes of a Meeting of the US Delegation, Geneva Switzerland, July 2, 1947, in Foreign Relations of 
the US 1947, Volume 1. Washington, D.C: U.S Government Printing Office, 1976, at p.960: and 
T. Alfred, Tariff Preferences in Mediterranean Diplomacy, London: MacMillan, 1977, at pp. 15· 
26 
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The GA TI rules in this area reflect the drafters' desire to provide for such agreements 
while at the same time ensuring that the trading interest of third countries are dully 
respected. More generally is the fact that such agreements are compatible with a rules 
based and progressively more open world trading system. For this reason, the provisions 
of Article XXIV establish a number of conditions, which the agreements must satisfy, as 
well as transparency requirements in order to monitor whether those conditions are 
being met. 
Article XXIV derives its authority from par. 2 of Article I of the GA TI, which explicitly 
exempts (grandfathers) certain regimes from the :MFN requirement. This refers to 
preferential arrangements, which were in place at the time the GA TI came into force. 
Bethlehem346 opines that the introduction of the MFN with the existing preferences 
tolerated but capped laid the foundation for future growth of world trade on the basis of 
non-discrimination. This, of course, as noted in chapter two was the central goal, in 
particular, of the United States - that is to widen frontiers to unrestricted global 
commerce. 
4.3.3 The Jurisprudence of Article XXN 
Under Article XXIV (herein after, 'the Article'), custom uruons and free trade area 
agreements are permitted exceptions to the cardinal principle of non-discrimination 
because it is recognised that such agreements have the potential to further economic 
integration without necessarily adversely affecting the interests of third countries. Par. 4 
sets out the parameters of trade liberalisation both internally and externally. The 
paragraph states inter alia that: "the purpose of a custom union or a free trade area should 
be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the 
trade of other Contracting Parties." 
Par. 8 of the Article defines the characteristics of customs union and free trade areas, 
which in effect amounts to this. That a party to a custom union and free trade area must 
eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations on commerce with respect to 
substantially all the trade between their constituent customs territories. The requirement 
to eliminate duties and other restrictions on mutual trade is nonetheless not absolute. 
345 Clair Wilcox, a Charter for World Trade, New York: MacMillan, 1977, pp. 7071. The logic behind 
Wilcox's economic argwnent is criticised in Richard Pomfret, Unequal Trade: The Economics of 
Discriminatory International Trade Policies, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988, at pp.62-63 
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Apart from the flexibility implicit in the "substantially all-trade" requirement, members 
may still "where necessary" exercise their rights to maintain duties or restrictions under 
GAIT Article XI -for quantitative restrictions, Article XII-for non-discriminatory 
administration of quantitative restrictions, Article XV- for exchange arrangements and 
Article XX for general exceptions. A further criteria which applies only to custom unions 
is that its members must apply substantially the same duties and other regulations of 
commerce to trade with non-members.347 
Bhagwati (1995)348 holds the view that an important rationale for the substantially all 
trade requirement is that it helps governments resist the inevitable political pressures to 
avoid or minimise tariff reductions in inefficient import-competing sectors. A wider 
sectoral coverage does enhance the trade-creating effect of such agreements. The 
requirement also ensures that regional agreements are limited to those, which have 
sufficient political support in member countries to overcome protectionist opposition to 
more or less complete free trade among the participants. It also ensures that such 
agreements are not abused as a cover up for narrow (sectoral) discriminatory 
arrangements. 
The criterion thereby helps "differentiate between politically unavoidable and containable 
deviations from the MFN rule by determining the point where trade policy is allowed to 
give way to foreign policy.349 Recast to emphasise its incentive effect, the argument is that 
"the rule of Article XXIV attempt to limit discrimination by imposing a high (political) 
cost on it. Strictly interpreted, they would only allow it when the parties are really serious 
about favouring each other... [thus] the high political cost of establishing such 
preferential arrangements acts as a deterrent to their formation.,,35o 
Par. 5 of Article XXIV spells out the conditions to be met by customs unions and free 
trade areas so as to avoid adverse effects on the trade of third countries. There is one 
346 Daniel Bethlehem: Regionalism and the World Trading System: WTO, Geneva, April 1995 at p.7 
347 In other words, have a common external tariff and more generally a common trade policy 
348 J agdish Bhagwati : " Regionalism and Multilateralism: an overview" in Jaime de Melo and Arvind 
Panagariya (eds.): New dimension in regional integration, Cambridge (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) at pp. 25 -27 
349 Ibid 
350 However, interpretation of Article XXIV has lowered this cost for all countries while the Enabling 
dause has reduced the cost for developing countries even further. The plethora of pseudo-free 
trade agreements now being implemented or proposed and the threat which they provide to an 
efficient, liberalising, multilateral system, suggest that the COSt may now be too low". 
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major constrain placed on customs unions. That is the requirement that the common 
external tariff, and other trade measures imposed at the time of the formation of a 
customs union, be set at a level that is not "on the whole" higher or more restrictive than 
was imposed by the constituent territories prior to its formation. If the level of the 
common external tariff is such that any of its individual members' bound tariffs are 
raised, par. 6 states that "the procedure set forth by A rtide XX VllI shall apply." 
Article XXVII procedure provides for the withdrawal or modification of previously 
negotiated tariff concessions, with the possibility for compensatory tariff reductions, 
taking into account the new market access opportunities created for the same product by 
decreases in tariffs of other members of the customs union.351 Members of free trade 
areas, even though they do not adopt a common external tariff or common trade policy, 
are subject to similar obligations. Par. 7 contains requirements to ensure transparency of 
the proposed agreements. Agreements are to be promptly notified to the WTO for 
examination by the Contracting Parties, which must make appropriate recommendations. 
Since customs unions and free trade areas are ordinarily established over a fairly long 
period of time to avoid the economic dislocation of a rapid move to free trade among 
the members, Article XXIV provides explicitly for Interim Arrangements. But to avoid 
the danger that such interim arrangements are used as a pretext for introducing 
discriminatory preferences, par. 5(c) requires that they incorporate "a Plan and Schedule 
for the formation of such a customs union or free trade area within a reasonable length 
of time." 
Where the Contracting Parties, acting jointly, find that the plan and schedule in the 
interim arrangements are not likely to lead to the formation of such a customs union or 
such a free trade area, or not to do so within a reasonable period, the Contracting Parties 
are to make recommendations. The agreement is not to be maintained or put into force 
unless it is amended in accordance with such recommendations. In 1972, it was decided 
that notification should be made following the signature of the agreemem.352 The practice 
has been for the parties to the agreement to provide trading partners with a text of the 
351 The decision on "Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII" (BISD 27S126) confirm that these 
are in relevant parts also valid for negotiations under Article XXIV6 
352 The 1972 decision states that "the CoWlcil decides to invite Contracting Parties that sign [emphasis 
added] an agreement falling within the terms of Articles XXIV, par. 5-8 to inscribe the item on 
the agenda for the first meeting of the CoWlcil following such signature ... " (BISD 19S/13) 
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agreement, so that they may consider III detail lts implications for their trade and 
economic interests.J5J 
Par. 10 states that proposals for free trade areas or customs union not meeting the criteria 
described above may be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Contracting Parties 
provided that such proposals eventually lead to the formation of a customs union or free 
trade area. The drafting history indicates that the provision on free trade areas and 
customs unions was agreed upon despite the fact that not all participants were GAIT 
Contracting Parties. 
4.3.4 The "substantially-aU-trade requirement 
Differences of opinions among participants 1ll working parties regarding the 
interpretation of the 'substantially-ali-trade> requirement in Article XXIV have been a major 
reason why parties have not reached a consensus on the WTO compatibility by 
individual agreements. This requirement refers to the scope of liberalisation to be 
achieved by members of a customs union or free trade area. Discussions in the wro 
working parties have centred on whether this concept should be understood in 
qualitative terms (no exclusion of major sectors) or in quantitative terms (percentage of 
trade of members covered). With regard to the qualitative perspective, third countries 
have questioned whether agreements that explicitly excluded trade in unprocessed 
agriculture products - the case of most agreements - met the substantially-all trade 
requirement.354 
3SJ During the EU-SA trade negotlatlons, SADe members were constantly consulted and updated at 
various stages. In practice, again, notification is generally foUowed by the establishment of a 
working party with the terms of reference "to examine in the light of the relevant GAIT 
provisions [name of agreement] and report to the Council. Participation in working parties is 
open and the countries who are parties to the agreement are always members of the working 
party and have the same status as other delegations. The working party's report is sent to the 
Council's governing body of the Contracting Parties who represent the views of all participants 
and therefore records different views if necessary. The report of the working party is adapted by 
the Council and may form the basis on which the Contracting Parties acting, jointly, may take a 
final decision on conformity of the agreement with Article XXIV or formulate recommendations 
to members of interim agreements. As was noted in the proceeding paragraphs, Article XXIV 
provides in several instances for recommendations and findings to be made by the Contracting 
Parties in particular as regards interim agreements. Article XXV par. 4 provides that; "decisions of 
the Contracting Parties shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast." Where a formal objection 
to the decision is made by a delegation at the meeting when the issue is taken up then this 
condition is deemed to have been fulfJled. By tradition, however, decisions in GAIT which have 
required a positive action to be taken by the Contracting Party or Parties have been taken by 
consensus 
J54 For example, the working party, which examined Sweden's free trade agreement with the Baltic States, 
failed to agree on the full conformity of these agreements with Article XXIV, This was despite the 
fact that the contents and provisions of the rest received broad acceptance. Agreement would 
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The signatories defending their agreement in this particular instance, and more generally, 
members to agreements which exclude agricultural products, have maintained that the 
criteria of Article XXIV is that obstacles be eliminated on substantially-ali-trade between 
the parties and not on trade in substantially all products or sectors. These members thus 
believe that the language does not preclude the exclusion of a sector of the economic 
activity such as agriculture, provided that the overall trade coverage of the agreement 
meets the criteria laid down in Article XXI V. 355 
This quantitatil.:e interpretation of the relevant provisions of Article XXIV 8(b) thus argue 
that the percentage of trade on which obstacles are eliminated by the agreements should 
be considered in determining whether the provision has been respected. J56 The counter-
argument is that the observed value of trade in a given sector may be low as a result of 
impediments to trade and not because of its having an intrinsically lesser economic or 
trade importance. These differences of opinion demonstrate the subjective nature of the 
interpretation of Article XXIV8 (b) in the absence of further guidance or agreed and 
other alternative interpretations.357 
Whereas Article XXIV 8 contains the definition of a customs union and free trade area, 
the determination of whether a particular customs union or free trade area is in / 
conformity with the WTO disciplines must also be based on other provisions of A rtiJ:le 
XXIV 358 Regarding these criteria of judgements, the foliowing imperative problems have 
ansen: 
~ the relationship between Art. XXIV'4 and other provisions in Article XXIV: 
~ The interpretation of the phrase " ... and not to raise barriers to the trade of 
other Contracting Parties with such territories" in Art XXIV4 
~ the interpretation of the requirement of Art. XXIV5(a) that in the case of a 
customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the 
institution of any such union in respect of trade with Contracting Parties not 
have been reached had some members of the working party not claimed that the exclusion from 
the agreements proper (and separate treatment) of agricultural trade prevented fuJJ conformity of 
the agreements with the obligation of Article XXIV The exclusion for agricwtural products are 
generally due to the restrictive trade policy regimes most governments maintain in this sector as 
part of domestic programs to support farmers' incomes. Although this exclusion is typical of a 
free trade area, it is more exceptional for customs unions, GATT document L/7338 
m This is the argument the EU has all along advanced in defence of its offending CAP policy 
356 The report of the working party on the "European Economic Community" records the proposal of 
EEC that "a free trade area should be considered as having been achieved for substantialJy alJ the 
trade when the volume of liberalised trade reached 80 percent of total trade" 
357 Bethlehem, Regionalism and the World Trading System, supra at p.14 
358 Dickson Yeboah: "Regional Integration and the GAIT", 17 World Ccmpetilion 1, Sepuml::er 1993, at p. 38 
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parties to such a union should not, on the whole, be higher or more 
restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of 
commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of 
such a union. 
Another issue on which differences of opUllon have been frequent is the scop: of 
lib:ralisation in the notifoxi agretment in tenm of measure ratro- them sectors car:ered. In particular, 
the extents to which non-tariff as well as tariff measures on intra trade are dismantled. As 
was noted earlier, Article XXI VB specifically provides that members of a free trade area 
or customs union may exercise their rights to maintain duties or restrictions on intra-
trade under a list of certain GAIT Articles. If this were to be interpreted as being an 
exhaustive list, it would disqualify agreements where members have retained the right to 
apply restrictions on intra-member trade under GATT provisions not explicitly 
mentioned in the list. 
This would be, for example, safeguard measures (under Article XIX) or restrictions for 
national security reasons (under Article XXI) or even to apply anti-dumping or 
Countervailing measures (Article VI). In this regard, the EEe argued before the 
committee, which examined the Treaty of Rome, that national security (Article XXI) was 
not mentioned in the list. But that it would be difficult, however, to dispute the right of 
Contracting Parties to avail themselves of that provision which related inter alia to traffic 
in arms fissionable materials etc.J59 
A related issue is whether parties to a free trade area or a customs union are entitled (or 
indeed, can be required) to exempt the other members from safeguard actions in the 
form of quantitative restrictions (for example under Article XIX). This would otherwise 
be administered in a non-discriminatory manner according to a historical trade share 
(Article XIII and XIV). Is a member of an agreement permitted to introduce such 
restrictions only on imports from non-member even though the alleged source of the 
problem is imports from all sources? 
In particular, members of certarn free trade agreements have sometlilles exempted 
regional trade partners from safeguard actions.J60 Third countries have often, however, 
taken issue with an interpretation of Article XXIV that permits a departure from all 
359 BISD 6S/ 70 
360 See Be[hlehem, Regionalism and [he World Trading Sysrem, supra 
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obligations requiring non-discriminatory treatment. The not on the whole higher or more 
restrictive requirement for regional regimes is a rather controversial edict that deserves a 
penetrating investigation. We venture a few observations in the following sub-section. 
4.3.5 "Not on the whole higher or more restrictive" 
A major constraint is placed on customs unions under par. 5 of Article XXIV. This is 
the requirement that the conunon external tariff and other restrictive regulations 
imposed at the time of the formation of the union not be on the whole higher or more 
restrictive than those imposed by constituent territories before its formation. As was with 
the Treaty of Rome, the method in which the conunon external tariff of customs unions 
is elaborated from individual member tariffs -i.e. simple averaging, trade weighting 
averaging or alignment at the lowest tariff has important effects on the ex post market 
access opportunities of third country suppliers. 
A closely related issue is whether it is necessary for the purpose of making a comparison 
between ex ante and ex post market access opportunities that a country by country and 
product by product examination of the effect of increases in tariffs be undertaken. In 
the examination of the Treaty of Rome, third countries argued that members of a 
customs union or free trade area should not have raised barriers to the trade of any 
individual third country. 
The EEC, however, opted for a contrary viewpoint. It argued that such an interpretation 
would be inconsistent with the requirement that the duties and other regulations imposed 
at the institution of the union should not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than 
the general incidence prior to the formation of the union. The requirement has been 
interpreted by the EEC to apply to third countries as a group rather than individually and 
to not preclude the raising of barriers to trade in a sector or su b-sector of merchandise 
trade provided barriers are lowered in other sectors or sub-sectors. 
Clearly, the position postulated by the EEC helps only to confuse an already difficult 
situation. Third countries have repeatedly raised their concerns regarding the operation 
of this provision in the working parties established to examine subsequent enlargement 
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of the EEC.361 In practice, the prOVlSlons of Article XXIV have not been strictly 
observed, partly due to ambigillties in the language that have permitted different 
interpretations. The notification and examination of the European Community was an 
important watershed for the subsequent fate of Article XXIV. For purely political 
reasons, WTO Contracting Parties decided not to issue a formal ruling on whether the 
Treaty of Rome was compatible with the WTO provisions.362 A precedent for inaction 
was thus set and has not, subsequently, been reversed. 
On the ll'h July 1975, 1O,h March 1981 and 4'h March 1987, the GAIT Council of 
Representatives established working parties to examine, in the light of the relevant 
provisions of the General Agreement, the first, second and third Lome Conventions 
respectively and to report to the Council. In these working parties, the Contracting 
Parties have so far never reached a consensus as to the compatibility of the successive 
Lome Conventions with the provisions of the GATT. On three occasions when the issue 
was examined in GA IT, there was wide sympathy for the view that the purpose and 
objectives of the convention were in line with those in the General Agreements. This was 
basically the view that the Convention was aimed at improving the standards of living 
and economic development of the developing countries.363 
As regards bound rate, if a Contracting Party proposes to increase a bound rate of duty 
on joining a customs union, the normal GAIT procedures for the modification of 
Schedules apply as set forth in A rticle XX VIII. In providing for compensatory 
adjustment, par. 6 of Article XXIV states that due account is to be taken of the 
compensation already afforded by the reductions brought about in the corresponding 
duties of the other members of the union. Controversy, however, exists as to when the 
negotiations for compensation should be carried out,364 the nature of the compensation 
and whether account must also be taken of tariff reductions by the members of the 
customs union on other items. The negotiations on the compensation that followed the 
361 The examination of the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK to the EC was halted as a result of 
such disagreement (GATT document C/M/107) 
362 Ibid. 
363 The rationale for the Enabling Gause in particular is to encourage the more affluent developing 
countries to reach out to the impoverished lot of the developing countries on palatable trade 
terms. Such an exercise, it is hoped would help in the effective assimilation of these economies in 
the mainstream of the world trading system. See the discussion on this item at chapter two 
364 For instance, is it before or after the establishment of the customs union 
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submission of the common external tariff of the EECJ65 proved sufficiently complex and 
disappointing for third countries that some were led to threaten retaliation.J66 
The EC's debacle has been a rather vexing nay-exacerbating experience for the WTOs 
relentless efforts to reign in offending regional trade arrangements. As a matter of fact, 
since the Contracting Parties have never officially formulated agreed conclusions as to 
the EEC's conformity with Art. XXIV, the EEC's legal status within the WTO has 
never been settled in a definitive way. Since 21 st November 1958, when the Contracting 
Parties decided that" ... the examination of the Rome Treaty pursuant to par. 7 of Article 
XXIV. .. could not usefully be pursued", the EEC has always enjoyed an ad!xx status in 
the GA TI.367 This, however, has never prevented the Community from exercising its 
competence in the WTO framework as foreseen by the Treaty of Rome. 
In spite of the Community's high profile participation in the WTO prgrammes since the 
1960s, some Contracting Parties still argue that the legal status of the Community remain 
open by the fact that it has never received an explicit WTO approval. According to 
members of the Community, however, the absence of the GA TI recommendation 
requesting the amendment of specific Community provisions automatically leads to the 
presumption that the Community must be in conformity with A rtide XXIV. 368 
To ensure that particular industries and non-member Contracting Parties would not be 
disproportionately affected by the customs union, the approach favoured by the Japanese 
delegation and the Secretariat was one which would take into account the specific 
product-by-product effects of the formation or enlargement of a union on individual 
non-members. The Community rejected the Japanese and the Secretariat's proposal as 
being in total opposition to its well-established views.J69 The Community had indeed 
repeated during each working group examination that the task under Article XXIV 5 was 
365 The 1961 Dillon Round 
366 See, for example, Bethlehem, Regionalism and the World Trading System, supra at pp.ll-12, see also 
BISD 6S1 70 
367 GATT Contracting Parties 13th session, Summary Record of the 19th Meeting held on 21st November 
1958, SR. D/19. P 202: also BISD 6th Supplement. p. 71. For the Community'S status in the 
GATT, see Meinhard Hilf Francis G. Jacobs and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.). The European 
Community and GATT, Deventer: Kluwer, 1986: and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Participation of 
the European Community in the GATT: Internal Law and Community Law ReportS. D. 
O'Keeffe and Heruy G. Schermers (eds), Mixed Agreements, Deventer: Kluwer, 1984, pp.167-
198 
368 GATT Uruguay Round documents MlN. GNGING7/W/13. P.ll 
112 
to discuss the consequences of the Community's formation or enlargement by looking at 
the total trade of the member States with the other Contracting Parties taken collectively. 
Specific problems, which could arise for individual Contracting Parties had to be dealt 
with during the Article XXIV: 6 negotiations, the Community added. 
Following the Community's reaCtion, a comprorruse was worked out which seemed 
acceptable to all parties. The compromise, which is contained in the Brussels draft 
Understanding, stipulates that future evaluations of A rticle XXIV 5 would" ... be based 
upon an overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties 
collected." This assessment must be based on import statistics for a previous 
representative period to be supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-line basis and in 
values and quantities, broken down by GAIT count!)' origin. The GAIT Secretariat 
shall compute the weighted average tariff rates and customs duties collected in 
accordance with the methodology used in the assessment of tariff offers in the Uruguay 
Round. For this purpose, the duties and charges to be taken into consideration shall be 
the applied rate of duty.,,37o 
A close reading of the comprorruse clearly demonstrates that the Brussels draft still 
provides sufficient room for members of customs unions and non-members to express 
diverging opinions on the relative weight to be attached to the overall assessment versus 
a product-specific assessment. Moreover, even if attention goes mainly to the overall 
assessment of a customs union's global tariff schedule, past Article XXIV 5 exercises 
have shown something else. This is that an evaluation of weighted average tariff rates on 
the one hand and of customs duties collected on the other does not necessarily lead to a 
similar conclusion. 371 
4.3.6 The improved version of Article XXN 
369 Uruguay Round - Meeting of GAIT Articles Group, 21-23 May 1990, Geneva: Delegation of the 
Corrunission of the European Community, May 1990, p. 2 
)70 It is also recognised that "for the purpose of the overall assessment of the incidence of the regulations 
of commerce for which quantification and aggression are difficult, the examination of individual 
measures, regulations, products covered and trade flows affected may be required." While the 
procedure foreseen for the calculation of the general incidence of tariffs would be substantially 
clarified by the adoption of this compromise, it is unlikely that the new formula would foster 
agreement on the final conclusion to be drawn by GAIT working groups. See Devuyst, Infra 
371 Y. Devuyst: " GAIT Customs Union Provision and the UR: The European Community Experience", 
26 Journal of World Trade, 1 Feb. 1992, at p. 29 
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The WTO Understanding clarifies several aspects of the operation of par. 5 of A rtide 
XXIV by providing guidelines on the methods to be followed in comparing the overall 
level of tariffs and charges on imports before and after the formation of the customs 
union. In particular, the assessment will be based on a weighted average of tariff rates 
and customs union duties collected using applied rates. A reasonable length of time for 
the formation of a customs union or free trade area is deemed to be ten years, except for 
exceptional circumstances, where a full explanation is required. 
The negotiations on compensation provided for under par.6 of Article XXIV, where 
needed, must begin before the common external tariff is implemented. This is important 
to third countries because the short-term trade diversionary effects of the establishment 
of a customs union are easier to mitigate when the new common external tariff already 
includes compensatory adjustments. In these negotiations, when one or more constituent 
members of the customs union is required to raise its tariff on a particular product, due 
account must also be taken of reductions in the tariff on that product by other members, 
in deciding on compensatory tariff reductions on other products.372 This Understanding, 
therefore, makes it clear that negotiating partners are required to take into account 
reductions of duty only on the same tariff line. While the text does not preclude 
acceptance of any incidental reductions in tariffs on the other products as part of the 
compensation, third countries cannot be obligated to accept them.373 
Regarding transparency, the discipline requires that all agreements notified under Article 
XXIV be examined by a working party. If an interim agreement is notified without a 
plan and schedule, the working party shall in its report recommend a plan and schedule. 
The Understanding also conflffils the biannual reporting requirement for members of 
regional agreements. The discipline also clarifies the relationship between the invocation 
of the dispute settlement provisions of the WTO, and the examination of agreements 
under Article XXIV. The discipline states that the dispute settlement provisions "may be 
invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of Article XXIV". This 
was intended to resolve the uncertainty as to whether a panel can consider issues arising 
372 The Understanding on the interpretation of Article XXVIII expands the group of trading partners with 
whom negotiations must be conducted to include the country with the highest share in its exports 
of the product affected by the withdrawal or modification. The purpose of the provision is to 
secure redistribution of negotiating rights in favour of small and medium-sized countries with a 
strong trade interest in the product. 
m As we noted earlier in this discussion, compensation was one of the major sources of conflict between 
the EC and third countries at the time of its formation and subsequent enlargement 
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from an agreement that had already been examined by a working party established under 
Article XXIV. It has, at times, been argued that only an Article XXIV working party can 
properly do this. 
The purpose of the Understanding on Article XXIV is to clarify certain of the areas 
where the application of the Article had given rise to controversy in the past. In 
particular as regards the external policy of customs unions. The Article has, so far fallen 
short of addressing most of the difficult issues of interpretation that have been raised. 
For, example, no consensus emerged in the Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on 
GAIT Articles concerning proposals made by several participants, notably Japan, to 
clarify the substantially-all-trade requirement. It is evident, therefore, that most of the 
problems that have plagued the working party process were not resolved in the Uruguay 
Round. There is a clear recognition of the Preamble to the Understanding.374 That is "the 
contribution to the expansion of world trade of customs unions and free trade areas is 
increased if the elimination of duties between the constituent territories and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade, and, [is] diminished if any major 
sector is excluded. ,,375 
Thus while there have been very few unanimous conclusions or specific endorsements 
that all the legal requirements had not been met, the working parties have also never 
reached the conclusion that the legal requirements had not been met. In other words, 
and this needs be emphasised, making no procurement on the key matters they were 
charged to examine has been the rule for Article XXIV working parties.376 The absence 
of such recommendations has been interpreted by several Contracting Parties as implying 
that it must, therefore, be assumed that the agreement in question is in conformity with 
Article XXIV. 
On the other hand, others have considered that in the absence of any final decision by 
the Contracting Parties acting jointly on the conformity of a particular agreement with 
374 Bethlehem, Regionalism and the World Trading System, supra, at p. 20 
375 The text, in addition, states that the "reasonable length of time" of interim agreements should exceed 
ten years only in exceptional cases. In cases where members believe that ten years would be 
insufficient they would provide a full explanation to GAIT members of the need for a longer 
period. On the renegotiations of bound tariffs, Article XXIV 6, the text clarify that "when a 
Contracting Party forming a customs union proposes to increase a bound rate of duty", it would 
proceed in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVll which deals with Changes in Tariff 
Schedules. 
lIS 
the provisions of Article XXIV, the legal status of such an agreement remains open. It 
remains to be seen what treatment the EU-SA trade partnership would and indeed the 
other integration regimes that are gathering momentum in the east and southern Africa 
region would receive as regards conformity with Article XXIV. 377 These issues would be 
the pre-occupation of the subsequent chapters treating integration regimes in the region. 
4.3.7 The implications of Article XXN on regionalism 
Obviously, neither the Brussels draft nor any other politically acceptable compronuse 
text will be able to bridge the huge gap which often separates members of customs 
unions on the one hand and non-members on the other regarding the concrete 
interpretation of par. 5 statistics or par.6 negotiation offers. Nevertheless, in view of the 
endless debates which have been held in the past, especially on the methods for 
calculating the "general incidence" under Article XXIV 6 the adoption of the Brussels 
draft Understanding could be very useful.J78 Some commentators are confident that the 
simple clarification of Article XXIV's textual vagueness might lead to a decrease in the 
number of methodological debates.379 
One of the Contracting Parties that decided to formally maintain reservations regarding 
the Brussels draft Understanding on Article XXIV did so because the Brussels draft did 
"not adequately address what was perceived to be a trend away from multilateralism and 
toward regionalism."J80 It is doubtful, however, whether Article XXIV, as such, could be 
expected to serve as a means of discouraging regionalism. In fact, Article XXIV merely 
sets out a number of purely trade-related multilateral criteria which regional arrangements 
must abide by. The maintenance of a certain degree of multilateral oversight by the 
GATT is extremely important in order to discourage the formation of inward looking 
376 Bethlehem; Regionalism and the World Trading System supra at p. 17 
377 It is noteworthy that members benefiting from a reduction of duties brought about by the formation of 
a customs union are not obliged to provide compensatory adjustment. On the measure taken by 
sub-Federal levels (Article XXIV: 12), the text makes clear that members are fulJy responsible 
within the GAIT for breaches of the General Agreement by subordinate levels of government 
within their territory. The review procedures of the customs unions and free trade areas are 
strengthened in order to increase the chances of working parties arriving at agreed conclusions. 
Amongst other decisions, the text makes clear that interim agreements not containing a "plan and 
Schedule" can be prevented from being put into force, and it creates an obligation to report any 
significant changes or developments as they occur. 
378 Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: an overview, supra at pp. 33-38 
379 In particular, consideration should be had to those aiming at the exclusion or inclusion of certain 
calculations and negotiations techniques purely on the basis of the expected positive or negative 
result of such techniques for the arguments of the opponent 
380 MTN. TNC/W/35, p. 306 
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trade blocs. Quite clearly, however, the reason for and implications of regionalism 
obviously go far beyond international trade. It is necessary, therefore, not to lose sight of 
Article XXIV's relatively narrow scope. 
But again, the political angle to the never-ending conundrum that clouds Article XXIV 
provisions cannot be under-estimated. The EU has, not infrequently, defended its 
enlargements and deepening of its association agreement as stenuning largely from the 
necessity to lent support to political democratisation and economic modernisation in 
unstable regions or turbulent new democracies. As a consequence of the political 
significance which has often been accorded to regional integration initiatives, the 
question has arisen as to whether the creation or strengthening of politically important 
regional arrangements can, in practice, be subordinated to narrowly conceived trade rules 
as contained in Article XXIV 
In this regard, it is interesting to look back at the attitude of the US on the occasion of 
the Article XXIV 7 examination of the Treaty of Rome in 1958. In view of the political 
importance which the Eisenhower Administration attached to the European Integration, 
the US delegation to the GAIT constantly tried "to avoid a narrow or legalistic 
approach."381 If followed literally, the formal GAIT procedures were bound to lead to 
difficulties, wrote Isiah Frank, the then Deputy Director of the Department of State's 
Office of International TradeJ82. As a result, US representatives argued in favour of "a 
practical and realistic approach. 
This then led to the decision by the Contracting Parties to "leave aside ... questions abollt 
the compatibility of the Treaty of Rome with Article XXIV provisions.383 In fact, the US 
argued in 1958 that the creation of the EEC was too important to be left to a simple 
assessment under GAIT's trade rules. Similar views can still be heard today. Whether or 
not a regional arrangement will foster the growth of international trade should be one of 
the main questions during any A rticle XXIV exercise. However, current examinations 
under Article XXIV focus exclusively on customs duties and non-tariff barriers. Quite 
381 Isiah Frank, The European Common Market: An analysis of Commercial Policy, New York: Praeger, 
1961, pp.161-164, 
382 Ibid. 
383 GAIT Contracting Parties 13th Session, Summary Record of the 19th Meeting held on 21 Sl November 
1958, SR p. 202: also in BISD 6th Supplement at p. 71 
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admittedly, these traditional commercial policy instnunents only marginally affect real 
trade flows. 
Indeed, economic competitiveness as well as pressures for protectionism is to a large 
degree determined by macroeconomic factors such as the evolution of the exchange rate, 
the level of inflation, and the cost of labour.J84 Realising the significance of these factors, 
regional arrangements such as the EEC increasingly try to affect the macroeconomic and 
monetary climate. Article XXIV, however, is still limited to commercial policy in the 
strict sense. The analysis of regional regimes in east and southern Africa in subsequent 
chapters clearly identifies political imperatives as one of the driving force for the 
evolution of these regimes. The political undercurrents are in some instances far much 
pronounced as to play a vital role in the very existence of these regimes their legal 
rectitude notwithstanding.385 Like we have demonstrated at chapter six, the legal persona 
of the SACU to contract with the SADC as a single entity is highly doubtful. The 
underlying political imperatives would, however, excuse such a legal travesty with ease. 
4.4 A critique of Article XXIV provisions 
The clear determination of 100 percent preferences as compatible with multilateralism 
and non-discrimination and the equally firm view that anything less does not amounts to 
compliance has served a concrete purpose. It meant that when Article XXIV was drafted, 
its principle objective was to close all possible loopholes by which it could degenerate 
into a justification for preferential arrangements of less than 100 percent preferences. 
Par.4-lO of Article XXIV was written precisely for this purpose. But as is now commonly 
conceded, their inherent ambiguity and the political pressures for approval of substantial 
regional groupings of preferences that are less than 100 percent have combined to 
frustrate the full import of the original desire to sanction only 100 percent preferences.J86 
This tension between intention and reality has a direct bearing on the important question 
of strengthening Article XXIV today beyond even what its original drafters intended. 
Bagwat?87 laments that the original Article XXIV was "reasonably clear" but was 
384 Rudiger Dornmbush and Jeffrey A Frankel: Macroeconomic and Protection, in Robert M. Stern (ed.). 
US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy, Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 1988, pp. 77-
130: See also Enzo Grilli, Macroeconomic Determinants of Trade Protection in World Economy, 
vol. II September 1988, pp. 313-326 
385 See the detailed discussion of these issues at chapters five rights through to chapter eight 
386Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: an overview, supra at p. 26 
387 Ibid 
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occasionally violated in spirit this to the point where the great expert on GA TI law John 
JacksonJ88 was clearly irked. He continues so far as to observe that the accommodation 
of the European Common Market's imperfect union in disregard of the legal 
requirements of Article XXIV was the beginning of the breakdown of the GA TI's legal 
discipline, which "we now seek to repair" .J89 Two issues suffice to demonstrate this 
contention. First, in regard to the elimination of internal barriers down to 100 percent, 
there was enough scope within the language of Article XXIV, par. 8, for its intent to be 
successfully avoided. Ambiguity could be exploited on two fronts. J90 
The first ambiguity lay in the directive that 'duties and other restrictive regulations on 
commerce" were; with the specific exceptions permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, 
XlV, and XX; to be eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories.' Skilful lawyers and representatives of governments could work 
wonders with the concept of 'substantially all the trade'. And then, even if a percentage 
cut-off point was accepted for this purpose - for example, 75 percent of all initial trade -
important issues remained ambiguous. Issues such as whether across the board 75 
percent cut on everything were required or whether substantial sub-sectors could be left 
out altogether from the scope of the cuts. The latter being evidently at variance with the 
intent of those who favoured 100 percent Customs unions but opposed less than 100 
percent preferential arrangements. With both interpretations possible, sectorally non-
uniform preferential arrangements could evidently not effectively be ruled out. 
An ambiguity of equal importance arose with regard to the problem of the speed with 
which the '100 percent preferences' would be implemented. Evidently, if they were 
stretched out over long periods, one was de facto sanctioning 'less than 100 percent 
preferential arrangements. In GA TI jargon, this was the problem of lllterun 
arrangements. Par. 5 did address this issue, requiring a 'plan of action and schedule' and 
asking for the customs union and free trade area to be fully consummated 'within a 
reasonable length of time'. Par. 7, in turn, laid down specific procedures for such interim 
arrangements to be approved. Needless to say, this provision, nonetheless, left the door 
wide open for substantial laxity in the conception and execution of the customs union 
388 Bhagwati; Regionalism and Multilateralism: an overview supra at p-27 
389 A substantially improved and more effective functioning Dispute Settlement Mechanism, aimed at 
restoring GAIT's legal discipline, is an important part of the 1992 'Dunkel daft' of what the 
Uruguay Round should conclude 
390Bhagwati Regionalism and Multilateralism: an overview, supra at p.27 
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and free trade areas under A nicle XXIV. 391 A strong tendency has also been manifested 
for interim agreements to provide for an even longer transitional period and to contain 
increasingly fewer detailed commitments for eventual completion of customs unions or 
free trade areas. 
4.5.1 The dilemma of reciprocity for regional regimes 
Part IV of the GATT on "Trade and Development"- Articles XXXVI, XXXVII and 
XXXVIII establish the principle of non-reciprocity in trade negotiations between 
developed and developing countries. It allows developed countries to adopt special 
measures to promote the expansion of imports from developing countries. It also 
provides a safe corridor for developed countries to establish special measures to promote 
the expansion of imports from developing countries. Part IV has been invoked in certain 
instances by developed country parties to justify preferential treatment and non-
reciprocal access for developing country parties. 
For example, in the working party on the first Lome Convention, the EC stated that it 
had not demanded reciprocity in its trade relations with Contracting Parties from the 
ACP group of countries "in the light of their development needs and the principles of 
Part IV of the General Agreements".392 No reverse preferences were required of the ACP 
countries and all remaining preference arrangements with the ACP countries393 were 
eliminated. The parties to the Convention were of the view that these trade arrangements 
were compatible with their obligations under the GATT "in panicular the provisions of 
Articles 1:2. XXIV and XXXVI, which had to be considered side by side and in 
conjunction with one another" .394 
391 On his part, Dam, supra at p. 290, states that the record was not that far comforting enough. He points 
out that perhaps only one of more than one dozen regional arrangements that have come before 
the GAIT could be said to have complied fully with Article XXIV criteria. He singles out the 
UK-Ireland free trade Area, as one that complies with Article XXIV. But even in that case certain 
doubts were expressed before the working party. In some cases, the regional arrangements were 
very wide off the mark. The European Coal and Steel Community, for instance, covering only 
two major product lines, could not even qualify for the special regional waiver of Article XXIV: 
10. It, instead, required a general waiver under Article XXIV 5. The New Zealand-Australian free 
trade agreement, although not purportedly an example of 'functional integration', provided for 
the liberalisation of an even smaller percentage of inter-member trade, supra at p. 290 
392 BISD 23S/53 
m For example, under the Yaounde Convention between the original six members of the EC and their 
fonner colonies 
394 BISD 235/53 
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Other participants in the working party did not share this view, arguing that reciprocal 
preferences should be part of any regional integration agreement.395 It was also 
emphasised that Part IV of the GAIT did not permit discrimination against other 
developing countries, since it endorsed special treatment in favour of all developing 
countries and not just a sub-group. These arguments were taken up again in the working 
parties established to examine the Second, Third and Fourth Lome Conventions. At one 
point, the working party examining the Fourth Lome Convention heard the views of 
several participants stated thus: 
" ... while they recognised the Lome Convention as a praiseworthy initiative, it violated 
the Most Favoured Nation treatment and they could not accept that it was in 
conformity with the provisions of the General Agreements only if the parties to the 
Convention were granted a waiver of their contractual obligations under the 
provisions of Article XXV as was done for the United States Caribbean Basin 
Initiative and Canada's CARIBCAN programme."396 
On December 1994 the GAIT Contracting Parties acting jointly (Article XXV5) granted 
the members of the Fourth Lome Convention a waiver from Article 1 until 29 th February 
2000 to the extend necessary to permit the EC to provide preferential treatment for 
products originating in the ACP States as required by the Fourth Lome Convention.397 
The decision notes that the parties to the Convention made the request for a waiver 
without prejudice to their position that the Convention is entirely compatible with their 
obligations under Article XXIV in the light of Part IV. Effective, therefore, the Cotonou 
agreement, which replaced Lome IV is structured to conform to Article XXIV provisions. 
This new alignment is, of course, as amply demonstrated in chapter seven, structured to 
the detriment of the ACP countries.398 
395 This has also been an issue in the working parties that examined the Australian - Papua New Guinea 
and Commercial Relations Agreement (BISD 24S/63), and the agreement between the European 
Community and Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and T urusia, respectively, for which under 
Article XXIV were claimed in conjunction (BISD 24S/80, 25S/133, 25S/142, 25S/88, 25S/123, 
24S/97 
396 GAIT document 7502 
)97 GAIT document Li7604 
398 See Chapter Six for a detailed discussion on this item 
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4.5.2 The status of the Enabling Clause 
The Enabling Clause (hereinafter -'the Clause') was agreed upon in November 1979 as 
part of the results that emerged from the Tokyo Round.399 It includes a number of 
provlSlons permitting GATT Contracting Parties to grant a differential and more 
favourable treatment to developing countries notwithstanding the non-discrimination 
requirement in Article 1 of the Geneva Agreement. It thus provides the legal cover for 
most notable trade concessions granted to developing countries under the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP).400 This is the subject of a decision of 25 th June 1971, 
waving the provisions of Article 1 in its application to developing countries. Initially, for 
a period of ten years, par.2(c) of the Clause applies such treatment to regional or global 
arrangements entered into among developing Contracting Parties for the mutual 
reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-tariff measures. 
The Clause is intended to facilitate the integration of developing countries more fully 
into the multilateral trading system by providing them with additional flexibility to meet 
their GATT obligations. Under this clause, arrangements that are exclusively among 
developing countries can be considered less restrictive, unless the arrangements 
contemplate the selective removal of non-tariff barriers, in which case approval by the 
GATT members is required 
Under the Clause, GA TT members may accord differential and more favourable 
treatment to developing countries without according such treatment to third countries in 
the following situations: 
~ preferential treatment accorded by developed countnes to developing 
countries' products in accordance with the GSP 
~ differential and more favourable treatment with respect to provisions of 
the General Agreement concerning non-tariff measures governed by the 
provisions of instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of 
the GATT. 
~ regional or global arrangements among developing countries aimed at 
mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs on products imported from one 
another. However" if the arrangements contemplate the selective removal 
of non-tariff barriers, approval by other GATT members would be 
required. 
399 GA TI focus March 1993 No. 97 
400 See rhe discussion on rhis irem below 
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The Enabling Clause also permits special trade treatment for the least developed 
countries (LDCs). Any differential and more favourable treatment provided: 
~ would be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing 
countries and not to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the 
trade of any other GAIT members. 
~ would not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of 
tariffs and other restrictions to trade on an MFN bias: and 
~ would, in the case of such treatment accorded by developed to 
developing countries, be designed and, if necessary, modified to respond 
positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing 
countnes. 
Additionally, developed countries would not expect developing countries, in the course 
of trade negotiations, to make contributions, which are inconsistent with their individual 
development, financial, and trade needs. The Clause is thus said to be less demanding 
than Article XXIV in terms of notification and consultations; substantially-all-trade 
requirements; ex ante and ex post protection vis-a-vis third countries; and the time frame 
for implementation of interregional trade liberalisation. In view of the discourse taken by 
the Enabling Clause and given the fact that South Africa is rated as a developed country 
under the WTO, the preferences it enjoys under the EU-SA trade partnership would be 
difficult to characterise.401 
The authority given under the Clause to enter into regional arrangements is governed by 
several conditions. A provision, similar to the key requirement of perr. 4 of A rticle XXI V is 
found in par. 3 of the Enabling Clause. It requires that any such arrangement be designed 
to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not to raise barriers to or 
create undue difficulties for the trade of the other Contracting Parties. Par. 2(c) clearly 
treats tariff differently from non-tariff barriers. There is no specific "criteria set out for 
the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs, while action on non-tariff barriers is to be 
governed by criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by Contracting Parties." 
An additional condition, which does not have a counterpart in Article XXIV, is that such 
agreements shall not impede the MFN reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
trade restrictions. As regards transparency, par. 4 requires that such arrangements be 
notified to GAIT when they are introduced, modified or withdrawn and that the 
401 See chapter five below for the detailed discussion of this item 
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participants are ready to consult with third countries upon request. The Committee on 
Trade and Development has the mandate to monitor the implementation of GAIT 
provisions in favour of developing countries.402 
Eleven agreements have so far been notified to the Committee on Trade and 
Development for which the parties claim the cover of the Enabling Clause.403 Although 
the experience with the Enabling Clause provisions on regional arrangements is limited, 
it has already given raise to controversy. The Enabling Clause does not contain any 
reference to Article XXIV, an omission which has left unclear whether the Enabling 
Clause applies in situations where Article XXIV does not or affects the terms of 
application of that Clause or represents, for developing countries, a complete alternative 
to the Article. Indeed, views differ as to whether the Enabling Clause provides an 
appropriate basis for all regional arrangements among developing countries.404 
4.6 International Trade in Services 
The GA IT only sanctions the trade in goods. It does not make provision for the trade in 
services (the so- called "invisible" trade) which represents about 35 per cent of 
international trade transactions and more than 60 percent of the BNP of most 
industrialised countries.405 A regulation of international trade should, however, include 
rules for the trade in services. During the Uruguay Round (1986-1993) negotiations took 
place for the conclusion of the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS).406 
402 This lS mainly with regard to Part IV and the Enabling Clause 
403 See appendix 'A' for a better illustration of this regimes 
404 Some governments maintain the view that the Clause was not intended to cover arrangements of major 
significance that up to 1979, would have been handled under Article XXIV, Recently, extensive 
debates took place on the modalities for examining the Southern Conunon Market 
(MERCOSUR) between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. These discussions led to the 
establishment of a working party under the Conunittee on Trade and Development in May 1993, 
which held its first meeting on the framework agreement in April 1995. The conunon external 
tariff implemented in] anuary 1995 has not yet been notified 
40SSee for example P Nicolaides, Lil:eralising service trctde (Chatham House, 1989 London) 
406 This extensive Agreement is based, among other things, on the following principles: Most favoured 
treatment (par.3.09), National treatment (par.3.43), "transparency, by publishing existing 
restrictions; progressive liberalisation through multilateral trade negotiations, as is already the case 
for the trade in goods {par.3.I3}; more liberalisation within the customs unions and free trade 
zones (see also par.3.11), greater participation of the developing countries in the international 
trade in services, iJU.er alia through access to technology, distribution channels and information 
networks. See also M. Footer, "GAIT and the Multilateral Regulation of Banking Services" 
(1993) 27 International Lawyer 343; See also F. Lazar, "Services and the GATT" (1990/1) ].W.T 
at p. 135; and P Nicolaides, Lwalising service trctde (Chatham House, 1989 London) 
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There are also some provisions on general exceptions and security exceptions in GATS, 
which are similar to Article XX, and XXI of the GAIT (par.3.44). "Service,,407 includes 
"any service in any sector, except services supplied in the exercise of governmental 
functions" (Article 1 (3)(b). It has been said that this description is too wide and that, it 
therefore, makes little sense to liberalise the trade in services in the same way as the trade 
in goods, because services are more person related than goods. 408 Moreover, one of the 
purposes of the GATS, i.e. the realisation of most favoured and national treatment, is 
very ambitious. Within the WTO, the Council for Trade in Services oversees the 
functioning of the GATS. Disputes between Contracting Parties about GATS 
obligations and conunitments have to be settled through consultations or under the 
Integrated Dispute Settlement System (par. 3. 07). 
The initiative to expand the GAIT Agreement to include the domain of services came 
from the United States. This is due mainly to the fact that an imponant and increasing 
part of its overall trade (especiallyexpons) consists of trade in services. From the outset, 
the position of the developing countries to the initiative was, if not hostile, at least 
sceptical and suspicious. Rom409 lists five reasons to explain this position. Firstly, the 
argument that the GAIT had no authority to deal with this subject already treated 
partially by UNCTAD. Secondly, the fact that GATT had not yet solved problems of 
existing conunitments and obligations - requiring solutions - of particular imponance 
for the developing countries, such as agriculture and textiles; 
The third reason for the demur is the dearth of knowledge on the workings of services 
trade that is readily available in the developing world. This is in contrast to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) countries, who had 
dealt with the subject for years. There was also a need to study the implications that the 
inclusion of services in the multilateral trade framework would have for the future 
independent development of this sector in developing countries. This was accompanied 
with underlying fear in developing countries that the initiative might serve to perpetuate 
the state of dominance of developed countries in this sector. 
407 In the sense in which the GATS is understood 
408 M.Van Empel, "The visible hand of the invisible trade" (1990/2) LIEL 26-27, 38-39 ("where 'goods', 
once produced, take on an identity of their own, 'services' are determined by the identity of their 
producer") 
409 Michael Rom supra; at p. 23 
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Fourthly, there was the additional fear in the developing countries that their developed 
counterparts would exploit their willingness to relax restrictions, long overdue, in the 
field of trade in goods, to pressure developing countries to make concessions and 
comnutments in the field of services. Finally, it should be mentioned that developing 
countries felt that the proposals submitted by the leading developed countries were 
actually strongly biased in favour of the developed countries. For instance, they 
emphasised subjects in which developed countries had a comparative advantage such as 
capital, know-how and technology- intensive services. Whereas they included only 
minimal proposals in favour of labour-intensive services -whether skilled or unskilled -
that were of interest to developing countries.410 
Only within the framework of the Punta del Este Declaration did developing countries 
agree to accept a compromise wherein it was agreed that negotiations about liberalisation 
in services would be carried out in the Uruguay Round. 411 TIlls should, however, be 
under a separate framework, parallel to the negotiations in trade in goods, without any 
inter-relationship with the GATT Agreement. The latter served to prevent any cross 
linkage being used by the developed countries to the detriment of developing countries. 
Even from a legal point of view, the trade negotiations with respect to goods were to be 
conducted by the Contracting Parties of GATT, whereas the trade negotiations on 
services under GATS were to be conducted by governments. 
At any rate development concerns, not the question of liberalisation, should be the 
centre of the negotiations.412 It should be mentioned that during the course of the seven 
years of negotiations on the Uruguay Round, a hard struggle was conducted by the 
developing countries to protect their interests. They managed to some extent to attain 
achievements and push through their positions. Yet, it is clear today that the developing 
4)0 Ibid. 
411 Despite the fact that the Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS) reports on the Trade Negotiation 
Committee (INC) constitutes an integral part of the Uruguay Round, this set up ensures that the 
negotiations on services are conducted as a separate and independent process outside the GATT. 
With the compromise, the Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este in 1986 achieved recognition 
of the developing countries' demands. That is, firstly, that the GAIT have no authority to deal 
with the subject of services. Secondly, that there be no cross-linkage between trade negotiations 
in goods and trade negotiations in services. And thirdly, that subjects regarding development of 
developing countries and the economic growth of all member countries be emphasised. That is to 
say, that the declared goal is the achievement of these targets by the expansion of the trade in 
services, and not liberalisation per se. 
4)2 In this report, see the detailed discussion in Jannette Mark and Gerald Helleiner, Trade in Seroices: The 
NegjJtialians Cona:ms 0/ the Deuioping Countries, the North-South Institute, Ottawa, Canada, 
December 1998 pp.19-22 
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countnes have not managed to mamtaln a total separatlon of the two Agreements, 
although it is possible that this was even desirable from their point of view.413 
Rom is of the decided view that a linkage has been established here.414 This may perhaps 
be explained by a change of heart by the developing countries he adds. The latter might 
have realised that they could gain far more linkage deals in the goods sector for services 
than from scrupulous avoidance of this kind of linkage between negotiations on services 
and the GATT negotiations on trade in goods. This reflect the fact of the real world 
where larger countries are already exerting pressure on smaller countries to introouce a 
more open regime for trade in services, threatening to retaliate with access limitations in 
the goods trade. The GATS provide a framework for liberalising trade in the services 
sector. The EU-SA trade partnership makes provision for trade in services. It is clear, 
here, as is the case with the GATT, that the EU is again the obvious beneficiary from the 
provision of this facility.415 The same linkage in goods and services is replyaed in the 
Cotonou Agreement.416 
The unconditional MFN principle requires each government to accord "services and 
service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords 
41) See the detailed description of the development of the negotiations during the period in Murray Gibbs 
and Mina Mashayekhi, the main issue in the Negotiations for a Multilateral Framework for Trade 
in Services in Asia and the Pacific, Selected Papers, Vol. I, UNCfAD/UNDP, UN, New York, 
1990, pp.427. pp. 427-441; and by the same authors, the Deu:lopnmt in the Umguay Round 
Negotidtionson Trade in Seruices, ibid., 1991, Vol. II, pp. 1-74. Thus, with respect to the cross-linkage 
the Services Agreement refers to the fact that in cases where no agreement can be reached 
between the Members it can rely on the understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Section 22, Compensation and Suspension of Concessions. For instance in 
A rtide XXIII, Dispute Settlement and Enforcement, in par. 3 
414 Michael Rom Supra; at p. 25 
415 Such trade is comprehensively defined as taking place through four modes of delivery as follows. (i) eras 
I:xrrder services supplied from the territory of one member to that of the other: for example, 
consulting services supplied by an enterprise in country A to consumers in country B. (ii) 
Consumption abroad services supplied in the territory of one Member to consumers of another: for 
example a resident of country B travels to country A to consume tourism services. (iii) 
Commercial presence services supplied through any type of business or professional 
establishment of one country in the territory of another: for example a bank headquarters in 
country A establishes a branch in country B. (iv) Temporary presence of natural persons: services 
supplied by nationals of one country in the territory of another: for example, a national of country 
A travels to country B to supply construction services. In accordance with the "Annex on M07.e/1'l?J1l 
0/ Nalural Persons Supplying Seruices under the Agmmou", measure affecting natural persons seeking 
access to the employment of a member and measures regarding citizenship, residence or 
employment on a permanent basis are outside the scope of GATS 
416 See chapter seven for example 
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to like services and service suppliers of any other country',.417 Exemptions to the MFN 
principle have been appended to GATS in lists, which relate to specific measures 
through which differential or preferential treatment is granted to certain countries for a 
specific period of time.418 
To achieve a more certain and open policy regime for services, states in the east and 
southern Africa region have bound liberalisation conurutment in schedules of "specific 
conurutments." For the service activities inscribed in a country's schedule, market access 
and national treatment apply, subject to the limitation specified thereto, to services 
supplied by each of the four modes of delivery. The market access and national 
treatment provided for in the schedule must be extended to all foreign services suppliers 
on an MFN basis. However, better treatment than provided for in the schedule may be 
granted to certain foreign suppliers of services if the measure has been specified in the 
MFN exemption list.419 
4.7 The WTO Dispute Settlement Framework 
As was noted above, preferential access granted by the EC has been the subject of three 
dispute settlement proceedings, in each case the EC claiming cover under Article XXIV. 
The adaptation of each of the three panel reports has been blocked in the Council. 
Under the enhanced dispute settlement proceedings this option will no longer be 
available. In relation to the previous GAIT system, the wro dispute settlement system 
provides claimants with automaticity with respect to various matters. The new procedure 
is that the establishment of a Panel to obtain a ruling on the legal status under the wro 
of the measure applied by the trading partner; adaptation of the Panel ruling and 
authorisation of counter-measures in the event where an adopted Panel ruling is not 
implemented. This greater automaticity has been accomplished by a negative consensus 
approach under which a consensus will be needed in order to halt the proceedings from 
advancing at any stage of the formal dispute settlement proceedings. 
417 See Article II - the MFN principle does not apply to government procurement until the conclusion of 
negotiations on this issue, which are required to occur within the period 1995-97 are concluded 
(Article XIII) 
418 For example, a nwnber of governments in Europe and Latin America have claimed MFN exemption 
for bilateral arrangements with neighbours or regional partners which facilitate the cross border 
movement of passenger and freight transport. Except for financial services, maritime service and 
basic telecommunications, where negotiations are ongoing, these lists are basically closed to 
further extensions in the future. 
419 For example, a country may have provided for the temporary presence of natural persons, but only 
nationals of certain countries may obtain the waiver of visa requirements. 
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In order to ensure the automacity in its adaptation Panel rulings are accompanied by 
greater confidence in the quality of legal findings. The appellate review is an important 
new feature in the WTO dispute settlement procedures. An appellate body will hear 
appeals from Panel rulings. If an appeal is not made, the Panel report is accordingly 
adapted. If on the other hand, an appeal is made, the report of the Appellate Body shall 
be adapted by the Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) and unconditionally accepted by the 
parties within thirty (30) days following its issuance to Members unless there is consensus 
against its adaptation. Following its adaptation, and provided that the Panel found in 
favour of the applicant party, the respondent party will have to notify its intention with 
respect to implementation of adapted recommendations. 
Under the GA TI, panels have generally recommended that an inconsistent measure be 
brought into conformity with the rules. If such a step is not taken within a reasonable 
period of time, compensation or the suspension of concessions or other obligations is 
available as temporary measures. If no satisfactory compensation is agreed, the claimant 
may request authorisation from the DSB - acting in accordance with the negative 
consensus approach to retaliate. The EU-SA trade partnership leaves it open to Parties to 
resort to the GA TI Dispute Settlement procedures. The Agreement has, however, and 
like integration regimes in the region, an in-built Dispute Settlement procedure. One 
would expect the Parties to exhaust the in-built mechanisms before, then when 
dissatisfied, resort to the multilateral procedures. 
4.8 Concluding Remarks 
The WTO framework is premised on the rationale that an open and liberal trading 
system underpinned by mutually agreed and legally binding rules, is the sure recipe for 
the growth of the global economy. We have argued in this chapter that the advent of the 
GA TI /WTO system has infused fresh impetus into free trade commitments in the 
international trade arena. The agreement is the basis for a global rule based trading 
system. Indeed the chapter has established that one of the WTO's overriding 
preoccupations is the reduction of the level of protectionism. This it purposes to achieve 
through the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and the decrease of existing tariff 
rates via reciprocal tariff reductions. The chapter has shown that tariff concessions are 
linked to non-discrimination through the principle of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
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treatment. We have also seen that through a series of Rounds, the WTO has significantly 
contributed to the liberalisation of global conunerce. 
The chapter has further demonstrated that legal issues became even more complicated, 
when more sectors like agriculture and the trade in services were brought into the fold. 
This legal conundrum assumed ever more volatile proportions when the exports market 
assumed urgent priority for many countries. The chapter has established that the effects 
of merely phasing out tariffs diminished since tariffs had already come down in 
subsequent WTO Rounds. Most importantly, though, the chapter has shown that many 
countries became used to lower tariffs in the framework of regional arrangements or 
through the General System of Preferences. 
This chapter has vindicated our introductory assertIon to the effect that the new 
institutional system points to the importance of rule based framework to guide the 
international economic development in the 21 St century. The opposite of rules we have 
argued, is a destructive series of ad /xx: protective measures. The WTO/GA IT should be 
viewed as the basis for emerging international institutions. Quite clearly, the opposite of 
a rule-based system would be a system of arbitrary import restrictions, in the shape of the 
so-called anti-damping policies. The chapter has conveyed the important point namely 
that multilateral trade rules erode when countries resort to protectionist measures. 
It is interesting to note that regional arrangements have adapted this pattern of rule based 
multilateral super structure. The chapter has identified Article XXIV and the Enabling 
Clause as the jurisprudential basis for regional regimes. The chapter has noted that 
although regional regimes offend not only the letter but also the spirit of the WTOs 
basic non-discrimination postulate, these regimes are nonetheless tolerated. We have 
explained that regional regimes are acconunodated under the WTO framework due to 
the fact that they are considered, among other reasons, to be a veritable vehicle to 
expedite tariff and non-tariff barrier phase down programme. We have also noted that 
A rticle XXIV was drafted with the principle objective of closing all possible loopholes by 
which it could degenerate into a justification for preferential arrangements of less than 
100 percent preferences. 
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As for the Enabling Clause, the chapter has pointed out that this facility is intended to 
facilitate full integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system. This 
objective would be achieved by providing developing countries with additional flexibility 
to meet their WTO obligations. Under this clause, arrangements that are exclusively 
among developing countries can be considered less restrictive, unless the arrangements 
contemplate the selective removal of non-tariff barriers, in which case approval by the 
GAIT members is required. We have noted that the key cau:at for the utility of the 
Enabling Clause is namely that any such arrangement be designed to facilitate and 
promote the trade of developing countries and not to raise barriers to or create undue 
difficulties for trade of the other Contracting Parties. 
The chapter has demonstrated that regional regimes conglomerate together the so-called 
'like-minded' parties hence their agility in the facilitation of tariff phase-out on a regional 
basis. This trans-national economic alignment would then eventuate into the totality of 
free trade world-wide. The chapter has noted that regional partners should be seen as the 
irrunediate beneficiary of this elaborate rule based international trade framework. It goes 
without saying, therefore, that regional arrangements in the eastern and southern Africa 
region are no exception in this regard. 
The chapter has noted that the MFN principle in Article 1 is the premier WTO rule upon 
which all other trade regulations derive their competence. Under Article 1 any 
concessions made by one country to another must be inunediately and unconditionally 
extended to like products originating from other Contracting Parties. We have seen that 
there are several exceptions to this basic rule. The chapter has noted, however, that the 
Enabling Clause and Article XXIV are the most fundamental exception to the MFN 
principle. Subject to the conditions set out thereunder these provisions constituent 
territories are permitted to establish more favourable duty and other arrangements 
amongst themselves that pertain to trade with non-member countries. We have explained 
that when a WTO member enters into a regional integration arrangement, it grants more 
favourable conditions to its trade with other parties to that arrangement than to other 
WTO members as a whole. This arrangement obviously goes against the grain of Article 1 
hence the necessity for the said exception. 
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The chapter has reviewed some of the terms and conditions under which regional 
regunes are allowed to operate and highlighted the latent deficiencies in these 
conditionalities. We have noted that the express purpose for granting the exception to 
regional regimes is explained under par. 4 of Article XXIV as being, to facilitate trade 
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other 
Contracting Parties. We have discussed the controversy around the WTO's edict that 
regional regimes cover "substantially all trade" and have submitted that the apparent 
ambiguity in this provision is entirely undesirable. 
We have noted that differences of opinions on the interpretation of the 'substantially-all-
trade' requirement under Article XXIV has been the main reason for the subsisting 
stalemate on the WTO compatibility by individual agreements. The chapter has also 
identified another major constrain specifically placed on customs unions. This is that the 
CET and other trade measures imposed at the time of the formation of a customs union, 
must be set at a level that is not "on the whole" higher or more restrictive than was 
imposed by the constituent territories prior to its formation. We have discussed the 
controversy attending this provision and have submitted that its ambiguity has created an 
easy loophole for countries bend on maintaining high tariff regimes against third 
countries. We have seen how the EU has manipulated this provision to perpetuate its 
offending CAP policy. 
The chapter has examined the dilemma encapsulating the WTO discipline on reciprocity 
under Part IV of the GATT agreement. We have established that Part IV of the GAIT 
did not permit discrimination against other developing countries, since it has endorsed 
special treatment in favour of all developing countries and not just a sub-group. 
The chapter has noted that there are presently no satisfactory multilateral rules that are 
comprehensive enough to govern the determination of rules of origin. The WTO has 
however tried to harmonise disciplines on origin rules. These disciplines are that the rules 
applied by each country must be based on a positive standard namely on what confers 
origin not what does origin confer. We have argued that this attempt at harmonisation is 
feeble and therefore incomparable to the more comprehensive origin rules covered by 
regional integration regimes. In the main, however, this chapter has set the basis upon 
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which the following analytical work on the compatibility of regional regimes with the 
wro disciplines would be premised. 
Chapter Five: The Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we now commence the analytical examination of regional regimes in the 
eastern and southern Africa region. To that extent this phase naturally forms the core of 
the thesis. This task would be undertaken with the view to gauge the implication of the 
confluence of trade regimes for the expressed desire to deepen integration in this region. 
We also concomitantly examine the compatibility of these regimes with the WTO 
disciplines. 
The preVlOUS chapters have achieved the goal of rolling out a clear road map by 
introducing what the subject matter of this work is all about. This we did by identifying 
the advent, character and the dynamics of regional integration regimes. To spice up this 
process, we did also capture integration developments across the globe to emphasis that 
the pattern is the same with similar processes that are taking root in eastern and southern 
Africa region (hereinafter alternatively referred to as 'the region'). We wrapped up the 
first phase of this work by reviewing the wro disciplines to which integration regimes 
must strive to comply in order to gain acceptance in the world trading system. 
This phase will undertake the core task of critically analysing integration reglmes m 
eastern and southern Africa region in the light of the deepening integration processes 
and compliance with the wro disciplines. The choice of the Trade and Development 
Co-operation Agreement, (hereinafter 'the Agreement), signed between the EU and 
South Africa to commence this important phase of our investigation is a deliberate one. 
The fact that this new trade instrument implies far-reaching implications for integration 
processes in the region cannot be overemphasised. The reason, however, for the 
fascination attending this development is not difficult to find. 
The EU plays an immensely significant role in the integration processes currently gaining 
moment in the region. The EU is also the premier market for the region'S export and it is 
by that designation a major trading partner for regional players. South Africa is, on the 
other hand, the undisputed economic powerhouse in the region. By virtue of this 
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economic muscle, many countries in the region look to South Africa as the launching pad 
for technological advancement. This technological advance is important if the region is 
to achieve international competitiveness that would ultimately lead it to sustainable 
prosperity. That brief exposition in a sense explains the huge significance of the EU-SA 
Agreement. 
This chapter will review the principal features of the Agreement and highlight some of 
the economic underpinnings for these provisions. We shall then examine how the 
Agreement fares on the score of compatibility with the WTO discipline to which it owes 
its jurisprudential justification. The Chapter will then undertake a critical appraisal of the 
entire Agreement. We shall conclude the chapter by interrogating the viability of this 
typical north-south trade partnership. 
We will then examine the implication of the EU-SA Agreement on SACU and SADe. 
This discourse would lay particular emphasis on the legal and economic aspects of this 
trade regime confluence. The focus in this respect would, in particular zero in on intra-
regional trade promotion, investment promotion, revenue losses and welfare creation for 
the region. 
The whole purpose of subjecting this trade instrument to this close scrutiny is to prepare 
the groundwork for the subsequent assessment of its implication for the process of 
deepening integration in the region. What this mean is that the EU-SA Agreement will 
feature prominently in subsequent chapters as we measure how it features into the 
integration equation in the region. 
5.2.0 A broad review of the principle features 420 
5.2.1 Tariff dismantling programme 
The overall coverage of the Agreement will amount to 90% of current EU-South Africa 
trade. Due to the developmental nature of the Agreement the EU will, however, open its 
market to South Africa's products more rapidly and more extensively than South Africa. 
While the EU willliberalise up to 95% of its imports from South Africa within 10 years 
after entry into force of the Agreement, South Africa will be able to retain its tariff 
420 See also appendix 'A' 
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barriers for a longer period of time. After a transition period of 12 years South Africa will 
open 86% of EU imports to duty free trade. 
The twill principles of Asymmetry and Differentiation reflect the developmental 
approach of the trade provisions. In recognition of South Africa's economic 
restructuring efforts currently ongoing the EU will open up its market faster and more 
extensively for South Africa's products than it will ask South Africa to reciprocate for its 
products. Within these transitional periods, the bulk of liberalisation of industrial 
products on the EU's side will take place in the first four years. On the South African 
side, tariff reductions for most industrial products will concentrate on the second half of 
the 12-year transition period, that is, between 2006 and 2012.421 
To respect the SenSItiVIty on both sides and taking cogrusance of the econorruc 
disposition of the southern African region, a limited number of products have been 
exempted from free trade.422 For instance, the EU in order to accommodate the 
preferential treatment granted to ACP States in the framework of the Lome 
Convention423 has on the exemption list of parties, beef and sugar. On the South African 
side, the main sensitivity lay in the industrial sector while the EU has made exemption 
mainly on agricultural products. Some products are subject to only partial liberalisation. 
In addition to South Africa liberalising 86.5% of EU industrial imports, 2.9% will be 
partially liberalised. On the EU's side an additional 13% of the agricultural imports will 
be liberalised partially, 61.4% being subject to fullliberalisation. Contracting Parties have 
agreed, however, that these exemptions will be reviewed during the life of the 
Agreement.424 
It is noteworthy that whereas South Africa's exports constitute only one percent of EU 
imports, one-third of South Africa's total imports comes from the ED. This equation 
unfavourably exposes the fragile South Africa economy to the obligatory fundamentals 
of the free trade agreement - be they good or bad. Again, the important yet nagging issue 
of non-tariff barriers to trade is not directly addressed in the Agreement. Presumably, 
421 Phillip Lowe, 'Main Parameters of the EU-SA Partnership, the EU-SA Agrrenml: South Africa, southem 
Africa cmd the European Union in Talitha Benelsmann-Scot, Greg MiUs and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos 
SAllA, eds. 2000 (CWCIF) at p.4l See also hup:! Iwww.wits.ac.za/saiia.html 
422 See Annex 1 of the IDCA for the list of agreed derogation to standstill and rollback items 
m This arrangement has expired and been replaced by a transitional arrangement under the Cotonou 
Agreement - for funher details see chapter seven below 
424 See Annex IV of the IDCA 
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however, these will be legitimated issues for discussion in the Council. In view of the 
intractable issues the non-tariff barrier regime has generated so far, it is unlikely that the 
Council would cover much ground in this regard. 
The EU may have agreed to reduce its tariffs to zero (or near zero) for a whole range of 
South Africa's products in the full knowledge that many of them will either be unable to 
enter the EU or find it exceedingly difficult to do so. This is due to the fact that a range 
of impenetrable non-tariff barriers or disincentives intricately encumbers the EU's 
market. Some of these barriers include bureaucratic customs and administrative entry 
procedures, technical barriers to trade; charges relating to imports, and government aid, 
including agricultural subsidies, to EU members States. 425 All these are veritable 
impediments to the flow of free trade. The Agreement is unfortunately silent on these 
obvious fetters to free trade. 
5.2.2 Establishment of a free trade area 
Under Article 5, the Community and South Africa agree to establish a free trade area in 
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement and in conformity with those of the 
wro disciplines. The free trade area will be established over a transitional period 
lasting, on the South African side, a maximum of 12 years and, on the Community side, a 
maximum of 10 years starting from the entry into force of the Agreement. The free trade 
area covers the free movement of goods in all sectors. This Agreement will also cover the 
Liberalisation of trade in services and the free movement of capital. 
Under Article 6, on the community side, the combined nomenclature of goods shall apply 
to the classification of goods imported from South Africa. On the South African side, 
the harmonised system shall apply to the classification of goods imported from the 
Community. Article 7 par. 1 provides that for each product, the basic duty to which the 
successive reductions set out in the Agreement are to be applied shall be that effectively 
applied on the day of entry into force of the Agreement. The Article at par. 2 provides 
that the Community and South Africa shall communicate to each other their respective 
425 Prior to the commencement of negotiations with the EU, representatives of labour in NEDLAC argued 
that it was important for government to undertake research that would identify non-tariff 
barriers, which the EU had in place. This did not occur. It was only during the course of the 
negotiations that some work was done on non-tariff barriers. It is Cosatu's view that this research 
should have been finalised prior to the commencement of the negotiations. Cosatu's argument 
here is not one without force. This is more so given that its fears have been vindicated in view of 
the range of NTBs that South Africa is faced with in the EU marker. 
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basic duties, in accordance with the standstill and rollback commitments agreed between 
the Parties, and the agreed derogation to this principles, as set out in Annex 1.426 
In cases where the process of tariff dismantling does not start at the entry into force of 
the Agreement A rtide 7 makes provision for the appropriate measures. In such a case the 
duty to which successive reductions set out in the Agreement are to be applied shall be 
either the basic duty referred to in par. 1 of the Article or the duty applied on an ergt 
anues basis. This takes effect on the starting day of the relevant tariff-dismantling 
schedule whichever is the lower. Under Article 8, the provisions concerning the abolition 
of customs duties on imports shall also apply to customs duties of a fiscal nature, with 
the exception of non-discriminatory excise duties levied on both imported and locally-
produced goods which are in accordance with the provisions of A rtide 21. And A rtick 9 
provides that the Community and South Africa shall abolish in their respective imports 
any charge having the effect equivalent to customs duties on imports on entry into force 
of the Agreement. 
A rtick 11-15 sets the scheduled tariff elimination programme on vanous products. 
Customs duties applicable on imports into the Commtrn..ity of industrial products 
originating in South Africa other than those listed in Annex II have been abolished upon 
entry into force of the Agreement. On the part of South Africa, customs duties 
applicable on imports into South Africa of industrial products originating in the 
Community other than those listed in Annex III have been abolished upon the entry into 
force of the Agreement. The schedule of tariff elimination covers both industrial and 
agricultural products. The duty phasing out programme favours South Africa in terms of 
time frame. 
For certain products referred to in Annex IV provision is made by either party for a duty 
free quota in accordance with the conditions thereunder mentioned. This arrangement 
will run from the time the Agreement commences until the end of the tariff phase down 
program. Par. 6 of Article 14 refers to customs duties applicable to processed agricultural 
products imported into the Commtrn..ity and originating in South Africa that are listed at 
426 The derogation at Annex 1 does, in particular, take into consideration the nature of South Africa's 
economic transformation and the specific stage of adaptation of its tariff system within the 
framework of its wro obligations. On these premises, the EU has conceded to an exceptional 
basis specific requests for derogation to rollback. 
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Annex IV, list 5 which are to apply ill accordance with the conditions mentioned 
therein.427 
Nonetheless, the Co-operation Council428 (hereinafter, the Council) is empowered to infer 
alia, decide on firstly, the extension of the list of processed agricultural products under 
Annex IV, list 5. Secondly the Council may decide on the reduction of the duties applied 
to processed agricultural products. This reduction of duties may take place either when, 
in the course of trade between the Community and South Africa, the duties applying to 
basic products are reduced or, in response to reductions resulting from the mutual 
concessions relating to processed agricultural products. 
Provision is made for the reduced customs duties applicable to certam agricultural 
products imported into the Community and originating in South Africa. These duties are 
listed in Annex IV, list 6 of Par. 8 of Article 14 and would only apply as from entry into 
force of the Agreement and in accordance with the conditions mentioned in the Annex. 
The customs duties applicable on imports into the European Community of products 
originating in the Republic of South Africa listed in Annex IV, list 7 shall be reviewed 
periodically. This exercise would take place in the course of the operation of the 
Agreement and on the basis of future developments in the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). Tariff concessions on products listed in Annex IV, list 8 are not applicable as 
these products are covered by protected EU denomination. Tariff concessions that are 
applicable on imports into the Community of products originating in South Africa listed 
in Annex V shall be applied in accordance with the condition mentioned therein.429 
A nicle 1 provides that if requested by South Africa, the Community shall consider 
proposals relating to an accelerated timetable for tariff elimination for imports of 
agricultural products into South Africa, coupled with elimination of all exports refunds 
for exports to South Africa of the same products originating in the Community. Par. 2 of 
the Article states that if the Community replies positively to this request, the new time 
427 See Armex IV of the IDCA, which lists the tariff treatment of agricultural products from the EU but 
lays down the conditions under which this should be effected. 
428 The institutional framework for the Agreement makes provision for the establishment of a Co-
operation Council that will ensure that the Agreement operates effectively and that the objectives 
of the Agreement are pursued in the best possible way. See Article 97, which provides for the 
institutional set up to cater for the administrative implementation mechanism of the Agreement. 
429 Annex IV makes provision for the Fisheries products which the EU should allow free access to South 
Africa 
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table for tariff elimination and elimination of export refunds shall simultaneously apply as 
of a date to be agreed by the two Parties. In the case of a negative response from the 
Community, par. 3 states that the provisions of the Agreement on tariff elimination shall 
continue to be applicable. Article 18 provides for a review no later than five years after 
the entry into force of the Agreement at which time the Parties shall consider further 
steps in the process of liberalisation of their reciprocal trade. 
5.2.3 Agreement on trade related issues 
Both the EU and South Africa will benefit from the elimination of tariffs on bilateral 
trade, the opening up of more government contracts to competitive bidding, the 
liberalisation of the energy trade, and the removal of some barriers to agricultural trade. 
Article 19 states that quantitative restrictions on imports or exports and measures having 
equivalent effect on trade between the Parties shall be abolished on entry into force of 
the Agreement. No new quantitative restrictions on imports or exports or measures 
having equivalent effect shall be introduced in the trade between the Parties. As from the 
date of entry into force of the Agreement, new customs duties on imports or exports or 
charges having equivalent effect shall not be introduced, nor shall those already applied 
be increased on trade between the Parties. 
Under Article 20, the Parties may have regular consultations in the Council on the 
strategy and practical modalities for their respective agricultural policies. If either Party, 
in pursuit of their respective agricultural policies, considers it necessary to amend the 
arrangements laid down in the agreement, it would notify the Council, which will decide 
on the requested modification. Should either Party in applying par. 2 of Article 20 amend 
the arrangement made by the Agreement for agricultural products, it shall make 
adjustments to be agreed upon by the Council. This proviso is necessary for the 
maintenance of the concessions on imports originating in the other Party at an equivalent 
level to that provided for in the Agreement. 
As regards fiscal measures, Article 21 urges Parties to refrain from any measure or 
practice of an internal fiscal nature establishing, whether directly or indirectly, 
discrimination between the products of one Party and products originating in the 
territory of the other Party. Products exported to the territory of one of the Parties may 
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not benefit from repayment of indirect internal taxation in excess of the amount of 
indirect taxation imposed on them directly or indirectly. 
Parties are free, under the Agreement to enter into and maintain customs unions, free 
trade areas or other arrangements between either of the Parties and third countries. The 
only caveat under Article 20 is that such Agreements must not alter the rights and 
obligations provided for in the Agreement. Consultation between the Parties shall take 
place within the Council concerning agreements establishing or adjusting customs unions 
or free trade areas and, where required, on other major issues related to their respective 
trade policy with third countries. In particular, in the event of a third country acceding to 
the European Union, such consultation shall take place so as to ensure that account can 
be taken of the mutual interests of the Parties. This, no doubt, is a contentious provision 
given the position of South Africa in relation to SA DC - EU - ACP triangle430. One fact 
is clear, though, and that is that the position of South Africa in SACU and SADC and 
that of the EU in the Cotonou arrangement runs counter to the very tenor of this 
provlSlon. 
Article 23 on the other hand provides that either Party is free to take anti-dwnping or 
countervailing measures in accordance with A nicle VI of GAIT 1994. This measure is 
permissible notwithstanding express provision in the Agreement on the contrary. A party 
is also free to act under the Agreement on Implementation of A rticle VI of the GAIT 
1994 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, annexed to the 
Marrakech Agreement establishing the WTO. It should however, be noted that before 
definitive anti-dwnping and countervailing duties are imposed in respect of products 
imported from South Africa, Parties may consider the possibility of constructive 
remedies. These are provided for in the Agreement on Implementation of A rticle VI of 
the GAIT 1994 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
430 See Chapter Six and Seven for a detailed discussion on this conundrum 
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S.2.4 Transition safeguard measures 
Where imports of products originating in one Party cause or threaten to cause a serious 
disturbance to the markets of the other party, the Council is empowered under Article 16 
to move swiftly and remedy the situation. The Council must diffuse the situation 
notwithstanding other provisions of the agreement and in particular Article 24431. 1his is 
more so given the particular sensitivity of the agricultural markets. Pending a decision by 
the Council, and where exceptional circumstances require immediate action, the affected 
party may take provisional measures necessary to limit or redress the disturbance. The 
Article provides further that in taking such provisional measures, the affected party shall 
take into account the interests of both parties. 
Specific attention is drawn to Articles 23 and 24 of the Agreement relating to 'Safeguard' 
and Transitional Safeguard Measures'. Generally these clauses will allow South Africa to 
clamp down on EU originating products should they be imported in quantities and under 
conditions such as to cause or threaten to cause injury to domestic producers. In certain 
instances infant industries and / or an entire sector may be affected in which difficulties 
could spurn major social upheavals. It is important that the government publicises the 
available safeguard mechanism fully, and takes overall responsibility for bringing them 
into effect. The overall review mechanism should be active, open, and accessible.432 
The Agreement contams several bilateral safeguard proViSiOns applicable during the 
transition period 4JJ During this period, a tariff "snapback" to the pre-Agreement level is 
allowed for up to tJm:.e years for most products, and up to feur years for the most sensitive 
products. This is in cases where imports from the EU are a substantial cause of serious 
injury or threatens serious injury to a local industry. In designing long transition periods 
and special safeguard mechanisms, the negotiators gave ample attention to the 
adjustment consequences of the Agreement in South Africa. Specific attention is drawn 
4J1 This relates [0 Transitional Safeguard measures for the benefit of South Africa 
4J2 This is [he same case with the NAFT A. During the transition period a partner that faces "serious 
damage" as a result of increased imports from another NAFT A country may increase tariffs or, 
with the exception of Canada-US trade, impose quotas [0 provide temporary relief [0 that 
industry. However, for goods that meet NAFTA's rules of origin, safeguard measures can only 
take the form of tariff increases. Safeguard actions may not last longer than three weeks and may 
not be imposed on a particular product more than once during the transition period. Once a 
safeguard action is lifted, the product will be subjected [0 the tariff that would have been in effect 
one year after the action was imposed. (See G.C Hufbauer and J. S Schon; NAFTA An 
AssessmenL· Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC 1993 at p.125) 
4JJ See Anules 23 and 24 
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to Article 23 and 24 of the Agreement relating to 'Safeguard' and Transitional Safeguard 
Measures'. 
Article 24 makes provision for a safeguard in cases where a product is imported in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious 
injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products. The Article, 
however, only applies where the domestic producers are in the territory of one of the 
Contracting Parties, the Community or South Africa, whichever is concerned. In such a 
case, the Agreement empowers the offended Party to take appropriate measures under 
the conditions provided for in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. It is also permissible 
for the wronged Party to act on the authority of the Agreement on Agriculture annexed 
to the Marrakech Agreement establishing the WTO and in accordance with the 
procedures laid down in Article 26. 
Provision is also appropriately made where a product is being imported in such quantities 
and under such conditions as to cause or threatens to cause serious deterioration in the 
economic situation of one or more of the other Members of SACU. In such a case it 
behoves South Africa, to lodge a request to the country [s] concerned and after having 
examined alternative solutions, may exceptionally take surveillance or safeguard measures 
in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 26 434. 
Article 25 makes provision for transitional safeguard measures. This is notwithstanding 
the provisions of Article 24. Exceptional measures of limited duration which derogate 
from the provisions of Article 12 and 15 may be taken by South Africa in the form of an 
increase or reintroduction of customs duties. These measures may only concern infant 
industries or sectors facing serious difficulties caused by increased imports originating in 
the Community as a result of the reduction of duties envisaged under Article 12 and 15, 
particularly where these difficulties spurn major social problems. 
South Africa must ensure that customs duties on imports applicable to products 
originating in the Community as introduced by these measures do not exceed the level of 
the basic duty. The Agreement at Article 25 also forbids such duties exceeding the applied 
MFN rates of duty or 20% of total imports of industrial products from the Community 
m The Article provides for a detailed procedure to be followed where safeguards become inevitable 
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during the last year for which statistics are available. These measures will be applied for a 
period not exceeding four years. The same would cease to apply at the latest on the 
expiry of the maximum transitional period of 12 years. These time limits may 
exceptionally be extended by decision of the Council. No such measures can, however, 
be introduced in respect of a product if more than three years have elapsed since the 
elimination of all duties and quantitative restrictions or charges or measures having an 
equivalent effect concerning that product. 
5.2.5 Agreement on trade in services 
Technological advances have increased opportunities for and the imponance of trade in 
services. Services trade negotiations demand a different focus from goods trade 
negotiations because service trade protectionism differs significantly from goods trade 
protectionism.43S Tariffs and quotas cannot protect domestic service providers. Customs 
officials at the international borders would not easily detect impons of services. Instead, 
services trade protectionism emphasis laws that focus not on the product, but on the 
producer. 
Some countries outlaw foreign owned service companies of various types and even go as 
far as to prohibits foreigners from acquiring controlling ownership in existing domestic 
companies. Some bestow monopolies on particular domestically owned producers. Some 
regulate foreign-owned companies differently than domestically owned firms of the same 
type. As a final complicating factor, one country's regulation for its service firms will 
typically differ substantially from another country's regulations for its service finns. The 
ideal solution is to harmonise the regulatory framework for the service industry. In many 
cases, Agreement on trade in services' opening reflects less protectionism than the 
clauses for goods trade. 
The EU -SA Agreement on trade in services does not create full harmonisation as such, 
but it moves in that direction and it particularly opens the South African service market. 
The Agreement provides for a national treatment in this area. This means that EU firms 
in South Africa would be entitled to regulatory procedures as if they were South African 
firms. Another element is that under the Agreement, national treatment is not de jwe, but 
a de facto one. That is to say, foreign firms may still face different regulatory treatment 
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than domestic firms, as long as the effect of the regulations is equivalent and does not 
place foreign firms at a competitive disadvantage. This, of course, is easier when said 
than done. Quite often, the situation on the ground tends to be overwhelmingly in 
favour of local firms. 
The EU-SA Agreement on trade in servIces broke new ground by establishing firm 
contractual obligations on services of both countries. The Agreement elaborates a 
framework of rights and obligations regarding treatment, establishment, licensing and 
certification procedures. Bilateral services transactions had been substantially unaffected 
by international discipline because of the lack of coverage of services in the GATT. The 
Agreement promotes fair trade in services by creating a level playing field and rules of 
the game. The Agreement does promote liberalisation in some areas, where the most 
notable reforms are in financial services. In addition, provision is made for professional 
labour services across the Contracting Party's markets. 
A nicle 29 reconfirms the obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). In recognition of the growing importance of trade in services for the 
development of their economies, the Parties have underlined the importance of strict 
observance of the GATS Agreements. In particular, the GATS' principle on the MFN 
treatment, including its applicable protocols with annexed commitments is observed. In 
accordance with the GATS, however, this treatment shall not apply to the advantages 
accorded by either Party under the provisions of an agreement as defined in A rtXle V of 
the GATS or under measures adopted on the basis of such an agreement. The same 
principle applies to other advantages accorded pursuant to the list of MFN exemptions 
annexed by either Party to the GATS. The Parties, too, reaffirm their respective 
commitment as annexed to the forth Protocol to the GATS concerning basic telecom 
and the fifth Protocol concerning financial services. 
A nicle 30 makes provision for further liberalisation in the supply of services. The Parties 
are to endeavour to extend the scope of the Agreement with a view to further liberalise 
trade in services between them. In the event of such an extension, the liberalisation 
process would provide for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination 
435 Is NAFTA Economic Integration? William C. Gruben and John H. Welch: Econanic Review; Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas: 1994 at p.42. 
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between the Parties in the servlces sectors that is covered by the Agreement. The 
instrument should cover all modes of supply including the supply of a service: 
• from the territory of one Party into the territory of the other; 
• in the territory of one Party to the service consumer of the 
other 
• by a service supplier of one Party, through presence of natural 
persons of that Party in the territory of the other. 
The Council is mandated to make the necessary recommendations for the 
implementation of the objective set out as aforesaid. In the process of formulating these 
recommendations, the Council is obligated to take into account the experience gained by 
the implementation of the obligations of each Party under the GATS. In particular 
reference is had to Article V of the GATS generally and especially par. 3(a) thereof. This 
proviso covers the participation of developing countries in liberalisation agreements. The 
objective set out above shall be subject to a first examination by the Council at the latest 
five years after the commencement of the Agreement. 
Article 31 provides for maritime transport. The Agreement enjoins Parties to endeavour 
and effectively apply the principle of unrestricted access to the international maritime 
market and traffic based on fair competition that is premised on commercial terms. The 
Parties, too, agree to extend to each other's nationals and the vessels registered in the 
territory of either of the Parties treatment no less favourable than that granted to the 
most favoured nation. This treatment is in respect of the maritime transport of goods, 
passengers or both, access to ports, the use of infrastructure and auxiliary maritime 
services of those ports and related fees and charges. Customs facilities and the 
assignment of berths and facilities for loading and unloading are also covered. This 
regime of rights is also based on fair competition and on commercial terms. 
Under Article 63, the Parties agree to foster co-operation in the services sector in general 
and in the area of banking, insurance and other financial services in particular through 
encouraging trade in services. Another element would be the exchange where 
appropriate of information on rules, laws and regulations governing the services sectors 
in the member States. At the same time, it envisions improving accounts, auditing, 
supervision and regulation of finances and financial monitoring. This activity would be 
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for instance, through the facilitation of training schemes that would be undertaken in this 
regard. 
5.2.6 Agreement on competition policy 
Article 35 makes provision for what should be considered incompatible with the proper 
functioning of the Agreement in so far as it may affect trade between the Parties. In the 
first place, Agreements and concerted efforts between firms in horizontal relationships, 
decisions by associations of firms, and agreements between firms in vertical relationship, 
which have the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in the territory 
of the Parties is forbidden. The firms must be able to demonstrate that the pro-
competitive effects far outweigh the anti-competitive ones. Secondly, abuse by one or 
more firms of market power in the territory of the Parties as a whole or in a substantial 
part thereof is expressly disallowed. 
Each parties' respective competition authority is mandated under A nicle 38 to make a 
determination of anti-competitive practices as defined in the Agreement. Whenever such 
a finding is made the offended Party is free to request the other Party's competition 
authority to take appropriate remedial action in terms of that authority's rules that govern 
competition. The anti-competition practices must, however, be adjudged to affect 
important interests of one of the Parties before the said remedial action is taken. 
The Agreement provides that the registered request must not prejudice any action under 
the requesting authority's competition laws that may be deemed necessary. It is 
important, too, that such a request does not, in any way, encumber the addressed 
authority's decision-making powers or its independence. This measure is necessary to 
ensure that the Agreement stops short of encroaching on the regulatory authorities of 
either Party. The sovereignty of the Contracting Parties must at all times be respected. 
In any event the addressed authority is enjoined to consider and give careful attention to 
the views expressed and documentation provided by the requesting authority. The 
addressed authority will nonetheless undertake this process without prejudice to its 
functions, rights, obligations or independence. In particular, the authority would pay 
heed to the nature of the anti-competitive activities in question, the firm or firms 
involved and the alleged harmful effect on the important interests of the aggrieved Party. 
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The Agreement makes prOVlSlon for consultation where the Conurussion or the 
Competition Authority in South Africa decides to conduct an investigation. 
Consultations are also a prerequisite where either Party intends to take any action that 
may have important implications for the interests of the other Party.4J6 The process of 
consultation could conunence at the behest of either Party. The emphasis here is that 
both Parties should strive to find a mutually acceptable solution in the light of their 
respective vital interests. Due regard would be given to each other's laws, sovereignty, 
the independence of the respective competition authorities and consideration of comity. 
This provlSlon would in effect challenge companles that enJoy a dominant market 
position, ostensibly to promote competition and investment. The nature of South 
Africa's economy would suggest that EU companies operating in South Africa would be 
in relatively strong position to challenge mergers and take-overs here. It is to the contrary 
feared that South Africa's companies will be less successful in this area whenever their 
interests are threatened in the EU market. There is, too, serious concern regarding the 
capacity of South Africa's customs and related authorities to police the Agreement. This 
weakness could be exploited by third parties to gain preferential access to South Africa's 
market.437 
It is significant that the Conununity, under Article 39, conuruts to provide South Africa 
with technical assistance in the restructuring of its competition law and policy. This 
partnership would also include the exchange of expertise, organisation of seminars and 
training activities. In the same vein Parties undertake, under Article 40, to exchange 
information, taking into account the limitations imposed by the requirements of 
professional and business secrecy. Care must however be taken to ensure that such direct 
assistance to industry does not distort competition and thereby bestow upon South 
African firms undue advantage. It is in this vein that the Agreement expressly forbids 
public aid that favours certain firms or the production of certain goods, which distorts or 
threaten to distort competition. In a nutshell, public aid that does not support a specific 
public policy objective or objectives of either Party is incompatible with the proper 
functioning of the Agreement. 
416 See Article]8 
437 Neil Van Heerden: 'Implications for South African Business' SAnA, 2000 supra at p. 96 
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5.3.1 Technical and development assistance 
One of the important benefits South Africa hopes to tap from this Agreement is the 
incidence of transfer of technology from the richly endowed EU member States. South 
Africa is in dire need of this technological transfer to be able to revamp its industrial base 
for international competitiveness. In this regard, Artide 41 makes provision for public aid 
in so far as the same would advance trade between the Parties. The Parties, too, agree 
that it is in their interests to ensure that public aid is granted in a fair, equitable and 
transparent manner. 4J8 
Remedial measures are addressed under A rtide 42 where Parties consider that a particular 
practice is incompatible with the terms of Article 41. These measures would in particular 
apply where such practice causes or threatens to cause serious prejudice to the interests 
of the other Party or material injury to its domestic industry. The Agreement takes 
cognisance of a situation where the existing rules and procedures are inadequate to 
remedy a given complain. In this eventuality Parties are urged to enter into consultations 
with a view to finding a mutually satisfactory solution. The envisaged consultations 
would be without prejudice to either Party's rights and obligations in terms of their 
respective laws and international commitments. Either Party may invite the Council to 
examine, in the context of such consultation, the Parties' public policy objectives 
justifying the grant of public aid referred to in Article 41. 
The virtue of transparency is underscored in Article 43. Parties covenant to ensure there 
is transparency in the area of public aid. In particular, where a Party so requests, the 
other Party should provide information on aid schemes, in particular individual cases of 
public aid, or on the total amount and the distribution of aid given. The exchange of 
information between the Parties would take into account the limitations imposed by 
either Party's laws relating to the requirements of business and professional secrecy. 
In the absence of any rules or procedures for the implementation of Article 41, the 
provisions of Article VI and XVI of the GAIT 1994 as well as the WTO Agreements on 
subsidies and Countervailing Measures would apply to public aid or subsidies. The 
Council is empowered to periodically review the progress made in these matters. In 
particular the Council is enjoined to continually endeavour to develop co-operation and 
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understanding on the measures taken by each Party with regard to the operatlon of 
Article 41. This periodic review is undertaken to ensure that areas of dispute are nipped 
in the bud. It is also significant that the GAIT Iwro disciplines are resorted to in 
situations of void. The GAITIWfO disciplines are by far more developed and are of 
universal application. These disciplines would, therefore be easily acceptable to both 
Parties as a point of compromise. 
5.3.2 Intellectual property rights 
Due to the importance of intellectual property protection in facilitating service trade and 
foreign investments, the Agreement's coverage of this item has received much notice. 
One of the most significant provisions of this section, and in the Agreement in general, is 
the codification of the national treatment. This codification ensures that the intellectual 
property of firms from any of the Contracting States will be legally treated in the third as 
if it had been developed in that country.4J9 
Under Article 46, Contracting Parties are obligated to ensure adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property rights in conformity with the highest international 
standards. Contracting Parties would apply the wro Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) from 1" January 1996 and undertake to 
improve, where appropriate, the protection provided for under that Agreement. Where 
problems relating to trading conditions in this area occur, urgent consultations shall be 
undertaken, at the request of either Party with a view to arriving at a mutually satisfactory 
sol u tion. 440 
438 Parties have undertaken under Artide 40, to exchange information, taking into account the limitations 
imposed by the requirements of professional and business secrecy 
43 9 For the purpose of the Agreement 'intellectual property' covers an array of instruments. Among these 
are copyrights, including the copyright on computer programmes and neighbouring rights, utility 
models, patents, which extend to bio-technical inventions and industrial designs. Other areas are 
geographical indications, including appellation of origin, trademarks and service marks. It also 
protects topographies of integrated circuits, as well as the legal protection of databases and the 
protection against unfair competition as referred to in Article 10 bis of the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Intellectual Property and protection of undisclosed information on know-how. 
440 South Africa is free to accede to various multilateral conventions to which the EU subscribes. These 
instruments are; the protocol to the Madrid Agreement concerning the International Registration 
of Marks (Madrid 1989), International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers 
of Phonograph and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome 1961). This accession is, however, without 
prejudice [0 the obligations arising from the wro Agreement on TRlPS. The Parties further 
confirm the importance they attach to other related bilateral and multilateral Intellectual Property 
mstruments. 
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Once again, and appropriately so, the EU undertakes to provide South Africa with the 
necessary assistance to facilitate the implementation of these disciplines. Such assistance 
would be made available on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions. 
Assistance would, among other things, cover the preparation of laws and regulations for 
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, the prevention of abuse of 
such rights, the establishment and reinforcement of domestic offices and other agencies 
involved in enforcement and protection. Human resource development is a vital element 
of this assistance. 
Due to the importance of intellectual property protection in facilitating service trade and 
foreign investment, the Agreement's coverage of this item must solicit considerable 
attention. One of the most significant provisions of this section is the codification of 
national treatment. This codification ensures that the intellectual property of firms from 
any of the Contracting Parties will be legally treated in the third as if it had been 
developed in that country. 
Contracting Parties are obligated to enforce intellectual property rights agamst 
infringement not only internally but also on a global scale. That is, the Agreement 
includes sanctions not only against the production of pirated products, but also their 
importation. One of the most important aspects of intellectual property protection in the 
Agreement is that it helps ensure the durability of South Africa's new intellectual 
property law. It is envisioned that the differences between Contracting Party's legal 
systems are a clear fertile ground for complications.HI 
5.3.2 Standardisation and conformity assessment 
One of the most controversial areas of a free trade area relates to the regIme of 
standardisation and quality assurance.442 Contracting Parties have covenanted to co-
operate in the field of standardisation, metrology, certification and quality assurance in 
order to reduce differences between Parties in these areas. This partnership is geared 
441 Under Article 46 of the IDCA the EU has committed, in order to facilitate the implementation of this 
provision, to provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical 
assistance to South Africa. The assistance would be in, among other things, the preparation of 
laws and regulations for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. It would 
also cover the prevention of the abuse of such rights, the establishment and reinforcement of 
domestic offices and other agencies involved in enforcement and protection, including the 
training of personnel. 
442 Article 47 makes provision for the Standardisation and conformity assessment 
150 
towards the removal of technical barriers and hence the facilitation of bilateral trade. 443 
This discipline is necessary for purposes of promoting greater use of international 
technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures, including sector 
specific measures. The partnership also entails developing agreements on mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment in sectors of mutual economic interest. 
Co-operation would importantly target technical assistance for southern Africa capacity 
building initiative in the fields of accreditation, metrology and standardisation. Parties will 
also co-operate in the area of quality management and assurance in selected sectors of 
Imponance to South Africa. Lastly, co-operation is envisaged in developing practical 
links between South African and the European standardisation, accreditation, and 
cenification organisation. The targeting of southern Africa region for capacity building is 
in line with the spirit of the Agreement to augment integration processes taking place in 
this region. Capacity building is without doubt one of the critical features of deepening 
integration in the region. 
Under Article 48 Parries have covenanted to promote and facilitate co-operation between 
their customs services. This element of co-operation is crucial in that it would ensure that 
the provisions on trade are observed so as to guarantee fair trade. Co-operation in this 
area would give rise, among other things, to the exchange of information and training 
schemes. The Contracting Parries' administrative authorities would be obligated to 
provide mutual assistance in accordance with the provisions of ProliXoI 2 of the 
Agreement.444 This administrative measure would be undertaken without prejudice to 
other forms of co-operation envisaged in the Agreement.445 
Co-operate in the all important field of statistics would be cultivated under A rtide 49. 
The envisioned co-operation here is geared mainly toward the harmonisation of 
statistical methods and practice to enable processing take place according to mutually 
agreed bases of data on trade in goods and services. More generally, co-operation would 
target any field covered by the Agreement lending itself to statistical treatment. It is not 
443 Areas of co-operation in this sphere shall include measures in accordance with the provisions of the 
wro TBT Agreement. 
444 ProUXJ:Jl 2 deals with various areas of mutual administrative assistance in implementing the contracted 
customs obligations. See the Protocol to the TDCA. 
445 This applies in particular under Article 90 where Parties are obligated to fight against drugs and money 
laundering 
151 
for nothing that co-operation in this technical area travels only one way - in favour of 
South Africa. No doubt the EU's quality assurance standards are by far much more 
developed than that of South Africa. 
One cannot talk of harmonisation without the EU reaching out to South Africa in terms 
of technical assistance to help the latter upgrade its standardisation systems. Like it has 
been demonstrated in chapter six below, South Africa - the economically superior player 
in the SADC - has assumed the responsibility to help her erstwhile partners to build 
capacity in standardisation and quality assurance systems. The gapping deficit in technical 
standards between South Africa and its SADC partners is a major stumbling block to 
free trade in the region.446 
5.4.1 Promotion of regional integration 
The negotiations of a long-term co-operation agreement between the EU and South 
Africa are also an important new step in strengthening EU-southern Africa relations. The 
Agreement has been designed with a strong regional component. This is a deliberate 
measure that is meant to benefit not just South Africa but the southern Africa region as a 
whole. For South Africa's inunediate neighbours in SACU, the provisions concerning the 
establishment of the Agreement will be especially significant since these countries already 
belong to a customs union.447 The EU and South Africa are convinced that in the long 
term, the Agreement will have a net positive effect for the so-called BLNS countries. 
South Africa and the EU have conumtted themselves to design the Agreement in such a 
way that it will support the process of regional economic integration currently underway 
in the east and southern Africa region. 
Commentators are of the view that the Agreement with Europe reflects, and its adoption 
would reinforce, the tendency in some quarters in South Africa to prioritise trade 
relations with Europe and the 'global market'.448 No doubt this urge is pursued at the 
expense of South Africa's strategic or developmental relations with the rest of southern 
Africa's.449 Keet is of the view that South Africa's rapidly expanding trade with Africa and 
446 See chapter six below for a detailed discussion on this item 
447 Anicle 96 of the IDCA pledges both financial and technical support for the regional integration effort 
being undertaken in the southern Africa region. 
448 See, for example D. Keet: "The European Union's proposed FTA with South Africa: The implications 
and some counter proposes" Development South Africa, Silverton Development Press, Vol. 13 
August 1996 at p. 650 
449 See chapter six for an overview of the southern Africa economic profile 
152 
more specifically with southern Africa, though representing a small portion, at some 30 
percent, and flows into much smaller markets consists mainly of manufactured goods 
and processed foods. 450 This is the kind of commerce South Africa badly needs to 
address the incidence of run-away unemployment. 
It is no surpnse then that the umbrella trade body Cosaru concurs with Keet's 
sentiments. Cosatu has put up a strong case urging that government policy should 
embrace and move toward the regional direction. The job creation component here is 
indeed very clear.451 South Africa, it would appear, is faced with two sets of trade 
relations that are qualitatively different. South Africa's major export markets in Europe 
are undoubtedly important, but so for different reasons - are its industrial development 
relations and its trade with its immediate neighbours. 
Trade relations with Europe must not be managed in a way that will actively prejudice 
South Africa's industrial development, both directly and through its economic relations 
with its neighbours. A trade agreement between Europe and South Africa should not 
pre-empt or complicate long-standing and essential plans for the creation of an effective 
and stable regional economic grouping in southern Africa. Deeper integration at the 
regional level is of great economic value for South Africa, which is why it should move 
to the priority perch. The explicit intentment in the Agreement to propagate and even to 
optimise regional integration activities is right on target. The Agreement however fails to 
elaborate on exactly how parties will go about to augment integration processes in the 
region. We think a clear-cut action plan is preferred to a mere statement of intent. 
5:4:2 Rules of Origin in the integration equation 
The term 'rules of origin' refers to the rules by which South African businesses have to 
operate in terms of sourcing, outsourcing, exporting and importing of raw material, 
components and so on. The Agreement under Protxxd 1 makes provision for extensive 
Rules of Origin regime. The instrument provides that materials originating in the 
Community shall be considered as material originating in South Africa when 
incorporated into a product obtained in that region. It provides further that it shall not 
be necessary that such materials have undergone sufficient working or processing, 
provided such material has undergone working or processing going beyond that referred 
450 Development South Africa, supra at p. 650 
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to in Article 6 of the Protocol. The same standard applies to materials originating from 
South Africa. 
It is noteworthy that as far as proof of origin goes, cumulation is provided for materials 
originating from the ACP and SACU countries. Par.3 of Article 3 provides that subject to 
the provisions of par. 5 and 6, materials originating in an ACP State shall be considered as 
originating in the Community or South Africa when incorporated into a product 
obtained there. It further provides that it shall not be necessary that such materials have 
undergone sufficient working or processing. 
There is a rider to this provision at par. 5. Products, which have acquired ongmaung 
status by virtue of Par. 3, would only continue to be considered as products originating in 
the Community or South Africa when the value added at that stage exceeds the value of 
the materials used when originating in anyone of the ACP States. If this is not so, then 
the products concerned shall be considered as originating in the ACP State which 
accounts for the highest value of originating materials used. In the allocation of origin, 
no account shall be taken of materials originating in the ACP States, which have 
undergone sufficient working or processing in the Community or South Africa. 
In effect, Contracting Parties here are not extending any favours to the ACP countries in 
the strict sense of the word. This cumulation provision is for all intents and purposes a 
self-serving one. It is akin to giving by the right hand and taking by the left. The 
provision only helps to advance Contracting Parties' interests by encouraging the ACP 
countries to import their products. It is also common cause that ACP counties invariably 
act as a cheap source of raw material for both the ED and South Africa. This is why it 
became necessary to tailor the rules of origin to accommodate this acknowledged 
economic reality. The position is different for SACU, which is treated for all practical 
intents and purposes as part of South Africa. That is why par. 4 provides that any 
working or processing carried out within SACU shall be considered as having been 
carried out in South Africa when further worked or processed there. 
As for the ACP States, par. 6 provides that the cumulation referred to in par. 3 may only 
be applied where the ACP materials used have acquired the status of originating products 
451 See Cosatu's submission infra 
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by an application of the rules of origin contained in the Fourth ACP-EC Convention. 
But that the Conununity and South Africa shall provide each other, through the EC with 
details of agreements and their corresponding rules of origin which have been concluded 
with the ACP States. 
It is not inunediately clear as to why reference is made to the Fourth ACP-EC 
Convention when the instrument has since expired. The EU has contracted the Cotonuo 
Protocol with the ACP States to replace the Fourth Lome Protocol.452 One would expect 
the former to be the valid point of reference and not the latter as is the case here. The 
Cotonou Protocol is definitely the valid instrument binding relations between the EU on 
the one hand and the ACP States on the other. In a nutshell, South Africa's business will 
have to become more flexible to the international market place, to future development, 
job empowerment and methods and types of investments. These are the express dictates 
of the rules of origin. 
5.4.3 Dispute settlement and the institutional framework 
The Agreement establishes a new framework for bilateral econonuc relations and 
extensive new rights and obligations that will have to be monitored and enforced. The 
consultative and dispute settlement procedures should help to pre-empt some disputes 
and more expeditiously resolve others. South Africa will, no doubt, devote more 
resources to the management of the bilateral relationship since the free trade area has 
institutionalised procedures for notification, consultation, and dispute resolution with 
regard to measures affecting bilateral trade and investment. Again, due to the extensive 
rights and obligations that are enumerated in the Agreement, South Africa will have to 
closely monitor the implementation of the Agreement to ensure that its rights thereunder 
are scrupulously safeguarded.453 
In this very vein, the Agreement has established the Co-operation Council to be managed 
by senior officials from both Parties' relevant ministries and/or their representatives to 
supervise the operation of the agreement and to resolve all disputes. However, the 
administrative provisions of the free trade area are not nearly as important as the dispute 
settlement procedures. The general dispute settlement procedures serve possibly two 
452 See the discussion on this instrument at chapter six below 
453 See Article 104 of the TDCA 
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llllportant functions. Firstly, they provide a consultative forum to pre-empt potential 
disputes. 
Secondly, when disputes do arise, the Agreement sets out procedures to resolve them 
more expeditiously than currently available in the legal system of either country or in the 
wro disciplines. The timetable for the free trade area dispute resolution is measured in 
months. By contrast, judicial appeals are, for the most part, a protracted affair. The WTO 
process on the other hand is still prune to being blocked by disputants and by other 
delays, though some progress has been made in recent years to expedite dispute 
settlement.454 
The implication of this scenano would be that consultations would be triggered 
whenever either party intends to take trade measures. Or when proposed changes in 
laws, regulations, or policies threaten to distort bilateral trade and investment flows. This 
would be necessary, in particular, when such measures tend to impair the benefits 
derived under the free trade area. In short, the procedures are designed to verify and 
secure the rights and obligations of the free trade area.455 No doubt, this is an important 
measure in view of the acrimony that attends a fledgling free trade area initiative. Trade 
wars and tension among industry players are not uncommon in this fragile marriage of 
convenience. The resultant intense trade jostling must be ventilated through well-
structured dispute settlement mechanisms. 
5.5 Compatibility with the WTO disciplines 
The question of compatibility with the WTO disciplines is very critical to the acceptance 
of the Agreement into the fold of the World Trading System. Like we pointed out at 
chapter four, Article XXIV is the enabling legal framework for preferential Agreements. 
In which case, therefore, it is important to measure the performance of the Agreement 
against the WTO edict as enunciated in A rtick XXIV and the pliant Enabling Clause. 
454 Jeffrey J Schott: Uniud States Canada Free Trade: An Evaluation of the Agrronmt: Institute For International 
Economics Washington DC, April 1988 at p.33 
4» As for the NAFT A, the first step in the dispute settlement process is consultation with the other party 
or parties. If the consultations fail to resolve the matter within 30-45 days, any country may call a 
meeting of the commission, which is to use "good offices, mediation, conciliation or other 
means" to resolve the dispute. In the absence of a mutually satisfactory solution, any country may 
institute panel proceedings. The complaining party may choose to bring the dispute under the 
GAIT or the NAFT A (See Hufbauer and Jeffrey, supra at p. 142) 
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First the Agreement had to be fully compatible with South Africa's multilateral 
obligations. That is to say the rules and disciplines contracted within the WTO 
framework. This requirement was strongly expressed by the EU Council in trade 
directives of March 1996, which had foreseen the possibility of sunset (or killer) clause 
whereby the Agreement would become null and void if it did not receive the blessing of 
the WTO. The WTO compatibility was an obvious condition if the Parties were to 
ensure that the outcome of negotiations would not be challenged by third parties, with 
the risk of being forced into renegotiations or the granting of compensation to outsiders. 
It was not, however, at the time of the negotiation, an easy condition to interpret and to 
fulfil. Indeed, for the EU, the Agreement with South Africa was the first one to be 
negotiated after Marrakech, where the WTO had been formally established and its rules 
refined456. 
As expected, it was on the basis of the WTO condition that the EU formulated its free 
trade area proposal. It would be recalled that the initial request by South Africa was an 
improvement of its access to the EU market through joining the Lome regime of 
unilateral trade preferences.457 But Lome itself only existed through successive waivers in 
the GAIT framework yet South Africa is not categorised as a developing country under 
the WTO rating458 • On the strength of this positioning, the EU quickly came to the 
conclusion that there was no Lome option for South Africa that could be WTO 
compatible, and that the only way to respond to the request for improved access was 
through a free trade agreement.459 
Article XXIV of the GATT requires that the Agreement should cover 'substantially all 
trade>460 and avoid the exclusion of any significant sector. This then explains the 
ambitious target of covering at least 90 percent of trade under the Agreement and the 
concomitant commitment to stick as much as possible to the standard time bound 
transition of 10 years. In 1995, South Africa already enjoyed free access for nearly 75 
percent of its exports to the ED. Had the Parties set their ambitions at a lower level, the 
deal would have achieved only limited success461 . This aspect, too, explains the inclusion 
456 See the wrO/GA IT compliance requirements under Article XXIV as discussed in chapter four 
457 See chapter seven for an elaboration of this development. 
458 South Africa has on its own volition elected to be rated as a developed economy under the WTO 
framework despite the clear developing country feature that dot the countryside .. 
459 Philip Lowe; 'Main Parameters of the EU-SA Partnership' SAnA, 2000 eds. supra at pAO 
460For a detailed discussion on this item, see chapter three above 
461 Lowe supra at p. 40 
157 
of agriculture under the objective of free trade. Given its structure and coverage, the 
Agreement is on this score in line with Article XXIV of the GAIT disciplines. 
The next step requires that the Agreement be notified to the wro for confirmation 
although the wro compatibility will have to remain a dynamic feature of the 
Agreement. The Agreement fulfils the minimum requirements of the GAIT since the 
rules of Article XXIV, like we discussed earlier in chapter four, are prune to all manner 
of interpretation and are therefore easily manipulated.462 It is arguable that more 
flexibility in the interpretation of Article XXIV will be called for in the future. This is 
more so, in particular, where a free trade area involves a developed country on the one 
hand and a developing one on the other463 . 
Effons to bolster Article XXIV requirement in the Uruguay Round and make them more 
specific and operational have produced feeble results. The proliferation of preferential 
trade arrangements in Europe, North America, Latin America and in Africa underscores 
an urgent need to revisit Anicle XXIV provisions. It is also becoming increasingly 
important that GAIT obligations under A rticle XXIV and the GAIT reviews of free 
trade areas and customs union be further strengthened. The most important preference 
for developing countries is the allowance of longer period within which to fulfil their 
time bound obligations under free trade agreements. 464 
The enabling clause is a facility that was specially created to empower developed 
countries to spread the hand of development to developing countries465 • This feature is 
captured prominently in the general structure of the Agreement. The Agreement had, of 
course, to acknowledge the difference between the two partners in terms of their 
462Hufbauer et al say that the GAIT requirements are not difficult to meet and are open to flexible 
interpretation. GAIT Article XXIV authorises derogation from the most favoured-nation 
obligation of Article 1 for free trade area and customs unions that meet two vague requirements. 
These are; the accord must cover "substantially all" the trade among the partner countries, and 
the accord should not raise barriers to the trade of third countries. According to Hufbauer et al 
no agreement has ever failed these tests (See Hufbauer and Jeffrey supra at pp.111-112) 
463 For a detailed discussion on the dynamics of the enabling clause see chapter four above. 
464 In explaining the ambiguity attending the GAIT provisions, Hufbauer et al aver that in essence, the 
conclusions of GAIT working parties that review Article XXIV notification reflect a recognition 
that the GAIT standards ignore practices that can have adverse effect on third country trade. For 
instance, Article XXIV skins around problems caused by grey area measures such as voluntary 
export restraints, contingent protection measures (anti-dumping and countervailing duties), and 
rules of origin. These measures may significantly distort trade and investment flows between the 
region and third countries, and thus third countries are reluctant to give pacts that include such 
measures unqualified approval. See also Lowe, supra, at p.4l 
465 See chapter four on the dynamics of the Enabling Clause 
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respective levels of development. It was expedient, too, for South Africa to undergo a 
series of structural reforms to lift up her fledgling economy to a more internationally 
competitive level. 
It would appear, from the outset that the EU was keen to insert a strong developmental 
dimension into the Agreement. This very same concern was the guiding principle for 
South Africa's negotiating team. It is reported that at one stage, the concept of a Trade 
and Development Agreement (IDA) was presented as an alternative framework to that 
of a free trade area.466 This was, however, felt to be overly restrictive and constraining. 
The character of the final document does, indeed, incorporate a strong and unequivocal 
developmental agenda. 
This developmental concern logically found its way into the trade part of the Agreement 
through the twin concepts of differentiation and Asymmetry. Differentiation reflects the 
difference in the coverage of free trade between the two sides at the end of the transition 
period, and it is quite significant. South Africa will grant duty free status to 86 percent of 
its imports from the EU, whereas the EU will accept 95 percent of South Africa's 
exports duty free. Asymmetry on the other hand has to do with the timing of the Party's 
respective tariff dismantlement schedules and hence tariff cuts will take place much 
earlier and faster on the EU side than on the South Africa's side.467 
That means that by year 2006 the bulk of the EU's liberalisation effort will be complete. 
Whereas South Africa's tariff cuts will concentrate on the second half of a 12-year 
transition period that is between 2006 and 2012. To that extend, the Agreement seats 
well within the rubric of the developmental intent espoused in the Enabling Clause.468 
The Agreement's approach has been heralded as a means to achieve substantial trade 
liberalisation on a bilateral basis and to bolster efforts currently under way in the 
466 Lowe, supra at p. 41 
467 Ibid. 
468 Development is also the subject of a whole chapter of the Agreement. It sets the basis for a 
continuation of the EU's financial and technical co-operation with South Africa. The EU is 
currently running one of the largest programmes it has ever had with an outside partner for South 
Africa: with Euros 130 million per year of project grants known as the European Programme for 
Reconstruction and Development (EPRD). A further Euro 150 million of the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) loans is guaranteed by the EC budget, and comprise more than US$300 
rnilJjon or R1.8 billion every year that can be committed to new projects and programmes. The 
Agreement does not contain any figure but it does commit the EU to maintaining its efforts at a 
simJar level in the coming years. 
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multilateral talks to strengthen the world trading system. This again is the spirit upon 
which Article XXIV exception to the basic non-discrimination rule is premised. 
It is important to note, however, that there are many trade barriers that are not amenable 
to bilateral solutions like the Agreement under review. Unilateral or bilateral disarmament 
will not work if the policies and practices of third countries continue to influence world 
trade and thus distort domestic markets. It is arguable that key trade problems that 
revolve around agriculture and subsidies require global solutions. Furthermore, if 
liberalisation is limited to specific products or sectors and is applied in a discriminatory 
manner, the agreement could undercut multilateral efforts and could even have perverse 
effects for world trade. From this point of view, one is justified to state that the 
Agreement runs counter to the wro's principle of promoting a tariff free world trading 
system.469 
The Agreement contributes to the improved management of bilateral trade relations by 
creating new rights and obligations that perforce require new consultative and dispute 
settlement mechanisms. These mechanisms are a prerequisite in order to supervise the 
operation of the agreement and to monitor and enforce rights and obligations created 
thereunder. These mechanisms could also provide a means to pre-empt potential 
disputes. The establishment of the Council and the provision of binding arbitration to 
resolve certain types of disputes under the Agreement are useful models for other up-
coming free trade agreements. 
Although such consultative mechanisms need not conflict with the GA TI objectives and 
disciplines, the existence of various bilateral dispute settlement mechanisms could raise 
problems with regard to the consistency of rulings. For, instance, different bilateral 
panels could put forward conflicting interpretations on Contracting Parties' 
obligations. 47o That said, however, the provision for an elaborate dispute settlement 
469ft is noteworthy that most of the past effortS by the US to open foreign markets selectively have resulted 
only in a redistribution of import share and not overall liberalisation, as the US supplier received 
special preferences to the detriment of other exporters. Other countries seeking their own special 
deals, however, usually imitate such effortS. In the end, such actions often result in market sharing 
arrangements instead of market uberalisation, an out-come clearly inferior to the maintenance of 
the GATT globalliberalisation spirit. See chapter twO for a discussion on the fundamentals of 
Regionalism and. Multilateralism 
47°The NAn A provides new rights for private investors to obtain relief directly against governments for 
NAn A violations. Instead of seeking relief in courtS or administrative tribunals of the host 
country, or trying to get his home government to pursue a claim against the host government, an 
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mechanism is in clear conformity with the GAIT disciplines. Again, the Agreement does 
not preclude Parties from accessing, if need be, the much advanced WTO dispute 
settlement mechanisms should they choose to do so. This leeway is a clear 
acknowledgement of the superiority of the WTO framework over that of the preferential 
Agreement. 
The discussion in chapter one did point out that free trade areas are unlikely to redress 
bilateral trade imbalances. ~The avowed objective of trade diversion implicit in such 
arrangements has little more than temporary political appeal. Efforts by candidate 
countries to reduce the bilateral imbalance in the short term yield little in terms of trade 
improvement or political goodwill. Contracting Parties find out sooner than later that 
they need a more sustained performance that can only be achieved through 
complimentary changes in macroeconomic and exchange rates policies. It was also 
argued that free trade areas slow the momentum for the multilateral tariff cuts by 
creating vested interests in the partner countries for the preservation of the free trade 
area tariff preferences.471 To this extend, the Agreement must be held to be inconsistent 
with the WTO's stated commitment to a multilateral trade regime. 
The Agreement scores well on the GAIT most favoured nation and national treatment 
fronts. The Agreement commits the Parties to provide national treatment to investors 
from the partner countries. In other words South Africa's and the EU and its member 
States' investors must be treated at least as well as domestic-based investors. This 
obligation must hold true for practices applied by States or Provinces. In addition, the 
Agreement contains a most favoured nation obligation that ensures that the Contracting 
Party's investors are treated in like manner with other investors in the country. 
Compared to GAIT rules, however, the energy secunty safeguards are sharply 
circumscribed. For instance, the national security exemption is limited to fulfrlment of 
investor may seek binding arbitral rulings directly against the host governments in an international 
forum. This would be governed by the rules established by the World Bank's International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the UN Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Remedies for violations of NAFTA obligations include monetary 
damages and return of property. The arbitration panels themselves cannot, however, enforce 
money damages or compel the return of property. Instead, the investor can take the arbitral 
awards to a court in any of the three NAFTA countries and seek enforcement under treaties to 
which all the three countries are parties (See Hufbauer et al supra at p. 81) 
471 See chapter one for the detailed discussion on the subject of 'Multilateral vs.- Regional Integration 
llUtlatives. 
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military related requirements, and shon supply restrictions must provide for proponional 
sharing of supplies with the other country. In essence, the Agreement ensures that in 
most cases energy trade will be based on commercial considerations, with prices set by 
the market forces. 
It would appear the Agreement fails to address the question of accession based on the 
GA TI procedures. The GA TI's procedure underpins the imponance of a free trade 
agreement being open to third countries.472 This omission renders the Agreement 
incompatible with the WTO's strategy to coalesce the world commerce into a global 
village through building blocks in regional integration schemes. The creation of an EU-
SA exclusionist trade club obviously does not augur well for the WTO refrain of a tariff 
free global commerce. 
The other basic features on tariffs and non-tariff barriers including dumping and 
countervailing measures to a large extend replicate the WTO disciplines. Provision is also 
made for safe guard measures that are specifically underscored by the WTO framework 
where an Agreement involves a developing country. Although South Africa is rated as a 
developed country under the WTO framework, the safe guard facility is clearly in its 
interest. The Agreement commits reasonable treatment to trade in services in a manner 
that conforms to the GATS disciplines. 
The next section would take a critical re-appraisal of the impact this agreement ponends 
for South Africa. It should, however, be clarified from the outset that the views on the 
implication of the Agreement are based on a reasoned estimation. The actual impact of 
the Agreement would be gauged during the implementation phase more panicularly after 
the contracted disciplines have been effectively domesticated. 
472It is noteworthy that NAFT A has an accession clause. The clause states that" any country or group of 
countries may accede to this Agreement subject to such terms and conditions as may be agreed 
between such country or countries and the Commission and following approval in accordance 
with the applicable approval procedures in each country". In addition, like in the GAIT Article 
XXXV, the NAFTA contains a "non-application" provision that allows existing members to 
deny new members at the time of their accession the benefits of the NAFT A in their markets 
without blackballing the candidate country or countries entirely from the club (See Hufbauer et al, 
supra at p. 114) 
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5.6.1 Implication of the Agreement for SACU 
SACU has been an arrangement whereby South Africa acquired "captive markets" in 
return for disproportionate share in the revenue pooL It guaranteed South Africa duty-
free access to the BLNS markets, and drew the latter behind South Africa's protective 
tariff wall. The problems that the BLNS have had with South Africa, and their 
relationship in the SACU, have received generous literary treatment by eminent scholars. 
It will, therefore serve no material purpose to reproduce these issues here.473 Suffice to 
say that the SACU is a customs tmion that goes back to 1910 and the colonial era. It was 
renegotiated in 1969, and Namibia became a sovereign state member in 1990. To date, 
there have been seven rounds of negotiations, with the last taking place in Swaziland, in 
March 1996.474 
For the SACU members, the EU-SA Agreement would effectively transform the BLNS's 
non-reciprocal status to reciprocal duty-free access. At least one-third of the revenues 
from SACU common revenue pool go to the BLNS countries, whose governments are 
to varying degrees dependent on those revenues for government expenditure.475 With 
the EU accounting for a little less than a half of the SAOJ's imports, the revenue 
implications are enormous and not sustainable. Economists fear that an EU -SA free 
trade partnership would be disastrous for a country like Lesotho, which receIves 
approximately 60 percent of its budget from customs revenues. 476 
The SACU arrangement is currently undergoing radical transformation, not least because 
it leaves the BLNS countries heavily dependent on customs revenue. It has been 
calculated that, customs revenue provides 14.5% of the total government revenue for 
Botswana, 57.7% in the case of Lesotho, 43.8% in the case of Namibia and 32% in the 
case of Swaziland.477 This is why the EU argues that a free trade agreement with South 
Africa or not, any trade liberalization would undoubtedly lead to a decrease in customs 
revenue and that this system of financing is inefficient and therefore unsustainable. 
473 See for example, M. Sisulu, et al, (ed.) Reconstituting and Democratizing the SACU, Report of the 
Workshop held in Gabarone, Botswana, March 1994 
474 The details of these negotiations are not germane to this discussion. Our discourse here is to set out and 
lay bare the level of economic dependency within SACU in order to amplify the implication of 
the EU-SA trade partnership for these States. 
475 SACU revenue accounted for 14.5% of Botswana's total government revenue in 1990/91, 32% of 
Swaziland's in 1989/90. 43.8% of Namibia's in 1991/2 and 57.7% of Lesotho's revenue in 
1990/91. See R. Thomas, Regional Arrangements supra at p. 26 
476 See Charles Harvey, supra at p.83 
477 Ibid. 
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Assuming this is true, the region will have to face massive adjustment costs, which will 
have to be paid for somehow. 
The EU has stated that, in principle, it is prepared to consider ways of compensating the 
BLNS, but has so far failed to put forward any specific proposals in this respect. It is 
obviously critical that comprehensive proposals be urgently tabled so that the 
understandable concerns of the BLNS can be urgently addressed. Even before the EU-
SA free trade partnership was agreed upon, its partners in southern Africa were already 
feeling the pinch as South Africa moved out of its long isolation towards integration into 
the global economy. Like we pointed out earlier, countries in the region have had to 
liberalize their economies as a condition of IMF/World Bank structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPS). As a result of these developments news abound of factories 
closing, job losses, and relocation of industries to South Africa. In an interview in 
November 1997, Jean Claude Boidin, Head of the Commission's Task Force for 
Negotiations with South Africa had this to say: 
"Let us be frank, the investment impact of the free trade agreement may not always be 
100% positive. During the apartheid years, when South Africa was facing serious 
investment and trade barriers, certain operators did invest significant capital in the 
BLNS countries in particular, to remain close to the South African economy, yet 
avoiding South African labels; in this way, they could enjoy easy access to the whole of 
SADC market, and also excellent access to the EU market, through the Lome 
Convention. Asparagus canning in Lesotho, flounnills in Botswana, textile units in 
Swaziland are sometimes quoted to illustrate the argumem."478 
Indeed South Africa has now gained a much better access to EU market in part thanks to 
'erga orrmes' tariff reduction in the Uruguay Round and even more so, thanks to the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The realty of Jean Claude's assessment is that 
tomorrow, if it becomes as easy to export canned asparagus from Bloemfontien - South 
Africa - as it currently is from Maseru, what will happen? We might see an investor 
decide that asparagus canneries would be more efficiently located in South Africa -closer 
to the fields where asparagus is grown, or the Port where it must be shipped. This would 
definitely make much economic sense. 
478 Sudworth, E, and K. Van Hove. 1998, EU-SA Trade Negotiations: Insight into an ACP·EU 
Negotiating process (ECDPM Working Paper No. 57) Maastricht: ECDPM cited at 
http://www.eusa.org.za at p.8 
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There is, therefore, legitimate anxiety among the BLNS that certain existing investments 
could be dislocated or rendered idle as a result of the fact that South Africa would 
become a preferential trading partner of the EU. This risk is known by economist as 
"growth polarization", where investment in a given economic area tend to be 
concentrated on a few local zones where profitability is higher.479 On this score, however, 
Claude communicates the EU's assurance in these terms: 
"We in the COrrmllssion would like to nature the pOSltIve impact of the future 
agreement on the region and avoid as far as possible the occurrence of negative 
consequences, growth losses, disruption of traditional activities or redundancies that 
could be caused by the closing down of one or more factories. We must work with our 
BLNS partners that this does not happen." 480 
Exactly how the EU proposes to achieve this level of stability is not quite clear. But there 
is a familiar ring of the old 'constellation of states' with South Africa at the hub, thought 
up by the apartheid regime in the 1970s.481 Meanwhile the EU officials insist that the 
decline in consumer prices in the BLNS countries that will be prompted by decreasing 
SACU tariffs will encourage foreign investors to set up shop here and give the region's 
consumers and businesses access to a larger variety of cheap European goods. The view 
among the BLNS States is, however, different, says Paul Goodison.482 
Goodison warns that the promised benefits for SACU may tum out a far cry. He points 
to the different structures and levels of development that the later have compared to 
South Africa's fairly diversified manufacturing and industrial base. Independent analysts 
such as Goodison worry that while South Africa is strong enough to cope with increased 
competition from European imports483 the fragile BLNS economies may not be able to 
handle the sudden arrival of cheap EU imports. It is quite correct to point out that in 
view of their limited industrial production base, the BLNS exports to the EU -already 
duty-free under the Lome Convention are unlikely to rise. It also remains valid to argue 
that the BLNS goods produced for the SACU market will come into competition with 
479 http://www.eusa.org.za1998 
480 hnp:! Iwww.eusa.org.za supra 
481 Countering this was the major driving force behind the creation of SADe, which the EU has supported 
from its inception. 
482 A researcher for European non-governmental agency, which has been working with Lesotho's ministry 
of Trade, Industry & Marketing to evaluate the regional impact of the SA-EU deal. 'African and 
Asian voice unease as South Africa picks up the Pen: Reported in the 48 Financial Times, Oct. 8, 
1999 
483 Indeed South African exporters will be able to benefit from reduced tariffs on EU markets as well 
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EU exports. There is, again, no gainsaying the fact that the Customs revenues paid to 
BLNS governments from SACUs common revenue pool will definitely take a deep dive. 
It is in this respect that the BNS are demanding action to protect vital economic sectors 
threatened by the EU imports, especially against subsidized farm products.484 The four 
countries may also press for direct representation on the EU-SA Co-operation Colllci1485 
that will manage the EU-SA Agreement. Economic analysts argue that though the SA-
EU free trade partnership has 'fundamentally transformed' the basis of BLNS relations 
with Europe thereby creating a de/acto EU-SACU free trade area, the four countries were 
never adequately consulted.48b This, they say, violates the EU-ACY treaty, which provides 
for prompt consultations in cases where the interests of any ACP member States are 
adversely affected by EU measures. 487 
SACU States are genuinely concerned about the prospect of investment diversion 
occurring within the SADC region. This concern stems from the fact that SADC states 
would apply widely differing external tariffs to the rest of the world while offering free 
trade within the region. The issue of regulating investment incentives (and external tariff 
harmonization) needs to be discussed at the regional level, although one must be 
doubtful whether there will be agreement on a precise workable definition of 
484 The EU argues that since the BLNS agreed to an FTA, any problems now arising are purely an internal 
matter for the SACU partners. This makes a mockery of the EU member states' stated policy of 
support for the economic development of the Southern African states, as contained in the Berlin 
Declaration of September 1994 (SADC/SO/1I942 of September, 1994), now known as the Berlin 
lnitiat.iu?. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU and SADC, adopted a Declaration which 
inter alia recalled, " .... the long standing co-operation between the two regions [the EU and 
SADq as expressed in bilateral and multilateral frameworks, in particular the Lome Convention; 
.. [Recognized] that the Southern African region has a substantial development potential through 
closer co-operation; [and] decided to enter into a comprehensive dialogue to further the 
development of relations between the two regions, taking into account other bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements and without prejudice to the Lome Convention .. " To this en~ the 
Declaration sets out the overall objectives of this co-operation between the two regions as, Inler 
alia: Supporting an open and increasingly productive and equitable international economy and, in 
this context, prrmoting ro-operation in trade wi1h cmd in the Southern African ?f!j!jan, in order to enhanre its 
econanic deuiopnmt 
485 See chapter five for a detailed discussion on the character of the Co-operation Council 
486 South Africa constantly consulted and briefed the BLNS States of progress on the EU - SA free trade 
partnership but the former think that this was not good enough 
487 Because of their intimate trade relationship with South Africa through the customs union and the 
difficulty of enforcing separate rules of origin, the SACU member States have always been 
considered de facto parties to this agreement. For this reason, South Africa has both consistently 
and conscientiously consulted and briefed SACU states for the period of the negotiations. See 
discussion on the EU-SA Negotiations at chapter five above. See also chapter seven for an in-
depth analysis of the EU-ACP post Lome relation. See also 48, Financial Times supra 
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"harmonization'. Nevertheless, the threat of an incentive race could lead the region to 
favourably consider moves to debate investment measures within the region. 
5.6.2 Implication for the SAOC Trade Protocol 
In respect of SADC, while its position is not as critical as that of the SACU States, it 
nevertheless faces a similar dilemma. This is so in that it has negotiated among its 
fourteen states to establish a free trade area within eight years of the entry into force of 
the SADC Trade Protocol -i.e. by late 2008.488 This Protocol has now entered into force 
following ratification by the requisite number of states.489 South Africa is a party to the 
SADC trade Protocol, signed in Maseru in August 1996. A key element in this trade 
Protocol is the principle of asymmetry whereby South Africa will offer market access to 
its poorer neighbours in exchange for concessions, by other SADC countries at a later 
date. 
The Protocol also includes a clause to the effect that no SADC State can offer trade 
benefits to a third country without extending them simultaneously to other SA DC 
member States.490 Thus, the bilateral agreement between the EU and South Africa has to 
be extended to other SADC member States. This explains South Africa's insistence on 
the 'SADC first' principle or what has become known as 'sequencing' and the importance 
it places on the question of asymmetry.491 
Commissioner Pinheiro,492 takes a different view on this maner. He says the main area of 
concern for exporters in Southern Africa is therefore not their access to the EU market, 
which will in any case remain favourable, but their access to the South African or rather 
SACU market. The South African market, he laments, is still the fortress it has been for 
so many years. In his view South African tariff and non-tariff barriers are still among the 
highest in the world. 
488 See the discussion on the establishment of the Ff A above 
489 As a consequence, any arrangement contracted by non-SACU members of SADC in terms of the 
Cotonou may be undermined once the proposed EU-EPA free trade agreement become fully 
reciprocal in 2012. A funher complication arises should, for example, Mauritius elect to conclude 
a separate deal with the EU along the lines of the EU-SA free trade partnership, to guarantee 
protection of its unique interests in the EU market. 
490 See Part Eight of the Trade Protocol 
491 Jean Claude admits that the EU has reached an agreement with South Africa that it would be legitimate 
for the latter to open up its market first to its SADC neighbours with whom it has entered 
another free trade agreement. The EU can then come in later. This is what they call 'SADC first' 
or in other words, a sort of 'SADC preference' See the ECDPM paper supra 
492 In his Maastricht address (ECDPM Paper) Supra at p. 8 
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He notes that the EU wants to be instrumental in the necessary liberalization process of 
the South African economy towards the region. Pinheiro adds that in its negotiations 
with South Africa, the EU therefore took the position that South Africa, at the 
minimum, should give the same trade concessions to its neighbours as it will give to the 
ED. This very principle has also been laid down in the SADC Trade Protocol.493 
Through this double locked mechanism the EU-SA Agreement serves as the crowbar for 
opening up South Africa to the region. This argument is not without some force. 
Commentators have argued that should South Africa extent concessions it has allowed 
the EU to her SADC partners the latter would have achieved greater in-roads into the 
hitherto fortress that has been the South African market.494 
It should be noted, however, that the desperate social and economic problems inherited 
by the democratic government of South Africa when added to the transformation 
process that is taking shape and then the attendant adjustment costs of this 'crowbar' are 
awesome in dirnension.495 For a clearer picture on the implications of the EU-SA 
Agreement for the SADC region, we dissect the various sectors that are in the firing line 
and consider the ramification of the Agreement on each one of them. 
(a) Trade and Deudopment 
Trade preferences granted by South Africa to the EU would also open up the SADC 
market to EU exports. This could thwart SADC's objective of using trade integration to 
achieve industrial development and diversification because regional producers are 
unlikely to be able to compete with ED producers, particularly in manufactured goods. 
Given, however, that the ED is a major trading partner for SADC, analysts' fear that the 
EC may impose new rules and conditions, strict specifications and standards on 
products, which could amount to a new form of protectionism thereby restrict SAOC's 
access to the EC market.496 For the SADC economies to prosper, they must have a 
reliable market to earn them the much-revered yet elusive foreign currency, which they 
need to purchase all kinds of imports. It is therefore necessary for the SADC countries to 
compete as a region in the rest of the world.497 
493 Pan Eight of the Trade Protocol 
494 See for example remarks by Pinheiro Supra 
495 The ECDPM paper supra at p.8 
496 Ibid 
497 See Tiroyamodimo supra at p. 5 
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The EU-SA Agreement would also have implications for the implementation of the 
Trade Protocol and the region's broader agenda of trade and development integration. 
Although a comprehensive study of the impact of the EU-SA Agreement on SADC has 
not been undertaken, preliminary evidence suggest that it will restrict the region's access 
to the South African market as well as the capacity to supply in their areas of strength.498 
Economist point out that industries that are likely to be negatively affected by unfair 
competition are mainly in foodstuffs such as biscuits, sugar, wheat, jams and beef. This is 
due mainly to the high agricultural subsidies, which the EU products enjoy under the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).499 
(b) TheprojXJsed EUSADC Free Trade Area (EPA) 
Depending on when the proposed European Partnership Agreement (EPA) SCJis 
concluded between the EU and SADC States, and when any trade benefits in respect of 
SADC begin to flow, there may be adverse effects for both sides. From SADC States' 
point of view, any benefits that they may negotiate vis-a-vis asymmetry in their tariff 
regimes with the EU under the EPA may be negated should goods slip through to their 
market via the free trade agreement with South Africa because of poor border controls. 
It follows, therefore, that even though the EPAs might insulate their economies from 
highly sensitive EU products, these would nonetheless enter their territories via their 
southernmost SADC partner, or through Mauritius. 
Again from the South African perspective, concerns already exist that the EU-SA free 
trade partnership excludes certain very sensitive products, particularly agricultural 
products benefiting from high subsidies. However, given that any EPA concluded with 
the EU will allow for comulation, the EU could use this arrangement with the SADC 
States to circumvent those exclusions through very liberal cumulation terms. This 
498 SADe Commissioned David Evans Study, for instance, admit that many problems limits its ability to 
forecast impact: The SADe Trade Protocol, May 1999, see also citation on th Report supra 
499 See comments by R Thomas, Trade Liberalization Issues, (supra) at p.49, See also chapter three for a 
detailed discussion on the EO's eAP policy 
5coThere are ongoing cliscussions to establish a free trade agreement between the SADC and the EV within 
the rubric of the ACP framework. The study report recommends that: "first, eXIend the EV-SA 
free trade agreement to other SACU members then conclude some form of REP A with the three 
remaining developing countries (i.e. Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe), temporarily leaving out six 
least developed countries that are better off outside a regional partnership agreement. A SADC-
wide REPA with the EV might be envisaged beyond 2010."The argument behind this 
recommendation is that least developed countries in SADe [t.e. Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) would continue to enjoy preferential access into the EV 
market even when the Cotonou expires without having to reciprocate. See the Evans Study supra 
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development, however, remains to be seen. The modalities of such an arrangement are 
yet to be worked OUt.50l 
(c) Implimlion far Reu?nUe Streams 
According to a study conducted by the Centre for Research into Economics and Finance 
in Southern Africa and Imani, Associates ('the Report,)502, both Zimbabwe and Malawi 
will have to raise their taxes by as much as 5% to free trade agreements. Lesotho, 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania would have to increase their 
taxes by 8% to 12%. These measures portend serious economic and social implications 
for the already poverty stricken populations in the southern Africa region. The report 
recommends that countries should opt for broadening their tax bases rather than an 
mcrease. 
The report says that a more serious problem is with customs revenue where, under the 
worst-case scenario Malawi and Mozambique would lose 90% of their customs revenue. 
This is due mainly to the fact that most of their trade is with the SADC countries and 
these would not be subject to any duty. It says Zambia and Zimbabwe would lose 25% 
and 41 % revenue respectively. The report points out that the impact on other countries 
is minor. These results happen due to the fact that imports from the rest of the world 
lead to the replacement of tariffs with non-tariff imports from the European Union. 
Compounding these concerns are fears in some quarters that the EU-SA trade pact will 
enable EU companies to use South Africa as an export base from which to make inroads 
into other Southern African markets thereby damaging local industries. 503 SADC states 
also fear that EU exporters will gain access to the South African market on better terms 
than those available to the neighbouring SADC flfms.504 
Ramsamy has, however, discounted fears that EU companies would be able to encroach 
on the SADC markets by transiting goods through South Africa.505 He points out that 
SADC rules of origin specify that if more than 35 per cent of a product's inputs originate 
in SADC countries, the product gets preferential access to the SADC market. He 
501 See the discussion on EPAS at chapter seven below 
502 Reported at http://www.africarecovery.org see infra 
503 African Recovery, vol. 13 # 1 June 1999 at p. 23 cited at http://www.africarecovery.org at p.l 
504 Ibid 
50; See http://www.africarecovery.org lSI June, 1999 at p.23 
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explains that bilateral agreements between South Africa and other SADC countnes 
specify a threshold lower than 35 per cent. Ramsamy, however, admits that some 
companies with a very high component of foreign imports won't meet the 35 per cent 
value-added threshold and might have problems penetrating the market.,o6 
Ramsamy adds another angle to this debate. He argues that should South Africa 
responds to pressure induced by trade liberalisation by acquiring technology to improve 
competitiveness, then this technology acquisition will penetrate the rest of the SADC 
market. He notes that it's important in the context of globalisation that SADC utilises the 
region as a stepping stone to the global market, and this is where the EU-SA Agreement 
comes 1ll handy.'O? Ramsamy's reasoning finds concurrence in the seminal views 
expressed by Nelson Mandela, the former South African President. Underlying the 
importance of technology to the economic growth of the SADC region, Mandela 
forcefully argues that: 
"We live in a world driven by science and technology. To enhance our development 
capacity, we need increased investment in research and development within the SADe 
region. This will assist to achieve high productivity levels and make us competitive in 
the international market place. It is regrettable to note that the developing world, 
including the SADe region spends less than 2 percent of their budgets on research and 
development compared with more than 10 percent for the developed world. More 
resources need to be mobilized from government and the private sector to fund 
research and development"so8. 
The main handicap afflicting the SADC States is the endemic weakness in the supply side 
structures. In view of this enduring handicap, it is inconceivable that these States would 
be in a position to compete with the EU's products in the South African market. In any 
case, SADC States have perennially failed to utilise all the quotas allotted to them to 
export to the EU market duty free under the EU-ACP trade arrangement. The reason 
why this is so is the deficiency of the supply side infrastructure. Describing SADC 
countries' concerns over the EU-SA trade deal as "legitimate," an April 1999 study by the 
South Africa Foundation,09 nevertheless sounds an optimistic note. The study predicts 
that the signing of the SADC trade protocol "will go a long way to provide equal access 
for products from SADC countries to the South African market." Moreover, the study 
SC" Ibid. 
507 See hw)j /v.r\VW.africarecovery.org 15\ June, 1999 at p.23 
SOBSmemenr by the then Chairman of SADC on the occasion of the official closing of ,he summit of heads 
of States and Government of SADC at Chichiri Conference Centre, 8,h Sept. 1997) 
509 Reponed at hap:! Iwww.africarecovery.org 1~1 June, 1999 at p.23 
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adds that the EU-SA Agreement has given an impetus to the signing of the SADC trade 
protocoP 10. 
One hopes that the EU-SA partnership would facilitate the much needed technology 
transfer to the SADC region. This measure would come in handy to strengthen SADC 
state's supply side deficiencies. It is in this light that one can validate Mandela's concerns. 
If SADC states do not get aboard the technological bandwagon and sooner rather than 
later, there is no hope for them to be fully integrated into the world trading system. 
To actualize the aforesaid feat SADC must reconfigure itself on the basis of assertive, 
mutually sustained and beneficial relationships so that it can locate itself, its 
neighborhood, and the rest of the continent in this period of major changes in the global 
system. The state of affair in southern Africa region is such that it behooves South 
Africa, as the regional economic powerhouse to take the lead in emancipating its SADC 
Partners from wallowing in the mire of economic stagnation and decay. South Africa can 
hardly afford to remain an island of wealth surrounded by a sea of poverty, and that the 
reglOn as a whole needs to benefit from any integration initiative taking root in the 
reglon. 
The immediate significance of this agreement, however, and one of the reasons for 
expediting the intra-SADC negotiations, was precisely in response to the EU -SA 
Agreement. An additional motivation, from South Africa's point of view, was to prevent 
countries further afield being able to claim - under the wro disciplines - the same 
preferential access to the South African market as was being accorded to its SADC 
partners. By registering SADC as a new trade bloc under the wro, the SADC would 
have secured some legal 'space' within which to polish and consolidate gains made in 
their region. SADC is also in a far stronger position to counter the EUs free trade 
demands as a solid front. In general terms being able to present SADC as a 'going 
concern' can be persuasive in bringing pressure to bear on the EU to concretise its 
support for SADC regional integration initiative. 
51O Mr. Hidipo Hamutenya, Namibia's Minister of Trade, shares this view: "There was really no sense of 
urgency [to trade liberalization in South Africa]. But now that South Africa is focused on the free 
trade agreement with the EU, they will have the opportunity to speed up the SADe Protocol 
Reported at http://www.africarecovery.org 1" June, 1999 at p.23 
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5.6.3 Any welfare gains for the region 
The overriding concern that has been expressed by the SADC States, both developing 
and the least developed, in respect of their special and differential status in the WIO 
should be applied equally. The special rights accruing to these States would be 
compromised at a critical time when such rights should be seen as part of the SADC 
armour for policy instrument. The SADe states need this differential facility in order to 
achieve their national development objectives. In particular, with the benefit of supply 
side-measure, special and differential measures could assist these countries in developing 
their comparative advantage. With the advent of the EU-SA Agreement, these benefits 
now precariously hang in the balance. 
To underscore what it considers to be its noble intentions in contracting a free trade 
Partnership with South Africa, the EU's representative in South Africa mints no words in 
this regard. He communicates his Union's commitment as follows: 
" I would like to reinforce one idea that has been a strong element in the European 
Union's overall approach to the SADC region and in particular to the South African 
negotiations. That is that the European Union is ultra anxious to ensure that this 
bilateral treaty with south Africa should help to develop intra-SADC trading and other 
relationships rather that to cause problems in the development of trade. Think about 
it. It is not in the European Union's interest to invest considerable amounts in 
development assistance in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries in the region, 
notably to stimulate the development of their trade with each other. If on the other 
hand, the EU were to enter into an agreement with South Africa, which in some way, 
creates obstacles to that process."Sll 
It is probably fair to say that it is still too early to form a conclusive judgement one way 
or other as to the cost and benefits of the EU-SA Agreement for either South Africa 
SACU or SADe. Having said that, it must be pointed out that for the SACU and SADe 
partners, the early prognosis does not, nevertheless appear to be positive.512 Within 
SADe, however, the costs of adjusting to the new trade regime are exacerbated by the 
fact that most of its member States have a weaker capacity than most other developing 
countries to successfully enter into tradable activities and develop exports, and absorb 
the shocks related to import liberalization. 
511 H.E Ambassador Micheal Laidler's presentations at the A WEPA Seminar supra at p.lS 
512 RH. Thomas: 'The EU-SA Trade, Development & Co-operation Agreement: precedent or 
Complicating factor? Paper presented at the 'Regional Workshop on the Coronou - ACP 
Agreement: What are the options and Challenges for SADC' Harare, Zimbabwe 21-22 September 
2000 
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The refrain by econOIll1sts has been that without first addressing their supply side 
structures, no amount of trade pegs would revamp SADC's competitiveness in the world 
markets.5l3 This is where Mandela's edict on the need to invest in technology is right on 
target. Economists admit that it is pertinently difficult to quantify welfare effects in the 
current erratic world markets.514 It has been suggested that the correct way to judge the 
overall economic effect of a regional arrangement is to compare real income under the 
arrangement with that occurring if there was no such arrangement. It is abundantly clear 
that increases in real income that arises from the expected positive economic welfare 
would benefit the region. Such as through specialization in production and trade 
creation, which can lead to increased imports from non-member States.515 This is, 
nevertheless, the ideal scenario. This is pertinently a difficult approach to take due to the 
sheer complexity and magnitude of the task involved.516 
For the sake of simplicity, McMillan has suggested that one cntenon for assesslllg 
regional trade agreements should, thus, be the economic welfare of non-regional trade 
agreement members.517 Accordingly, he prefers to base the process of regional 
integration assessment - on economic welfare of non-member States. The design here is 
to examine whether the welfare of non-member States would be protected if their 
exports to the newly created regional bloc remain unchanged. This scenario would, 
however, need to maintain the existing terms of trade to ensure that the welfare of none 
member States is maintained. Consideration is, therefore, needed as to the value of the 
513 See for example P.S Mistry "1k New Regjonalism: impalimmt or Spur to foture MuitilaterialWn.?" in Teunissen, 
]. (ed.), RegionalWn & the Global Econany: 7he case of Latin AmenCa & the Caribbean, 1995). 
514 Ibid. 
515 From the political standpoint, a member State's subjective assessment of the costs and benefits derived 
from integration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. See for example Mistry "1k 
New Regionalism: impalimmt or Spur to future Multilaterialism supra. He contends that" there is an 
imbalance between the sophisticated quantitative analysis which can be undertaken to assess the 
trade implications of RIAs (regional integration arrangement) and the less rigorous, almost elusive 
qualitative basis on which the case of assessing the none-trade effects of RIAS must rely . 
... Developing a holistic methodology for assessing all the advantages of regionalism in general, or 
even of specific RIAs in particular is, of course, easier mooted than achieved. There is no obvious 
precedent which suggests the viability of a single all-embracing approach to evaluating the costs 
and benefits of a phenomenon with multiple effects of a quite different nature (economic, 
political, military, social)." 
516 P. Wonnacott and M. Lutz (1989), 'Is There a Case for Free Trade Areas?', in J. Schott (ed.), Free Trade 
Areas and US Trade Policy, Washington, Institute for International Economics, pp.59-84 
517 J. McMillan (1995), 'Does Regional Integration Foster Open Trade? Economic Theory and GATT's 
Article XXIV', in K. Anderson and R Blackhurst (eds.), Regional Integration and the Global 
Trading System, New York, St. Martin's Press, pp.292-310 
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net trade balance before and after any regional trade agreement is formed or the addition 
of new members to the group.518 
Again, like we have pointed out before, quantification of welfare gains is problematic in 
the ex-ante case when several other influential factors are at work in the global arena.519 
One only needs look at the way world markets tumbled in the wake of September the 
11·h terrorist infamy. The treble effects ignited by that ghastly act ricocheted in every 
corner of the global market resulting in a deep recession that still plague some economies 
to date. 
Another shade of opinion predicts the welfare effects on trade volumes and product 
prices.52o This school of thought argues that the impact of the regional trade agreement 
can still be constructed as one that determines whether trade volumes and product prices 
are likely to alter considerably as a consequence of the formation of the regional 
econonuc bloc. This, approach is premised on the assumption that global forces 
elsewhere would, of course, not affect world product prices, as well as world trade levels 
of products under consideration.521 In our considered view, this approach is an entirely 
impossible feat to predict with any measure of certainty. 
Trevor Manuel holds the view that foreign direct investment in a reglOn mamtaUlillg 
tariff barriers against the rest of the world is attracting investment unnaturally by way of 
market and price intervention.522 The Minister contends that this would lead to a less 
than effective allocation of resources and, thus a fall in global economic welfare. 
Interestingly, one may expect that a regional trade agreement would see a shift in 
industries. The EEC experience we examined earlier speaks the contrary view. Its 
creation did not lead to large-scale contraction of entire industries in anyone country and 
their subsequent replacement by imports from another Member State. 
518 As suggested by A. Panagariya (2000), 'Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and 
New Developments', Joumd of Ecananic LiterCl1Ure, 38, pp.287-331 (at p.327), 
519 See Marceau et al supra at p.308 
520 See for example, A Winter and W. Chang (2000), ' Regional Integration and Import Prices: An 
Empirical Investigation', Journal of International Economics, 51, at pp. 363-377 
521 Other unforeseen events too impact negatively on trade outflows. For instance events of the l1·h 
September 2001 suddenly threw the world economy into a biting recession. 
522 Minister Manuel's views at the AWEPA Seminar, supra at p.42-45 
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Marceau opme that this might have been due to the fact that affected industries 
reinvented themselves to adapt to the new regime of increased competition.sn The 
argument goes that such industries eventually found their market niche, thereby 
specialising in production, trading according to comparative advantage, exploiting 
potential economies of scale and remaining in business.s24 Either way, it is unlikely that 
the EU-SA Agreement would ignite an exodus of EU frrms relocating to the SADC 
region. In the unlikely event that this were to happen, one hopes that the fundamentals 
of economies of scale which economists are wont to peddle would be replayed in this 
poverty plagued region. 
When, however, past expenence were anything to go by, any influx of industrial 
establishments in the SADC region would be the frnal nail in the coffin of the already 
bed-ridden SADC companies. The struggling frrms in the SADC region are hardly in a 
position to stand against a technologically backed EU establishment that decides to set 
up operations in the region. So it appears to be a vicious circle of a double-edged sword 
cutting with ire of economic gloom either way. It is unlikely that the eventuality of 
industrial relocation would material for the SADC region in the foreseeable future. 
Certainly not if the performance of the concluded trade instruments is anything to go by. 
The changes in the global economy, notwithstanding, the EU -SA Agreement presents 
enormous opportunity to SADC States if properly managed and marketed. The 
reappraisal of investment opportunities in the wake of the Asian collapse is a clear wake-
up call for SADC to careful strengthen and give an impetus to the ongoing economic 
transformation in the region. 
The SADC Trade Protocol is clearly of enormous signifrcance to the consolidation of an 
integrated economy in southern Africa. To the frustration of the non-SACU members 
and South Africa, the smaller states in SACU shun any discussion of the SACU 
negotiations on institutional and trade matters within the SADC for a free trade 
agreement. Within the SACU negotiating rounds, they push to the farthest recesses of 
the agenda, any discussion of relations within SADC and COMESA. This does not bode 
well for the development of sound policies and inter-linkages between the diverse 
523 Marceau et al, Legal Issues of Economic Integration (supra) at p.307 
524 Marceau et al supra at p.38, see also chapter two for the fundamentals of the economies of scale 
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institutions, and makes a mockery of the Abuja Treaty's call for building blocks to fuse 
together the Pan-Africanist vision for a continent-wide common market. 
It is also significant that the SADC Protocol has to a large extent complied with the 
WTO disciplines. The question of dispute settlement presents a peculiar problem in a 
proliferation of free trade area setting. The fronting of SACU as unit on tariff disciplines 
is without legal basis either in the SADC Protocol or under the WTO framework. This 
grey area needs to be resolved before the on-set of dispute settlement processes as 
established under the Protocol. 
5.7 The viability of the Agreement 
We have noted in chapter one that there are two primary supply conditions, which are a 
prerequisite for a successful integration effort. The first is what Mattli525 called 
"commitment institutions" such as a centralised monitoring institution and third party 
enforcement mechanism. These factors enhance the chances of sustained co-operation 
by acting as constrains on contracting Parties in circumstances where self-help measures 
alone are insufficient to prevent reneging on contractual obligations. According to Mattli, 
the second supply condition is the presence of a hegemon among the group of countries 
seeking closer ties to act as the focal point in the co-ordination of rules, regulations, and 
policies. Such a hegemon does, also help to ease distributional tension by assuming the 
role of regional paymaster. 
To a considerable extend, the Agreement does satisfy these important criterion. The 
Council should undertake the responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the 
Contracting Parties' obligations. One would be justified to say that the Council plays the 
role of a commitment institution and the presence of the affluent European Union, 
through its member States, supplies the necessary hegemon stature. One would expect 
the EU to take on and carry forward the critical institutional leadership that is necessary 
in the process of deepening the integration disciplines. Indications, at least as far as the 
Agreement goes, show that the EU is ready and willing to ease distributional tensions 
through generous side payments. The developmental nature of the Agreement would 
vindicate such benevolent intentions on the part of the European Union. 
S2S See chapter one for a discussion on the "supply of regional integration" 
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The crucial brief for the Council, according to the spirit of the Agreement is to see that 
individuals, companies, and member States do not violet the express provisions of the 
Agreement. The mandate of the Council is broad and it covers treaty regimes including 
competition policy, intellectual and commercial property, public procurement, state aid, 
telecommunications, banking, financial services, company accounts and taxes, indirect 
taxation, technical rules and standards, consumer protection, health and safety, transport, 
and even political participation. 526 
It is yet to be seen how actively pnvate firms and individuals would partlClpate ill 
enforcing the Agreement to call the respective governments to account. Such activity 
goes a long way to entrench the Council's role as a central monitoring agent. 527 As for 
institutional leadership, it behoves the EU to playa key role in especially bankrolling the 
functional operations of the contracted regimes. Needless to state the EU remains South 
Africa's principal trading partner by which designation it plays a central role in the 
growth of the latter's nascent economy. The EU's prosperity is common cause and its 
development assistance obligation to South Africa is well documented in the Agreement. 
It would not be too extravagant to say that the EU would take the lead as the key policy 
initiator and institutional pacesetter on a wider range of issue areas. 
In view of the stated fundamentals it is not far-fetched to point out that the Agreement 
does stand a good chance of cementing the Parties economic and political relations. It is 
also safe to predict that the Agreement has the potential to take the EU -SA economic 
relations to a significant level of tariff-free trade. It goes without saying that this 
526 For example, if firms enter into an agreement that restricts competition, the Commission may seek a 
voluntary termination of such an agreement or issue a formal decision prohibiting it and inflicting 
fines on the parties to the agreement. It can also take member States to task by demanding 
termination of an infringement, or by taking the maner to the Court of Justice for a final 
determination. See Uhich Everling, The member States of the European Community before their 
Court of Justice," European Law Review 9 (1984), 215-24l. 
527 This direct participation of private parties in the enforcement of the Treaty of Rome, a treaty of 
international law, is without precedent. It has greatly improved the court's role as a central 
monitoring agent. For the same reason, it has increased the Court's caseload. In response, the 
EU, in 1988, added a new institution, the court of First Instance, to its enforcement system. This 
new court was established to hear and give judgement on a number of specific types of legal 
action, particularly on complaints or disputes arising from the EU's competition policy. Chve 
Archer and Fiona Butler, The European Community Structure and Process (N ew York: St. 
Martin's Press 1992), p. 37. See also Chapter One for the discussion of 'integration in Europe" 
178 
eventuality is good riddance for the world trading system and the fledgling integration 
initiatives in the east and southern Africa region. 
5:8 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have taken a sweep through the principles features of the TDCA. 
We have noted that the Agreement is fairly comprehensive and one that covers not only 
trade and trade related issues, but also co-operation in economic, social and political 
matters. We have pointed out that the twin principles of Asymmetry and Differentiation 
that characterise the Agreement reflect the developmental approach to the trade 
provisions. We have argued, however, that the asymmetrical and differential nature of the 
Agreement will be eroded by the EU's superior capacity to immediately take up increased 
production as well as defend their own markets. 
We have opined that the Agreement scores well on the GAIT most favoured nation and 
national treatment fronts. We have noted that the Agreement corrunits the Parties to 
providing national treatment to investors from the partner countries. It is our thesis, 
however, that compared to GAIT rules the energy security safeguards are sharply 
circumscribed. We have pointed out that other basic features on tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers, including dumping and countervailing measures, to a large extend replicate the 
WTO disciplines. 
We have noted that the provision for an elaborate dispute settlement mechanism is in 
clear conformity With the GAIT disciplines. We have postulated that the Agreement 
does not preclude Parties from accessing the much-advanced WTO dispute settlement 
mechanisms should they choose to do so. It is our submission that this leeway is a clear 
acknowledgement of the superiority of the WTO framework over that of the preferential 
Agreement. 
We have argued that the Agreement fails to address the question of accession based on 
the GAIT disciplines. We have pointed out that the GAIT disciplines underpin the 
importance of a free trade agreement being open to third countries. In our considered 
view this omission renders the Agreement incompatible with the WTO's strategy to 
coalesce the world commerce into a global village through building blocks in regional 
integration schemes. We have argued that the creation of an EU-SA exclusionist trade 
club obviously does not augur well for the WTO quest for a tariff free global commerce. 
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The chapter has established that the Agreement makes provisions, which would stimulate 
intra-regional trade and integration of the southern Africa region. We have argued that 
the challenge the South African government in general and the business community in 
particular are faced with is to relentlessly pursue the obvious potential benefits offered by 
the Agreement for South Africa's market. On the other hand, we have demonstrated that 
the Agreement will impose considerable adjustment costs both on the vulnerable sectors 
in South Africa and the rest of the eastern and southern Africa region. We have noted, 
however, that the Agreement makes provision for safeguard measures that would 
cushion against import surges, which threaten domestic producers. 
We have argued, in the main, that the Agreement sends out a positive statement about 
South Africa to the international community. In our considered view, this message 
effectively communicates South Africa's wish to be seen as an economic entity that is 
more developed than developing, and one that is able to hold out its own in trade and 
Investment terms. 
We have reviewed the sustainability of the Agreement and have noted that by and large it 
satisfies the two main tests of commitment institutions and supply condition. As for the 
first test, we note that the Agreement makes provision for a centralised monitoring 
institution and third party enforcement mechanism. These factors enhance the chances 
of sustained co-operation by acting as constrains on contracting Parties in circumstances 
where self-help measures alone are insufficient to prevent reneging on contractual 
obligations. As regards the second test, we have noted that the ED clearly plays the key 
role of policy pacesetter and thence acts as the focal point in the co-ordination of rules, 
regulations, and policies. Above all else, we have noted that the ED would also help to 
ease distributional tension by assuming the role of paymaster, to which it has given a 
good account in the recent past. 
In view of the stated fundamentals it is not far-fetched to point out that the Agreement 
does stand a good chance of cementing the Parties economic and political relations. It is 
also safe to predict that the Agreement has the potential to take the ED -SA economic 
relations to a significant level of tariff-free trade. It goes without saying that this 
eventuality is good riddance for the world trading system and the fledgling integration 
initiatives in the eastern and southern Africa region. 
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The chapter has noted that SACU is the first casualty of the EU-SA Agreement. We have 
argued that the EU-SA Agreement would effectively transform the BLNS's non-
reciprocal status to reciprocal duty-free access with serious legal and economic 
ramification. In respect of SADC, while its position is not as critical as that of the SACU 
States, it nevertheless faces a similar dilenuna. 
The chapter has alluded to the provision under the EU-SA Agreement what purports to 
extent trade benefits to SADC member States. The chapter has detailed the various 
SADC State's sectors that are in the firing line of the EU-SA Agreement. We have, in the 
main, argued that the principal handicap afflicting the SADC States is the endemic 
weakness in their supply side structures. We have argued that in view of this enduring 
handicap, it is inconceivable that these States would be in a position to compete with the 
EU's products in the South African market. 
We have pressed that the reality of supply side handicap remains true in spite of 'the 
SADC first' principle which the EU-SA Agreement has internalised. We have argued, 
however, that SADC stands to benefit immensely from the technology transfer 
opportunity, which the EU-SA partnership offers. We have cautioned, however, that to 
actualise this feat SADC must reconfigure itself on the basis of assertive, mutually 
sustained and beneficial relationships so that it can locate itself, its neighbourhood, and 
the rest of the continent into the competitive global economy. 
Chapter Six: The SAOC Trade Protocol in the Integration Equation 
6.1 Introduction 
Several important events are occurring within the east and southern Africa region 
simultaneously with efforts to nature the integration process. These developments have a 
bearing on the deepening of integration in the east and southern Africa region. Some of 
the significant developments in the region include the negotiations between several 
SADC member States, at a bilateral level, for the conclusion of preferential trade 
agreements between themselves. The most outstanding of these developments is the 
recently concluded EU-SA free trade Partnership. 
The SADC Trade Protocol clearly represents an enonnous amount of work, which by 
itself is an almost insurmountable challenge. The SAOC Trade Protocol is taking shape 
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in the backdrop of the recently concluded bilateral agreement between the European 
Union and South Africa, the motor of which is, of course, the establishment of a free 
trade area. This development when measured against the even more complicated 
background of the intended differentiated trade arrangements negotiated for the Lome 
countries after the expiry of Lome IV you begins to see that the timing and the inter-
relationship of all these processes would demand skilful and flexible handling to succeed. 
On the other hand many of the SADC members are party to the COMESA and have, 
within the latter agreement, adopted a programme to deepen trade relations amongst 
themselves. The extent, to which this confuses even further, the SADC agenda, also 
requires discussion. Questions that would need to be addressed include how to deal with 
existing bilateral preferential agreements? How SADC should, as a regional grouping, 
deal with third party relations and appropriately align SADC to the wro multilateral 
trade disciplines. All these preponderance of developments tend to complicate the entire 
regional integration agenda. 
The manner in which this 'open-regionalism' is taking place within SADC is cause for 
concern, as it tends to undermine the east and southern Africa's strategies for integration 
and has the propensity to create conflict. This convoluted process could negatively 
impact on the region's economic development and its ultimate integration into the global 
economy. 
This chapter would commence the rather complicated analysis of the convoluted 
configuration of regional trade regimes in the east and southern Africa region. The thrust 
of the discussion is to underpin the conundrum created by the addition of the EU-SA 
free trade partnership to an already polarized regional integration profile. It is important, 
too, to lllVeStlgate the compatibility of the SADC Trade Protocol with the wro 
disciplines. 
The objective of the chapter is to investigate the implication of the configuration of 
preferential trade regimes on SADC's expressed desire to deepen integration in the 
region. We would, along the way, highlight the synergies that emanate from this 
configuracy in order to sue for harmonization of integration processes. To achieve this 
goal it would be necessary to look into the SADC region's economic profile in order to 
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demonstrate its strengths and weaknesses. The chapter will then take a critical look into 
the SADC Trade Protocol and underscore features, which we think conflict and or 
comply with the WTO disciplines on regionalism. We would at the end of the chapter 
wrap up with a few concluding remarks. 
6.2 A brief historical ovetview 
The cheguered history of SADC's development is amply documented and the same has 
received a generous literary treatment. Its evolution from the politically oriented SADCC 
to the more economically focused SADC has been a beneficiary of fascinating academic 
exposition. It, would, therefore, serve no material utility to reproduce what is a matter of 
common knowledge. Suffice to say that a brief historical overview will lay the foundation 
and open the door for our chosen field of endeavour. A glimpse into the known would, 
we think, more safely navigate us into the unknown territory that lay ahead. 
Following an uninspiring attempt at regional co-operation in the 1980s, southern African 
states began pursuing economic integration with renewed vigor in the Nineties primarily 
as a consequence of developments in Europe and North America.S28 Certainly the 
political rapprochement in the region had a strong influenceS29 • But more panicularly, the 
emergence of a new and democratic South Africa in April 1994 lent urgency to the 
search for a new pannership dispensation5JO 
528 When it was created in 1980, the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) 
which was the precursor institution to SADC, deliberately eschewed trade in favour of a 
functional-sector oriented integration arrangement. Indeed Mistry amply conveys the position 
thus "To assume that expanding trade is the purpose of economic co-operation is one of the two 
basic errors of the standard free trade approach to economic integration. States are less concerned 
with trade as such than with material production, employment and economic security. The 
second error is to argue for an unregulated, free-market approach to regional trade when, in fact, 
all the participating governments practice interventionism (even if to varying degrees) nationally. 
Further, regionally, as well as nationally, free markets (as opposed to managed markets) are 
inconsistent with ensuring an acceptable division of gains and costs among members". See P.S 
Mistry "The New Regionalism: Impediment or Spur to future Multilaterialism?" in Teunissen, J. 
(ed.), Regionalism & the Global Economy: The case of Latin America & the Caribbean, 1995). 
529 The trade agenda was seen as falling within the mandate of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (PTA), which had been established precisely for that, purpose. On this basis, 
Southern African states could perpetuate a fiction and justify their involvement in two potentially 
competing institutions: SADCC and the PTA (now COMESA). 
530 Thus the Heads of States and Government of the former SADa::::, meeting in Arusha at the end of 
August 1991, and in anticipation of South African membership resolved decisively to shift the 
focus of the organizations activities away from the co-ordination of externally funded projects, 
towards promoting economic integration amongst the ten members, eventually including South 
Africa as the eleventh member. See U Africa: SADCC Dreaming too Sweetly of South Africa", by 
Rachel Waterhouse, Inter Press Service, Maputo, January 31, 1992, and "Chissano opens SADa:::: 
Consultative Conference". by Paul Fauvet, Agency France Presse, January 30, 1992. ANC Deputy 
President Walter Sisulu had pledged that a non-racial South Africa would not seek hegemony 
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In anticipation of the latter event, the region had already begun, in 1991, to seriously 
reconsider its strategies for closer economic co-operation, acknowledging the importance 
of consolidating efforts to integrate their economies. As a consequence, the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) was established by Treaty in August 1992, 
succeeding the former Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC). Not surprisingly, in August 1994, South Africa53I became the eleventh 
member and one-year later, in August 1995, Mauritius joined the SADC as the twelfth 
member.532 
The SADC Summit meeting in Maseru, which was held between 17-25 August 1996, 
concluded and adopted a Protocol on Trade and Development for the region. This 
initiative anticipates the establishment of a free trade area in 8 years533 . This attempt at 
regionalism must be viewed against developments in the global economy. Like we argued 
earlier in chapter four multilateralism has seen the adoption, in 1994, of a rules-based 
trading system and witnessed the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to 
police trade diplomacy.534 
6.3.1 The Jurisprudence of the SAOC Trade Protocol 
The SADC Trade Protocol ('the Protocol') is in essence, an interim agreement leading to 
the establishment of a free trade area.535 It comprises in total, thirty-seven articles and 
five annexes and is clearly reflective of the times in which it is written. The Preamble 
recognizes, inter alia, the pivotal role of the private sector and is mindful of the 
overarching effects of the Uruguay Round Agreement on global trade liberalization. The 
over the region, and endorsed the SADCC principles of "equity, interdependence and mutual 
benefits». 
531 In November 1999, Parliament ratified the Protocol and South Africa deposited her instrument of 
ratification with the Executive Secretary of the SADC in December 1999. After ratification by 
two-thirds of the eleven member States that are signatory, the Protocol entered into force on the 
25th January 2000. There are good reasons why South Africa should have entered into an 
agreement with SADC states. First and foremost, South Africa has a moral responsibility to assist 
in the economic development of the region. Many SADC states carried a large burden as a result 
of South Africa's liberation struggle. See Mark Bennett; Policy Bulletin (infra) at p.l 
532 Today, SADC regroups 14 member states, namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
533 The SADC Treaty as adopted, is a broad enabling document, which does not create specific obligations 
of an economic nature for member States. These are to be spelt out in a series of protocols. 
S3~ For a Trade Protocol to be acceptable under the rules of the wro, it must cover substantially all trade. 
Thus, concessions by South Africa must cover substantially all goods, usually interpreted as over 
80%. There must also be a correspondi.ng concession from the other SADC countries. The only 
real concession that South Africa can give, as the EU gave in the EU-SA Agreement is on timing. 
See also Chapter Two and Three for the treatment of the wro and GATT agreements 
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Pan Africanist ambition for an African Economic Conununity has not been forgotten 
either, as the Preamble recalls the provisions for the Abuja Treaty of 1991. It recognizes 
the circwnstances within which it has been concluded by alluding to both existing 
bilateral agreements and trade arrangements. 
The Preamble calls for a framework of co-operation based on the SADC principles of 
"equity and mutual benefit", although it is interesting to note that" fair competition" has 
also been added. Within this context, an important issue for the member States to 
consider, is what would be the most appropriate WTO instrwnent under which to 
register the Protocol? What must be born in mind is the economic diversity in the region, 
and the flexibility in approach that will be necessary, should the member States proceed 
with the more restrictive Article XXIV, or should they rely on the pliable Enabling 
Clause.s36 
6.3.2 The tariff phase - out timetable 
The main thrust of the Protocol is to facilitate regional econonuc growth and 
development through, among others, the creation of a Free Trade Area in the SADC 
region. With regard to trade in Goods Article 3 states that the process and modalities for 
the phased elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers shall be determined by the 
Committee of Ministers responsible for trade matters (CMT) having regard to specific 
matters.537 The CMT would also take into consideration concerns of member States who 
feel that they may be or have been adversely affected by the removal of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade. The affected States must, however, first apply to the CMT 
to be granted a grace period to afford them additional time for the elimination of tariffs 
535 See chapter four for a note on the nature of "interim Arrangements" 
536 Because of its lack of flexibility on a number of criteria, Article XXIV is viewed as a difficult instrument 
with which to proceed, especially when exploring alternative strategies to maximize the 
development impact of trade arrangements. SADC member States should explore the use of the 
more flexible "Enabling Clause" as the region begins to consider how best to develop the 
"framework agreement" it adopted at Maseru. the existing schedule of tariffs applies in theory but 
not in practice. The difference between tariffs that are supposed to be levied and those actually 
collected is enormous-- largely because of the lack of effective administrarion of customs at 
boarder posts. This is, inter ali.1, due to endemic misrepresentarion and miss-classification of 
goods in bills of lading for imports 
537 From South Africa's perspective, the Protocol in any case places far too much emphasis on the 
elimination of tariffs and the role of tariff policy in archiving regional integrarion through a free 
trade agreement, when tariffs per se are not the issue for two important reasons. When a limited 
range of tariffs will be in use at anyone time by the majority of countries in SADe. South Africa 
is likely to be the only country requiring an elaborate range of tariff lines. Secondly, tariffs are 
hardly the reason why intra-SADC trade remains at such low levels. See, for example rhe 
discussion on investment matters below 
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and non-tariff barriers. This provision is in line with the different developmental levels 
which member States have achieved. It is necessary that the principle of asymmetry and 
differentiation come into play here.5J8 
A rtide 3 also provide that different tariff lines may be applied within the agreed time 
frame for different products in the process of eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
Again the process and method of eliminating barriers to intra-SADC trade, and the 
criteria of listing products for special consideration, would be negotiated in the context 
of the Trade Negotiating Forum (TNF). Article 4 provides for a phased reduction and 
eventual elimination of import duties in accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on 
goods originating in member States. 
It is important to note the rider to the liberalisation process in that it is linked to an 
industrialisation strategy. TIlls is tailor made to improve the global competitiveness of 
member States. Parties539 are wide-awake to the possible adjustment costs that will be 
engendered by this process and provision is made for the CMT to adopt relevant 
measures as may be appropriate to mitigate the effects of such an eventuality. To ensure 
compliance with the WTO Article XXIV provision member States are to refrain from 
raising import duties beyond those in existence at the time of entry into force of the 
Protoco1.540 
What is not certain, however, is whether the framers of the Article anticipate that this 
caveat on import duties should be as against each other, as against third parties, or lastly 
as against both SADe members and third parties. The beneficiaries of this clause are not 
immediately obvious, and clarification is sought. Thomas541 is of the view that the latter 
interpretation was probably the one intended. It is pertinently important for the 
Protocol to be clear, as ambiguity in the language could give rise to interpretations that 
were not anticipated by the negotiators, resulting in unnecessary trade disputes. The 
WTO dispensation would tend to support the latter interpretation. 
538 See discussion on 'asymmetry and differential treatment 
539 In an attempt to mitigate on the obvious monotony resulting from repeated use of this phrase, 'member 
States' and 'Parties' are used interchangeably 
540 See for example the discussion on the wro compatibility below 
541 R Thomas, Regional Arrangements supra at p.38 
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At Article 5 Parties commit themselves not to apply any export duties on goods destined 
for export within the SAOC area. Member States may however, apply export duties that 
are necessary to prevent the erosion of any prohibition or restriction which apply to 
exports outside the Community provided that the WTO most favoured Nation treatment 
is extended to third countries as well. What this provision means is that municipal laws in 
this respect shall take precedent over the Protocol. This is an issue that has serious 
ramification. It is also a contradiction in terms given that it takes away what clause 1 of 
the Article purports to give. Namely that members should promote a tariff free trading 
environment in the region. 
In terms of the Protocol, South Africa's542 offer to non-SACU SADC countnes IS 
delineated into three categories. 
• Immediate liberalisation is forecast on products that attract 
less than 17% import duty. They include copper, iron 
products and steel, wood and articles made of wood, 
machinery and appliances, paper and paperboard and printed 
materials, hides, skins and leather. 
• For gradual liberalisation are products that attract between 
18% and 25% of import duties, and would be removed in the 
first three years of implementation. They include furnirure 
and bedding, selected chemicals, paper products, machinery 
and appliances. Under this category, products that attract 
duties above 25% would be duty free within the first five 
years of the free trade agreement's implementation. Products 
in this category include articles of leather, rubber, selected 
textiles, vehicles, parts and commodities, selected footwear, 
cutlery, ceramic kitchen and tableware.54) 
• On the sensitive list are largely textiles, clothing and footwear 
products that are the subject of disagreement and outstanding 
negotiations among the SADC member States. These 
products constirute 0.78% of tariff lines and represent 3,04% 
of the SADC imports. 
542 The Depanment of Trade and Industry informed the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry that 
Cabinet committed South Africa, to act in unison with panners in the SACU to creates a 
momentum for forward movement in tariff reductions and the credibility of the SADC free trade 
agreement. This would be achieved by implementing the agreement to eliminate tariffs and other 
non-tariffication barriers by 1" January 2000 even if it means that SACU implement unilaterally 
ahead of other SADC countries. 
54} Most of these goods are categorized as sensitive because they are labour intensive and they have been 
among the most difficult to sell in any international trade. Motor vehicles are a concern because 
of their symbolism, but also because of global excess capacity necessitating downsizing. To date, 
there is no overall agreement on tariff reduction, sensitive goods or the terms of a SADC 
agreement. Some countries have declared so many goods as "sensitive" as to reduce the meaning 
of any agreement that far. 
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6.3.3 The non-tariff barrier regime 
Article 6 attempts to address the rather vexed question of non-tariff barriers to trade 
(NTB)544. Under this provision Parties are urged to adopt policies and implement 
measures that would ensure the elimination of all existing forms of NTBs and at the 
same time refrain from imposing such measures anew.545 This is a general provision, 
which then ushers in Articles 7 and 8 where specific non-tariff barriers are addressed. 
Quantitative import restrictions546 are a common non-tariff barrier, which Parties are not 
only urged to phase out but also to refrain from introducing new ones. Another 
common non-tariff barrier to trade comes in the form of Quantitative Export 
Restriction547 • 
Article 8 prohibits Parties from applying quantitative restrictions on exports against other 
member States but again this provision is diluted by a rider which allows Parties to 
circumvent the provision where measures are necessary to prevent the erosion of any 
prohibition or restriction which apply to exports outside the Community. This rider 
clearly creates room for States that are keen on maintaining protectionist structures to 
hide behind this convenient cover. It is particularly difficult for SADC to monitor the 
veracity of excuses Parties give when resorting to this particular measure. This provision 
should, however, be viewed in the light of the colonial structures that favour exports to 
the EU market. These skewed structures have not yet been redesigned to provide the 
much-needed diversification of exports to the regional markets. 
General Exceptions to Articles 6 and 7 are contained in Article 9 and comprise a medley 
of exemptions including inter alia public morals, precious, semi-precious and strategic 
minerals, provisions of the WTO Agreement and treasures of an historic or other value. 
A major concern here is that some of the exceptions are so broadly defined. For 
instance, Art.9 (a) provides" ... necessary to protect public morals". This is obviously a 
recipe for loopholes for ease of circumlocution and therefore the gateway to evading this 
obligation, in particular, to eliminate non-tariff barriers. 
544 For a detailed discussion on this regime see Chapter three. 
545 For all the reasons stated in the African Development Bank Study on Econanic Integration in Souti:em 
Africa (1993) indicated that the major problem in intra-SADe trade, were non-tariff barriers - not 
tariffs for these and other reasons, the focus of the Protocol on tariffs is considerably misplace. 
546For a detailed discussion on this item see chapter three above 
547 Ibid. 
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Article 9 and 10, however, make a weak attempt to forestall the possibility of abusing this 
rider. These two provisions state as follows. That "subject to the requirement that such 
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustified discrimination between Parties, or disguised restriction on intra-SAOC trade." 
This provision would have offered a measure of balance but it did not go that far. The 
provision is, again, diluted when it is made subject to the dictates of the Member State's 
Municipal Law. The relevant parr states that "nothing in the said Articles shall be 
construed as to prevent the adoption or enforcement of any measures by a member 
States to enforce provisions of the mtm.icipallaw". 
This rider clearly derogates from the only available remedy against abuse. Although areas 
of such intervention are clearly spelled out, this is no bar to the abuse of the provision by 
Parries who are not committed to the tariff phase-out discipline. It is more so given that 
the decision as to whether to effect the non-tariff barrier lies entirely with each Member 
State.548 This, again, is a clear fertile ground for the incident of trade wars to germinate. 
In situations where some States feel that a certain measure taken by the other State is 
arbitrary and without foundation, retaliatory counter-measures would ensue and thereby 
a cause for disharmony. The aggrieved State would most likely retaliate with a similar if 
not more devastating missile hence the intermittent eruption of destabilising trade wars 
between member states. 
The veritable principle of National Treatment is underscored under Article 11. Parties are 
enjoined to accord, "immediately and unconditionally National Treatment to goods 
traded within the community as to goods reproduced nationally". By urging Parties to 
give National Treatment to member States this provision implicitly excludes third Parries 
from being accorded similar treatment. This measure runs counter to the wro 
provision on the National Treatment facility that should be extended to all wro 
members and to this extend non-SADC members are covered well.549 
Again, Article 11 is unrealistic and probably unenforceable in the short-to-medium term, 
as it accords immediate and unconditional national treatment on goods traded within the 
region, in respect of laws, regulations and standards applying to the sale, purchase, 
548 Specific commitments are not asked for, nor are any timetables for the tariffication of non-tariff 
barriers, mentioned. 
549 See for example the discussion on this item at chapter four 
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transportatIon, distribution or use of such goods. This will obviously gIve nse to 
problems given the differing standards and technologies existing currently in the region. 
Without a qualification with respect to the latter, and a time frame for compliance, it 
becomes a bad rule since it is almost certain to be transgressed immediately the Protocol 
comes into force. Developing countries not only require time, as indeed it is 
unequivocally recognized in the WTO legal framework to get their standards right, but 
they also require time to ensure that their legal and operational framework is in order. 
Technology is always, of course, a critical factor in measures pertaining to trade 
liberalization550• Yet this is a commodity that is in severe short supply in the SADC 
regIon. 
6.3.4 Differentiation and asymmetry 
The GAIT legal system as a whole and the various agreements of the Uruguay Round in 
particular, enshrine the right of least developed countries (LLDCs) to differential and 
more favourable treatment. It makes similar provisions for the developing countries 
albeit it is time bound and limited for the latter. Thomas argues that the Protocol is, to a 
large extent devoid of such differential treatment for the weaker members in its ranks. 
Not even for member States, which have the status of LLDCs, she laments.551 She notes 
that the Protocol, in A rtide 19 as read with A rtide 111, obligates parties to a reduction of 
subsidies within 8 years for all States in the region. This article empowers the Committee 
of Ministers to grant a "grace period" and elaborate "appropriate criteria for the 
consideration of such applications". Thomas concludes that the Protocol takes away 
rights that have been granted least developed and developing countries within the global 
trade framework in recognition of their special positions.552 
Thomas is of the considered view that the strategy adapted by the Protocol is better 
suited for countries at the same level of development.553 It is true that the principle of 
SSO See for example, R Thomas, Regional Arrangements supra, at p.22 
5Sl There are a number of areas where the gains made by LLDCs during the Uruguay Round of the GA TI 
have been eroded in the regional context. These include tariffs on agricultural goods, export 
subsidies, standards with respect to technical regulations, textiles and clothing and the elimination 
of tariffs. Taking away rights granted to LLDCs under the GATT agreement would obviously be 
inimical to their economic development. See R Thomas Trade Liberalization Issues (supra) at 
p.Sl 
552 For instance the GATT 1994 does not require least developed countries to phase out export subsidies at 
all - that is, implicitly, until they graduate from their unfortunate state of underdevelopment. 
Developing countries, on the other hand, are given ten years to do so and need only cut subsidies 
by two-thirds of those cuts applying to developed countries. 
sS3Trade Liberalization Issues supra at p.51 
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differentiation and asymmetry is acknowledged even in the most successful showcases of 
regional integration.554 Like we pointed out earlier, the South African region has a diverse 
economic landscape. Four of the BLNS States comprise only 3 percent of South Africa's 
GNP. The South African GNP is four times larger than that of the other thirteen SADe 
States combined. Given these glaring differentials a proposal like the one projected by 
the Protocol in respect of industrial development is inexplicable. Thomas555 suggests that 
what the Protocol should have attempted to do, is to build upon the natural advantages 
these countries have under the GATT regime and to maximise their opportunities within 
the SADe trade framework so as to achieve economic growth and development. 
The argument advanced by Thomas is right on target with regard to the question of the 
SADe States building upon their natural advantages for sustainable growth and 
development. On the score of asymmetry and differentiation we beg, with due respect to 
disagree with the learned author. The tariff timetables we examined earlier are designed 
along the lines of the EU-SA Agreement.556 The tariff lines are governed by principles of 
asymmetry and differentiation. Under this design, the weaker economic partners would 
have more time within which to implement onerous obligations of the agreement than 
the stronger ones. 
Abraham Pallangy0557 - the SADe industry and trade adviser - explains this arrangement. 
He says that the SADe free trade agreement would be structured in such a way that the 
South Africa-SACU States558 will front-load and, Mauritius and Zimbabwe will mid-load. 
He adds that the rest of the member States will back-load in terms of the time frame, pace 
of the tariff reduction and the coverage of the SADe free trade. To this extend the 
Protocol must be taken to have paid sufficient homage to the twin WTO ethos of 
asymmetry and differentiation for developing States within the SADe. Whether the ratio 
554 In the EU, for instance, Portugal has been supported financially to prop it up to achieve developmental 
levels of other member States. Mexico in the NAFTA was allowed more space within which to 
implement certain obligation than the time frame accorded to Canada and the USA. See also 
chapter three for a more in-depth discussion of this subject 
555 R Thomas: Regional Arrangements supra at p.53 
556 Under the EU-SA ITA the EU would front-load its tariff phase-out schedule while South Africa will 
back-load its tariff obligations 
SS7Cited at http://www.mg.co.za on 21 st June 2000 
sss South Africa has undertaken to phase-out its tariffs to 0% within eight years of accession. Most tariffs 
will be at 0% in four years. Sugar and Automobiles are excluded. SADC states will have 12 years 
within which to reduce their tariffs to 0%. It is estimated that by the end of the period, 90% of 
SADC products will be at 0% duty. See the DTI presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Conunittee supra 
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of asynunetry and differentiation pledged under the Protocol is welfare creating for the 
beneficiary States is a different matter altogether.559 
The complication here though is that South Africa already has bilateral trade agreements 
with a number of non-SACU countries.560 The SAlMalawi bilateral agreement allows the 
latter to export everything to South Africa duty free on condition that 25% of goods 
originate from Malawi.56' The SA/Zimbabwe bilateral trade agreement allows the latter 
to export certain products to South Africa at half the most favoured nation (MFN) rates 
whilst Mozambique is required to have a 35% originality value for her goods to access 
the South Africa Market duty free. 562 This pattern of bilateral preferential trade 
arrangements is another fertile ground for intractable trade conflict. 
It is not clear, for example, between the bilateral trade arrangements and the Protocol as 
to which one would take precedent in case of inconsistency. For purposes of 
harmonisation it would have been better for the Protocol to override all the existing 
bilateral trade arrangements. In any case, it would be a culpable case of discrimination if 
South Africa were to offer better terms of trade under a bilateral arrangement than what 
is on offer for other SADC member States. 
Thomas is of the view that no special dispensation was asked for by the least developed 
States, despite their GA TT entitlements in this regard. 563 She adds that, none were asked 
of South Africa as the developed economy in the equation, even though they would have 
conformed with Part IV of GAIT (Art XXXVI: 8) and the Enabling Clause. The 
answer to this state of affairs recites in the tariff regimes of these countries. Most of the 
SADC countries with the exception of South Africa had already undertaken extensive 
tariff reduction under the IMP/ World Bank administered Structural Adjustment 
Progranunes (SAPS). 
559 But like we have pointed out below, this is a vexing issue that has engaged economists for a 
considerable length of time. No clear resolution of the issue seems to emerge from these 
obviously animated discussions. 
560 These are between Namibia and Zambia, and between South Africa and Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
respectively, although strictly speaking, the negotiations between South Africa and Zimbabwe are 
for the re-instatement of an old agreement, but on revised terms. Agreement in principle was 
arrived at between South Africa and Zimbabwe on 6 August 1996 in respect of textiles and 
clothing (Zimbabwe, S. Africa in textile deal". Financial Times, Wednesday 7 August 1996, at pA, 
561 According to Abraham Pallagyo, SADC industry and trade advisor: Reponed in the Mail & Guardian; 
June 21, 2000, See also http://www.mg.co.za 
562 Reponed in the Mail & Guardian, June 21, 2000 
563 infra 
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Again, it is not entirely the case that none of the SADC States has moved to seek 
preferential favours from South Africa. Zambia for one has complained that it is the only 
Southern African country not enjoying a preferential trade arrangement with South 
Africa. This despite the fact that due to its open economy, South African manufacturers 
have successfully penetrated its markets, giving rise to substantial problems of dislocation 
and de-industrialization and a huge trade deficit. For this reason, Zambia now rightfully 
seeks reciprocity from South Africa. 
Thomas, however, says that the South African government takes a different view of this 
matter.564 She explains that the granting of a preferential agreement to Zambia at this 
stage, and prior to the conclusion of a GATT Article XXIV arrangement within SADC, 
would expose South Africa to MFN claims from other developing countries which are 
not members of the regional arrangement. To this assertion, we counter that the MFN 
status is a WTO obligation for all states to comply with provisions to the contrary in 
regional regimes notwithstanding. The exception to this express provision only comes 
into play when no duties are raised against third parties. It has also been argued that a 
free trade agreement with South Africa is precisely what Zambia does not need at this 
stage, as this would merely exacerbate its already precarious economic situation. 565 It is 
not clear as to how the Zambian situation could worsen when in actual fact, South 
Africa's products are having a field day in its market. 
6.3.5 Measures on trade laws 
Part IV of the Protocol deals with Trade Laws and comprises A rticks 16 to 21. The 
Articles make provision for sanitary and phytosanitary measures; standards and technical 
regulations; anti-dumping measures; subsidies and countervailing measures; safeguard 
measures and, infant industry protection. This part of the Protocol attempts to achieve 
harmonization across the board. The Protocol also by reference lllcorporates a 
substantial part of the WTO Agreement on these various issues.566 
(a) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
These Articles obligate member States to base their sanitary and Phytosanitary measures 
on international standards, guidelines and recommendations. The aim here is to achieve 
564 R. Thomas, Regional Arrangements, supra at p. 15 
565 Ibid. 
566 See chapter four for a discussion of the GAIT /WTO agreement. 
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harmony in sarutary and phytosanitary measures for agricultural and livestock 
production. It is, however, unrealistic to expect most of the SADC States, especially the 
least developed one to measure to international standards on sanitary and phytosanotary 
measures. One of the biggest obstacles standing in the way of the SADC trade with 
South Africa is that the latter has far much higher sanitary and phytisanitary standards 
than the rest of the SADC member States. The LLDCs among the SADC in particular 
do not have the technological infrastructure to achieve international standards as 
required by this provision.567 
Perhaps it was in recognition of this latent deficiency among members that there is a 
rider to this provision which allows Parties to enter into consultations with the aim of 
achieving agreements on recognition of the equivalent of specific sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures. Such an understanding must, however, be in compliance to the 
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 
(b) Standards and Techniml Regfdations 
On Standards and Technical Regulations on Trade under A rtide 17, Parties are absolved 
from this obligation where the provisions of the Protocol would render ineffective or 
inappropriate the means for such Party to fulfil its legitimate objectives. This is clearly a 
subjective test, which is susceptible to abuse by Parties hell-bent on maintaining arbitrary 
non-tariff barrier regime. At par. 4 of A nicle 17, Parties are enjoined to accept as 
equivalent technical regulations of other member States, even if these regulations differ 
from their own, provided that they adequately fulftl the objectives of their regulations. 
This particular provision goes against the quest for harmonisation of standards, which 
SADC craves to achieve. It is unlikely that the dream of achieving a harmonised system 
would crystallise where each Party fronts what it deems to be equivalent standard 
measure. At any rate, the diverse disposition of the member States in itself renders this 
rider a veritable recipe for abuse. 
(c) Trade Related ImRStment Matters 
Parties are obligated under the Trade Related Investment Matters at A nicle 22 to adopt 
policies and implement measures within the Community to promote an open Cross-
567 In its presentation to the Parliamentary Committee on Trade and Industry, the OTI said that South 
Africa has the highest technical standards in the region such that other SADC countries cannot 
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Border Investment (CBI) regime. This measure would stimulate economic development, 
diversification and industrialisation. This is an important enabling legal framework given 
that the levels of intra-SADC trade are unacceptably low. Like we have argued below, the 
SADC region can only realise sustainable economic growth if cross border investment is 
intensify. This activity would, no doubt open up opportunities for the much sought after 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
(d) Anti-dumping, Subsidies, SafeffWdand Countemding Measures 
Article 18 justifies anti-dumping measures taken by any Party the only caveat being that 
such measures are in conformity with the WTO disciplines in this respect. The touchy 
question of Subsidies and Countervailing measures is given treatment under Article 19. 
Parties are forbidden from granting subsidies, which distort or threaten to distort 
competition in the region. Under the framework of the tariff phase-out timetable 
provided for under Article 3, Parties may legally maintain subsidies in line with their 
developmental rating. Countervailing duties are only permissible under the WTO rubric, 
which also goes for the introduction of new subsidies. 
The Protocol also provides for Safeguard measures agamst unfair practices. In such 
instances the affected Party would have recourse to take anti-dumping action and apply 
Countervailing Measures to import trade that distorts fair competition. It also prohibits 
the granting of production and export subsidies that may distort or threaten fair 
competition. It is proposed that products benefiting from direct and actionable subsidies 
that may distort fair competition, including export subsidies such as export processing 
zones should be granted preferential treatment under the Trade Protocol. This 
proposition has a clear foundation in the nature of the nascent industrial base in the 
regLOn. 
Many of the SADC countnes mamtam an export-processing zone, which is heavily 
subsidised by the respective state to stimulate industrial growth. It would be disastrous if 
products from such an industrial zone are subjected to countervailing measures. Since 
the Protocol makes provision for infant industry subsidy, it is sensible to accord such 
industrial establishments preferential treatment under the Protocol. This is where the 
South African leadership authority comes in handy. South Africa must be seen to come 
access its market unless they comply with its standards. The MoD on SQAM has set out 
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out strongly to support industrial revolution in the region. After all, this measure is 
critically important for her economic prosperity. One way of doing this is to admit 
substantial tariff leeway for products of member States originating from such export 
processing zones in order to promote industrial growth in the region. 
Article 20 allows Parties to apply such measures to a product upon determination that 
such a product is being imported to its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or 
relative to domestic production. And the same is imported under such conditions as to 
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or 
directly competitive products. The WTO provision568 on what constitutes serious injury 
to industry is the applicable yardstick here. 
One immediately visualises a scenario where, say South Africa imports goods from the 
EU, which causes serious injury to an industry in a SACU country, like Lesotho. This is 
highly likely given the level of market dependency these Countries have on South Africa. 
It is not immediately clear whether Lesotho can then institute safeguard measures under 
the SADC Protocol or the SACU Treaty or both. This again is an area of conflict of laws, 
to which no attention has been paid at all by the Parties to the Protocol. 
(e) Infant Industry 
Protection of infant industry is provided for under Article 21. The affected Party must 
apply to the CMT for relief. The CMT may in turn and as a temporary measure in order 
to promote an infant industry and subject to the WTO disciplines authorise the affected 
Party to suspend certain obligations under the Protocol in respect of like goods imported 
from the other member States. The catch here kicks in where say South Africa is, under 
the EU-SA Agreement, accorded this facility for the protection of its infant industry. 
How then would measures taken in pursued of this relief affect South Africa's obligation 
under the Trade Protocol. If the activity on the ground were that South Africa is taking 
measures to protect its infant industry from the surging EU imports, what would be the 
implication of such a measure for South Africa's obligations under the Trade Protocol? 
Conversely, where one of the SADC states acts under the COMESA Treaty, to which it 
modalities for co-operation, which was signed in January 2000 by the SADC Council of Ministers. 
568 See chapter four for an explanation of what constitute serious injury to industry and when such 
measures are applicable and for what period of time 
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owes membership, to protect its infant industry, would such a measure be permissible 
under the Trade Protocol? This again, we submit, is another area rife with conflict. Any 
measure that is taken by a member State under the authority of its membership to a 
different trade arrangement would severely encroach on its mandate under the Protocol. 
This plays out where derogation is permissible under one trading regime but the same is 
expressly forbidden in the other. 
Similarly, Parties are obligated to make a notification of the non-tariff measures that they 
apply in their trade policies. They are also urged to make firm undertakings on the 
removal of measures that distort or inhibit the free flow of trade in the region. In this 
regard, the removal of trade-distorting measures in agricultural trade such as quantitative 
import and export control, single channel marketing and price control is an urgent matter 
that still needs to be addressed more effectively.569 
6.5.6 General Agreements on Trade in Services 
The equivalent of the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) in the WTO 
framework is captured under Article 23 of the Protocol. What is significant here is the 
fact that members acknowledge and give due recognition to the trade in services for the 
development of the economies of the SADC States. The significance of this 
development draws from the fact that developing countries were most vocal in rejecting 
the introduction of the trade in services regime under the purview of the WTO 
disciplines570 • Parties are obligated to adopt policies and implement measures that would 
conform to the WTO disciplines on the GATS and thereby liberalise the services sector 
within the SADC region. The conformity of the GATS to the WTO disciplines is a good 
riddance to the multilateral stakeholders who have been agitating for the opening up of 
developing countries' trade in services. 
The liberalisation of the services sector is a tricky catch for developing countries and 
more so in a region where discussions on free movement of labour is avoided like a 
plaque. It is submitted that without the concomitant framework for the free movement 
569 The main areas of disagreement are the product-specific rules of origin for clothing, textiles and 
footwear. There were also disagreements on differentiated tariff offers from the non-SACU 
SADC states who wanted one offer from South Africa and another offer from Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia Swaziland and Mozambique. Another area of disagreement was product 
coverage and the timing of the tariff reduction schedule. 
570 See chapter four where this development is discussed under the GATS provisions 
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of labour within the region, the GATS law for SADC would remain a dead letter law. It 
is notable, however, that South Africa which is known to be vehemently opposed to the 
provision for free movement of labour in the region is the biggest beneficiary of the 
GATS providence. The Service industry is already blossoming in the region only that it is 
a one way highway shooting from South Africa to the rest of the region.571 Arguably, 
trade in services is hardly the kind of investment any country would want to attract to its 
market since it has the potential and does dig many graves for small and upcoming local 
entrepreneurs.572 The good aspect to this provision is that it has been made WTO 
compliance to avoid situations of conflict with the multilateral disciplines. 
The theme document produced in Maputo, Mozambique (1992) observed that 
"promoting the free movement of labour and people generally across borders will be an 
essential component of a strategy of regional integration." The movement of citizens 
within the SADC region is regrettably still curtailed by legislation such as the requirement 
of Visas, work permits and the use of passports. Although this issue was tabled for 
discussion under the "'freedom of movement" Protocol, it has never been signed as 
many States have encountered stiff opposition from their citizenry. Those that are for the 
Protocol argue that labour will be readily available for professional jobs hence bring 
about an economic boost to the region. Those against it argue that foreigners will come 
and take up their jobs under the pretext that they are more qualified57J . 
Provision is made for Intellectual Property rights under Article 24. This provision, too, 
has been made WTO compliant wherefore Parties are obligated to adopt policies and 
implement measures within the SADC region for the protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights. The same goes for trade related investment measures. On Competition Policy, 
Parties are enjoined to implement measures in the Community that prohibit unfair 
571 In a recent seminar for Trade, Investment and Infrastructure Co-operation within the SADC region 
organized by the African European institute, a delegate from Malawi posed some rather vexing 
questions. He posited "What do we do when the influx of cheap foreign goods results in the 
closing down of local industries and therefore unemployment for our people? How do I, as a 
politician explain to these people who have just lost jobs as a result of foreign competition that 
globalization and trade liberalization are good for them? How can we, as politicians preach the 
virtues of great productivity when some of our policies appear to discourage local initiatives?" 
The presentation by Hon. Ken Lipenga, deputy Foreign Minister, Malawi at joint initiative by the 
South African Chief Whips Forum and A WEPA, Cape Town South Africa, 20-21 March, 1998. 
572 See remarks by Hon. Ken Lipenga, deputy Foreign Minister, Malawi, in his address to the A WEPA 
Seminar, infra 
573 For instance, the South African immigration department is currently locked in a feud with farmers in 
the Limpopo province whom it accuses of harbouring illegal inunigrants as cheap labour at the 
expense of the locals 
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practices and instead strive to promote competition. It is important to note that until 
recently and with the urging of the 1MF and World Bank sponsored programmes, most 
firms in the region consisted mainly of entrenched monopolies some under a hefty State 
subsidy. 
With the liberalisation of the services and manufacturing sector, most firms in the region 
have been exposed to outside competition. Unfortunately this wind of change has come 
suddenly and thereby sweeping the firms off balance before they could put in place 
necessary structures to position themselves in order to be internationally competitive. 
Indeed many firms in the region can be classified as infant industries even after long 
years of existence. This is clearly a misnomer given the fact that quite a few firms have 
roots in the colonial era. This unending stupour of infancy has everything to do with 
complacency created by monopoly status that gave no motivation for these firms to 
invest in the cutting edge technology. Such struggling firms would be more worried 
about their survival in the liberalised market dispensation than worry about infringing the 
provisions of the competition policy. 
6.6.1 Institutional Framework 
We have underpinned the vital role played by institutional arrangement structures in the 
success of a free trade agreement. The EU-SA Agreement has vested the administration 
of the trade partnership to a Co-operation Council574 • The Council among other things 
oversees the implementation of the contracted obligations. Initially SADC's 
organisational structure was such that different Member States co-ordinated various 
sectors575 • At an extraordinary meeting of the SADC Council of Ministers in November 
2000, recommendations were put forward for the phasing out of some twenty sector co-
ordinating units and commissions that are currently located in individual member 
574 See chapter five above 
575 Angola is responsible for coordinating the energy sector: Botswana the agricultural sector: Lesotho the 
water sector: Malawi the inland fisheries, forestry and wildlife. Mauritius holds the tourism sector 
and Mozambique is responsible for transport. Namibia for marine fisheries and resources while 
Swaziland is responsible for human resources development. Tanzania caters for Trade and 
industry and Zambia takes charge of employment, labour and mining. Zimbabwe takes the 
portfolio of food, agriculture and natural resources and South Africa retains the finance and 
investment docket. This later sector was estabLshed in February 1995. It is one of the youngest 
sectors within the SAOC having been established soon after South Africa became a full member 
of the SADC in August 1994. This revelation was made by M. Lindie, Chief Director, 
Department of Finance, South Africa, at the A WEPA Seminar (supra) at p.49 
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StatesS76 • During the SADC Summit held in Namibia in March 2001, the SADC Heads of 
States approved the formation of four Directorates to be based in Gabarone Botswana. 
The phasing out of the existing sectors and commissions is to be undertaken within two 
years. 
Commentators have expressed optimism that the new managerial structure adopted at 
the SADC's extraordinary summit in Windhoek would go a long way towards promoting 
regional co-ordination and co-operation.S77• Horst Brammer, a deputy director in South 
Africa's Foreign Affairs Department, supported the move and expressed hope that new 
structure would bring greater focus to the SADC and the manner in which it approached 
project implementation. He, in particular, remarked that; 
"Until now there has been a sectoral approach, a great deal of decentralization among 
cOW1tries with differing degrees of capacity. Depending on the capacity of a COW1try 
driving a particular sector, some were operating and others were not operating at all. 
Now, instead of a COW1try running one sector, experts from across the region will be 
used,"s78 
According to Brammer the changes could transform the SADC into a leaner and meaner 
body.s79 No doubt the new system will be less cumbersome. It will be cheaper, and at the 
same time there will be a higher level of efficiency because this is a case of pooling 
expertise580. The Protocol has under Article 31 rolled out institutional mechanisms for the 
implementation of its objectives. These institutions according to their hierarchical order 
are the Council of Ministers of Trade, a Committee of Senior Officials responsible for 
trade matters, the Trade Negotiating Forum and the Sector Co-ordinating Unit. 
Thomas58 1 is critical of the idea of creating a second bureaucratic layer of "Senior 
576 It was recommended their respective work programs be consolidated in four directorates to be located 
in Gaborone, Botswana. All the existing sectors were to be clustered under these four 
directorates according to their sectoral linkages. 
577 South Africa: SADC Update: Africa Policy Electronic Distribution list hnp:! Iwww.africapolicy.org 
010418 Johannesburg, 13 March (IRIN) 
57S Ibid. 
579 See hap:! Iwww.africapolicy.org010418Johannesburg, 13 March (IRIN) 
sso J akkie GUiers, director of the Institute for Security Studies, based in South Africa, agrees. He explains 
that Protocol was negotiated and it was agreed at ministerial meetings in Swaziland that the 
organ's leadership would rotate. But Cilliers points out that the fact that it took five years to find 
agreement on the issue indicated that the region remained divided, with members of the SADC 
being suspicious of each other, and with differing approaches to issues like conflict resolution and 
regional collaboration. 
581 R Thomas, Regional Arrangements supra at pp.23-24 
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Officials" over the Trade Negotiating Forum, which she says ill any case compnses 
senior officials of SADC member States.582 
To the extent that this arrangement has financial consequences583 we concur fully with 
the position taken by Thomas. It will also slow down procedures. The justification for 
such is therefore questionable. One may however justify this elaborate structure given 
the sheer expanse of the SAOC region. There is also a need for close monitoring at this 
crucial fledgling phase of the Protocol. Unlike the EU, which has the technological 
know-how that enables it to maintain a leaner institutional structure, SADC lacks 
equivalent state of the art technology. Indeed most SAOC States have poor to none 
existent infrastructure that would facilitate the co-ordination and implementation of the 
Protocol. ;84 
It must be admitted however that the Trade Negotiation Forum is a superfluous 
structure. In the first place it is now a fimaus cfficio organ it having completed its task 
upon the signing of the Protocol. Secondly, the forum would consist of the very same 
people to be found in the Committee of Senior Officials and the Sector Co-ordinating 
Unit. The TNF, in our view serves no meaningful purpose in augmenting the objects of 
the Protocol. 
The CMT is the highest-ranking body on regional trade matters. It is entrusted with the 
supervision of the implementation of the Protocol. It also foresees the supervision of the 
work of any committee or sub-committee established under the Protocol. On the other 
hand the Committee of Senior Officials reports to the CMT on matters relating to the 
implementation of the provisions contained in the Protocol. It is entrusted with the 
responsibility of supervising the work of the Sector Co-ordinating Unit as well. This 
measure is undesirable in view of the fact that the CMf also supervises the Unit. Too 
much supervision from different hierarchical quarters is a breeding ground for conflict of 
interest. It would have been better for the Committee of Senior Officials to supervise the 
Co-ordinating Unit and report back to the CMT instead of the later directly supervising 
the Unit. This is more so given that the Committee of Senior Officials plays the vital role 
of a liaison between the CMf and the Unit. 
SS2Ibid. 
S83This set up would indeed increase the number of meetings that will be necessary before policies are 
adopted 
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The TNF's main responsibility lies in the conduct of trade negotiation and reports to the 
Committee of Senior Officials. One of the most important briefs for the TNF is to 
establish a linkage between trade liberalisation and industrial policy. The importance of 
this intervention lies in what economists have repeatedly warned that a programme of 
liberalisation devoid of industrial policy would be meaningless. Like we pointed out 
earlier it is of critical importance to develop a sound industrial policy, which will help 
stimulate intra-SADC trade and therefore ensure sustainable economic growth. This is 
where the private sector factors in the equation of measures. The private sector is, after 
all, the veritable engine of development hence the excellent gateway to economic growth 
and development. 
The Sector Co-ordinating Unit (the Unit) has the onerous mandate of overseeing the day 
to day operations in the implementation of the Protocol. This group is essentially a 
technical team comprising experts drawn from different disciplines. They are specially 
tooled to provide technical and administrative assistance to the CMT, the Committee of 
Senior Officials and the TNF. Granted its load of expertise and the fact that it is on the 
ground to overseer the implementation of the Protocol, the unit is in a far better position 
to periodically constitute a Trade Negotiating Forum to share experiences and identify 
areas of urgent intervention. 
The TNF is, therefore, in our considered view, an unnecessary bureaucratic layer that 
merely duplicates the work of the Unit. It is noteworthy that the Unit has been mandated 
to work closely with the private sector. This is an important feature that is not catered for 
in the EU-SA Agreement. The private sector like we have pointed out, is the engine of 
development and there is an urgent need to give it guidance in identifying trade and 
investment opportunities that would be spurned by the implementation of the Protocol. 
The Unit does well to sensitise the private sector on investment indicators so that full 
advantage is taken of the trade opportunities within the region. 
The office of institutional mechanisms is a standard measure adapted by regional blocs 
and preferential trade agreements to foresee the implementation of the covenanted 
obligations. The measure is admissible under the WTO disciplines and hence its 
legitimacy cannot be disputed. Co-ordination of Trade Policy is one crucial measure for 
584 This is, in fact, one of the reasons the earlier design of sectoral coordination was a rueful failure. 
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the success of a free trade agreement. The EU's common marke285 has been sited as a 
model success story due largely to its integrated policy harmonisation. This is why Article 
29 enjoins member States to attempt their best endeavour in the area of co-ordination of 
their trade policies. 
Admittedly the implementation of the Protocol would require effective co-ordination 
and an improved efficiency of all the relevant institutions. It also calls for an increasing 
leading role by the Parties in driving the process forward, in monitoring and in 
maintaining close liaison with one another. This raises, in a broader context, the urgency 
of institutional reform and rationalisation of the SADC with Parties providing political 
leadership and the requisite technical support. 
6.6.2 Dispute Settlement Procedures 
Free Trade Agreements are known to spurn some of the most vexing trade wars between 
Nations. This scenario not infrequently leads to intermittent but bitter diplomatic rows 
among States. The free trade instrument per se would never guarantee a smooth riding 
trade partnership. Sooner rather than later there will be accusations and counter 
accusation mostly in the undefIned area of non-tariff barriers. Free trade agreements, for 
the most part, tend to set up a programme for phasing out tariffs but merely make 
general provisions with regard to non-tariff barriers. This is why the non-tariff barrier 
regime is almost always the bane of trade wars. 
It is in anticipation of such disagreements that free trade agreements, perhaps with the 
benefit of hindsight, provide mechanisms for the smooth settlement of trade related 
disputes. The Protocol is no exception in this regard. Article 32 enjoins members to 
endeavour to agree on the interpretation and application of the provisions set out in the 
Protocol. The Protocol underscores the importance of co-operation and consultation in 
seeking to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement. Co-operation and consultation 
does, to a great measure promotes consensus which builds trust. 
On the other hand the adversarial panel adjudication process tends to exacerbate 
divisions and breeds mistrust among the Parties. Panel adjudication is In most cases 
summoned as an avenue of last resort. This is after efforts at conciliation have 
585 See chapter three on 'Integration in Europe for an in-depth treatment of the EUs common market. 
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completely failed to yield agreement. The available remedies to the wronged party are a 
withdrawal of equivalent concessions. The offending Party is in the first instance called 
upon to remove measures not conforming with the provisions of the Protocol or those 
causing nullification or impairment of such provisions. This is a WTO compliant 
procedure for dispute settlement. 
The main object of the revised dispute settlement provisions is to ensure certainty and 
predictability in the settlement of disputes arising under the Protoco1.586 TIlls feat has 
been achieved by clearly outlining the different phases in the settlement of disputes and 
linking them to clear cut time frames. The new provisions are based on the same 
principles underpinning the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO. It is, 
however, not made clear whether Parties are free to take recourse to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement mechanisms in place of those provided for under the Protocol. The EU-SA 
Agreement makes this option open to an aggrieved Party.587 This ambiguity needs to be 
resolved to widen the field of remedy for an aggrieved member State. 
It is noteworthy that the appointment, composition, powers and functions of the panels 
is to be determined by the CMT. This procedure is, in our view, an undesirable one. The 
CMT is hardly the appropriate authority to carry out this manifestly important 
responsibility. The Protocol does not say whether the Panel would be set up on need 
basis or whether there would be a permanent list of panellist to be drawn from whenever 
a dispute arises. If the later is the case, then the CMT would severely curtail the work of 
the panel since the latter's meetings are going to be periodical in nature588 and yet a 
dispute could erupt at any time. To the extent that this arrangement clearly interferes 
with a Party's right to choose whom they want to adjudicate on their dispute and urgently 
whenever necessary. It is an inefficient regulatory measure. The same must be reviewed 
urgently before trade disputes start flooding in as is expected. 
Baring the fact that SADe has not been notified to the WTO and therefore it is not a 
member, the WTO's dispute settlement structures are still open to parties by virtue of 
586 See the revised Protocol on 'dispute settlement measures Article 32 
587 The details of this provision is discussed in Chapter Four under 'dispute Settlement Mechanisms' 
588 Trade Ministers are first and foremost politicians in -charge of very busy ministerial portfolios. They 
owe their position first and foremost to their respective electorates where the calling is very 
demanding. It is unlikely that SAOC meetings would take priority over important governmental 
business. Convening this lot on a short notice is hardly achievable. 
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their individual membership. The WIOs Dispute Settlement Board is well supplied 
with the necessary expertise and that it boosts vast experience in settlement of both 
multilateral and regional trade disputes. The Protocol should have, therefore, opened the 
door for members to access this multilateral facility if they so desire even though practice 
has shown that developing countries' participation in the WIO dispute settlement 
process is almost none existenf89 • 
The reason for this cavalier attitude on the part of developing countries toward this 
important dispute settlement facility is beyond the limited means of this work. In any 
case since the EU-SA Agreement operates within the SADC region, SADC States have a 
direct recourse to the WIO procedures should they be aggrieved by the EUs activities. 
At any rate, since the Protocol does not expressly forbid members from accessing the 
WIO dispute settlement process, the Parties are free to submit their dispute to this 
process if they so desire. 
6.6.3 The dilemma in the right of audience 
South Africa and its SACU Diaspora have under the Protocol offered a cumulated tariff 
reduction schedule. The non-SACU SADC countries were vehemently opposed to this 
move. They wanted each SACU member State to individually reduce tariffs and not as a 
bloc. There are serious legal implications to this arrangement. One of the conundrums 
has to do with the implication for the dispute settlement process. The crisp question one 
is bound to posit here is "what happens in the event that say, South Africa fails to meet 
its tariff phase-out schedule and a fellow SADe country is aggrieved in the result? The 
collateral question is, would that country institute dispute settlement procedures against 
South Africa as a country or should it be SACU that is to be arraigned before the dispute 
settlement panel? 
Fortunately there is persuasive authority for this type of eventuality. The recent case of 
Turkey Textiles590 is on all fours in point on this issue. In this dispute, Turkey's trade in 
textiles with third countries represented less than 4.5% of Turkey'S external trade. It was 
thus considered that, for the Turkey-EC customs union to be GAIT compatible, 
Turkey's duties and regulations concerning textiles with third countries did not need to 
589 The record of developing countries and especially African countries seeking audience at the WTO 
dispute settlement panel is pathetic. This is an understandable situation given that the WTO 
procedures are complex and far too expensive for developing cOlUltries to afford 
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be harmonized with those of the European ConmUssion. The question for the Panel, 
really, was whether the Turkey-EC customs union had a la:us standi before the wro 
dispute settlement panels. 
In this dispute, the panel noted that the wro dispute settlement system is based on 
Member's rights. It is only accessible to Members and is only enforced and monitored by 
Members.59l The Panel pointed out that the Turkey - EC customs union was not a wro 
member and, in that respect, did not have any autonomous legal standing for the purpose 
of wro law and, therefore, its dispute settlement procedures. Accordingly it was 
impossible for the Turkey - EC customs union to have any standing in this procedure. 
The same analogy captures the SAW-SADC scenario. Since SAW is not a member of 
the SADC it has no locus sttmdi before the latter's dispute settlement procedures. It is only 
the individual SACU member States that must answer to queries pitting the SACU union 
against a SADC non-SACU Member State. In any case, as was argued in the Turkey 
Textile case, once it is factually determined that the particular SAW Member State had 
taken the measures in issue individually within its borders then such a member is 
answerable to the aggrieved SADC State individually. 
What is important is to establish that the offending measures were enforced on such 
Member State's territory and that the State in question was ensuring the surveillance of 
such quotas at its borders. Once this fact is established then that State must answer to 
charges individually irrespective of its SAW membership. In this scenario, it is unlikely 
that SAW would be clothed with the requisite competence to defend the dispute purely 
on the ground of its harmonized tariff regime. Thomas592 points out that as a WTO 
consistent arrangement, SAW should address trade matters with other SADC States as a 
single entity, and not the individual member States. She offers that SAW should be 
negotiating the scheduled tariff reductions with the rest of SADC in the Trade 
Negotiating Forum (TNF). 
The position espoused by ~Thomas is in effect untenable on the hard issue of audience at 
the dispute settlement panel. Of course negotiating tariffs, as a bloc is another matter all 
S90 Turkey Dispute Article 4 and Customs Unions cited in Marceau et al supra at p.306. 
591 The Panel cited par. 101 of the Appellate Body Report on United States - Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, adopted on 6th November 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R (US -Shrimp) 
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together. The point remains that SACU is not a member of the SADC as such. It is 
therefore a misnomer to give it an audience before the dispute settlement panel. The 
right of audience as established under the Protocol before the panel is reserved for 
members only. The SACU union, therefore, lacks the requisite lrots standi to address the 
panel. For the very same reasons, it is a serious misnomer to allow SACU to offer a bloc 
tariff schedule. This framework is not provided for in the Protocol either. 
The implied ultimate and ideal situation is that once the constituent members of a 
customs union adopt a complete single common foreign trade regime, a series of 
different arrangements are possible. But in all cases, the formation of a customs union 
will necessitate important harmonization of duties and other regulations of commerce. In 
the light of par. 4, the requirements of par. 5 must be taken into account by regional trade 
arrangements in the determination of how harmonization should proceed, particularly 
since such harmonization should not lead to increased barriers to trade with third 
countnes. 
The argument advanced by SACU is that since it has a Common Market, it is only 
prudent that tariffication be considered as a bloc to avoid policy inconsistency which 
might erode the efficacy of the Common Market. Thomas593 suggests that SACU 
member countries may opt to deal with the WTO as a single entity as well as 
independently, as individual WTO members. Indeed with regard to the EU -SA 
Agreement SACU is treated by the EU as part of South Africa. In which case SACU is a 
de facto member of the EU-SA Agreement. This argument, no doubt, carries considerable 
force. While it may appear convenient to hitch SACU States unto South Africa's back 
when dealing with a seasoned predator like the EU, we doubt that a similar design is 
appropriate with regard to the SADC The view we take of this matter is that the 
arrangement with respect to SADC creates an awkward scenario where SACU as a bloc 
is a de/acto member of the SADC while on the other hand the SACU countries claim 
individual membership to the same bloc. 
This is a classic case of having one's cake and eating it. It is simply untenable legally. 
Either SACU contracts in the SADC as SACU or as individual States that belong to 
592 R Thomas, Trade Liberalization Issues supra at p. 43 
593 She however cautions that SACU will need to detennine how to deal with their partners in SADC and 
with other parties such as the EU, COMESA and third countries, Ibid. 
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SACU. Furthermore, we have argued that SACUs status is not provided for anywhere in 
the SADC Protocol. Save that the SACU conunon market makes provision for a 
conunon external tariff (CET) the SACU out-fit is not recognized in the Protocol as a 
legal entity with a persona of membership. Such recognition, if one were to be supplied 
in the Protocol, would have created insurmountable legal quagmires. 
Cumulation has the potential to encourage econonuc linkages within the reglon. 
However, it also has the potential to encourage economic polarization by encouraging 
the more developed areas to source raw materials from less developed areas. With the 
lowering and removal of tariffs SACU must explore ways and means in which to retain 
and enhance its attractiveness as a location for investment. The opening up of the SACU 
market to the EU and SADC will reduce the relative preference that Swaziland has 
through its membership of the SACU.594 
The non-SACU members of the SADC seek clear direction from SACU members as to 
where the latter is going in this regard, since it impacts fundamentally on the Protocol. If 
SACU is to be a custom union in the true sense of the definition, it should be "SACU", 
the institution that would enter into the free trade area agreement with the other SADC 
Member States, and not its constituent members. Thomas595 says that both SACU and 
SADC perpetuate the myth that it is irrational for five countries, which operate behind 
one external tariff, to go into negotiations as individual parties capable of making 
separate concessions on tariff lines. She points out that in reality the same principle that 
applies to the BLNS vis-a-vis the EU-SA Trade agreement applies proportionate to 
SACU"s relations with SADC. It is unfortunate that SACU member States are unable to 
provide an answer to the SADC non-SACU members on this tricky issue. 
594 We have carried out a review of our fiscal policy (e.g. New Income Tax Bill, considering (he 
introduction of VAT, and are proceeding with the strengrhening of the revenue deparrments) 
with the aim of ensuring that we remain competitive. See also R. Thomas, Trade Liberalizarion 
Issues supra at p. 47 
595 Thomas urges that there should be a progression by SADC member States individually or as a group, ro 
a deeper level of integration with SACU. This could happen through graduation of the non-
SACU members from SADC -free trade area to the SACU. Ir is highly conceivable thar as the 
most advanced regional arrangement, SACU could accommodate individual SADC member 
States within the inner-core as and when they achieve greater macro-economic policy coherence 
and harmonizarion with SACU. See R. Thomas, Trade Liberalization Issues supra at p.44. As 
politically unacceptable this suggestion may appear to the majority of the SADC States, it is 
nonetheless the most logical way forward in the circumstances. 
208 
6.7.1 The Rules of Origin regime 
To ensure that SADe States do not become conduits for goods made elsewhere in the 
world to enter especially the South Africa market, specific 'rules of origin' have been 
developeds96 • Rules of Origin are used to determine whether goods originate in the 
region and whether such goods qualify for preferential tariff treatment under the 
Protocol. In this sense, it is right to state that origin rules are the very bastion upon 
which the entire free trade area edifice recoils. This is why the origin rules are given an 
extensive treatment in instruments of this character. The reviseds97 origin rules are aimed 
at ensuring that sufficient value adding takes place in the region in the manufacturing or 
processing of goods. The new rules can be broadly divided into two categories namely 
that goods must be wholly produced in the region or they can consist of some materials 
not wholly produced in the region but have undergone sufficient work processing. In 
respect of the later, conditions or "lists-rules" have been developed which describe the 
minimum working or processing that must take places98 . 
The SADe Ministers on Trade agreed in Gaborone, Botswana on 151h July 1999 on well-
defined rules of origin that would help stimulate economic activity in the SADe region. 
The Rules would also enhance value-added processing and circumvent trade of illicit or 
counterfeit goods and the fraudulent supply of third party goods. Basically, the origin 
rules provide that agricultural products must be wholly produced while clothing and 
textiles products undergo a two-stage transformation. Footwear and leather must 
undergo substantial transformation while processed agricultural goods should undergo 
substantial transformation as well. The traditionally sensitive auto industry must equally 
undergo substantial transformation.599 
596 For example, only the meat of an animal, which is born, raised and slaughtered in a SADC state, would 
qualify for duty privileges into the South African market. Manufactured goods would generally 
have to undergo two stages of transformation before they could be granted access to the South 
African market. 
597 The preamble to Annex 1 on the amended Rules of Origin takes cognizance of the fact that it is 
desirable to provide for transparency in the regulations and practices regarding rules of origin. 
Parties are desirous to ensure that rules of origin themselves do not create unnecessary obstacles 
to trade and to facilitate the implementation thereof by Customs administration by providing an 
exhaustive and complete text. 
598 South Africa insists on Lome 4 rules that are 60% material content and 30% value added (including 
labour) coming from SADC countries but allowing "cumulation of value added in SADC could 
make meeting these requirements easier. However, unless there is effective enforcement of the 
Origin Rules, the problem of transshipment could significantly harm the importing economies. 
599 See Annex 1 of the Protocol 
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It is now agreed that all primary products, including agricultural products should be 
wholly obtained from each Member State. It has further been agreed that processed 
industrial products can acquire originating status provided that the imported materials 
have undergone sufficient transformation such that the value of the CIF of the materials 
does not exceed 60% of the total cost of the materials used in the production of the 
goods. It also provides that value-added resulting from the process of the production 
accounts for at least 35% of the ex-factory costs of the goods.6°O 
The Rules of Origin regime is covered under Article 12 and elaborated at Annex I of the 
Protocol. The Annex details a complex maze of origin rules, which would principally 
regulate the intra-SADC trade. The two way criterion for the rules of origin are firstly 
that Rule 2 of Annex 1 provide that goods shall be accepted as originating in a member 
State if they are consigned directly from the member State to a consignee in another 
member State. Such goods should be wholly produced in any member State as provided 
for in Rule 4 of the Annex601 • The purport of the phrase 'any member State'602 instead of 
the particular Member State takes note of the provision for cumulative treatment. This 
means that raw materials or semi-finished goods originating in any member State shall, 
for the purpose of determining the origin of a finished product be deemed to have 
originated in the Party where the final processing or manufacturing takes place. 
This measure allows for the blossoming of industrial network within the region. 
Unfortunately, save for South Africa, most SADC countries do not have cross- border 
industrial networks. Once again South Africa is, no doubt, the main beneficiary of this 
provision given that it is the principal recipient of raw material from the region. South 
Africa manufactures and sells a substantial part of finished products to the SADC 
regional market. The rest of the SADC countries do not have a strong manufacturing 
sector to process raw products imported from within the region. Most of the countries 
have light industries, which process or prepare for processing what is produced locally. 
The second level of origin rules is that products that are not wholly produced in any 
600 Considerable emphasis has in particular been placed on processed agricultural products, textiles, 
clothing, leather, footwear and auto industry. These items have specific list of rules detailing 
sufficient processing and substantial transformation to confer an originating status. 
601 Rule 4 makes provision for cumulation in that for the purpose of the Protocol member States shall be 
considered as one territory. 
602 Any member state here must be taken in context to mean a member State in the SADC group. 
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member State are sufficiently worked or processed when the conditions set out in the 
.Aru1ex are fulfilled.603 
Under Rule 11 of the Annex, the CMT is empowered to grant derogation where the 
development of existing industries or the creation of new industries is justified. Parties 
are, however, called upon to make the request for derogation for existing or new 
industries to the CMT, which then shall respond to each Member State accordingly. The 
CMT can only exercise the prerogative to grant derogation where such derogation does 
not threaten to cause serious injwy to any su bstantial industry within the region. The 
CMT, in our view, is hardly the appropriate institution to manage this important facility. 
It would have been better if this function were entrusted to the Senior Trade Officials or 
the Co-ordination Unit. The latter, especially the Unit is by far the better-placed 
institution to expedite the processing of such applications. It is possible for the CMT to 
delegate this responsibility. This has, however, not been expressly stated in the Protocol. 
Clarity on this important matter would be the preferred methodology. 
Senior Trade Officials and the Unit are the people on the ground and being full-timers 
would be able to process the appropriate remedy without delay. Delay in processing 
derogation requests is in itself a non-tariff barrier to trade. It is common cause that most 
SADC countries would flood the CMT with requests for derogation to protect their 
"enduring infant industries". Derogations are allowed under the WTO framework to 
protect infant industry. The Enabling Clause does also leave room for derogation in 
favour of the Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) and developing countries to a certain 
measure as well. With the exception of South Africa, the SADC is, after all, nothing 
other than a conglomeration of least and developing countries.604 
67.2 Co-operation in customs administration 
To facilitate the smooth implementation of these rules Article 13 makes provision for co-
operation in customs matters as laid out in Annex II of the Protocol. The Article entreats 
Parties to take appropriate measures, including arrangements regarding Customs 
Administration Co-operation that would ensure that the provisions of the Protocol are 
effectively and harmoniously applied. This edit is tied to Article 14 where Parties are 
enjoined to take such measures as are necessary to facilitate the simplification and 
603 These conditions are set out in the list in Appendix 1 of the Annex to the Trade Protocol 
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harmonisation of trade documentation and procedures. The modalities of such 
facilitation are laid out in Annex III. On the other hand A nick 15 enjoins Parties to 
ensure the free movement of goods within the region at nominal rates for services 
rendered.6Os 
Under the provlslOns of A nick 12 of this Annex the CMT is empowered to adopt 
regulations to facilitate the implementation of the Annex. Provision is also for a 
Regulation on Mutual Assistance and Co-operation in Customs Matters.606 The 
Regulation aims at putting an institutional framework in place between SADC customs 
authorities to co-ordinate mutual assistance and co-operation and provides for the 
undertaking of joint customs inspections and visits to verify the origin of goods receiving 
preferential tariff treatment. 
A rtick 8 of the amended Annex Jf07 enjoins the respective Parties' customs authorities to 
proceed 'within the limits of their competence and valuable resources to supply 
information already possessed by carrying out appropriate enquires or by arranging for 
them to be carried out. This edit again will suffer at the altar of the already weak 
information and enforcement structures bedevilling the SADC member States. For those 
who have been unfortunate to deal with some of the SADC States' customs authorities, it 
has been, for the most part, a nauseating experience. Most SADC States are still lagging 
far behind in information technology hence the ran-down information systems makes it 
almost nightmarish to secure quick reference to relevant information. This is one area 
that SADC would have to contend with. It should in any case be addressed as a matter of 
utmost priority if the noble objectives of the Protocol are to be seen to function for the 
benefit of all. 
Rule 10 of the Annex makes provisions for penalties for the infringement of the origin 
rules. The rule enjoins member States to introduce legislation, where non-exists, to make 
such provision as may be necessary for penalties. These are sanctions against persons 
who, in their territories furnish or cause to be furnished documents, which are untrue in 
any material sense, particularly in support of a claim in another Member State. The 
efficacy of this provision would be severely undermined by the pertinently weak 
604 Under the wro South Africa is rated as a developed Nation (Also See Chapter Four) 
605 See the discussion below on "Customs Co-operation" 
606 See Appendix to Annex II of the Protocol 
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enforcement structures in member States' customs border posts. It is generally believed 
that due to poor monitoring infrastructure and the untamed menace of endemic 
corruption well-intentioned customs regulations are a dead lener law in most of the 
member States' jurisdiction. SADC member States would do well to move fast in 
addressing the capacity and structural deficiencies if the well-intentioned mechanisms 
outlined in the Protocol are expected to yield any tangible results.60B 
6.8 Implication of regime configuration 
In recognition of the proliferation of free trade agreements and other bilateral trade 
instruments in the region Article 27 grandfathers the existing trade regimes609 • Parties are 
free to contract new and/or maintain the existing preferential trade and other trade 
related arrangements. The rider to this is that the new arrangements must not be 
inconsistent with and/or inimical to the objectives set out in the Protocol. If parties 
adhere to the WTO disciplines it is possible to avoid conflict in the free trade agreements 
contracted outside the SADC'lO. In view, however, of the many conflict areas we have 
highlighted before, it is unlikely that this measure can be realised. 
Paragraph 3 of Article 27 takes cognisant of the fact that a substantial number of the 
SADC States belong to and have membership in the COMESA. The EU-SA Agreement, 
where South Africa is the only regional member, albeit de jun!'ll is conveniently skipped 
and yet, this is the most complicating of all the instruments in the region. Paragraph 3 
provides that Parties with membership in existing preferential trade arrangements and 
607 See Appendix 1 of the Protocol 
608 Thomas is in full agreement here. She says that there is widespread fear that the regional customs' 
administrations will be unable to ensure that goods smuggling do not take place as a way of 
getting around the 'rules of origin'. In the past, South Africa has been flooded with illegal goods, 
which have entered via other southern Africa states. This has had a significantly negative impact 
on domestic employment and has resulted in the state losing significant customs duries and VAT 
payments. 
609 The problem with such a condition is that enforcement and administration of the divergent tariff 
regimes by member States will be extremely difficult. This is more so given the structural 
weakness of customs border controls within the region. This applies to South Africa as well. In 
this regard, Thomas suggests that it would have been better were member States to attempted 
either to simplify their arrangements, in line with the AFDBs " variable speed, multiple geometry" 
approach to integration. Regional Arrangements supra at p.23 
610According to Thomas member States are not willing to make the hard decisions that are necessary given 
the global environment, in regard to SACU, COMESA and other bilateral agreements. While 
such uncertainty and ambiguity surrounds regional relations the world over, it is unlikely that the 
single most important objective of the Protocol .- namely to contribute towards the improvement 
of the climate for foreign investment .. will materialize in any substantial way. Regional 
Arrangements supra at p.23 
611 It is understood that SACU is, by virtue of South African membership, a de/acto member of the EU·SA 
Free Trade Partnership 
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other trade related arrangements612 must undertake to review the further application of 
such agreements with a view to attaining the objectives of the Protocol. 
What is implicit in this provision is the fact that it comes out more like a directive than a 
suggestion is an appeal to SADC States with membership in the COMESA to withdraw 
their membership from the later. In our considered view, rooting for harmonisation 
rather than seeking withdrawal from this trade pact is the better way to go.6IJ It is not 
clear why South Africa's dual membership in both the EU-SA Agreement and the SACU 
union is excluded yet the two, especially the former are inimical to SADC's achievement 
of its stated objectives. The influx of cheap subsidised EU agricultural products and the 
intensified competition in the South African market is hardly a healthy economic growth 
environment for the stated objects of the SADC Protoco1614 • 
Like we pointed out before615 the Most Favoured Nation principle is the cornerstone of 
the multilateral trade agreements. Article 28 of the Protocol is merely restating the 
principal precept of the WTO disciplines. It is however not clear whether, when the 
provision obligates Parcies to accord the Most Favoured Nation Treatment to 'one 
another' it implicitly excludes such treatment from being extended to third parties. If this 
were the case, then the Protocol would be in clear breach of the fundamental law of the 
world trading system. The establishment of regional arrangements is, nevertheless, 
permissible under the WTO framework as an exception to the MFN principle. The main 
caveat being that the existing tariff regime between member States is not raised, in 
particular as against third countries.616 
It was in view of the EU-SA Agreement that par. 2 of A rtide 28 allows Parcies to grant 
and maintain preferential trade arrangements with third countries. It is permissible under 
the protocol for Parcies to so contract as long as such covenants do not impede or 
frustrate the objectives of the Protocol. This, no doubt, is a classic case of applying 
612 It should be noted that most of the SADC countries have many bilateral trade instruments between 
them. Indeed only Zambia has no bilateral trade pact with South Africa in the region 
613 See chapter eight for a discussion of this proposition 
614 This position is elaborated in the argument that follows below 
61S See Chapter four for an in-depth disposition on the principle of Most Favoured Treatment. 
616 According to top trade officials, South Africa's strategic approach also requires that the WTO rules 
governing regional economic co-operation and integration programs must be "interpreted 
flexibly" in recognition of the different levels of development in the world - see the DTI 
presentation to Parliament supra. The South African government spokesperson also refers to an 
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double standards. Whereas the EU-SA Agreement is tolerated, Parties with membership 
in the COMESA have been prevailed upon to review such membership. It is not 
altogether difficult to see why this is so. South Africa is clearly putting its economic 
predominance in the region to good use to protect its vested interests. 
Quite clearly, in a situation where a member of the SADC elects to remaIn 1n the 
COMESA, this would be uncouth for the South African economy. It should be born in 
mind that Kenya and Egypt, two countries that could utilise their COMESA convenience 
to sieve their goods through unto the South African market, dominate COMESA duty 
free. It is also possible for developing countries from the Far East and developing 
countries to percolate their goods through these countries into the South African market. 
This is one development South Africa is not ready to let materialise. On the other hand, 
the EU-SA Agreement has U1ll1erved many SADC States yet since the big brother is the 
culprit here, he must have his way. That then explains why the EU-SA Agreement is 
"tolerated" whilst the CONIESA Diaspora is resisted in certain SADC quotas with deeply 
vested interests. 
We have already alluded to the damage the EU-SA Free Trade Partnership would 
unleash on the nascent SADC Free Trade Area initiative617. This aspect is in fact 
common cause. It would appear, however, that the Protocol does not provide a remedy 
where a preferential Agreement covenanted by a member State impede and therefore 
frustrates the objectives of the Protocol. This, in our considered view is a serious 
omission. It means that the aggrieved party has no recourse to a tangible remedy and 
therefore they must suffer in silence. It would be interesting to see how South Africa 
would manage to calm down the already garrulous SADC States who fear that the EU-
SA Agreement is a sure death nail in their efforts towards deepening integration in the 
regIon. 
The very same par. 2 provides that any advantage, concession, privilege or power granted 
to a third country under a preferential Agreement must be extended to other member 
States. One needs not go any far to see the fallacy of this edict. Already SACU is an 
exclusive club of States under the South Africa tutelage. SACU States have duty free 
"overreaching review of [he WTO rules so as to address [he needs of development in a more 
focused way. 
215 
access to the South African market. This particular facility is not extended to other 
SADC States in line with this provision. The beckoning dilemma here is however 
conveniently redressed by the rider at par. 3 which provides that a Party shall not be 
obliged to extend preferences of another trading bloc of which that Party was a member 
at the time of entry into force of the Protocol. This means that the SADC States who 
have granted concession to non SADC /COMESA States are not obliged to extend 
them to other SADC States since COMESA was in existence before the Trade Protocol 
came into effect.618 
The same argument must go for SACU and other bilateral instruments that have been in 
existence before the Trade Protocol. This scenario then leaves out the EU-SA 
Agreement as the only other major preferential trade arrangement in the region that 
would not be hit by this provision619 • Where the EU-SA Agreement is concerned South 
Africa has always insisted on the 'SADC first Principle'. The EU says it has no problem 
with this approach.620 In fact the EU says it wants to create space for the principle to take 
root within the SADC region. This development, however, remains to be seen in the 
light of the considerable duty leeway South Africa has extended to the EU. It is all the 
more urgent with regard to the so-called sensitive product regime. 
Under Article 39, the Protocol is open for accession by third pames. This prOVlSlOn 
complies with the WTO mandate on the accession clause for third parties. It is notable 
that the EU-SA agreement lacks the equivalent provision. Article 29 enjoins the Parties to 
take up negotiating position in respect of relations with third countries or groups of third 
countries and international organisations. Economists have been critical of SADC's 
expansiveness which they claim would seriously constrain its limited resources and hence 
617 The impact of the EU-SA Ff A on SADC is treated in detail below. See also chapter five above for 
additional insights on this item 
618 To the frustration of the non-SACU members and South Africa, the smaller states in SACU shun any 
discussion of the SACU negotiations on institutional and trade matters within the SADC for a 
free trade agreement. Within the SACU negotiating rounds, they push to the farthest recesses of 
the agenda, any discussion of relations within SADC and COMESA. This does not bode well for 
the development of sound policies and inter-linkages between the diverse institutions, and makes 
a mockery of the Abuja Treaty's call for building blocks to fuse together the Pan-Africanist vision 
for a continent-wide common market. 
619 The Protocol came into effect before the EU-SA Agreement_ 
620 Ambassador Michael Laidler, the EU representative in South Nrica indeed conveys this point more 
emphatically and in no uncertain terms when he says, "the EU is ultra anxious to ensure that the 
SADC Protocol is a success Story". H E. the Ambassador's address to the A WEPA Seminar 
supra at p.lS 
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affects delivery of services to members.621 Some commentators have called for a leaner 
and more focused free trade area that would realise its objectives more efficiently. 
Other commentators fear that the expansive size of the SADC may prove to be its 
Achilles heel. They point to what is now paraded as the success story that is the 
Mercosul.622 It is argued that if four countries can be so successful in a regional grouping, 
it shows that the SADC may not be successful due to a large membership, with countries 
of diverse and varying interests. The bureaucracy of debating macro-economic 
stabilisation or liberalisation is, with less membership, not that protracted. This reasoning 
is, of course misplaced. The membership number may have been a contributing factor 
but it is certainly not the dominant reason for this bloc's success story. The success of 
this grouping is due mainly to the fact that some of the individual States' GDP is higher 
or equal to that of the entire sub-Sahara Africa. Brazil has a GDP of two and a half times 
the size of sub-Sahara Africa and Argentina's GDP is almost equal to it.623 
No doubt the Mercosul countries have a measure of commonality in the basic economic 
interests and perspective. The SADC group is not so endowed, at least at its current stage 
of development. This reasoning appeals as far as there is, indeed, nothing common in the 
current level of economic fundamentals in the SADC regional economic bloc. 
Commentators even go as far to argue that some countries in the organIsation are 
currently contributing nothing to the region's development. This is a position fronted by 
Tiroyamodimo. 624 He singles out the admission of the DRC into the SADC fold, which 
he says is more of a liability than an asset to the SADC hegemony. He adds further that 
three member States namely: Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe are now embroiled in the 
DRC civil war that is draining their fledgling economies. This is a war that they did not 
have to fight if it was not for their national interests he laments. 
These arguments, though factually valid, nonetheless fail to take cognisance of the bigger 
picture in the regional integration initiative. The SADC States have basically agreed to 
pool resources in order to create larger markets and be able to maximise the exploitation 
621 O.B Tiroyamoclimo: 'The SADe: Toothless lion or salvation in Action?" hnp:/ /wwwlzle-l/A: I \ the 
sadc.htm 2002/03/16 at p.5 
622 The South American Regional Grouping (MERCOSUL) is made up of four members States. These are 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
(2) See Tiroyamoclimo (supra) at p.5 
624 Supra at pp. 5-6 
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of their full potential for sustainable growth. The DRC, in-spite of its current sorry state 
of belligerency remains one States that is amply endowed with vast reserves of natural 
resources in the region. It could have been a big folly on the part of the SADC to deny 
the DRC membership simply because there is a war going on there. After all 
Mozambique and Angola have long been ravaged by intractable wars whilst still 
maintaining their SADC membership. 
There are, of course, the brighter prospects on the other side of the Civil War Bridge. 
These prospects must be sought by SADC The one rime war ravaged Mozambique has 
managed to record a phenomenal GDP rate in the entire sub-continent.625 In any case, by 
SADC embracing the DRC as a member in its ranks, it has strategically positioned itself 
well to be able to influence the course of this war for the better.626 Tiroyamodimo argues 
that SADC could have avoided being embroiled in the DRC conflict had it opted for a 
smaller membership of countries free from internal problems, conunitted to the rule of 
law and full economic development. 627This line of thinking once again detracts from the 
long-term spin-offs that SADC stands to gain when doing business with a peaceful DRC 
It is no wishful thinking that upon the restoration of peace in the DRC (and hopefully 
Angola) SADC will have under its wings two strategically placed mineral rich member 
States. This is definitely something to look forward to the present security complications 
notwithstanding. 
The flip side of the coin, of course, is that the larger the group, the greater is the chance 
of embracing lowest cost products, thereby minimising trade diversions.628 Also similar 
production patterns in integrating countries will lead to greater scope for trade creation if 
there are differences in production costs. Marceau and Reiman629 , however, argue that 
such factors might prove to be elusive when seeking robust measurements. They note 
that some factors have a priori bearing on the relative size of the trade creation and trade 
diversion effects. The learned authors point out that the fall of high initial tariffs 
625 Estimated to grow at the rate of 8% which is the highest figure record for developing countries in the 
region. See A WEPA Seminar supra - see Mfundo Nkuhlu - the DTI presentations at [he 
AWEPA Seminar supra at p. 33 
626 Following regional peace overtures, significant developments towards a peaceful resolution of the civil 
strife are taking shape. Uganda and Rwanda, [he main belligerents in the war have pulled most of 
their troops from the DRC. 
627 G. Marceau at el infra at p.306 
628 Ibid 
629Marceau and Cornelis Reiman "Legal issues of Economic Integration 28(3): 297-336, 2001. Kluwer Law 
International; Netherlands 
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encourages trade creation and the growth of economic welfare.630 Indeed like we noted in 
chapter two, low trade barriers lead to less incidence of trade diversion. 
The experience of the EU integration, which we examined earlier, clearly shows that 
political considerations do also affect the success of regional trade arrangements631 . Quite 
admittedly, one of the powerful political tools that the SADC has realised through the 
Protocol is that of engaging the international conununity with one voice. This IS a 
powerful voice that is unachievable were each State to crusade for its own cause. 
A rtide 30 allows member States to develop co-operation and conclude agreements with 
third countries or groups of third countries and international organisation as provided 
for under Part VII!. 632 This is a rather curios provision. There are very good tidings when 
a country co-operates globally. We do not, however, see the wisdom in urging States to 
conclude Agreements with third countries whilst Article 27 par. 3 enjoins member States 
to review preferential agreements they have with third parties. In any case there are 
already numerous preferential trade agreements in the region that calling for more is a 
sure recipe for turmoil. 
It is possible that the Protocol here refers to co-operatIon agreements, such as for 
development and technical support with the donor conununity. In this category are co-
operation arrangements that are devoid of preferential treatment on trade. Experience 
has, nonetheless, shown that most instruments concluded along these lines are crowded 
with conditionalities that have serious implications for a country's trade obligations with 
the outside world633 . 
630 Ibid 
631 In Chapter three, on the subject of the 'integration in Europe', we saw how the desire for the European 
States to come together to form a bulwark against the ever rising might of the USA was a deep 
motivation for seeking regional integration. 
632 Pan VIII of the Protocol makes provision for trade arrangements among member States with third 
countnes 
633 A co-operation akin to the America's brainchild of African Growth and Opportunity Agreement may 
sound a unilateral attempt to create markets for African produce but underlying it is a 
requirement that certain basic materials be sourced from the USA. This requirement would 
obviously carry negative effects for a regional arrangement. 
-
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Member States have elected to notify the arrangement under Article XXIV of the GAIT 
Agreement.634 This means that the free trade agreement will have to conform to the rules 
prescribed for the establishment of free trade areas and customs unions under that 
Article. Par. 8(b) of Article XXIV provides that a free trade agreement must eliminate 
duties on 'substantially all trade' between its members and maintain external tariffs at the 
same level as before the creation of the free trade area.63S In addition, A nicle XXIV 5(b) 
provides that members' tariffs and rules for the regulations of commerce are not "higher 
or more restrictive than those in existence prior to the formation of the free trade area" 
6.9 Concluding Remarks 
One striking feature that has come out clearly in this chapter is the fact that the process 
of integration in the SADC region involves unequal developing and least developed 
countries. This chapter has pointed out that such an economic landscape offers unique 
yet insurmountable challenges for economic integration processes 
We have seen that the mam thrust of the Trade Protocol is to facilitate regional 
economic growth and development through, among others, the creation of a free trade 
area in the SADC region. We have discussed the significance of the rider to the 
liberalization process in that it is linked to an industrialization strategy. This strategy, we 
have argued, is tailor made to improve the SADC State's global competitiveness. 
The chapter has noted that before ratification of the Trade Protocol most SADC States 
had liberalized on a large scale. We have argued that when one looks at the issue from 
this perspective, it then becomes abundantly clear that an expedited move to a free trade 
area would be more demanding in terms of adjustment on South Africa than would be 
for her SADC counterparts. 
We have demonstrated that the Trade Protocol is to a large extent compatible to the 
wro disciplines save for some areas of ambiguity, which we have highlighted. It is not 
clear, for example, between the bilateral trade arrangements and the Protocol as to which 
one would take precedent in case of inconsistency. We have argued that it would have 
634Despite views to the contrary expressed by South Africa. See R. Thomas, 'A South African Perspective 
on the SADC Trade and Development Protocol", in Schwersensky, S (ed.) The Maseru Protocol 
on Trade, Friederich Ebert Stiftung, 1997). 
635 See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of this provision 
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been better, for the sake of harmonisation that the Protocol override all the existing 
bilateral trade arrangements 
The chapter has alluded to the fact that provisions on trade in services have been made 
wro compliant to avoid situations of conflict with the multilateral disciplines. We have 
pointed out that the service industry is already blossoming in the region only that it is a 
one way highway shooting from South Africa to the rest of the region. On the obverse 
side of the coin, however, the chapter has cautioned that with the liberalisation of the 
services and manufacturing sectors, most firms in the region have been exposed to 
outside competition. We have argued that this wind of change has, unfortunately, come 
suddenly and thereby sweeping the regional firms off balance before they could put in 
place necessary structures to position themselves in order to be internationally 
competitive 
We have faulted the Protocol for failing to provide a remedy where a preferential 
Agreement covenanted by a member State impede and therefore frustrates the objectives 
of the Protocol. We have also alluded to the inconsistencies created in A nick 27 par. 3 on 
the creation of new preferential instruments. We take the view that in any case there are 
already numerous preferential trade agreements in the region that calling for more is a 
sure recipe for turmoil. We have, however, noted that, indeed, these regional regimes 
duplicate each other in the coverage of trade and development issues. 
We have lauded the fact that the revised dispute settlement provisions strife to ensure 
certainty and predictability in the settlement of disputes arising under the Trade Protocol. 
We have noted that this remarkable feat has been achieved by clearly outlining the 
different phases in the settlement of disputes and linking them to clear cut time frames. 
We have also noted that the new provisions are based on the same principles 
underpinning the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO. The chapter has 
highlighted the difficulty created with respect to SACU's lucus standi before the dispute 
settlement panel by its insistence on presenting a harmonised tariff regime within the 
SADC framework. We have argued that in this convoluted scenario, it is unlikely that 
SACU would be clothed with the requisite competence to gain audience before the panel. 
Chapter Seven: Exit Lome enter the Cotonou: Implication of the New Trade 
Dispensation for Integrative Processes in 
Eastern and Southern Africa 
7.1 Introduction 
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The EU-ACP partnership is, beside the EU-SA Agreement, the archetype north-south 
relationship that binds the affluent north to the impoverished States in sub-Sahara 
Africa. States within the east and southern Africa region constitute a significant 
constituency of the ACP membership. This means that the EU-ACP trade regimes 
would have important implications for integration processes within the east and southern 
Africa region. 
Indeed, we have noted in chapter five that one of the commitments, which the EU-SA 
Agreement makes, is to promote the closest links between the ACP States and South 
Africa. This commitment is not surprising in view of the bare fact that the EU is the 
main player in both Agreements. Since the Cotonou Agreement commits the east and 
southern Africa states to a direct trade partnership with the EU in spite of the integration 
disciplines taking root in the region, it is important to review the implication of this 
relationship. 
The Cotonou is a transitional mechanism that would run for a 12-year period before a 
Lome replacement is negotiated and formulated. That is an awfully long period of time 
whose repercussions for the region would be considerable. This chapter examines some 
of the pertinent features of the Cotonou and how this reflects on integration regimes 
within the east and southern Africa region. We also contend that the Cotonou has taken 
aboard some significant innovations, which are healthy for the east and southern African 
regional integration initiatives. 
The chapter examines the position of the Cotonou vis-a.-vis the EU-SA Agreement and 
the SADC Trade Protocol. We then highlight some of the synergies and divergences that 
emerge in view of the wro disciplines on regionalism. The chapter closely examines 
arguments around the question of the EU-SA Agreement being the model for the post-
Lome replacement and affords some reasoned grounds on why this proposition is 
flawed. We also analyse the differing views regarding the proposed post-Lome 
dispensation. These views are then measured on the past and present realities in the 
Lome life span. Our thesis is that no matter what shape the post-Lome regime takes the 
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EU-ACP arrangement would largely retam 1tS principal theme, which 1S aid and 
development for the ACP States. 
7.2.1 A brief review of the principle features 
The Cotonou aims to strengthen the political dimension of the partnership, to provide 
new flexibility and to entrust the ACP countries with additional responsibilities. The 
Agreement has three main dimensions, namely politics, trade and development, and 
represents an approach that is both integrated and sectoral. Progranune support focuses 
on specific sectors such as health, transport and combines many different aspects of co-
operation such as economic, environmental and social development. This strategy is to 
ensure that aid is better targeted. The Agreement has been concluded for 20 years, with a 
revision clause every five years. 
The preamble to the Agreement asserts the Parties'636 resolve to make, through their co-
operation, a significant contribution to the economic, social and cultural development of 
the ACP States and to the greater well being of their population. It pledges to help the 
ACP States face the challenges of globalisation and to strengthen the ACP-EU 
Partnership in an effort to give the process of globalisation a stronger social dimension. 
The Agreement also reaffirms Parties' willingness to revitalise their special relationship 
and to implement a comprehensive and integrated approach for a strengthened 
partnership based on political dialogue, development co-operation and economic and 
trade relations. 
The ACP States have been empowered under Article 4 to determine the development 
principles, strategies and models of their economies and societies in all sovereignty. This 
means that the ACP States would establish, in conjunction with the Community, co-
operation progranunes provided for under the Agreement. It is, however, significant that 
Parties recognise the complementary role of and potential for contributions by non-State 
actors to the development process. To this end, under the conditions laid down in the 
Agreement, non-State actors would, where appropriate be informed and involved in 
consultation on co-operation policies and strategies, on priorities for co-operation 
especially in areas that concern or directly affect such non-state development partners.6J7 
636 The term 'Parry' whenever it appears in this chapter refers to the contracting Parties under the 
Cotonou Agreement - that is to say the ACP on the one hand and the EU on the other hand 
637 The Article adds that on the political dialogue such States would be provided with financial resources, 
under the conditions laid down in the Agreement in order to support local development 
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In order to ensure the full participation of non-state actors, A rtide 5 of the Agreement 
deals with Co-operation in information to create greater awareness of the basic features 
of ACP-EU Partnership. Co-operation will also encourage partnership and build links 
between ACP and EU actors; strengthen networking and exchange of expertise and 
experience among the actors. The importance of strengthening conununity organisations 
and non-profit non-governmental organisations in all spheres of co-operation is given 
credence under Article 7. This would enhance the contribution of civil society to 
development. There is need for the establishment of arrangements for involving such 
organisations in the design, implementation and evaluation of development strategies and 
progranunes. 
7.2.2 Promotion of regional integration 
The EU has become increasingly concerned about the proliferation of regional 
preferential trade agreements and the possibility of significant trade diversion against EU 
exports. The EU is particularly much more concerned than in the past that these 
arrangements should be fully compatible with the WTO disciplines.638 This is where the 
crucial question of regional co-operation and integration that is treated under Article 28 
of the Agreement kicks in. Co-operation in this area would provide effective assistance to 
achieve the objectives and priorities, which the ACP States have set themselves in the 
context of regional and sub-regional co-operation and integration. This feature would 
include inter-regional and intra-ACP co-operation.6J9 In this context, co-operation 
support would aim to foster the gradual integration of the ACP States into the world 
economy. It will also accelerate economic co-operation and development both within 
and between the regions of the ACP States. 
As regards prograrnnung of regions, or in other words the regIOns covered by the 
Regional Indicative Pro granunes , the Cotonou implies important changes in relation to 
the practice so far. These changes are the result of paying explicit attention to regional 
economic integration. For the first time the Agreement states that it is the ACP States 
processes. They would also be involved in the implementation of co-operation project and 
programmes in areas that concern them or where these actors have a comparative advantage; be 
provided with capacity-building support in critical areas in order to reinforce the capabilities of 
these actors. This is particularly as regards organisation and representation, and the establishment 
of consultation mechanisms including channels of communication and dialogue, and to promote 
strategic alliances. 
638 Steven, et al IDS Commonwealth Secretariat at p.7 4 
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that must decide on the geographic composltlOn of progranurung regions. 64o TIlls 
provision takes cognisance of the prevailing situation on the ground. There IS a 
worrisome proliferation of regional trade agreements within the ACP ranks in general 
and in the sub-Saharan Africa in particular. 
The Agreement also specifies that the definition should be based on the membership of 
regional organisations with a mandate for economic integration. In the event of an 
overlap in the membership of different organisations, the programming region should, to 
the maximum extent possible, be constituted by the combined membership of the 
overlapping organisations. This particular provision is rather troublesome. If taken on 
face value, it would mean that SADC and COMESA must constitute one region. Such an 
arrangement would create an expansive regional hegemony that would be too unwieldy 
for effective administration. Already the dominant thinking in SADC is that those within 
its ranks that have membership in the COMESA must review such membership to ease 
the administrative pressure integration initiative.641 The logic behind the principle of 
programming regions is that regional co-operation should build on and strengthen 
regional integration in a coherent and efficient way. 642 A situation of disharmony is the 
very anti-thesis of regional integration processes. 
Free movement of persons, goods, services, capital, labour and technology among ACP 
countries will also be promoted under this co-operation endeavour. This provision would 
definitely encounter problems in implementation within the region. This hiccup is 
attributable to the fact that the SADC Protocol makes no pledge on free movement of 
labour. Indeed, the SADC membership is deeply divided over whether to let free 
639 Regional Co-operation can also involve Overseas Countries and Territories (OeTs) and outermost 
regions. 
640 Commissioner Nielson singles out three Regional Indicative Programmes: East Africa, SADC and 
Indian Ocean Commission. The geographic coverage of these programmes corresponds to the 
combined membership of COMESA and SADe. Both organisations have a declared purpose of 
economic integration, but there are 9 ACP States belonging at the same time to both 
organisations. Commissioner Nielson suggests that Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian 
Ocean constitute a single programming region. Admittedly, there is certainly scope for sub-
regional organisations to assume the role of Regional Authorising Officer. Commissioner Nielson 
is of the view that the approach is fully consistent with the Cotonou Agreement and, that it will 
provide an incentive towards coherence of the integration programmes. It is the lack of 
coherence that is among the main causes of the limited results of integration so far. It slows down 
the whole process. It is also the approach that will lead to the most effective use of resources. 
Commissioner Nielson opening statement see infra at p.3 
641 See H. Thomas: ECDPM WokingPaper, supra at p.2 
642 Opening Session - Meeting of Heads of ACP Regional Organisations Statement by Commissioner 
Nielson; Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Brussels 7.12.2000. 
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circulation of labour within the region or put caps on this activity.643 No specific 
commitment has been made to this end which means the maner has been left to fall into 
a limbo for the present. It is unlikely that the provision for free movement of people 
within the region as made under the Cotonou would change the situation as it stands on 
the ground. 
Parties will also co-operate to accelerate the diversification in the economies of the ACP 
States to make them internationally competitive. It is crucial for the sustainability of the 
ACP economies that there be harmonisation of regional and sub-regional co-operation 
policies. This initiative would also be driven to achieve just that in addition to the 
promotion and expansion of inter and intra-ACP trade with third countries. This 
measure is welcome in view of the fact that there is dismal trading activity among the 
States in the region. The problem, however, resides with the absence of economies of 
scale given that the regional States, with the exception of South Africa, deal in primary 
exports only. Like we argued earlier, such an undiversified economic base severely 
constrains intra-regional trade. 
On the germane issue of regional economic integration A nicle 29 provides that co-
operation would support the development and strengthening of the capacities of regional 
integration institutions and organisations set up by the ACP States to promote this 
initiative. Efforts by National governments and parliaments in maners of regional 
integration would also be augmented.644 Within the SADC, the institutions targeted here 
are the Council of Ministers of Trade, the Comminee of Senior Officials responsible for 
trade maners, the Trade Negotiating Forum and the Sector Co-ordinating Unit as 
established under the trade Protocol. To its immense advantage, COMESA has a 
clearinghouse, a regional court and a regional Re-insurance facility. All these institutions 
are set to benefit from the Cotonou co-operation assistance with a view to deepen 
integration in the region. 
The promotion of Cross-Border Investments (CBI) both foreign and domestic, and 
other regional or sub-regional economic integration initiatives would, too, benefit from 
643 See, for example, chapter six above 
644 The Article recognises the importance of fostering the participation of LLOCs in the establishment of 
regional markets and sharing the benefits therefrom. The LLDCs would therefore be assisted in 
the implementation of sectoral reform policies at regional level and the liberalisation of trade and 
payments. 
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the Cotonou program assistance. These measures would, however, be implemented while 
taking account of the effects of net transitional costs of regional integration on budget 
revenue and balance of payments. There is already an active C.B.I facility driven by the 
IMF and the World Bank in the east and southern Africa region. This cross border 
investment facility has not, however, made an impact in raising the level of inter and 
intra-regional trade to any significant point. One hopes that this new initiative would help 
to inject the much-needed impetus in the CBI's activities to raise the temple of cross 
border trade in the region. 
A rtick 30 recogruses the central role played by regional co-operatIon III fostering 
development among the ACP States. In that vein co-operation will be geared to support 
a wide variety of functional and thematic fields which specifically address common 
problems and take advantage of scale of economies. Among the measures covered here 
include infrastructure development in particular transport and communications and its 
safety thereof. The services sector, which rolls the road map to the economic growth 
infrastructure, is another area in dire need of development. This is one prime area for 
which the SADC Trade Protocol is seriously grappling with. The EU-Aa co-operation 
in this respect would go along way in helping to argument the regional efforts in this 
regard.645 
The Cotonou recognises, and rightly so, that there are enormous regional opportunities 
in the area of information and Communication Technologies (lCT), the environment, 
water resource management and energy. Other vital areas identified by the Agreement 
and which are suited for regional co-operation are; health, education and training to 
mention just a few.646 This is certainly a new but awfully important feature that the 
SADC Protocol has trained its sights upon. Under its sectoral programmes the Protocol 
645 Indeed SADC is 'work-in-progress' and intra-regional trade integration and development is explicitly 
linked, and in many ways premised upon the implementation of a whole range of related 
provisions. As the 1996 Maseru Trade Protocol indicates, regional trade integration and 
promotion in southern Africa requires extensive improvement of transport, communication and 
other infrastructure, and the co-ordination and harmonisation of trade financing, insurance and 
banking systems, customs procedures, etc. See Dot Keet: IDG Occasional Paper No.21 TIPS 
Workshop Proceedings supra at p.31 
646 Article 32 makes provision for environmental protection and sustainable utilisation and management of 
natural resources. This shall aim at among others mainstreaming environmental sustain ability into 
all aspects of development co-operation and support programmes and projects implemented by 
the various actors. Other areas covered here are water resource management and energy; health, 
education and training, research and technological development; regional initiatives for disaster 
preparedness and mitigation; and other areas, including arms control, action against drugs, 
organised crimes, money laundering, bribery and corruption. 
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hopes to harness regional resources to foster development and economic growth in the 
region. COMESA has, too, picked up this very theme which it has incorporated in its 
free trade area initiative. With the Cotonou moving in the same direction as the 
dominant trade regimes in the region, possibilities for harmonising these processes can 
no longer be dismissed as far fetched. 
Apart from the foregoing commitments, co-operation would also support inter and intra-
ACP co-operation schemes and initiatives. It is expected that co-operation in this area 
would help promote and develop a regional political dialogue in areas of conflict 
prevention and resolution; human rights and democratisation. This would be achieved 
via exchange of information and networking through the promotion of mobility between 
the different actors of development, in particular civil society. In the past, the ACP States 
were viciously opposed to the idea of linking human rights and democratisation issues 
with trade. A new thinking has taken root, however, in that these issues are also covered 
in the regional integration regimes.647 Indeed, it would be foolhardy to ignore these issues 
given the prevailing international mood, which is strongly advocating for clear measures 
to internalise respect for fundamental human rights and for states to nature democratic 
. . . 
InstItutIons. 
7.2.3 Development of the economic sector 
On the critical score of macroeconomic and structural reforms and policies, A rtide 22 
provides that Co-operation in this field would support ACP efforts to implement 
macroeconomic growth and stabilisation through disciplined fiscal and monetary policies. 
Partnership here would specifically target those policies that result in the reduction of 
inflation, and improve external and fiscal balances. These measures would be achieved 
through strengthening of fiscal discipline, enhancing budgetary transparency and 
efficiency. Improvement will also be made on the quality, the equity and composition of 
fiscal policy. Similar measures will target structural policies designed to reinforce the role 
of the different actors, especially the private sector and improve the envirorunem for 
increases in business, investment and employment.648 
647 Indeed, the new kids on the bloc - that is the AU and Nepad - have reiterated the centrality of this 
theme for development in the continent. African foreign Ministers meeting in Johannesburg 
made a commitment to the Nepad's peer review mechanism that would ensure good governance 
and democratic principles. Reported in the Mail & Guardian at hnp:/ Iwww.mg.co.za on the 20th 
October 2002 
648 Liberalise trade and foreign exchange regimes and current account convertibility, having regard to the 
particular circumstances of each country; strengthen labour and product-market reforms; 
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On economic sector development strategy, Article 23 creates room for Co-operation to 
support sustainable policy and institutional reforms and the investments necessary for 
equitable access to economic activities and productive resources. Co-operation in this 
area will in particular be designed to develop training systems that would help increase 
productivity in both the formal and the informal sectors.649 ~These measures would, no 
doubt, augment similar provisions under the SADC Protocol and the COMESA Treaty 
to address macro economic sector development.65o 
Adequate provision is also made under Article 24 for the potentially lucrative but orren 
neglected Tourism sector. Co-operation in this field will aim at the sustainable 
development of the tourism industry in ACP countries and sub-regions. Assistance to 
tourism is in recognition of the sector's increasing importance to the growth of the 
services sector in ACP countries and to the expansion of their global trade. The 
Agreement also recognises the ability of the Tourism sector to stimulate other sectors of 
economic activity, and the role it can play in poverty eradication. That the east and 
southern Africa region boasts an enormously rich but awfully under-developed Tourism 
resource is no longer in doubt. The problem within the region has been that Tourism 
players compete against one another instead of pursuing complementary policies to 
harness this vital resource. Within the SADC Protocol, an entire sectoral programme has 
been committed to the development of tourism.651 Similar disciplines are duplicated in 
the COMESA Treaty and the EU-SA Agreement. One hopes that this important co-
operation would go along way to revamp this otherwise hugely under-utilised yet vital 
sector. 
encourage financial systems refonns. These help to develop viable banking and non-banking 
systems, capital markets and financial services, including micro-finance; improve the qualiry of 
private and public services; and encourage regional co-operation and progressive integration of 
macroeconomic and monetary policies. 
649 Capital, credit, land, especially as regards property rights and use and development of rural strategies 
aimed at establishing a framework for participatory decentralised planning, resource allocation 
and management. Others are agricultural production strategies, national and regional food 
securiry policies, sustainable development of water resources and fisheries as well as marine 
resources within the economic exclusive zones of the ACP States. Any fishery agreement that 
may be negotiated between the Communiry and the ACP States must pay due consideration to 
consistency with the development strategies in this area. Also covered is the area of economic and 
technological infrastructure and services, including transport, teleconunurucation systems, 
communication services and the development of infonnation society. 
650 See Article 26 and Annex V of the SADC Protocol. 
651 The Tourism Sectoral Development Protocol 
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The Agreement provides that Co-operation programmes and projects will support the 
efforts by the ACP countries to establish and improve their legal and institutional 
framework and resources for the development and implementation of sustainable 
tourism policies and programmes. Co-operation will also be geared toward revamping 
the sector in an effort to improve its competitive position in particular for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This measure would be achieved through investment 
support and promotion, product development including the development of indigenous 
cultures in ACP countries, and strengthening linkages between tourism and other sectors 
of economic activity. 
7.2.4 Promotion of the private sector investment 
There have been, in the past, very little or no involvement of the private sector in the 
formulation of decisions, protocols, and so forth within most regional groupings. Due to 
this non-inclusive process, the private sector has often reacted lethargically to regional 
integration programs. This is the outcome of the statistic outlook in many countries and 
also within the region and it might explain why there is often unwillingness by the private 
sector to invest time and resources to participate in the trade liberalisation programs.652 
Like we indicated earlier, all regional regimes have redressed this defect and that fairly 
comprehensive provision is made for the private sector participation. 
Investment and the enure corpus of the pnvate sector development is treated to a 
comprehensive regime of disciplines. Co-operation in this area would be targeted to 
support the necessary economic and institutional reforms and policies at national and/or 
regional leve1.653 This measure would aim at creating a favourable environment for 
private investment, and the development of a dynamic, viable and competitive private 
sector.654 Co-operation in this regard would also support and improve the quality, 
availability and accessibility of financial and non-financial services to private enterprises, 
both formal and informal.655 
652 See Ernest, Trade Refonn and Regional Integration in Africa supra at p. 411 
653 See Article 21 of the Agreement 
654 The promotion of public-private sectors dialogue and co-operation; the development of entrepreneurial 
skills and business culture; Privatisation and enterprise refonn, development and modernisation 
of mediation and arbitration systems. 
655 This would be achieved by catalysing and leveraging flows of private savings, both domestic and 
foreign, into the financing of private enterprises and by supporting policies for developing a 
modern financial sector including a capital market, fmancial institutions and sustainable micro-
finance operations. Other measures are the development and strengthening of business 
institutions and intennediary organisations, associations, chambers of commerce and local 
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In recognition of the central role the private sector investment play in economic growth 
and acknowledging the need to take steps to promote such investment, Parties undertake 
to implement measures to encourage participation in their development efforts by private 
investors.656 Under Article 74 co-operation in this respect would, through financial and 
technical assistance, support the policies and strategies for investment and private sector 
development as set out in the Agreement. 
Parties will also take necessary measures and actions, that help to create and maintain a 
predictable and secure investment climate as well as enter mto negotlatlons on 
agreements, which will improve the climate for the growth of the private sector 
investment.657 The EU on its part has pledged to encourage its private sector players to 
invest and to provide specific assistance to its counterparts in the ACP countries under 
mutual business co-operation and partnerships. This edict, then, clearly creates a synergy 
of purpose with the same pledge featuring prominently under the EU-SA Agreement.658 
The importance of capacity building cannot be over-emphasised in view of the fact that 
most of the east and southern Africa infrastructure is either largely undeveloped or non-
existent. This veritable handicap renders regional states functionally wanting in 
international competitiveness. It is also recognised that most private sector plays in east 
and southern Africa lack crucial knowledge on the availability of investment 
opportunities in the regional and the international market. The Agreement proposes to 
address this deficiency by disseminating information on investment opportunities and 
providers from the private sector supporting and providing non-financial services to enterprises 
such as professional, technical, management, training and commercial support services. Also to be 
supported are institutions, programmes, activities and initiatives that contribute to the 
development and transfer of technologies and know-how and best practices on all aspects of 
business management co-operation. 
656 See Article 75, the Agreement, however, would only target those who comply with the objectives and 
priorities of ACP-EC development co-operation and with the appropriate laws and regulations of 
their respective States. 
657 Room is made for Co-operation to promote business development through the provision of finance, 
guarantee facilities and technical support aimed at encouraging and supporting the creation, 
establishment, expansion, diversification, rehabilitation, restructuring, modernisation or 
privatisation of dynamic, viable and competitive enterprises. This venture covers all economic 
sectors as well as financial intermediaries such as development finance and venture capital 
institutions, and leasing companies. This measure would be achieved by encouraging inter-firm 
linkages, networks and co-operation including those involving the transfer of technology and 
know-how at national, regional and ACP-EU levels, and partnerships with private foreign 
investors which are consistent with the objectives and guidelines of the ACP-EC Development. 
See Anide 74 of the Agreement 
658 See chapter five on the aspect of private sector development - the EU would further support capacity 
building for domestic investment promotion agencies and institutions involved in promoting and 
facilitating foreign investment. 
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business operating conditions in the ACP States to all stakeholders in commerce and 
industry.659 
Parties have also undertaken to promote national, regional and ACP-EU private sector 
business dialogue, co-operation and partnerships, in particular through an ACP-EU 
private sector business forwn. The Agreement pledges support for operations of an 
ACP-EU private sector business forwn whose main objective would, among other 
things, be to facilitate dialogue within the ACP lEU private sector and the bodies 
established under the Agreement. The forwn will also help to analyse and periodically 
provide relevant bodies with information on the whole range of issues concerning 
relations between the ACP and EU private sectors in the context of the Agreement or, 
more generally, of economic relations between the Community and the ACP countries.660 
The treatment on pnvate sector illvestment promotlOn IS an immensely important 
innovation on the part of the ACP States. It stands to reason, as we have indeed 
reiterated in previous chapters that the private sector is the veritable engine to 
development. The Lome was fundamentally flowed to have failed to make adequate 
provision in support of the private sector development. The EU-SA Agreement has also 
been criticised for lacking adequate mechanism to advertise and make available 
investment opportunities in the Agreement to the private sector. The EU-SA Agreement 
commits a fairly detailed coverage with regard to the development of the private sector. 
The Cotonou must, however, be commended for making ample provision for the 
promotion of the Private Sector Investment. 
The typical investor - be they local or foreign - are for the most part jittery and 
indecisive on the appropriate investment portfolio unless the market is right and there 
are clear guarantees for the return on their investment. It is in this vein that A rtick 77 of 
the Agreement makes provision for an increasing availability and use of risk insurance as 
a risk-mitigating mechanism in order to boost investor confidence in the ACP States. To 
659 Other areas of endeavour would be to facilitate partnerships and joint ventures by encouraging co-
financing, sponsor sectoral investment fora to promote partnerships and external investment. 
Support would also be made available to the ACP States to attract financing, with particular 
emphasis on private fmancing, for infrastructure investments and revenue generating 
infrastructure that is critical for the private sector. Article 74 of the Agreement 
660 In the same vein the EU would help to analyse and provide the relevant bodies with information on 
specific problems of a sectoral nature relating to, inter alia, branches of production or types of 
products at regional or sub-regional level. See OJapter 7 of the Cotonou Agreement 
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respond to lack of risk cover that normally inhibit investment in the east and southern 
Africa region, provision is made for risk-capital for equity or quasi-equity investments, 
guarantees in support of domestic and foreign private investment and loans or lines of 
credit.661 
A similar measure is not provided for under the EU-SA Agreement or the SADC 
Protocol despite its obviously huge benefaction potential. COMESA is in good shape on 
this score with its reinsurance institution already in place. Further provision is made for 
support on the basis of complementary and value added with respect to private and/or 
public initiatives and, whenever feasible, in partnership with private and other public 
organisations.662 
The Agreement enJoms Parties within the scope of their respective competenCIes, to 
promote and protect either Party's investments within their respective territories. In this 
respect, Parties have, under Article 78, affirmed the importance of concluding, in their 
mutual interest, investment promotion and protection agreements, which could also 
provide the basis for insurance and guarantee schemes. This provision is not surprising 
given the protracted incidence of instability that bedevils some of the ACP States. It 
would be much easier for SADC to borrow a leaf from COMESA and set up a re-
insurance entity to drive this process and thereby benefit from the EU's goodwill under 
the Cotonou.663 
7.3 The Rules of Origin regime 
The Rules of Origin include a tolerance threshold for ignoring non-originating material 
but - unlike Cotonou, where this threshold has been set at 15 percent - the GSP sets the 
level at 5 percent, and this does not apply to textiles.664 The EU has shown sufficient 
661This is made conditional on the conditions laid down in Annex JJ "Terms and Conditions of Financing" 
to the Agreement. Also Loans from the Bank's own resources would be granted in accordance 
with its statute and with the terms and conditions laid down in Annex JJ to the Agreement. 
662 Parties would within the framework of the ACP-EC Development Finance Co-operation Committee 
undertake a joint study on the proposal to set up an ACP-EC Guarantee Agency to provide and 
manage investment guarantee programmes. See Article 77 of the Agreement 
663 It is notable that COMESA already has a re-insurance body that serves its member States. The 
Agreement establishing the Airican Trade Insurance Agency (A TIA) came into force on 20th 
January 2001 and the six states that have signed and ratified the Agreement are Burundi, Kenya, 
Malawi, Uganda and Zambia. At a previous meeting, the COMESA Central Bank Governors 
decided that all COMESA countries should take advantage of the financial resources made 
available by the World Bank through IDA credit in an attempt to widen the membership of the 
ATIA. See also http://www.comesa.int 
664 Stevens, et al supra at p.78 
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conurutment to standardising the rules of ongm for all its preferential trade 
arrangements. This is more so in respect to improvement to the rules of origin, safeguard 
measures and tolerant thresholds. It is therefore essential that the ACP States ensure that 
this process is based on 'best practice', which, in most if not all cases, will require the 
application of the Cotonou provisions to all beneficiaries as well as simplifying them for 
the LLDCs. 665 
The SADC Protocol allows for cumulation within the region. This provision could be 
used as an impetus to encourage regional co-operation in production to boast the export 
trade to the EU market.666 The only complication here is that some SADC States double 
membership in the COMESA, which has its own origin and cumulation disciplines. The 
best way forward for the two dominant regional regimes is to work toward a formula for 
harmonisation in order to configure synergies and iron out any difference among them. 
Matambalya667 notes that production comulation encourages the ACP econOffiles to 
collaborate in the production of goods for eventual export to the EU market. It is 
noteworthy that the Lome is the only EU trade arrangement that allows both the EU and 
the beneficiary States to participate in production comulation. One hopes that the 
cumulation rule would encourage intra-ACP trade as well as ACP-EU trade. At the same 
time, third countries can still supply the developing partner market, provided the prices 
of their intermediate produce are sufficiently lower than EU prices to more than offset 
the EU duty on the final product. 
The differences with the Rules of Origin in the agreement with Morocco compared with 
those of Cotonou are important. The EU is committed to the harmonisation of the rules 
of origin in all its free trade agreements. It is essential that the ACP States resist any 
further restriction on the already onerous rules of origin, which they have to fulfil in 
order to obtain preferential access to the EU market. For instance, confining cumulation 
of origin to the member States of the regional partnership agreement and excluding other 
non-SADC, or non-ACP developing countries in the region, would seriously undermine 
665 Supra at p.89 
666 Bilateral cumulation with the EU is permined under Article 3 but surprisingly given the objectives of 
economic integration in the Mediterranean region, cumulation between the Mediterranean 
countries is permined only with Algeria and Tunisia (Article 4). Also unlike the Cotonou there is 
no derogation procedure in the Mediterranean Agreement. 
667 Matambalya supra at p.97 
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regional integration and the general attractiveness of the region to the coveted foreign 
direct investment. 
Commentators note that under the present arrangements, each ACP country maintains 
its own border restrictions and does not discriminate between products from the EU and 
other non-regional suppliers.668 A European Union producer has therefore to decide 
between exponing to the developing panner's market or jumping over the border 
restrictions and servicing the panner's local or regional market via impon-substituting 
foreign direct investment. These decisions would, however, depend solely on the 
transaction costs of exporting versus the costs of producing in the panner country and 
the size of the market.669 
The argument goes that since only the EU has preferential access (guaranteed by treaty) 
to all of the ACP countries that have concluded co-operation and pannership 
agreements, it will tend to be a more attractive location for investors than anyone of the 
sub-regions.670 Yet despite its preferential head stan, no animated investor activity has 
been witnessed in the east and southern Africa region during this long spell of time. The 
investor apathy in the east and southern Africa region must, therefore, lie somewhere 
else - cenainly not the realignment of the cumulating procedures. 
7.4 Dispute Settlement Procedures 
The vital disciplines on dispute settlement are set out in brevity under Article 98 of the 
Cotonou. The Article provides that any dispute arising from the interpretation or 
application of the Agreement between one or more Member States or the Community, 
on the one hand, and one or more ACP States on the other, shall be submitted to the 
Council of Ministers. Between meetings of the Council of Ministers, such disputes shall 
be submitted to the Committee of Ambassadors.671 
(,68 supra at p.S8 
669 With separate free trade agreements for each ACP sub-region, the product coverage, transitional 
arrangements, rules of origin and other details of the agreements can be expected to differ. 
Countries will wish to maintain the integrity of their border restrictions against other countries, so 
the transaction costs of trade, including regional trade, will rise. Economist contend that with 
these features in place producers (EU and non EU alike) will have an increased incentive when 
deciding how best to service the ACP market of economies of scale and lower transactions costs 
to locate in the EU rather than an ACP country. 
670 Stevens, et al supra at p.S9 
671 These dispute settlement procedures appear to go beyond WTO disciplines. It must be underscored 
here that the WTO procedures have been greatly strengthened by the Uruguay Round's decision 
to change from a 'consensus to accept', a dispute panel report to 'consensus to reject'. A party to 
a dispute may refuse to implement the panel's decision if they are unwilling to accept retaliation. 
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The Cotonou provides that where the Council of Ministers does not succeed in settling 
the dispute, either Party may request settlement of the dispute by arbitration. To this end, 
each Party is entitled to appoint an arbitrator within thirty days of the request for 
arbitration. In the event of failure to do so, the Agreement allows either Party to ask the 
Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to appoint the second 
arbitrator. The two arbitrators would in turn appoint a third arbitrator within thirty days. 
In the event of failure to do so, either Party may ask the Secretary-General of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration to appoint the third arbitrator. 
The Agreement further provides that unless the arbitrators decide otherwise, the 
procedure applied shall be that laid down in the optional arbitration regulation of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration for International Organisations and States. The 
arbitrators' decisions shall be taken by majority vote within three months. Each Party to 
the dispute shall be bound to take the measures necessary to carry out the decision of the 
arbitrators. For the application of this procedure, the Community and the Member States 
shall be deemed to be one Party to the dispute. 
Unlike SADC and COMESA that are not a customs union, the EU has the requisite 
competence to appear as a party before the Dispute Settlement Board. SACU is a 
customs union and so qualifies to appear as a party on behalf of its member States. There 
are definite advantages in appearing as a region. The overriding one being that States that 
are members to a customs union are able to pull resources together and offer a united 
front in the event of a dispute. 
Dispute settlement processes are an expensIve affair and more so for the strained 
resources of a developing country. This would, in part, explain the lustre participation in 
the wro's DSB by developing countries. The non-participation by the third world 
countries in the world's premier arbitration panel should not be construed to mean that 
these States are without complain or at all. Quite to the contrary most of these countries 
The EU-Morocco Agreement provides for the Association Council to deal with disputes. The 
majority decision is binding on both parties although it is unclear what sanctions may be used 
where a Party fails to implement the arbitrator's decision. This is a potentially useful innovation, 
which the ACP States should seriously consider to incorporate into a future trade agreement with 
the ED. In our view, the Cotonou Dispute Settlement Procedures are functionally flowed and not 
altogether satisfactory. 
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harbour numerous petitions against the wealthy western nations but for want of where-
withal elect to forebear their rights and opt to suffer in silence. 
As with the SADC Protocol, the designation of the Council of Ministers as the first court 
of instance for dispute settlement procedures is ill advised and an entirely incompetent 
mechanism. Disputes that arise here are essentially of commercial nature and time is 
always of essence. The Council of Ministers is a political organ whose meetings are 
sporadic and far between. TIlls is a situation, which renders them wholly unsuited for 
processing urgent commercial disputes. 
It is arguable that by the time the Council of Ministers is properly constituted and set to 
function irreparable damage would have been done to a member States' economic 
interests. Resolution of disputes of this nature is better left to bodies that are specially 
tooled to urgently process them. Again no provision is made for parties to access the 
wro's dispute settlement procedures should they choose to do so. Such a provision is 
important since it offers Parties an option to petition the more efficient and experienced 
hand of the WTO's dispute settlement expertise. It may well be that the EU is not keen 
to settle scores with its economic proteges in the often-abrasive WTO dispute settlement 
forum. The EU is comfortable with an in-house mechanism by which to iron out issues 
with what it considers its principal ally in the global economic politics. This is the point 
where consultations and conciliation mechanisms become critical. 
7.5.1 The quest for the WTO compliance 
Parties to the Agreement underscore the importance of active participation in the WTO 
as well as in other relevant international organisations by becoming members of these 
organisations and closely following their agenda and activities.672 To this end Parties agree 
to co-operate closely in identifying and furthering their common interests in international 
economic and trade co-operation in particular in the wro, including participation in 
setting and conducting the agenda in future multilateral trade negotiations.673 
The envisaged co-operation only reiterates an already entrenched tradition of partnership 
in the WTO that spans the incredible space of four decades. The EU-ACP partnership 
672 See Article 39 of the Agreement 
673 In this context, particular attention shall be paid to improve access to the Community and other 
markets for products and services originating in the ACP countries. 
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has over time proven a fonnidable force in the wro trade talks. It is perhaps in this 
respect that conunentators disagree with the EU's lame excuse, which foresees 
difficulties in achieving an extension of a waiver for a post-Lome regime. 
It is of interest that Parties are also agreed on the importance of flexibility in WTO rules 
to take account of the ACP's level of development as well as the difficulties faced in 
meeting their obligations. Article 40 identifies the main area of concern hereto as the need 
to ensure a better operation of international conunodity markets and to increase market 
transparency.674 Parties have reaffirmed their willingness to step up consultations 
between them in the international fora and organisations dealing with commodities.675 
The main area of flexibility in the wro rules that gravely concerns the ACP States and 
one that the Cotonou fails to address regards the principle of reciprocity and 
differentiation. It is important, nay expedient, that the wro rules be appropriately 
realigned to reinvent these two crucially beneficial facilities. It is not much of an over-
statement to aver that without these twin support mechanisms for deferential treatment, 
the ACP economies are ruefully incapable of holding ground in the ferociously 
competitive global commerce. 
It is noteworthy that the SADC Trade Protocol and the COMESA Treaty recognise and 
give effect to the twin principles of differentiation and asymmetry.676 The EU-SA 
Agreement does pay homage to this regime as wel1.677 This is why it is inconceivable that 
in view of the glaring economic disparities between the North-South divide the WTO 
envisages a system of reciprocity across the border save for the LLDC Statess. It is all the 
674 The Parties have further agreed on the need for technical assistance to enable the ACP countries to 
implement their commitments. The EU has, pledged to assist the ACP States in their efforts, in 
accordance with the provisions set out in the Agreement, to become active members of these 
organisations, by developing the necessary capacity to negotiate, participate effectively, monitor 
and implement these agreements 
675 To this end, exchange of views shall take place at the request of either Party: regarding the operation of 
existing international agreements or specialised intergovernmental working parties with the aim of 
improving them and making them more effective, consistent with market trends. When it is 
proposed to conclude or renew an international agreement or set up a specialised 
intergovernmental working party. The aim of such exchanges of views shall be to take account of 
the respective interest of each party. They may take place, where necessary, in the framework of 
the Ministerial Trade Committee 
676 The SADC [he Protocol, at Article 19 as read with Artide III, obligates parties to a reduction of subsidies 
within 8 years for all States in the region. This article empowers the Committee of Ministers to 
grant a "grace period" and elaborate "appropriate criteria for the consideration of such 
applications 
677 See Annex 1 of the TDCA for the list of agreed derogation to standstill and rollback items 
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more frightening that the EU has willy-nilly picked up this infamous chorus for which it 
has taken every opportunity to dnunbeat to the dazed ACP States. 
In VIew of the objectives and principles set out in Article 35, Parties have agreed to 
conclude new WTO compatible trading arrangements, progressively removing barriers to 
trade between them and enhancing co-operation in all areas relevant to trade. Parties 
agree that the new trading arrangements would be introduced gradually and recognise the 
need, therefore, for a preparatory period.678 The Cotonou is essentially a transitional 
Arrangement that allows time and space for a negotiated post-Lome Partnership. It is, 
however, not clear what preparatory period the Agreement is alluding to here.679 
It is possible that the Agreement refers to a time-bound arrangement within which time 
the ACP States would be expected to meet the contracted disciplines. Experience has, 
however, shown that the ACP states have never been faithful to the contracted time-
bound obligations. It has been a frustrating exercise with the result that the ACP States 
have always stagnated in the very same hapless position they were in at the signing of the 
Agreement if not worse. 680 
678 In order to facilitate the transition to the new trading arrangements, the non-reciprocal trade 
preferences applied under the Fourth ACP-EC Convention shall be maintained during the 
preparatory period for all ACP countries, under the conditions defined in Ann:x V to the 
Agreement. In this context, the Parties reaffmn the importance of the commodity protocols, 
attached to Annex V of the Agreement. They agree on the need to review them in the rubric of 
the new trading arrangements, in particular as regards their compatibility with WTO rules. This 
would be gone into with a view to safeguarding the benefits derived therefrom, bearing in mind 
the special legal status of the Sugar Protocol. 
679 Article 37 states that economic partnership agreements would be negotiated during the preparatory 
period, which shall end by 31 December 2007 at the latest. Formal negotiations for the new 
trading arrangements shall start in September 2002 and the new trading arrangements shall enter 
into force by 1 January 2008, unless earlier dates are agreed between the Parties. All the necessary 
measures shall be taken so as to ensure that the negotiations are successfully concluded within [he 
preparatory period. To this end, the period up to the start of the formal negotiations of the new 
trading arrangements shall be actively used to make initial preparations for these negotiations. 
680 It is noteworthy that the Agreement leaves it open for the ACP States that are in a position to enter into 
the negotiations of the economic partnership agreements to do so. This provision is more of a 
mockery than an honest room to exercise an option. What is obvious here is that the ACP States 
would have some other option from which to make a choice. It would have been better for the 
EU to provide for an alternative regime from which the ACP States could elect wither way. The 
only alternative that is yet to be designed is one that makes provision for the LLOCs. This they 
will do at the level they consider appropriate and in accordance with the procedures agreed by the 
ACP Group, taking into account regional integration process within the ACP. In 2004, however, 
the Community, will assess the situation of the non-LDC, which, after consultations with the 
Community, decide that they are not in a position to enter into economic partnership agreements. 
Upon this assessment, the Agreement provides that the EU will examine all alternative 
possibilities, in order to provide these countries with a new framework for trade, which is 
equivalent to their existing situation and in conformity with WTO rules. 
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Negotiations for the economic partnership agreements would notably aim at establishing 
the timetable for the progressive removal of barriers to trade between the Parties, in 
accordance with the relevant WTO disciplines. What is important to note here is the fact 
that most of the ACP countries have heavily liberalised their markets under the IMF and 
World Bank driven SAPs. In any case liberalisation is not and should not be a priority for 
the States in the region. These States's main concern, rather, is building supply and 
demand side capacity infrastructure that would improve market access to the lucrative 
but ever elusive western market. The other twin concern is capacity to diversify their 
production portfolio. This are germane issues and concerns which the post-Lome regime 
should focus on and not the exhausted theme of liberalisation.681 
The Cotonou makes prOVlSlOn for negOtiatlOns to take account of the level of 
development and the socio-economic impact of trade measures on ACP countries, and 
their capacity to adapt and adjust their economies to the liberalisation process. In this 
sense, negotiations are structured in such a manner as to ensure the necessary flexibility 
to necessitate the duration of a sufficient transitional period and the final product 
coverage. The provision for this space would also take into account sensitive sectors, and 
the degree of asymmetry in terms of the timetable for tariff phase-out, while remaining in 
conformity with the prevailing WTO disciplines.682 
7.5.2 The significance of the WTO compatibility 
To a certain extent the rules administered by the WTO are more stringent than the old 
regime under the GAIT. Increasingly exceptions from MFN treatment are now viewed 
in a more sceptical light than in times past. In the opinion of the EU, the preferential 
access provided to ACP exports was justified under Article XXIV of the GATT read in 
the light of Part IV and, in particular, Article XXXVI par. 8. Under this provision 
681 For its part, the EU's trade liberalisation would build on the acquis and aim at improving currem market 
access for the ACP countries through infer alia, a review of the rules of origin. There is nothing 
wrong with increasing the ACP's market access portfolio to the EU market. The question to 
address is whether this is a priority area. This is a relevant queStion in view of the fact that ACP 
States have over the years utilised only a fraction of their allocated quota of export portfolio to 
the EU market. 
682 To assure the success of all these programmes the Agreemem binds Parties to closely co-operate and 
collaborate in the wro with a view to defending the arrangemems reached, in particular with 
regard to the degree of flexibility available. The Community pledged, under the Agreemem to 
start by the year 2000, a process, which by the end of multilateral trade negotiations and at the 
latest 2005 will allow duty free access for essentially all products from all LDC. This would be 
build on the level of the existing trade provisions of the Fourth ACP-EC Convention and which 
will simplify and review the rules of origin, including cumulation provisions, that apply to their 
exports. 
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developed countnes 'do not expect reciprocity' for preferences glven ill trade 
negotiations to LLDCs.683 This position was challenged in 1993 by the GAIT Panel 
established to investigate Latin American complaints concerning the European banana 
regime. The after-shocks of this challenge are still being felt, and their implications for 
the EU's non-multilateral system is as yet uncertain. 
The banana dispute showed with frightening clarity that, rather than being just an 
irrelevance, the Lome could prove to be a serious embarrassment. This provided a 
stimulus to find a new formulation that would remove the danger. The initial response to 
the challenge presented to the Lome was for the EU to seek and obtain in 1994 a waiver 
from the MFN rule under GAIT Article XXv. This removed the immediate questions 
about the validity of the Lome. But while the waiver, since renewed by the WTO, has 
provided some respite, the problem has not gone away.684 
In its judgement on the EU banana regime, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel brought 
into question the compatibility of the entire Lome relationship with international trade 
rules. The dispute on bananas illustrated that the precise terms of a waiver can be the 
subject of a close scrutiny with the aim of striking down aspects of the regime that have 
not been supported unambiguously.685 
Preferential treatment for products originating in ACP States as required by the relevant 
provisions of the Convention is designed to promote the expansion of trade and 
economic development of beneficiaries. This endeavour should be pursued in a manner 
consistent with the objectives of the WTO disciplines and with the trade, financial and 
development needs of the beneficiaries. The main caveat to this trade relief is that such a 
683 See Stevens, et al, supra at p.27 
684 The WTO Panel issued a report in May 1997, which upheld the complaint by the Latin American States. 
Importantly, the report did not take issue with the duty-free preferences for the ACP, but found 
fault with aspects of the licensing system.684 The EU appealed, but the appellate body upheld the 
Panels' decision. A subsequent dispute in the autwnn of 1998 between the USA and the EU over 
whether the latter's policy changes agreed after the appeal ruling dealt adequately with the 
complaint only added to the reverberations. Although targeted at one product, the dispute has 
much wider implications. 
685 Stevens, et al propose that in the absence of any guidance from the committee, it would still be open to 
any aggrieved WTO member to file a complaint under the dispute settlement mechanism. For 
example, if the USA considered that the EU-SA Agreement disadvantaged its exporters, it might 
post a complaint. But this would be risky. There is very little guidance available on how the weasel 
words of Article XXIV are to be interpreted. As the banana dispute has shown, the WTO has 
given birth to a strong dispute settlement mechanism. After Lome: A strategy for ACP-EU 
Relations supra at p supra at p.31 
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differential relief should not raise undue barriers or create undue difficulties for the trade 
of other contracting parties.686 It is not immediately clear what amounts to 'undue 
barriers in this provision. It is common cause that any preferential treatment would 
subject non-beneficiaries to a considerable level of market access disadvantage. The 
degree of this inconvenience would of course depend on the amount of trade that go 
between the countries in question. 
The idea then, in the Cotonou, is that all the ACP States will be required to conclude 
REPAs with the EU, which in essence will be free trade agreements. These Agreements 
will have to conform to A rtick XXIV. The Enabling Clause does not apply between 
developed and developing country free trade area arrangements, which means the only 
rule that will govern these arrangements, is A rtick XXI V. 687 
The EU insists that these free trade areas will have to be in accordance with the WTO 
rules, which stipulate that substantially all trade (more than 90%) between the two parties 
need be liberalised over a period of not more than 12 years. This is a fundamental 
departure from the non-reciprocal preferential access to the EU market that ACP 
countries have enjoyed since 1975. However, LLDCs will continue to have non-
reciprocal preferential access to EC markets in view of the WTO rules allowance for 
their special and differential treatment.688 
The chequered Lome history clearly affords credence to the view that waivers are not 
difficult to secure. More importantly, the EU opts to ignore or counter the call by the 
ACP countries and various voices within Europe for the 15 EU and 71 ACP member 
States to combine their political influence if need be. Such a combined force would 
686 Annex 2: Decision of the GAIT Council under Article XXV·5 Granting a Waiver to the Lome 
Convention, 9 December 1994 (L/7604 
687 None of the ACP sub-groupings (SADC, SACU, EAC, CEMAC, UEMOA, CARlCOM and the Islands 
of the Pacific) are capable of concluding such free trade agreements in the short to medium term. 
They have barely established trade regimes within their own regions. Within the Pacific region, 
none exists currently, and there is potential for them to forge closer relations with the East Asian 
bloc. Even SADC has only just completed its negotiations on its trade agenda, while SA OJ has 
yet to make progress in its restructuring. See also RH Thomas The EU-SA TOCA: Precedent or 
Complicating factor supra at p.19 
688 There are three main pegs in the WTO agreements under which members may seek justification for 
discriminatory treatment of one group of trading countries vis-a.-vis others (which is what 
preferences are). They are namely; if the countries concerned are creating a free trade area or 
customs union (covered by Artide XXIV). The other is if the trade partners are developing 
countries subject to special and differential treatment' (covered by the 1979 Enabling Clause), and 
lastly if a waiver has been obtained (under Art. XXV). See Stevens " EU-SADC Trade Relations, 
supra at p. 26 and Kato Lambichts: "A post-Lome Convention Trade Regime supra at p.l 
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supply the necessary numerical weight to achieve any waivers for the ACP States would 
require for the WTO compliance.689 
Keet contends that if the joint ACP-ED effort produces counter-demands elsewhere in 
the WTO for quid pro quo concessions, this would in turn require further joint effort 
and wider alliances to be built with other developing countries by the ACP-ED 
alliance.69o This strategy is not altogether impossible or unusual to master. It is indeed in 
keeping with the general bargaining process and trade-offs that characterise decision-
making within the WTO framework. 
It is very important that the ACP States begin as soon as possible the task of building 
consensus within the WTO in support of a waiver. It would be imprudent to rely on the 
ED to do this. Achieving such a consensus would require overcoming a range of possible 
objections from other developing countries and transition economies, as well as from 
some developed States.69 1 The CAP upon which the ACP preferences hinge has, no 
doubt, withstood many attempts at fundamental refonn. It would, however, be 
imprudent for the ACP to assume that it will not succumb to reciprocity pressures in the 
next decade. 
Matambalya correctly predicts that the CAP must yield to a number of unavoidable 
factors. These burgeoning eventualities include the concurrent onslaughts of the cost to 
ED's consumers and taxpayers, the demands of ED enlargement to the east, and the next 
Round of WTO talkS.692 If that were to happen, and there a very likelihood that it would, 
then the repository that had sustained the ACP preference regime would have crumbled. 
And with it the honeymoon that has been the ACP and by extension states in the east 
and southern Africa region's exports to the ED market.693 
689 Dot Keet: 'Regional Economic Partnership Agreements -Implications for Regional Integration and 
Development in Southern Africa', IDG Occasional Paper No.21 TIPS Workshop Proceedings, 
supra at p.3S 
690 Ibid. 
691 As the banana panel demonstrates, it is also vital that any waiver be drafted in such a way as to provide 
support for all those facets of the current trade regime that the ACJ> wish to protect. The required 
level of specificity will make the task of achieving a consensus more difficult because it will 
reduce the scope for compromise through the use of general terminology. See Francis 
Matambalya: The Merits and Demerits of EU Policies supra at p.9 
692 Supra at p.lS 
693Commentators contend that the WTO 'problem' is an intractable' one since none of the pegs' that 
support discrimination in favour of certain developing countries but not others is entirely fool-
proof.693 They point out that none of them provides a fully robust justification for the EU-ACJ> 
trade regime. Even variations within the GSP could be subject to challenge. This was illustrated at 
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Whatever may be the legal postulates with regard to the WTO compatibility, one aspect 
is not in doubt at all here. That is, the onus is on the ACP to negotiate not only with the 
EU but, probably more importantly, other developing countries and industrialised States 
with preferential trade deals outside the GSP such as USA and Canada to develop a 
consensus in favour of continuation of reciprocity. In view of the changing arrillides 
toward the utility of reciprocity, this challenge is certainly not going to be easy. That 
export preferences sustain the level of exports for states in the east and soutnern Africa 
region is not in doubt at alL The main point of concern is how long it will last these 
States to step out of this kids glove treatment and take the bull that is international 
competition by its horns. 
7.6.1 The Cotonou in me realm of the EU-SA Agreement 
The EU-SA agreement has been touted as an example of the type of trade agreement the 
EU has in mind for ACP countries.'94 South Africa's exclusion from Lome rv prompted 
the new government in 1994 to look for other avenues to access the wealthy EU market. 
The EU responded with a free trade agreement offer to South Africa."s In terms of the 
WTO rules, this would have required the elimination of duties on "substantially all 
trade". G96 
(he very end of the research project, when Brazil announced that it was lodging a complaint 
against the treatment by the EU of exports from the Andean Community of instant coffee. The 
special preferences for the Andean States are provided within the GSP - what has been called in 
[his Report the 'Super GSP'. Similarly, Article XXIV, which covers free trade areas and customs 
unions, might nm provide defence ag~ns[ a challenge by an aggrieved State. The trealmem 
accorded to the EU-SA Agreement, if it is concluded, may provide case law that would then apply 
to REPAs. See Stevens, et al, supra at p.8 
694 The EU is also negOtiating trade and co-operation agreemems with some Mediterranean-basin countries 
such as Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. AlmOSt aU SADC countries also form part of the 
COMESA, which extends as far north as Egypt. Tradc deflection would occur if Egyptian goods 
arc imponed at no duty U1tO Tanzania, and then fI.lter through to other SAOC countries as being 
of Tanzanian origin via Kenya within the EAC free trade area. This could happen in the absence 
of strict rules of origin, proper certifIcates of origin, or a system of verifying [he certifIcate of 
orig1n. Such trade deflection. would prevent [he gains from lowering adrrlin.istrative trade barriers 
within the SADC to be realised. See Gavin Massdorp: lmanj Development Luruted; a Study of 
the Impact of introducing Reciprocity Trade Relations Berween European Un.ion and the SADC 
Region; IGD Occasional Paper No. 21 TIPS Workshop Proceedings Braamfontein South Africa 
at p.50 at p.17 
b9S SOllth Africa expressed its dissatisfaction with the EU's proposed free trade agreement. Thomas opines 
rhar at the core of South Africa's dissatisfaction is the view that the EU stood to benefit 
disproportionately from sueh an arrangement, and more particularlYI that it would not be 
compatible with South Africa's current commitments to and furure vision for relations with its 
southern Africa neighbours. Rosalind H. Thomas: "Trade Liberalisation Issues Affecting SADC 
within the context of the Forthcoming post-Lome IV Negotiations"; Seminar Report - Dar Es 
Salaam 5-7 May 1998 at p.49 
6% The EU interpreted this to mean 90 percent of current expons co South Africa and a similar percemum 
of the latter's exports to the former. On South Africa's insistence, it was accepted thar (he free 
trade agrecmem would be asymmetrical in timing, but that it would allow South Africa ten years 
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South Africa had requested Lome status in respect of its trade access together with 
cumulation.69l It argued, then that a free trade agreement with the EU would have 
adverse repercussions both domesticall198 and for the SADC regional partners. This is 
particularly the case since Lome grants its ACP members preferential non-reciprocal 
access to the EU markets.699 A free trade agreement between the EU and South Africa, 
particularly where the latter is in a custom union with a group of, mainly least developed 
countries, and intends a free trade agreement with similar groupings would definitely 
complicate the regional alignment in southern Africa.loo 
As it turned out, the EU would not accommodate South Africa's Lome ambitions on the 
ground that the country has a modern infrastructure. The EU also argued that South 
Africa's economy has a distinctly different profile from that existing in an average ACP 
country. Thirdly and more importantly, that South Africa's full admission to the Lome 
membership would endanger the WTO waiver applicable to the Lome. After extensive 
rounds of negotiations, South Africa ended up with a qualified membership to the Lome 
in addition to the EU-SA Agreement, which would henceforth define its relationship 
with the member countries of the EU. 
South Africa's qualified Lome membership excludes it from the trade and aid benefits 
that accrue to the ACP States. This position, however, significantly empowers South 
Africa to act in solidarity with the ACP countries during the period of renegotiations on 
future EU-ACP relationship. The rapidly expanding market for South Africa in Africa, 
together with South Africa's political and social affinities with the rest of the continent, 
bestows on South Africa a natural leadership mantle for the ACP States.lOI 
in which to reduce duty against EU imports. See Chapter Six above on the EU-SA Agreement 
(IDCA) 
697 but no participation in Stabex or Sysmin facilities and no access to EDF funds 
698 Especially for the R&D programme 
699 This is clearly in line with Part IV of the GATT Article XXXVI: 8 and the Enabling Clause. 
700 Commentators argue that this would erode the non-reciprocal status that both SACU and SADC have 
with the EU, as a whole. See also R.H. Thomas: "Regional Arrangements & The wrO: The case 
of the SADe: Paper submined for presentation at the 8th Annual Conference of the Nrican 
Society of International & Comparative Law; Cairo, Egypt, 2-5 September 1996 at p.2S 
701 In the Southern Nrican region there are clear signs of an accelerated breaking down of barriers and the 
bringing into play of the benefits of regional integration. See also the Keynote Address by 
Michael Laidler, the EU Ambassador to South Africa; to the South African Business at the "The 
EU-SA Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement and Lome: the implications" South 
African Business and the European Union in the context of the New Trade and Development 
Agreement 18 June 1999 Rand Afrikaans University Johannesburg, Seminar Report, supra.p.D 
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One overriding factor to be born in mind always is that South Africa is an African 
country and a developing economy at that. This explains why, at the outset, South Africa 
had hoped to be admitted as a full member of the Cotonou rather than have to trade 
with the EU on the exorbitant most favoured nation basis together with certain unilateral 
concessions under the heading of the GSP. It is agreed that although South Africa's per 
capIta Income of approximately US$3000 is by far higher than most developing 
countries, this statistic is strongly qualified by a wide disparity in the levels of 
development of its population.702 
Strategically speaking, South Africa thus finds itself astride two trade regimes, which one 
might argue also characterise its state of development. We would now move to examine 
how this North-South duality positions South Africa in the pedestal of leadership in the 
precarious southern Africa economic equilibriwn. 
This is the stage where the EU-SA Agreement becomes an important reference point. 
Whether the EU-SA Agreement serves as a model for the successor Lome or not there 
are several important implications and lessons, which can be drawn from the South 
Africa negotiating experience. This would help more particularly in formulating the ACP 
position in respect of the successor Lome, as well as the strenuous process of 
negotiations. South Africa is actively contributing to the formulation of positions relating 
to these discussions, to the actual discussions, as well as to the research work that has to 
be done in support of the negotiations.70J 
Should one imagine SACU, SADC, COMESA, Africa and ultimately the ACP region as 
representing a series of concentric circles, South Africa's present potential role in this 
structure could be pictured as an important overlapping factor. Links 704 opines that 
South Africa has a vast potential to trigger development and economic growth, regional 
702 This is understandable especially in view of the fact that approximately 19 million South Africans, 
representing almost half the population, must be considered poor in the sense that their incomes 
fall below the poverty line. Indeed the Gini·coefficient (measure of inequality in society) is 
considered to be one of the highest in the world. This means that the top 20% of the South 
African population accounts for 70% of national expenditure, whereas the bottom 20% of the 
South African population for a mere 1%. This puts South Africa among the countries with the 
highest income inequality in the world. A recently published UN repon indicated that if one takes 
"white South Africa" as a country of its own ranking of per capita income groups, it would 
occupy 13th place next to Spain. If one did the same with "black South Africa", it would occupy 
113 th place next to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ORC) 
70} HE Elias Links, the IDCA Seminar Repon, supra at p.24 
704 Supra at p.2S 
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co-operation and integration, and technological advancement and capacity building in 
each of the concentric circles. South Africa is overall being considered as the favourite to 
provide this important catalyst for development in the southern Africa region in 
particular and for the African continent as a whole. This is where the EU-SA Agreement 
kicks in. 
One thing is clear though, that the EU-SA Agreement cannot be a model for the 
successor Lome. It would indeed be ironical were the contrary be true. South Africa 
embarked on the negotiations leading to the EU-SA Agreement because it was 
considered by the EU to be a non-typical ACP country and therefore not eligible to be 
included in most of the provisions of the Lome. The EU-SA Agreement must be seen as 
a bilateral agreement reached between the EU and a relatively industrialised developing 
country. How then can the very platform upon which SA was denied membership be 
used as a model for a post-Lome regime? It is inconceivable that the ACP States shouJd 
be accorded the same treatment as South Africa. This would diminish the very logic 
upon which South Africa was denied full Lome status when it very much desired such 
membership. 
While not a model, the EU-SA Agreement can and should be an important source of 
hard lessons for the ACP countries. The Agreement is, no doubt, a product of hard and 
lengthy bargaining in which haggling to promote the vested interests of various EU 
lobby groups often held sway over the latter's professed intention to promote growth, 
development and democracy in the developing world. The demands on the capacity, 
both in government and civil society, were also significant.7os Davies 706 notes that a 
major challenge will be to dissect the lessons at various levels and to take them into the 
negotiations that would commence in September 2002 between the EU and the ACP 
countries.707 
There are, however, some less satisfactory features of the EU-SA Agreement. One is that 
the EU has introduced areas of non-merchandise trade into its demands. There are 
sections in the EU-SA Agreement on services trade and on the free movement of capital. 
It must be emphasised, however, that these disciplines do not at the present appear firm 
705 See chapter five on the EU-SA Agreement 
7C(, Dr, Robert Davies: "Implementation of the EU-SA TDCA: The Department of Trade and Industry 
Perspective; South African Business and the European Union in Context supra at p.42 
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and onerous corrunitments for South Africa. It is clear that the EU wishes to extend its 
agreements in these areas for the post-Lome regime. Stevens, Mcqueen and Kennan 70B 
suggest that it may be necessary for any ACP Regional Economic Partnership 
Agreements (REPAs) negotiators to exercise extreme caution in ensuring that firm 
corrunitments are not introduced into the agreements. 
Again, provisions in the EU-SA Agreement use a system for establishing ongmatmg 
status that is significantly different from that employed both under the Cotonou and 
under the GSP and the EU's other trade accords. The EU-SA origin rules incorporate a 
detailed list of products and specify the value added or process that are required in 
respect of each to transform non-originating materials into originating products. Since 
the origin rules vary from product to product, it is not possible to state whether the EU-
SA Agreement rules are more or less onerous overall than those of the Cotonou. 
Economists contend that a comparison is possible on a product to product basis.709 Such 
a laborious expedition is, however, beyond the limited confines of this work. 
One must, nonetheless, acknowledge the importance of establishing, as a matter of 
priority, whether or not the EU-SA Agreement is a precedent for the system that Europe 
will attempt to apply to any post-Lome regime. ACP diplomats in Brussels are convinced 
that the SA-EU Agreement will become a model for Europe's future relations with other 
African nations.7lO The fact that the EU is moving to jettison the current system of 
reciprocal EU trade preferences is no longer an issue. The real question is whether the 
post-Lome regime would be fashioned on the EU-SA framework. Commentators believe 
that the EU-SA Agreement is an indication of what Brussels want to conclude with the 
ACP States.711 Some commentators have expressed the view that it would be consistent 
for the EU to secure different agreements with the ACP group and South Africa.712 
707 Negotiations for the successor Lome commenced in earnest last September 2002 
708 supra at po 70 
709 Stevens, et al supra at p.71 
710 SA-EU Trade: "Trade Pact could harm South Africa's neighbours and disrupt World Trade" Financial 
Mail, October 1999 at pol 
711 Says the group's deputy secretary general, Carl Greennidge in the Financial Mail, October 1999, supra at 
pol. 
712 0 "ACP countries are worried, says Brussels based development analyst Eileen Sudwortho "If the South 
Africa deal is the best an African Goliath can achieve, then what kind of Agreement would 
countries that do not have the South Africa leverage be able to obtain from the EU?" Financial 
Mail October 1999 at pol 
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Some commentators contend that the EU's shifting foreign trade policies is in actual 
sense a self-serving manoeuvre. Goodison 7IJ belongs to the school of thought that hold 
the view that the EU trade policy is being driven not by the developmental needs of 
African economies, but by the need for the EU to position itself within an increasing 
competitive global economy. Its policy on free trade areas therefore has a decidedly 
strategic justification, namely; 'the need for the EU to reinforce its presence in particular 
markets and to attenuate the potential threat of others establishing privileged relations 
with countries which have traditionally been economically important to the EU. 
The Cotonou's main potential benefits for South Africa lie in manufactured goods that 
most ACP countries do not produce or export. The EU-SA Agreement remains 
restrictive, albeit to a much lesser extent than comparable "association agreements" with 
Mediterranean countries, in agricultural products and agro-industries, where most ACP 
countries would begin their struggle for development and industrialisation.714 
The benefits that South Africa receives from Cotonou membership include important 
opportunities for co-operation and integration with the ACP States. This will assist South 
Africa in redressing its historically isolated position, especially vis·a-vis its neighbours in 
the SADC region. South African companies are eligible to tender for projects in all ACP 
countries financed from the 8th European Development Fund (EDF) and amounting to 
Euro 7.5 billion.715 South Africa is also a full member of the institutions of the Cotonou 
namely the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the ACP-EU Conunittee of Ambassadors and 
the ACP-EU Joint Assembly.716 The manner of interface effectively places South Africa 
at the vintage point from where to influence integration processes in the east and 
southern Africa region. 
713 P. Goodison, "Emerging EU Policy on FTAs", (ERO.NNAlNNCCI), jW1e 1996. Given the objective 
of the MoU signed by the SADC Secretariat and the US government, one can well understand the 
EU's apprehension. See also R H Thomas: 'Regional Arrangements and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO): The Case of the Southern African Development Community (SADe)' ; 
supra at pp.9-10 
714 Dr. Roben Davies, supra at p.42 
715 It is reliably W1derstood that a number of South African companies have already been awarded tenders 
in ACP countries, which are fmanced in terms of this fund. See remarks by Michael Laidler, infra, 
at p. 13 
716 The ACP is made up of 71 States including South Africa. See also the Keynote Address by Michael 
Laidler, the EU Ambassador to South Africa; to the South African Business and the EU in 
context of the IDCA Seminar Repon, supra.p.D 
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7.6.2 The Cotonou and the SADC Trade Protocol 
A key argument against the REPA proposal by the EU is that reciprocal trade 
liberalisation can only be introduced between equal trading partners, otherwise most of 
the benefits will accrue to the developed member of the free trade area. A counter 
argument, however, is that SADC has concluded the Trade Protocol that would lead to 
an eventual free trade area, despite the asymmetry between the South African economy 
and those of the other SADC countries. Massdorp 717 explains that in the case of SADC, 
South Africa's strong economic position is seen as a stimulus for equitable growth and 
development in the region. But this is not happening. If anything, the opposite is true - a 
huge trade imbalance in favour of South Africa. 
The other argument is that the economic size disparity between South Africa and the rest 
of the region is much lower than between the EU and SADC - the combined size of the 
EU economies is 240 times that of SADC economies combined.718 This argument does 
not seem to help matters either. The mere fact that the EU is less of a giant to SADC 
than is South Africa is no excuse for South Africa's economic emasculation of the SADC 
economies. What is important is for South Africa to move decisively and address this 
gapping disparity, which will be worsened by South Africa's aggressive venture into the 
world market. The result of this adventurous feat by South Africa is to tie her SADC 
partners to unwholesome trade disciplines that are none of their making. 
As members of the ACP group, trade between the SADC States and the EU has always, 
to a large extent, been regulated by the Lome Convention. This is why economic 
commentators argue that the Lome provides the most favourable terms, while the 
GATT Iwro disciplines provide the least favourable.7I9 SADC and COMESA would 
conduct, as they have indeed done for the last four decades, most of their international 
trade with the EU under the Cotonou. This option provides the greatest certainty and, 
consequently, the most reliable export stability for the preference recipients among all 
717 Munetsi Madakufwnba - South African Research and Development Centre; the IGD Occasional Paper 
No. 21 TIPS Workshop supra at p. 46 
718 Ibid 
719 AWEPAA: South African Accession to the LC: the background issues and questions" in Cemral 
Europe and Southern Africa in transition", AWEPAA Conference Documents, Vienna Oct. 
1992: BI B17, and Stevens C et al.: "EU-South African Trade" in International Affairs vol. 69, 
No.1, 1993: 92-94. See also Stevens, et al supra at p.l0l 
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the EU trade regimes. It is plausible within the framework of this study, to investigate the 
extent to which these trade links interface within the southern Africa region.no 
SADC aims to establish a free trade area and as such would be a natural partner for the 
EU in the proposed REP A arrangement. However, at the moment SADC is constrained 
by a number of both internal and external factors in moving in that direction. Until these 
problems are overcome, it will be difficult for the EU to negotiate a REPA with the 
SADC. These reasons are institutional, political, legal and economic. Massdorp 721 
contends that SADC is yet to achieve a high level of integration and the institutional 
structure currently is not conducive to negotiating regional trade arrangements. This is 
highlighted by the difficulties in making progress with the SADC Trade Protocol and 
indeed with the other protocols. 
The Lome has always determined the terms of SADC's trade with the EU, which is one 
of the most important trade partners, for a quarter a century. Whatever is agreed over the 
next two years, it is likely that there will be substantial changes. The gist of the argument 
is that, despite its limitations, the Lome has had considerable value to SADC member 
States. Like we have pointed out before these advantages run the risk of dilution over the 
next decade regardless of what happens in the ACP-EU negotiations for a post-Lome 
regime. This is why it is expedient for SADC to start evaluating its medium-term 
strategy. 
South Africa will require twelve years to reach full reciprocity with the EU.722 This is 
considered to be a rapid schedule for restructuring its economy to deal with the 
downside effects of the greater economic might of the EU. Given this fact, it is highly 
unlikely that progress will be made before 2012723 for any of the ACP regional 
institutions to arrive at coherent and workable free trade areas amongst themselves 
before the EU-SA agreement become fully reciprocal. This raises concerns about what 
time frame is reasonable for even considering any free trade agreement with the EU by 
the ACP member States. Certainly, SADC would need to reconsider this issue should it 
720 Stevens, et al supra at p.ll1 
721 Massdorp: IGD Occasional Paper No. 21 TIPS Workshop Proceedings supra, at p.50 
722 See discussion on the IDCA at chapter five above 
723 Cenainly for some, not even by 2020 
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fail to succeed in establishing its own free trade area within the eight-year time frame as 
set, which begun to run as from 2000.724 
SADC is far from graduating to a customs union status. Legally any agreements, which 
the EU proposes to enter with SADC, would have to be signed with individual members. 
SACU could be expected to negotiate jointly. But there are difficulties with this too. It 
must be pointed out that Lesotho is in the category of the least developed countries, and 
therefore has a guaranteed access to the EU and hence it is entitled to a special 
negotiating mandate.725 The wide range of tariffs that are operational currently within the 
region further complicates the process. Those countries with high tariffs will be at a 
disadvantage relative to the SADC countries with more liberal tariffs. There will also be 
immediate competitive effects and potential effects on the location of future investment 
. h . 726 
In t e regIon. 
The EU is unwilling to let regional issues affect its negotiating stance and has shifted all 
responsibility for reconciling regional dimensions to South Africa.727 It is clear that the 
EU-SA / Cotonou / SADC configuration complicates integration processes in the 
region. Parties must in this vein prepare themselves for a truly abrasive engagement on 
the appropriate legal instrwnents that would catapult the EU-ACP States into the new 
millennium. 
724 R H Thomas on the EU-SA TDCA Regional Workshop on Cotonou-ACP-EU Agreement supra at 
p.19 See Chapter Five for a detailed discussion on the proposed SADC free trade area 
725 Massdorp, IGD Occasional Paper No. 21 TIPS Workshop Proceedings supra at p.56 
726 A further complication concerns the concluded EU-SA Agreement. South Africa is also a member of 
SADe. Since one of the objectives of the REFA is to strengthen regional integration, a 
mechanism would have to be found to link the two free trade area Agreements. Furthermore, 
BLNS countries are linked to South Africa through the SACU. As such they are de-fCK1o part of the 
EU-SA Agreement. They could not therefore also be part of a separate free trade area with the 
EU through SADe. See Imani Report supra at p.58 
727 An illustration of this stance is the EU's recent interpretation of an obscure annex to successive Lome 
Conventions on trade between Swaziland and governments to applying the same customs duties 
to EEC imports as those applied to "the other country in the customs union i.e. South Africa. CF 
- European Research Office, "The EU-SA Free Trade Negotiations: Regional Implications", April 
1996. See also R. H. Thomas Regional Agreement & the WTO 8,h Annual Conference, supra at 
note 126 
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7.7 Implications for integration processes in the region 
Economists are of the view that the benefits emanating from the trade relationship 
between the EU-ACP have been noticeable.'" For example, the stability and 
predictability of the trade preferences became an import incentive for investment. This 
was particularly apparent when Lome IV was concluded in December 1989 for a period 
of ten years instead of the usual five. Non-reciprocal preferential access created more 
favourable market conclitions and progressively stimulated economic growth in certain of 
the beneficiary countries although the extent and distribution of these benefits has been 
limited ."9 
Another dynamic effect is what has come to be known as the 'lock in' of policies. The 
argwnent goes that the Cotonou would create a system of trade liberalisation and other 
obligations between the EU and east and southern Africa region. The threat of sanctions 
against defaulting member States would presumably prevent them from reneging on their 
obligations. This in rum would improve investor perception, especially of the SADC 
region, and therefore increase investment. As a result the region would benefit from 
effects such as technology transfer and employment creation. Kato,7JO however, pours 
cold water on such prospects. He opines that the experience of many attempted regional 
integration schemes in Africa has been that signatory countries have done very little to 
keep their obligations after signing a regional contracrual agreement. This would explain 
the perennial trade wars that dog many regional integration regimes in Africa today. 
Some economic commentators have advanced the argwnent that southern Africa's policy 
regimes will gain more credibility as a result of the Coronou partnership with the EU lJI 
This argument has its origin in the NAFTA experience. In this regard, economists have 
argued that the primary benefit of NAFTA to the Mexican economy has been a gain in 
policy creclibility as a result of its economic policy obligations, vis-a-vis Canada and the 
72S Rosalind H. Thomas: The EU·SA'IDCA 'Regional Workshop on the Cotonou·ACP·EU Agreement 
supra at pA 
729 Countries clearly benefiting from the advantages of the trade preferences given under the successive 
Lome Conventions were limited in number and have included Fiji, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius and 
Zimbabwe. These countries were able to use the preference successfully to diversify from trading 
in traditional primary commodities and their by-products (e.g. coffee, cocoa, banana and sugar) 
into non-trad.itional exports such as clodling, proeessed fish and horticulture and floricultural 
products. See Commission of the European CommW)ities (1996). 'Green Paper on relations 
between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21~! Century: Challenges 
and options for a new partnership' COM (96) 570 final, Brussels 20 November. 
7JO Massdorp, IGD Occasional Paper No. 21 TIPS Workshop Proceedings supra at p.17 
7J1 R H Thomas Regional Arrangement & the WTO 8" Annual Conference supra at p.25 note 126 
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USA under the Agreement. Cassim 732 argues that although there might be some merit in 
this argument, the Mexican case was very specific and must be treated as such. Indeed 
not only are the Mexicans and USA economies contiguous and do register a high level of 
trade with each other, yet the Mexican government was also suffering a serious credibility 
crisis prior to the agreement. 
In view of the recent political developments in east and southern Africa and the other 
myriad negative socio-economic perceptions regarding the economic viability of the 
region, there is no doubt that the region too is in dire need of a credibility jerk-up. This 
argument implies that even if a free trade area agreement may have a negative effect on 
an economy from a static point of view, this might be offset by the gain in credibility, 
especially if it results in increased foreign and domestic investment.733 
Thomas734 begs to disagree and contends instead that, such an outcome has only been 
proven in the case of Mexico. She postulates that the mere fact of states entering a free 
trade area with the EU may not have similar effects in southern Africa. She singles out 
South Africa, which she says, did not negotiate a TDCA with the EU primarily to gain 
credibility. The point taken by Thomas no doubt holds considerable force. One must, 
however acknowledge the fact that the EU-SA Agreement carries substantial credibility 
spin-off for South Africa in particular and the east and southern Africa region in general. 
It is also true that issues such as labour market flexibility and corruption may influence 
perceptions of a country's policy credibility more than its trade agreements.7J5 
Free trade areas are operationally difficult to administer. The South African government 
has spent substantial financial and human resources on negotiating a trade agreement 
with the EU. This did not only include the financial cost of consultants, but also the 
opportunity cost of spending valuable time and resources negotiating the Agreement. 
Government officials could have spent the time and resources on a variety of other 
critical issue areas, for example on WTO maners. If this is a critical issue for South 
m Rashid Cassim: A critical Assessment of the Impact Study; IGD Occasional Paper No.21 TIPS 
Workshop, supra at p.20 
m Ibid. 
734 See Rashid Cassim, supra at p.20 
7JS Ibid. 
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Africa, it is an even more burdensome endeavour for other states in the region that are 
less endowed in resource outlay.736 
On the one hand, Cotonou preferences would literally divide SADC in half and could 
weaken it as a regional entity. On the other hand, the continued or reinforced 
dependence of half of its member States on the Lome type trade provisions could 
contribute towards perpetuating their status as LDCs. This at the expense of encouraging 
the processes of the convergence in economic strategies and levels of economic 
development between them and other developing countries through targeted regional 
programmes. In the result, it is a catch 22 situation from which regional states would 
have to work extra harder to extradite themselves. 
States in the east and southern Africa region already have virtual free access to the EU 
market under successive Lome and yet the result since 1975 has been limited. 
Nevenheless, there have been clear benefits in a number of SADC countries as a result 
of this free access. Diversity and expansion of exports coupled with new investments 
have been experienced in several countries. Whilst Mauritius has been an outstanding 
example in this regard, several other SADC countries have experienced significant 
investment in export production targeted toward the EU market. Such investment could 
be expected to continue and possibly increase under the REP A.7J7 
It stands to reason that the lesser and least developed countries' fundamental need is to 
have the time, policy 'space', and political right to pursue their own economic 
development and diversification needs. These countries also crave to identify their 
essential requirements and optimal strategies with respect to external economic relations 
and external inputs. It is only within such strategically conceived framework that 
improved financial and technical assistance, and increased foreign investment can be 
made to be useful or at least much less exploitative. 738 
736 Ibid. 
737 Massdorp states that the least developed countries would benefit most from the REPA in this respect 
given that the LLDCs would retain their market access facility, IGD Occasional Paper No. 21 
TIPS Workshop Proceedings supra at p.61 
738 UNCTAD World Investment Report reveal that profits rates for foreign direct investment in Africa - at 
an average of 25% - were much higher than in either developed or developing countries for most 
years between 1980 and 1984. Its most recent study reveals that profit rate rates are now running 
at 29% for foreign investors in Africa. See also Rashid Cassim 'A critical assessment of the 
Impact Study, supra at p. 31 
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Economic commentators are united in the convlctlon that reclproclty of trade 
preferences will open up the regional markets to EU expons.7J9 This development, they 
argue, could thwart the objective of SADe to use trade integration to achieve industrial 
development and diversification. This is so in view of the fact that regional producers 
would be unable to compete with EU producers, particularly in manufactured goods.740 
This scenario would also contribute to the de-industrialisation of SADe economies since 
local manufactures would not be able to compete with highly subsidised agricultural and 
sophisticated industrial goods that would come from the EU?41 
The foregoing argument flies in the face of the Lome experience in this regard. States in 
the east and southern Africa region have interfaced with the EU tmder Lome for a 
considerable period of time yet none of this partnership materialised. It cannot be argued 
that the Lome preferences were such that the EU firms fotmd them terribly onerous to 
penetrate the SADe market. The EU firms could have easily accessed the regional 
market if they so wished but they did not. There is no indication that the continued 
negative attitude displayed by EU firms towards the region would tmdergo any 
significant change upon the implementation of the proposed REP As. 
Another major drawback at this stage is the weak level of market and econOffilC 
integration. States in the east and southern Africa region still have a long way to go 
before their macro-economic policies are conducive to a free trade area between 
themselves, let alone being conducive to conclude a REP A with the EU.742 The SADe 
States are discouraged by the time, human, financial and other policy resources it 
demanded from South Africa to reach an agreement with the EU after 21 rounds and 40 
months of negotiations. Most ACP cotmtries are less endowed with resources and may 
lose valuable opportunities if they have to negotiate similar agreements with the EU.74J It 
739 Thomas says that this could thwan SADC's objective of using trade integration to achieve industrial 
development and diversification because regional producers are unlikely to be able to compete 
with EU producers, particularly in manufactured goods, RH Thomas Trade Liberalisation Issues, 
SADC-EU Seminar Report supra at p.49 
740 See Massdorp: Study of the Impact of introducing reciprocity, IGD Occasional Paper No. 21 TIPS 
Workshop supra at p.14 
741 It would appear reciprocal regional free trade areas are at the core of the EUs post-Lome scenarios, 
even though the EC is being prevailed upon to provide alternarives for the LLDCs in the ACP 
group. Such preferences would be in the form of continued LC-type preferential access to the EU 
market. For non-LDC ACP countries the preferred pegs would be an inclusion into the EUs 
GSP for access to the EU market. Dot Keet; IGD Occasional Paper No.2l TIPS Workshop, 
supra ar 31 
742 Massdorp, IGD Occasional Paper No. 21 TIPS Workshop supra at p.14 
743 Kato Lambrechts, Preface to the IGD Occasional Paper No.2l TIPS Workshop, supra at p.l 
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is in view of this concern that the Cotonou has promised financial support for capacity 
building in the ACP human resource development. 
Indeed the time taken for SADC to negotiate its own Trade Protocol, the time it is taking 
to renegotiate the SACU agreement; and the time for the EU-SA Agreement to come to 
fruition, all indicate that it will not be easy for the EU to negotiate a REPA with regional 
States. The anticipated time frame may not be realistic. Furthermore, at a recent 
SADC/EU Seminar on Trade Liberalisation there was a strong statement by the 
participants from the SADC region that the region was not ready, and was unlikely to be 
ready by the time envisaged, to negotiate a REPA with the EU.744 One is inclined to 
wonder whether the ACP States would ever have enough time to integrate their battered 
economies into the World Trade System. If Lome has been in existence for more than 
four decades, what, then, would be the measure of sufficient time for the ACP States to 
mature into competitive economies?45 
7.8 Concluding Remarks 
In chapter two we noted that regional trade arrangements in east and southern Africa 
region have been intended as a mechanism for enhancing the competitiveness of national 
and regional economies of the member States. Indeed, the motivating force for Regional 
Trade Arrangements extends beyond trade and encompasses far broader issues. 
We have walked through the body of the Cotonou Agreement and have noted that 
despite its transitional character it nonetheless replicates other regional regimes in item 
coverage. We have noted that the Cotonou, like other regional instruments, covers a 
wide spectrum of sectors. These sectors are technology, foreign direct investment, 
money and finance, services, labour markets, government procurement, environment and 
competition policies. We have argued that this comprehensive coverage is within the 
much wider framework of integrating the region into the global economy. 
744 SADe/EU Seminar on Trade Liberalisation, Dar Es Salaam 5-7 May 1988 
745 The degree of asymmetry between the ED and the east and southern Africa economies is currently too 
large. Admittedly it is too soon in the day to seriously consider a move towards free trade 
between the two regions, even one that allows for asymmetry in implementation. This lustre 
performance notwithstanding economic commentators insists that the Lome preferences wilJ 
cease to have any practical value during the second half of the next decade. They argue that at 
best, the ACP has a window of opportunity, which must be used to best effect. See Massdorp, 
IGD Occasional Paper No. 21 TIPS Workshop, supra at p.50 
257 
We have conunented that the Cotonou does well to unequivocally acknowledge the 
different needs and levels of development for the ACP countries and regions. The 
chapter has noted that the Cotonou is crafted in a deliberate fashion in order to build on 
and strengthen integration process in east and southern Africa region in a coherent and 
efficient manner. This chapter has highlighted the centrality of the Private sector interest 
in enhancing investment opportunities. We have noted the unmistakable synergy in the 
treatment of the private sector in all the regional agreements under review. 
We have noted that despite the Cotonou's comprehensive coverage of regional 
integration friendly features, the problem, however, resides with the absence of 
economies of scale given that the regional States, with the exception of South Africa, deal 
in primary exports only. We have argued that such an undiversified economic base 
severely constrains intra-regional trade. The chapter has pointed out that the Cotonou's 
coverage of the services trade is more comprehensive than similar efforts undertaken in 
other regional instruments. We have pointed out that the services sector rolls out the 
road map to the economic growth infrastructure and hence deserve to be treated to more 
comprehensive disciplines. 
We have noted that the central theme of bringing the pnvate sector aboard the 
integration processes resonates in all the regional instruments. The Cotonou has 
nonetheless surpassed other instruments by making broader commitments on the private 
sector support and development. The Cotonou, for instance, pledges support for 
operations of an ACP-EU private sector business forum whose main objective would, 
among other things, be to facilitate dialogue within the ACP lEU private sector and the 
bodies established under the Agreement. We have noted that this important innovation 
will bring together all entrepreneurs in the region for the conunon good of investment 
promotion. 
On the all-important question of rules of origin we have noted that the EU is committed 
to the harmonisation of the rules of origin in all its free trade agreements. We have urged 
that the regional States must resolutely object to any further restriction on the already 
onerous rules of origin, which they have to fulfil in order to obtain preferential access to 
the EU market. Our view on this matter is that the Cotonou has, for obvious reasons 
performed dismally on its coverage of the origin rules. We have also argued that 
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provisions on the dispute settlement disciplines are clearly inadequate as a catalyst for 
regional integration. 
We have pointed out that the main area of flexibility in the WTO rules that gravely 
concerns the ACP States and one that the Cotonou fails to address regards the principle 
of reciprocity and differentiation. We have urged for more flexibility in the WTO on this 
score to augment integration processes in the region. 
We have noted that strategically speaking, South Africa thus finds itself astride two trade 
regimes, which one might argue also characterise its state of development. We have then 
demonstrated how South Africa is strategically placed right at the vintage point within 
the Cotonou framework to augment and ultimately actualise the deepening of integration 
processes in the region. 
The chapter has identified and explained what measure the Cotonou should contribute to 
integration processes in the east and southern Africa region. We have argued that SADC 
and COMESA would conduct, as they have indeed done for the last four decades, most 
of their international trade with the EU under the Cotonou. This option provides the 
greatest certainty and, consequently, the most reliable export stability for the preference 
recipients among all the EU trade regimes. 
We have reviewed the prospects for the proposed REPAs and have examined in some 
detail the arguments advanced for and against these arrangements. We take the view that 
although these arguments carry substantial merit, it is nonetheless unlikely that the 
proposed REP As would differ from the Cotonou structure in any significant measure. 
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Chapter Eight: The Dilemma of Regional Integration in Southern Africa: 
Is intra-bloc co-operation the answer? 
8.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters we have examined three main preferential Agreements that 
conglomerate in the east and southern Africa region. These are; the EU-SA Agreement, 
the SADC Protocol and the Cotonou Agreement. We have noted that a number of 
important events, which have a bearing on regional integration initiatives and indeed 
which would tend to complicate the process are occurring within the eastern and 
southern Africa region. These events are happening simultaneously with a global match 
toward greater liberalisation. It is noteworthy that many of the SADC members are party 
to COMESA (hereinafter 'the two blocs) and have within the latter agreement adopted a 
programme to deepen trade relations amongst themselves. To what extent does this 
confuse even further, the two regimes' integration agenda? The complexity obtaining 
here is magnified by the existence of two customs unions, that is the SAW and the EAC 
within the precincts of the two regimes. 
No doubt the biggest challenge facing regionalism in east and southern Africa is the 
dilemma occasioned by the confluence of COMESA and SADC trade regimes in the 
region. This chapter examines the implication of the SADC-COllIESA-Confluence for 
the integration process in the east and southern Africa region. The two blocs have 
numerous common internal weaknesses, which call for urgent restructuring if they are to 
survive the challenges posed by the wind of globalisation. The chapter would highlight 
areas of common weaknesses between the two blocs. This discourse would help to 
demonstrate the necessity for co-operative approach. We will then explore and seek to 
explain the motivation that drives states to double in identical regional regimes. The 
proliferation of identical regional regimes has raised serious concerns as to the viability of 
this nascent regional integration process. The chapter would review what commentators 
have suggested as being the best way forward and argue that the options given thereby 
fail to address the root cause of the problem. 
One particularly central threat that runs through the two blocs' objectives is the ultimate 
desire to realise an African Economic Community. We suggest that the best way to 
achieve the stated objective is to begin this difficult process from the known to the 
unknown. We then look at the role the two foremost customs unions - EAC and SACU -
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should play in actualising this enduring dream. South African is, owing mainly to Its 
advanced economic structures, at a vantage position to influence the process 0 f 
deepening integration in the region. We examine how South Africa factors in this 
fascinating integration equation. 
In the final analysis, we argue that the reality of the proliferation of identical regional 
regimes is here to stay and this hard fact should be acknowledged as a first step to 
looking for workable programs to deepen integration in the region. We argue that the 
practical answer to this regionalisation conundrum lies in co-operative approach. We 
then demonstrate the necessity for such co-operative approach. 
The chapter then identifies areas that are ripe for a co-operative approach between the 
two blocs and shows the respective implications of such discourse. The chapter 
concludes that given the southern Africa track record in region integration and the 
current regional and national challenges, the path of regional integration can be expected 
to proceed haltingly with clisputes among member states and cliversions, as countries 
focus on national priorities. We argue, in the main, that co-operation will go along way in 
allaying some of these unavoidable integration undercurrents. 
8.2 Motivation for multiple membership 
The key regional organisations and preferential trade arrangements that exist within the 
eastern and southern Africa region are as follows: SADC, SACU, the EUSA Agreement, 
EAC, the COMESA, the CBI and the Cotonou. Countries in the region invariably 
double membership in these regimes to varying degrees. Double membership, however, 
features prominently in the SADC and COMESA. Memberships of each of these 
groupings influence not only trade patterns in the region but also the implementation of 
the two regimes' respective integration clisciplines. Intra-regionally, there are three tiers of 
relations:''' SACU and the EAC which together exhibit the deepest level of integration; 
SADC which until 1992 pursued sectoral co-operation; and COMESA which has 
attempted to foster market integration among the countries of the east and southern 
Africa and Inclian Ocean Islands. Botswana and South Africa are the only countries that 
have not ventured membership in the COMESA.'47 
7·1(, In addition Tanzania is a member of [he newly-re-established EAC initiative, Mauritius is a member of 
the Indian Ocean Commission (lOC) and five of the SADC countries panicipate in the eEl 
1~7 R H Thomas, Trade Liberalisauon issues, supra at pA2 
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A study of the variables that determine whether a country will join another in a bilateral 
arrangement found that political relations, proximity, conunon borders, openness to 
trade and small economic size are all but cumulatively important.748 These variables were 
found to be important in explaining whether agreement will be sustained. Although most 
African countries conclude regional agreements with their neighbours, they have not 
always pursued open trade regimes, nor have political relations always been cordial.749 
Some conunentators advance the view that countries with good political relations will 
probably have similar ideals.750 This makes negotiations and reaching consensus on a 
broad range of issues much easier. There will also be more willingness to cede 
sovereignty in certain policy areas to the regional body made up of members with which 
each country has good relations. The intractable political instability in several parts of 
Africa may be important in explaining the unwillingness to develop strong regional 
institutions and the lacklustre performance of the existing regional integration initiatives. 
One notably strong persuasion for multiple memberships in different regional groupings 
that succinctly captures the convoluted regionalism equation in sub-Sahara Africa is the 
hope to get aboard the gravy train of donor funding?51 Most of these states maintain 
membership in numerous regional regimes not for purposes of promoting trade but with 
a hope of tapping on the gravy train of donor funding.752 For instance, SADC's sector 
projects are for the most part donor funded and so are COMESA's. Given the burden 
that is brought to bear on national priorities, especially the incidence of grinding poverty 
748 Brada et al, 1993 in Thomas Trade liberalisation issues at p.42 
749 See discussion on implication of COMESA-SADC Confluence at chapter 8 below. 
750 See for example Ernest Aryeetcy: 'Sub-Saharan Africa Experiences with Regional Integration: Trade 
Reform and Regional Integration, seminar, supra at p. 414 
751 Pundits fault the aid approach pointing out that the system is susceptible to corruption whilst trade is 
not. Developed countries have been urged to offer Developing countries a fair trade deal and the 
latter would build their own roads, hospitals and schools with taxation revenue like other nations. 
See remarks by Mutuma Mathu at http://www.nationaudio.cominfra 
752 One reflective commentator has severely criticised the aid syndrome in the most unflattering terms. He 
avers that developing countries have played the aid game long enough. He counsels that after 40 
years of aid and little progress, it is time to change the game. The commentator has a soft spot for 
the former US President, Bill Clinton's policy of trade in place of aid, which he applauds as a 
more sustainable and dignified way of solving what he calls 'the African miasma of poverty'. (See 
Mutuma Mathu in the Sunday Nation, February 17, 2002 at http://www.nationaudio.comIndeed 
it is difficult to fault this reasoning in view of the fact that in the two years the Americans have 
allowed some African countries duty-free export of textiles to its market, export earnings have 
grown in leaps and bounds. South Africa, Mauritius and Kenya have particularly ripped windfalls 
under the AGOA facility. It is estimated that more than 200,000 jobs have been created in Kenya 
alone owing directly or indirectly to the AGOA export reprieve. (Remarks attributed to the 
Kenyan Minister of Trade and Industry Mr. Nicholas Biwott reported in the Daily Nation online 
on February 17, 2002 at http://www.nationaudio.com 
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in the region, no state would let pass an opportunity to anchor its membership to an 
organisation that would cushion such budgetary constrains.7S3 
The two blocs have been recipients of a generous share of donor funding for project 
development in their respective spheres of influence. It then goes without saying that 
countries that maintain double membership in these trade regimes stand to benefit twice 
in donor-supported projects within their borders.754 Donor support is a direct and 
immediate benefit. It is unlike intra-regional trade promotion activities whose benefits 
mayor may not mature. Trade liberalisation disciplines, too, are more onerous than the 
soft pickings availed by donor-funded projects. This is why most of these states are 
happy to anchor membership unto any regional bloc that has the potential to attract 
direct foreign funding for projects that would ultimately trickle benefits to their 
. . 
respective countnes. 
8.3.1 Implication of the SAOC-COMESA confluence 
Like we have noted before, the biggest challenge facing regionalism ill the east and 
southern Africa region is the conflict between COMESA and SADCss . The two blocs 
bring together 23 countries, ranging from Angola in the South to Egypt in the north. 
COMESA groups the relatively more industrialised Kenya, Mauritius and the least 
industrialised Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Zambia. Moreover, COMESA 
encompasses about five other regional groups, with some members belonging to three 
75) Although the anti-aid protagonists point out that what Africa needs is open trade that will make her 
people prosperous. Trade will benefit the farmer and give incentives for more production; Africa 
cannot be productive through aid, they argue. A keen analysis of the situation in Africa reveals 
twO important points. The fact that aid has helped linle in reviving economies on the continent. 
Many aid recipients have been losing ground economically. Seventy countries are poorer than 
they were in 1980,43 are worse off than they were in 1970. See remarks by James Shikwati, in the 
Daily Nation on July 10, 2002 at hnp:! /www.nationaudio.com 
754 When it comes to sharing these resources, the EU has expressed its desire to work with fewer regional 
organisations selected by the Aa member states themselves. No doubt, the geographical 
coverage, capacity of each of the two blocs and moreover, the economic integration mandate 
qualifies them to more donor funding under the Cotonou facility. (See the statement by 
Commissioner Nielson, at hErp:! /www.comesa.int supra 
755 Thomas notes that the old SADCC was focused on sector/project co-ordination, while its sister 
institution the PTA (the present COMESA) was oriented towards trade and finance. This 
historical division of labour is now complicating maners within SADC. This conflict is caused 
mainly by a significant change of course by SADC towards trade integration an area that was 
previously a preserve of COMES A. See R H. Thomas, 'Regional Arrangements and the wro: 
The case of the SADC: Paper submined for presentation at the 8th Annual Conference of the 
African Society of International and Comparative Law, Cairo, Egypt, 2-5 Sept. 1996 at p 12 
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different trade regimes. For instance, Tanzania belongs to SADC and the EAC, and 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are members of SADC and SACU at the same time.756 
In this polarised scenario, the potential for conflict of interest is real and looms large like 
a colossus over the two blocs' integration initiative. It is already evident that arriving at 
consensus necessary for the implementation of regional integration policies within the 
two blocs is often difficult. Proliferation and duplication of functions give rise, at the 
regional level, to conflicts over mandates and to a divided loyalty among governments. 
At the governmental level, the effect of this conflict is to impose heavy fInancial and 
administrative burdens on the already strained member states' domestic budgets. The 
regional institution's budgets are invariably too small for the Herculean tasks 
governments routinely assign to them. 
The contrary view now being raised is that smaller regional bodies are more viable in the 
short run. It is argued that such smaller but well-functioning units would then form a 
bigger bloc in the long run.757 It is imperative for the two blocs to take key strategic 
decisions about their own future. It is no secret that as commentators grapple with the 
issue of overlapping membership, and what it portends for deepening integration in the 
region, the two blocs are not relenting in their zest to expand. 
A couple of years ago the two blocs would probably have had a better sense of the outer 
limits of their own geography. Right now, it is guesswork because institutional expansion 
would inevitably come at the expense of deepening the integration process. The greater 
the number of countries, the higher the number of unknown variables and, therefore, the 
more complex the overall equation. It is possible that the two blocs have not carefully 
evaluated how expansion will impede the deepening of integration. It is the same 
challenge that the Europeans themselves encountered as they deepened their own 
integration through the monetary union while expanding eastward at the same time.758 
In moving toward trade integration in the last few years, SADe, which embraces 11 
COMESA states, has adopted measures that involve tariff reductions and the removal of 
756See Louis et al supra at p. 480 
757 Indeed, some SADC member states have expressed their desire to break away from COMESA. Louis et 
al supra n. 3 at p. 467 
758 See chapter three for a detailed discussion on the ED's integration experience 
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non-tariff barriers.759 It seeks greater co-ordination of external tariffs and the promotion 
of the free movement of capital and people. It also has an interest in setting up regional 
infrastructure authorities and a development bank. COMESA on the other hand has 
similar objectives and has set up the very same copycat structures to vehicle her toward 
the much-coveted ultimate goal of a common market. The co-existence of the two blocs 
is certainly questionable considering the congruence of their objectives and their 
individual circumstances.76o 
The two blocs make provision to accommodate members with prior obligations to other 
regimes.761 The only caveat is that the affected members are urged not to renew such 
membership upon its expiry in the case of COMESA and to immediately review such 
membership in the case of SADC.762 This also means that once a CET has been 
established in 10 years time, SADC members who are in COMESA would find it 
extremely difficult to maintain their double membership. This is due to the fact that a 
common market with a CET is a deep form of integration that would not lent itself to 
double membership in other regimes within the region. 
Whenever the innovative adulteration of a free trade area and customs UIllon 
fundamentals is allowed within a region, the result is a diluted customs union that is 
rendered overly irrelevant to its core functions. This is true for the SACU and the EAC 
customs unions.763 The states that constitute the membership of these customs unions 
are in the habit of moonlighting membership in other trade regimes where they are often 
called upon to give trade concessions that are unsavoury to the customs union edifice. 
759 Article] of the SADC Trade Protocol 
760 In general, regional integration arrangements in sub-Saharan Africa have been characterised by a 
number of peculiar features, not always present in other arrangements elsewhere. These includes, 
existence of multiple objectives, absence of strong supranational institutions, inadequate 
sanctioning authority, non-implementation of harmonisation provisions, lack of political 
commitment, unclear perceptions about gains, inadequacies in the distribution of the gains from 
integration, inadequate compensation mechanisms and stringent trade liberalisation schemes. See 
for example Ernest, Trade Reform and Regional Integration Seminar, infra, at p.408 
761 Article 180 of the COMESA Treaty provides that where, by virtue of obligations under an existing 
contract entered into by a Member State and such a Member State is unable to comply with the 
provisions of this Article, the Member State shall, upon the entry into force of the Treaty, notify 
the Council of this fact. 
762 The Member State shall, however, not renew or extend such contract at its expiry. Member States agree 
to the gradual establishment of a common external tariff in respect of all goods imported from 
third countries within a period of ten years from the entry into force of the Treaty and in 
accordance with a schedule to be adopted by the Council. See Article 180 supra 
763 See discussion on EAC below 
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Article 49 of the COMESA Treaty, is one such case in pomt. Member States have 
undenaken to remove immediately upon the entry into force of the Treaty, all the then 
existing non-tariff barriers to the impon into that Member State of goods originating in 
the other Member States and thereafter refrain from imposing any funher restrictions or 
prohibitions.764 The difficulty here is that Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (LNS) 
constitute the SACU, which is a common market with a CET. In which case it is 
impractical for them to participate in COMESA's tariffication program, particularly when 
the dominant member in this case South Africa is not in agreement. 
At the time of the signing of the SADC Trade Protocol, which provides for the gradual 
liberalisation of intra-regional trade765 , 10 of its members had already effected 70 percent 
tariff reduction under the COMESA Trade Liberalisation Program.766 Thomas767 notes 
that the overlap in membership of the various arrangements in the region could hamper 
implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol. She explains that the SADC tariff lines 
would be higher than those of COMESA until at least 2006 and therefore trade between 
SADC members that also belong to the COMESA fold would be conducted under the 
COMESA arrangement. The foregoing scenario implies that the SADC Trade Protocol 
will only effectively cover non-COMESA SADC members. This proposition is explained 
by the fact that imponers will clearly choose to pay the lower rates of customs duties 
under the COMESA umbrella. 
In any event these states are, for all intents and practical purposes, South Africa's 
economic proteges. Indeed, the SACU tariff lines are set by South Africa, which means, 
764 Provision is made for the purposes of protecting infant industry. A Member State may, impose for the 
purposes only of protecting such industry for a specified period to be determined by Council, 
quantitative or like restrictions or prohibitions on similar goods originating from the other 
Member States. This would be on condition that the measures are applied on a non-
discriminatory basis and that the Member State shall furnish to Council proof that it has taken all 
reasonable steps to overcome the difficulties faced by such an infant industry. ( See Articfe 61 of 
the Treaty) Provision is also made where a Member State encounters balance-of-payments 
difficulties arising from the application of the provisions of the Treaty. In which case the affected 
member may impose for the purpose only of overcoming such difficulties for a specified period 
to be determined by the Council, quantitative or the like restrictions or prohibitions, on goods 
originating from the other Member States. (See Article 83 of the Treaty) 
765 With regard to trade in Goods Articfe 3 states that the process and modalities for the phased elimination 
of tariffs and non-tariff barriers shall be determined by the Committee of Ministers responsible 
for trade matters (CMT) having regard to specific matters. This process involves front-loading by 
the more developed members such as South Africa and Zimbabwe whilst the least Developed 
states like Mozambique and Zambia are allowed to back-load hence the principle of asymmetry 
and differentiation in tariff reduction. 
766 This excludes Botswana and South Africa who are non members 
767 Trade Liberalisation Issues, Seminar Report supra at p.4S 
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therefore, that no adjustment can be effected to the tariff lines without its prior approval. 
It is unlikely that South Africa is going to disrupt the SACU balance by conceding to 
COMESA's overtures - where it has no membership in the first place. The other 
complication on tariffication is that SACU's goods are in free circulation hence South 
African products would easily percolate into COMESA through one of the COMESA-
SACU member states. Effectively, therefore, South Africa would indirectly benefit from 
a much lower COMESA tariff rate without incurring the corollary obligation of 
committing its membership to the regional body. 
A number of studies have indicated that regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa 
generally and in southern Africa in particular are not significant determinants of intra-
regional trade flOWS.768 Stimulus to intra-regional trade is more likely to come from the 
development and growth of the national economies and from a reduction of trade costs. 
The complimentarities and tensions between the objectives of regional integration as 
envisioned by the two blocs and those of the domestic economic policy need to be 
explored if intra-regional trade is to be infused with the much needed buoyancy. 
Ernest questions, for example, the impact of eliminating subsidies or infant industry 
protection assuming that these do not fall under permitted exemptions as required in 
terms of the two blocs' instruments on the domestic economy.769 This provision, he 
argues, runs counter to the principle that intra-regional growth can only spring from the 
growth of the domestic economy. It is also no secret that for the struggling regional 
industries to acquire international competitiveness, the injection of subsidies is an 
unavoidable option. 
A summit of the heads of states held in Lusaka in January 1992 agreed to a merger of the 
two blocs. The argument was that the merger would make co-operation within the region 
effective by reducing duplication of activities. The effort was also seen as a means to a 
faster movement toward an African Economic Community through a single sub-regional 
768 See Ernest Aryeetcy: 'Sub-Saharan African Experiences with Regional Integration: Trade Refonn and 
Regional Integration in Africa: Papers presented at the IMF African Economic Research 
Consortium Seminar, on Trade Refonn and Regional Integration in Africa, Dec. 1-3, 1997; llv1F 
Institute Washington, D.C at p. 459 
769 Ibid. 
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group m eastern and southern Africa. The proposal seemed credible, given that the 
objectives of the two organisations clearly indicate many cases of duplication.770 
8.3.2 Regime amalgamation and the donor factor 
It stands to reason that in order to promote stable economic groupings, countries in the 
region should belong to the one economic group that fully represents their interests. 
This viewpoint assures that it is still possible for countries within COMESA to formalise 
as sub-regional entities without dual membership. These sub-groupings should be 
responsible for sectoral projects and harmonisation of macro-economic policies in their 
respective sub-region.771 This no doubt, is an ingenious crafting which however falls 
short of addressing the root of the problem. 
All these organisations have the same objectives. The irony is that the ultimate goal of 
the two blocs is to lay the foundations for a single pan-African trading bloc.772 Eventually 
one of them will have to give up for the other. There have been consistent choruses 
from some policy makers urging Kenya and Uganda to join SADC so as to unify the 
regional integration equation. Not everyone is however receptive to this call. Some in 
SADC are of the considered view that deepening the present level of integration within 
the SADC should be the immediate priority for member states.773 This move, they opine 
is the only way to stimulate intra-regional trade rather than a directionless institutional 
enlargement that would eventually prove too unwieldy to focus programs. It is difficult 
to begrudge the logic behind this demur. The reasoning is materially merited. 
The proposal for merger has largely been greeted with a cold receptlon among the 
majority SADC members. This is in part due to SA DC's approach to regionalism. 
Thomas774 points out that CO:MESA is heavily preoccupied with the grand plan of 
promoting the African Economic Community. Conversely, she posits, SADC is largely 
770 See Louis et al supra at p. 481 
771 In the medium term, calls for the implementation of SAPS within a regional perspective are likely to 
gain ground. Already, SAPS have helped to eliminate macroeconomic distortions in many of the 
countries in the region. Studies Mistry: The New Regionalism: (1995) infra and Thomas in 
'Regional Arrangements and the mo, supra at p. 28 
(1995) show that countries in the region have implemented far-reaching economic reforms in the past few 
years and are set to continue in the coming years. A number of countries have market-determined 
prices, interests rates and exchange rates. 
772 That wish may come true although COMESA has moved faster than its peers have to implement free 
trade. This despite the fact that intra-COMESA trade in 1998 was lower than in 1970. 
77J See remarks by Mark Ashurst, supra 
774 R H. Thomas: Regional Arrangements and the wrO,supra at p.12 
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prOject oriented and tends to attract the involvement of member countnes. This 
observation overlooks the fact that COMESA too has developed numerous sector-
oriented projects that are receiving substantial donor funding.775 
The change of focus is a deliberate strategy on the part of COMESA to counter the 
monumental challenge posed by its erstwhile neighbour the SAOC. Sector oriented 
projects are without doubt an ideal innovation for developing countries. It stands to 
reason that this strategy has the potential to attract massive donor funding by far more 
than the liberalisation program that has been the mainstay of COMESA's regional 
integration process. Liberalisation disciplines, like we pointed out before, in essence call 
for more sacrificial commitments from members. The attendant benefits for this 
otherwise engaging venture are distance and linger to mature whilst the sector project 
strategy promises instantaneous donor funded project rollout. 
The benefits of the projects to member states are direct and therefore more noticeable 
than the formerly more policy oriented programs of the PTA and COMESA. Moreover, 
the projects are mostly donor funded, and therefore member states need not dig deeper 
into the scarce national resources to finance regional projects. More recently, the entry of 
the more powerful and prosperous South Africa has strengthened SADC at the expense 
of COMESA. As a result, some countries in southern Africa have expressed the desire to 
pull out of COMESA, while other potential members have indicated that they would not 
be taking up membership.776 It is, perhaps, on this basis that some commentators have 
confidently predicted a mass exodus from COMESA to SADC. This eventuality comes 
at the courtesy of the attraction to the better economic prospects offered by South Africa 
- the regional economic power-house.777 
In this thesis we beg to disagree with the foregoing prediction. There is ample evidence 
to suggest that the predicted exodus may not materialise any time soon. Not with 
COMESA having received considerable EU and World Bank funding for its integration 
programs lately.778 We have argued before that free project money is too strong an 
775 See for example, the statement by the Secretary General-Erastus Mwenja, infra 
776 Tanzania has pulled out of COMESA in preference to SADC while Lesotho, Mozambique and 
Swaziland have indicated that they may not take up their membership after all 
777 Louis et al op. Cit. n.3 
778 Under the Cotonou Agreement, 1.3 billion Euros are allocated for regional prograrrunes. At the same 
time, COMESA has revealed that through member states' joint effort it has been able to mobilise 
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mcentlve for these countnes to mamtaIn double membership than decamp from 
COMESA merely to be seen to dance to the South African tune. In spite of its economic 
muscle, South Africa does not offer anything close to the massive donor funds injected 
into projects undertaken by each of the two blocs. 
If anything, South Africa, its relatively advanced economic structures notwithstanding, is 
still very much dependant on the very same donor funding for most of its major projects. 
South Afria's dual economic structures put it in a position of an aid recipient rather than 
that of a donor for the region. The two blocs' membership consists LLDCs who hope to 
anchor membership to a supranational body like COMESA and SADC in the hope that 
these bodies would act as a conduit pipe for donor funded projects to trickle into their 
territories by virtue of such membership. 
In our considered view, the quest for free donor funds is an attraction these struggling 
economies would be hard put to forbear. 779 This insatiable zest for donor stipends 
explains the reluctance on the part of many SADC members to heed their own 
Protocol's edict to decamp from COMESA.780 It is also instructive that the call to 
reconsider COMESA membership is fronted mainly by South Africa and Botswana, the 
two sole non-COMESA members. Botswana should be seen in the light of its position as 
the host country to the SADC seat of power and hence the need to show solidarity with 
its own home based institution. As for South Africa, the beckoning responsibility to take 
the leadership role in southern Africa would have been severely constrained had It 
registered membership with COMESA. 
close to US10 billion dollars for investment and infrastructure development. See statement by the 
Secretary General-Erastus Mwenja- on the Occasion of the Extraordinary Summit to the Launch 
of the Free Trade Area - 31st October, 2000 supra n. 14 
779 It was recently reported that COMESA had received a Sh64 million boost from the United States. The 
money would go to COMESA's Court of Justice and to develop capacity for trade within the 
jurisdiction of American Growth and Opportunity Act. The US Trade Representative Robert 
Zoellick was quoted to remark that his government would give scholarships for trade officers in 
the COMESA member countries to undertake a comprehensive training course on the World 
Trade Organisation in Geneva. Mr Zoellick is said to have stated that the money was part of a 
$10 million programme to develop trade with Africa. Some $8.7 million will go to an AGOA 
trade capacity building fund for SADC Reported in the Daily Nation Online, the East African, 
Business section Friday, February 15, 2002 at http://www.nationaudio.com 
780 Article 27 of the SADC Trade Protocol urges member states that have membership in other preferential 
trade agreements to review the further application of such agreements with a view to attaining the 
objectives of the Trade Protocol. Though not expressly stated in this edict, is clearly targeted at 
the COMESA membership whose co-existence with SADC is viewed, as being inimical to the 
latter's integration objectives. 
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The reluctance to let go of the gravy train of donor pecks is in our view what oils conflict 
between COMESA on the one hand and SADC on the other. Disengaging from 
COMESA in the light of so much promise for better times ahead is too much of a bitter 
pill for these countries to swallow. And so the two blocs have gone full throttle to 
outshine each other in program roll-out in a strategy that is meant to captivate donor 
interest and thence attract more development funds to their fold. Furthermore pnor 
conurutments to COMESA's trade liberalisation disciplines render it tactically impossible 
for these countries to disengage in the medium term. 
The proposition for the amalgamation of regions only serves to address the physical 
corpus of the regimes under review. It is, so to speak, a mechanical re-alignment of 
countries for convenient regionalisation. ~Ibese arguments though portend, fail to 
address the teething problem of the dearth of intra-regional trade and the lustre flow of 
direct foreign investment in the region. This problem would persist in spite of the larger 
markets created by the process of regionalisation. The arguments also gloss over the 
debilitating problem of production and export capacity that has been the long-standing 
plague to regional economies. 
This state of affairs is needless to say inimical to the deepening integration in the east and 
southern Africa region. It also contradicts the region's grand dream of coalescing into a 
pan-African Economic Union. This observation then begs the question whether this 
noble dream is, in fact realisable. We now examine whether, indeed, the existing 
structures in the region are a pointer to a super-highway for the realisation of an African 
Economic Conumll1ity. 
8.4.1 The super-highway to the African economic union 
Some commentators have suggested that the best way to go about integration in the 
region is to strengthen the tried and tested regimes and then move forward from here.781 
This thesis postulates that deepening integration with neighbouring countries would lay a 
firm foundation for spreading outward to the uncharted territory further afield.782 
781 See, for example, Louis et al supra at p.48S 
782 The other shade of opinion proposes that COMESA be broken up into smaller groupings with similar 
interests. Louis and Abuka explain that, countries near South Africa have common interest in 
trade, infrastructure, currency and security and these could form a strong regional group. The 
EAC states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda also have had experience with regionalism. They also 
posses a fairly good infrastructure, have common security interests and share trade which 
strengthens the case for the EAC. At the same time, so goes the argument, it does not prevent 
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The starting point, in our view is SACU and the EAC, which are the two established 
customs unions common to SADC and COMESA respectively. The two unions boast a 
deeper degree of integration than the two blocs. But there is a linkage between the two 
customs unions and each of the two blocs. Whereas COMESA is linked to SACU 
through the membership of the LNS, the SADC is on the other hand connected to EAC 
via the membership of Tanzania. The question is inevitable, is it possible that a jointer of 
the two well-grounded customs unions would offer the much-needed road map and act 
as a super-highway to greater and deeper integration in the region? There is no ready 
answer to this fascinating question. 
It is safe to point out that there is certainly great wisdom in an attempt by the two blocs 
to commence their economic recovery program by moving from the known to the 
unknown. The SACU and EAC experiences offer far greater insights and lessons in the 
quest by the two blocs to take the trade partnership to the higher order of a common 
market. Mwenja seems to harbour this vision.783 He notes that the smaller regional 
groupings can be a fast track for COMESA's match to a common market. In order to 
allow South Africa to be a part of the regional trade regime SADC is also advocating a 
free trade area by 2008. According to Mwenja after SADC achieves a free trade area the 
east and southern Africa region would effectively link the Cape to Cairo.784 He 1S 
convinced that this is not a pipe dream any more as it was in the time of Cecil Rhodes. 
Whether this grand much would become a reality in the foreseeable future only time will 
bear the proponents out. One thing is for certain though and that is the fact that the two 
blocs are in agreement that the final objective of their integration is to contribute to the 
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic 
Community.785 In order to actualise this grand idea it behoves the two blocs to partner 
Burundi the DRC and Rwanda from joining this grouping. This school of thought espouses the 
view that, the formation of a sub-group to cover Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan 
may be appropriate. The remaining countries, it is suggested, should consider joining any of the 
three subgroups. It has been suggested that the PTA should remain and specialise in areas that 
cut across all countries in the region. In this regard, the PTA should deal with intra-regional trade 
liberalisation and work toward the unification of the sub-groupings for a future COMESA. The 
argument concludes that this dichotomy would help to establish more coherent and cohesive 
regional groupings. 
7SJ Statement by the Secretary General -Erastus Mwenja- supra n. 14 
784 Ibid. 
785 Article 178 of the COMESA Treaty deals with relations with the African Economic Community. The 
SADC Trade Protocol sets out the objectives of the Protocol namely, among other things, to 
further liberalise intra-regional trade in goods and services on the basis of fair, mutually equitable 
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with other regional economic communities in the continent.786 The two blocs would have 
to implement their respective trade disciplines with due consideration to the provisions 
of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community.787 
We now move to examine the strategic positioning of each of these advanced customs 
unions and how they relate to the two blocs in so far as they offer possibilities for 
deepening regional integration and ultimately catapult the region to the promised land of 
the African Economic Union. Given its domineering position and the new role it is 
playing as a pace-setter for economic growth in the region, we shall also examine the role 
and where South Africa factors in this integration equation. 
8.4.2 The EAC factor in the integration equation 
One of the initially successful regional groupings ill eastern and southern Africa, 
especially during the colonial period, was the East African Community (EAC). The three 
countries making up the EAC, namely Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda had achieved 
significant integration during the colonial period. The treaty for the establishment of the 
Community provided for the removal of all trade barriers, and the community had a 
common external tariff and exercise duty plus common services. Tension that had 
emerged in the pre-independence era heightened in the post-colonial period as Kenya 
opted for a market-oriented approach, while Tanzania and Uganda leaned more toward a 
socialist system.788 
This tension was exacerbated by disputes over the distribution of benefits. Kenya, being 
more industrialised than the other two derived a higher benefit than Tanzania and 
Uganda. Efforts to use the East African Bank to promote balanced industrial 
development failed because the bank focused its financing only on viable projects which 
largely favoured Kenya. These problems, among others, resulted in Tanzania and Uganda 
pressing for dissolution. The closure of the Kenya-Tanzania border was followed by 
and beneficial arrangements, complimented by Protocols in other areas. The other related object 
is stated to be a contribution toward the improvement of the climate for domestic, cross-border 
and foreign investment. At the same time, the Protocol aims at enhancing development, 
diversification and industrialisation of the region. See the preamble to the Trade Protocol 
786 Such groups like ECOW AS and also to revisit the Protocol on Relations between the African 
Economic Community and the Regional Economic Communities. 
787 In the final analysis the Common Market or its successor, would then, at a time to be agreed upon 
between the Common Market or its successor and the African Economic Community, be 
converted into an organic entity of the African Economic Community. 
788 See Louis, et al supra at p.476 
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political tension between Tanzania and Uganda during the 1970s. All these developments 
were exacerbated by the internal conflicts in the regional group. The Community finally 
collapsed in 1976.789 
More recently, there have been senous efforts toward the revival of the East African 
Community.790 This has come about, in part, with a realisation by Kenya that being the 
biggest of the three economies there are benefits it could derive from a reconstituted and 
expanded market.791 In addition, Uganda, which is landlocked, requires both Kenya and 
Tanzania's port facilities. As a result, the three countries have now promoted currency 
convertibility. Furthermore, they have also agreed to join onsite supervision of banks 
with branches across borders. At the level of immigration, an Eastern Africa passport is 
due for issuance to facilitate travel within the region. The EAC Parliament has been 
opened and the same is properly constituted and is fully operational.792 With regard to 
policy co-ordination, the three countries have agreed to read their budgets on the same 
day as well as to a co-ordinated approach to foreign investment.793 
789 Several lessons emerged from the experience of the regional integration efforts under the EAC Obid.) 
790 Now coined the East African Co-operation. A meeting of a task force in Arusha, Tanzania, made 
recommendations to the draft protocol on the establishment of the East African Customs Union. 
The draft was then presented to the meeting of the EAC Permanent Secretaries responsible for 
Trade, Finance and Regional Co-operation, for further consideration. Some of the areas covered 
in the draft Protocol are the elimination of internal tariffs; harmonisation of commodity 
description and coding systems; establishment of the EAC Common External Tariff; 
simplification and harmonisation of customs documentation and procedures; harmonisation of 
exemption regimes; and EAC Rules of Origin. The Council of Ministers met on May 17 and 18 to 
consider and adopt the draft protocol. See the Daily Nation Online, the East African business 
section on Tuesday, May 14, 2002 at http://www.nationaudio.com 
791 Although the three partner states have argued that the advantages of an East African bloc, with a single 
market of 80 million people, far outweigh the disadvantages of surrendering their sovereignty, 
officials are still jittery over the uncertainties, which the changes would create. EAC officials say 
that the regional Union will create new business opportunities, improve revenue collection and 
attract direct foreign investment. Report by David Kaiza in the Daily Nation Online, the East 
African business sections on Monday, April 15, 2002 at http://www.nationaudio.com. At the 
heart of the stalemate is the demand by Uganda and Tanzania that goods from Kenya be 
subjected to a tax of 15 to 16 per cent, while their own goods enter Kenya at the zero rate. Fears 
that goods from Kenya, which has a more robust manufacturing industry, will swamp Uganda 
and Tanzania have bogged down progress on the economic and political integration of the 
commuruty. 
792 The three countries for the first time read their budgets on the same day as a show of commitment to a 
common monetary area. The first East African Community's budget was presented in the 
regional parliament in Arusha in the backdrop of $3 million (Sh237 million) in outstanding 
contributions by the three member states. Kenya's former foreign minister, the late Dr Robert 
Ouko was the last to read the budget for the collapsed community - the forerunner of the current 
one - at the same venue in 1977. The Daily Nation Online, the East African business section on 
Friday, May 3,2002 at http://www.nationaudio.com 
793 Louis et al supra at p. 476 
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Economic commentators point out that several measures need to be put in place to 
address issues relating to the distribution of benefits or the design of a special regional 
assistance vehicle.794 Yet as the Kenyan economy stagnates, Tanzanian is looking south 
not just for investment but also for technology and skills.795 The courtship is, however, 
not entirely happy. The logic of merging national markets into regional trading blocs is 
based on the potential for exports. The potential to develop Tanzania as a base for 
manufactured exports remains untested, and it is unlikely to happen without money from 
South Africa. That would require big business in Johannesburg to play the kind of role in 
promoting new African industries like Germany assumed when it bankrolled the EU.796 
South Africa must, however, move swiftly to address the high tariff lines it still maintains 
against its regional partners. Tanzanian's exports such as cigarettes and textile, which 
could sell in South Africa, are hit with duties of up to 45 percent. The injustice of this 
asymmetrical tariff rate has not, however, deterred Tanzania from the appeal to anchor 
unto SADC's regional bandwagon.797 Tanzania reasons that if the potential for economic 
integration can be realised, the SADe promises far bigger rewards. As the poor sibling in 
each family, Tanzania has a good claim to preferential trading terms with any of these 
regional groupings in the run-up to free trade. Its decision to quit eOMESA reflects the 
limited promise of a group dominated by Kenya has to offer.798 
794 They contend that for future co-operation, Uganda may need to develop its power industry with greater 
market opportunities in the region for distribution in mind, while the exploitation as well as the 
management of the Lake Victoria environment is an area that appears appealing for regional co-
ordination. 
795 One commentator has put it more sarcastically that the role of a deserted husband falls to Kenya, the 
largest economy in COMESA grouping and until recently Tanzania's principal trading partner. 
(See the Business Day, 10th October 2001) . It is a mark of the smaller country's gradual recovery 
and Kenya's decline that Tanzania in effect has chosen a future in league with South Africa. 
Historically Kenya has played a dominant role, but Tanzania is playing a very crucial role. The 
Tanzanian Minister of industry and Trade -Mr. Iddi Simba recently remarked; " We are a bridge 
berween the EAC and SADC. We are committed to the SADC, as indeed we are for historical 
reasons to the EA Co-operation. We really want to play both of them at the same time". (See 
Mark Ashurst, writing from London - Business day 10th October, 2001) 
796 Mark Ashurst, ibid 
797 The chairman of the EAC Commi[[ee on Transport, Trade and Investment, Mr Y ona Kanyomozi, said 
that Tanzania's position had complicated matters for the EAC Customs Union because it meant 
that while Kenya and Uganda did not belong to SADC, Tanzania's interests in it would inevitably 
be binding on both countries. See the Daily Nation Online the East African business section 
Tuesday, May 14, 2002 at http://www.nationaudio.com 
798 There have been reports suggesting that Uganda is preparing to follow Tanzania to join SADC - aU of 
which, from a vantage point of Nairobi, must make a sorry spectacle: the hoary old bride 
Tanzania and their closest neighbour Uganda running into the arms of the rich suitor from the 
South. See Mark Ashurst supra n. 68 
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The downside, however, for South Africa in opening up its market for Tanzania is that 
Kenyan goods would easily find their way into the South African market via the EAC 
customs union. This eventuality could witness a situation where even Egypt in the far 
north exports its products to South Africa through Kenya under COMESA and 
Tanzania via the EAC into SADC. The counter-argument to this is that South Africa 
stands to benefit immensely through the reverse view of the scenario. 
What may hurt South Africa the most is where either under the Cotonou or COMESA 
arrangement cheap subsidised goods from the Far East markets percolate through these 
countries into South Africa's market. This, perhaps more than anything else, is the treble 
effect that South Africa fears when contemplating how far to open its markets to 
regional partners. There is no telling from exactly whence imports would be sourced in 
such a free circulation preferential trade area. The grim reality is made even worse by the 
weak to non-existence customs administration structures in some of these countries. 
The EU notes that there is scope for sub-regional organisations like EAC and SACU to 
assume the role of Regional Authorising Officer.799 The EU is thus satisfied that this 
approach is fully consistent with the Cotonou Agreement and, that it would provide an 
incentive towards coherence of the integration programmes. The most important 
observation by the EU is to the effect that the lack of coherence is among the main 
causes of the limited results of integration in the region so far. It is difficult to begrudge 
this valid point of view. Lack of program coherence no doubt slows down the whole 
process of deepening integration. Besides regional partnership program coherence would 
lead to the most effective use of the scarce resources. 
8.4.3 The SACU factor in the integration equation 
The preamble to the COMESA Treaty states that Parties take cognisance of the unique 
situation of Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (LNS) arising from their membership of 
799 The EU has taken the view that three of the present regions can be maintained: these are the Caribbean, 
the Pacific and West Africa. It is suggested that the Central African region could correspond to 
membership of CEMAC. The East Africa, SADC and Indian Ocean Commission geographic 
coverage corresponds to the combined membership of COMESA and SADC. Both organisations 
have a declared purpose of economic integration, but there are 9 ACP States belonging at the 
same time to both organisations. The EU, therefore, takes the view that Eastern and Southern 
Africa and the Indian Ocean could constitute a single programming region. SADC is however 
vehemently opposed to this manner of regional programming and it goes without saying that 
COMESA would take the same position. Statement by Commissioner Nielson supra 
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the SACU and the Conunon Monetary Area.8OO The Article provides further that the 
parties are also conscious that calling upon the LNS countries to implement immediately 
certain provisions of the Treaty may cause dislocation or fundamental disturbances to 
their economies.801 
A rtick 1 of the Treaty, however, provides that without derogating from the generality of 
the provisions of the Treaty, the provisions of the Protocol shall apply for the purposes 
of establishing a framework of special arrangements in regard to the participation of the 
LNS countries in the Conunon Market.80l The LNS States have been granted a five (5) 
year derogation from the application of the provisions of the Treaty relating to tariff 
reduction and the removal of non-tariff barriers the establishment and maintenance of a 
conunon external tariff most favoured nation treatment and monetary co-operation. 
The corollary to this derogation is one very positive indicator of co-operation between 
COMESA and SACU. The LNS countries have been obligated to take such measures, 
including those of a structural, economic and technical nature as will make possible the 
progressive increase in trade and economic co-operation with the other Member States. 
The LNS must also pursue socio-economic policies that will be conducive to the 
fulfilment of the objectives of the Treaty. On this score the Secretariat must be updated 
with reports on progress made with respect to obtaining the concurrence of the other 
members of SACU and the CMA to extend concessions granted in the context of SACU 
and the CMA to the other Member States.80) 
Indeed provisions on the LNS are coached in such terms as to suggest that COMESA 
would rather the LNS severs its SACU membership in order to fully participate in the 
former's integration programs. The five-year derogation awarded to the LNS would, in 
8e] See the preamble to chapter 22 of the COMESA Treaty 
801 Annex III contains the Protocol relating to the unique situation of Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
802 COMESA and its predecessor, the PTA permitted SACU members to enlist membership under a 
special protocol, which afforded them derogation from the obligations under the Treaty as long 
as they were parties to the SACU Treaty. For obvious reasons, this exemption was not going to 
be applied to South Africa if it had decided to join COMESA. As South Africa has taken a 
decision, in keeping with its membership of both SACU and SADC, not to join COMESA, this 
latter expectation is merely academic. 
803 Article 3 provides that the Council, acting on the proposal of the Intergovernmental Committee, may 
make recommendations to the LNS countries concerning the measures and projects to be 
undertaken in furtherance of the provisions of the Protocol. It also states that for the effective 
implementation of the provisions of this Protocol the Secretary-General shall undertake studies 
and make appropriate recommendations to Council on the practical aspects of and any other 
matters relating to the implementation of the Protocol. 
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our view, have to be extended ad infinitum To expect othetwise is a dim wishful thinking. 
There is no indication that the LNS would want to take flight from the SACU nest that is 
amply feathered by the big brother - South Africa. Equally, and as we have indicated 
earlier, it is not probable that South Africa would concede to manoeuvres by COMESA 
to upset SACD's common market strictures by acceding to LNS concessions for 
COMESA's Member States. 
It is significant, though that COMESA has a special provision for the LSN owing to their 
SACU membership yet no equivalent provision is made for the EAC save for the general 
indication to co-operate in various aspects.804 It is curious too, that no mention, let alone 
functional provision, is made regarding SADC whose majority membership belong to 
COMESA as well. Indeed for the sake of the EAC clear provisions have been made for 
co-operation to augment the latter's integration initiatives. This alignment smacks of a 
clear case of double standards. Whereas COMESA commits itself to facilitate the 
integration of the EAC, it gives lukewarm support for the SACU common market. 
COMESA in fact stops short of urging the LNS to decamp from the SACU fold and be 
committed solely to its mandate. 
The very same irony resides with the SADC, which has made direct reference to SACU 
as a close partner for integration while avoiding any mention of the COMESA whose 
membership double in the SADC as well. This ambivalence goes along way to explain 
the tension and suspicion that obtains between the two blocs. The two blocs tend to 
avoid and compete against each other than make direct overtures for co-operation. It is 
clear that SACU is treated as a part and parcel of the SADC in the like manner the EAC 
is treated as part and parcel of the COMESA. The only other notable feature is that 
whilst Tanzania is a core member of the EAC and a committed member of SADCo5 
none of the SACU members are committed to COMESA. The LNS membership in the 
COMESA is still doubtful in view of these countries' indication not to ratify the 
COMESA Treaty. 
Although the LNS membership is still on hold, it is difficult to see how the three can 
make concessions to CO}..lIESA where the dominant member - South Africa - is openly 
804 Article 178 makes provision for relations with the African Economic Community 
805 Indeed, it had to quit eOMESA to vindicate the pledge to its commitment to the SADe and its 
southern Diaspora 
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opposed to such overtures. In any event, South Africa sets the SACU tariff lines in which 
case any adjustment thereto can only be effected with the concurrence of the later. Quite 
adminedly, this is an eventuality that is unlikely to crystallise in the foreseeable future. 
The scenario is different with the EAC whose dominant member - Kenya - is a key 
player in the COMESA. The EAC can therefore afford to give concessions to COMESA 
without much complication, which is not to say the same with the LNS under SACU and 
SADC. 
Membership of the LNS in the COMESA is the one element that more than anything 
else manifests the deep-seated rivalry between the two blocs. The LNS are indeed South 
Africa's economic proteges and if they were to be won over to COMESA's side the 
former and Botswana would effectively be isolated. This scenario does not bode well for 
SADC's integration and SAWs corrunon market. The practicability of the LNS 
maintaining membership in the COMESA whilst still members of the SACU is a hard 
school altogether. The fundamentals on which the two regimes operate are clearly 
irreconcilable. 
It is safe to state that by seeking concessions from SACU, COMESA is expanding the 
space for intra-regional trade. It is possible that a meeting of trade concessions from the 
SACU corrunon market and the EAC would go a long way to deepen integration efforts 
in the region and knit SAOC and COMESA securely together. The only possible 
downside to this discourse is the fact that such concessions would dilute the essence of a 
customs union to the point where the utility of the union would be rendered irreverent 
to its own beneficiaries. 
It is true to aver that the unity of purpose in trade is what the two blocs aspire for in 
their desire to ultimately realise that elusive dream of a Pan-African Economic 
Corrununity.806 It is, therefore, arguable that the SACU-EAC axis might as well prove to 
be the incentive that would move the regional integration vehicle into the fast lane of the 
highway to the Pan-African Economic Corrununity. Our thesis is that for such an 
eventuality to be actuallsed there would have to be greater co-operation between the two 
806 Article 3 of the COMESA Treaty states that in the final analysis it is hoped that co-operation would 
ultimately contribute towards the establishment, progress and the realisation of the objectives of 
the African Economic Community. See also the preamble to SADC Trade Protocol 
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blocs. Such co-operative approach would ensure unity of purpose between the two blocs' 
customs unions, which would spread to the region at large. 
8.4.4 The South African factor in the integration equation 
Like we pointed out earlier, SADC progressed to its current high profile regional 
integration edifice by dint of the South African membership. SADC has now become, 
not only COMESA's main challenger for regional resources, but that it is a pacesener for 
the deepening of integration in the region. It is indeed not far-fetched to suggest that 
COMESA's galloping race toward a common market have everything to do with the 
meteonc nse of SADC to become a formidable regional economic adversary to the 
former. 807 
The end of open conflict in southern Africa in 1993808 as well as the advent of a 
democratic South Africa in 1994 saw the emergence of the new SADC and the 
COMESA as the dominant regional trade blocs. Both institutions went all out to anract 
the young state.809 Mistry express the view that the overlap between SADC and 
COMESA, and the sensitivities related to South Africa's membership in one and non-
membership in the other, are likely to present problems for integration in the region.8IO 
He contends that some of these problems arise from the asymmetric trade panerns in the 
region. South Africa enjoys a significant trade surplus with the region, and this has been 
enhanced by a sharp rise in South Africa's exports to the region in particular and to the 
rest of the continent generally in the post-democratic period. 
At the advent of democratic rule in South Africa, COMESA with its clear and ripe 
objectives for the formation of a common market was a natural favourite outfit for the 
former than the then spurious objectives fronted by SADC. Yet in the face of this clear-
807 Although Mwenja disagrees with the contention that COMESA is blindly rushing the free trade area 
program. He scoffs at those harbingers of doom noting that there are those who are genuinely 
frightened about the implications of the COMESA free trade agreement. Some might even 
suggest that the pace is too fast for them, he says. According to Mwenja, however, the root cause 
of this hesitation is lack of information and the fear of the unknown noting that the cynics will 
see problems but serious entrepreneurs see opportunities. See statement on the Extraordinary 
Summit to the Launch of the Free Trade Area supra 
808 Angola being an exception and the Mozambique peace process was well on track 
809 R. Davies, "South Africa Joining SADCC or SADCC Joining South Africa: Emerging Perspectives on 
Regional Economic Co-operation After Apartheid", in A Van Nieuwkerk and G Van Staden 
(eds.). Southern Africa at Cross-roads: Prospects for the Political Economy of the Region, 1991 at 
p.237 
8!OThe period 1990-94 recorded a 24 percent increase in the dollar value of South Africa's exports to the 
region. Ernest, Trade Reform and Regional Integration Seminar, supra at p.439 
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cut divide, South Africa elected to join the SADC - obviously the weaker of the two 
blocs. Thomas is of the view that this informed election on the part of South Africa 
suggests that COMESA's advanced integration process was less appealing to South 
Africa.811 This view finds favour with the priorities, which South Africa harbours, for the 
economic rival of the region. 
South Africa's perspective is that of a comprehensive approach to regional development 
that encompasses a regional industrial strategy. This approach includes regional 
infrastructure projects and the harmonisation of the financial sector, which should be on 
the SADC agenda and not merely free trade. It is however possible that there were other 
reasons that motivated South Africa to prefer SADC to COMESA. One of the obvious 
reasons is the geographical location of South Africa in relation to other SADC members. 
This geographical proximity offered far greater and favourable prospects for regional 
integration than the almost nebulous COMESA fraternity. The other important reason is 
the role the disbanded SADCC had played in mobilising frontline states in the struggle 
against the emasculating apartheid regime. Upon its political emancipation, joining fellow 
comrades at arms in SADC was the only natural and logical thing to do on the part of 
South Africa. 
It is important to keep in mind that, while government contributes to the environment 
within which business decisions, including location are made, it does not take such 
decisions. Undeniably, South Africa as the dominant economy in the region, and given its 
current privileged international status, is uniquely positioned to make a positive 
contribution to the international investor image and the competitiveness of the region. A 
query in this regard is whether South Africa can afford to concentrate on regional issues 
while domestic challenges to policymakers are beckoning uncomfortably.812 By joining 
SADC, South Africa realised it could not 'go it alone when dealing with advantaged 
nations. The clear thinking is that although it is a relatively rich country, South Africa 
cannot survive as an island that is surrounded by the sea of regional poverty. 
In view of the massive incidences of inequality still subsisting in South Africa's societal 
strata and the concomitant ongoing process of transformation, it is unlikely that South 
Africa would effectively play the role of the paymaster general for the region in the same 
811 Trade Liberalisation Issues, supra, n.31 
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manner Germany did for the EU. Unlike Europe, the number of LLDCs in the region is 
such that it is near impossible for South Africa to assume the responsibility of allaying 
the resultant distribution costs without plunging its nascent democracy into chaos. 
Suffice to state that the challenges that encumber regional growth in the east and 
southern Africa region are legion and therefore far beyond the limited resources that 
South Africa is in a position to offer in offsening the resultant distributional costs. 
South Africa has to grapple with the problem of poverty, disease, inequality, and 
democracy in infancy as a country as well as a part of the region. Policy-makers must 
understand that the country's destiny is interwoven with that of the region. It is not 
within the competence of this work to delve into this vexing question. Suffice to posit 
that, as the undisputed regional economic powerhouse, South Africa has effectively 
assumed the daunting mantle of regional leadership. By that very description, much is 
expected, nay demanded, of South Africa beyond its national borders. 
South Africa must, therefore, rise to the challenge of giving leadership on the way 
forward not only to its SADC flock but to the wider region and the continent as a whole. 
In our considered view, South Africa can and should play a pivotal role in building 
bridges between the two blocs in order to spur intra-regional trade.813 In so doing, South 
Africa would have given a fresh impetus to the much-hyped grand match to an African 
Economic Community. 
8.5.1 Locating areas of common weaknesses 
The two blocs have numerous internal weaknesses that are common to both and which 
call for urgent restructuring if they are to survive the rampaging wind of globalisation. 
One issue of critical significance is the fact that the two blocs share membership of states 
with diverse characteristics and economic interests and the recorded benefits accruing to 
a member of such a large regional grouping are minuscule. We now examine, albeit in 
brevity, some of the areas of common weakness that co-operation would seek to address. 
812 See Ernest, Trade Reform and Regional Integration Seminar, supra n. 43 at p.439 
813 It is noteworthy that South Africa is already living up to this calling by playing a leading role in rhe 
Nepad initiative. On the 9th July 2000, the moribund OAU was given a descend burial and in irs 
place a new horizon for the economic emanciparion of Africa in the name of rhe African Union 
(AU) was born. Wirh South Africa firmly in rhe driver's sear, and appropriately so, the African 
Union must be raken as the rrue manifestarion of rhe much-ralked about African Renaissance. 
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(aj Owfapping ammm market areas 
Most countries in sub-Sahara Africa have membership in more than one regional 
arrangement. Problems arise when the various groupings have conflict means in which to 
achieve sometimes similar objectives.814 The membership of the Common Monetary 
Area (CMA) closely overlaps that of SACU, except for the absence of Botswana from 
the former. The CMA operates under the Multilateral Monetary Agreement (MMA), 
which is supported by bilateral arrangements between South Africa and its partners. 
Thus, and as earlier indicated, within east and southern Africa region, there are forms of 
integration that are more important to some members than others. Then there is the 
EAC on the other end of the regional pendulum.8IS The two blocs have to swing 
precariously between these already established customs unions.816 The result is the 
irreconcilable adulteration of common market fundamentals with those of a free trade 
area. This scenario then renders the entire corpus of a common market completely 
dysfunctional and to that extent nugatory. 
\ 
An important consideration is COMESA's intention to erect a common external tariff. 
The SADC countries that have membership in the COMESA may not be in a position to 
extend zero tariff preferences to non-COMESA members. Taking account of the fact 
that one SADC country, South Africa, accounts for the bulk of intra-SADC trade, it can 
be expected that very little intra-SADC trade would be generated as a result of the SADC 
Trade Protocol. 
Thomas warns of the confusion that is likely to ensue from having two parallel 
arrangements, SADC and COMESA, with significant overlaps in memberships.81l She 
cautions that liberalising intra-regional trade may be confounded and confused rather 
than facilitated in view of this unwholesome complexity - our emphasis. In addition, 
there is the Cross-Border Initiative that is a fast-track regional integration regime that 
commenced in 1993. Its mandate is for member countries to lower tariffs to those of the 
lowest-tariff members - which under structural adjustment programs have already 
814 Many of the ECOWAS member states also belong to UEMOA but UEMOA is widely perceived to be 
a means for countering what is seen by the French to be a growing Nigerian influence in the sub-
region. See Ernest Trade Reform and Regional Integration Seminar at p. 411). It thus poses a 
challenge to the cohesion of ECOWAS. 
815 See discussion on the EAC equation below 
816 Ernest, Trade Reform and Regional Integration in Africa, supra at p. 410 
817 R H. Thomas, Trade Liberalisation Issues, Seminar Report, at p.4S 
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reached levels as low as 5 percent. This llliUatlve, too, has membership overlapping 
across the two blocs.818 
The SADe Trade Protocol at Par.3 provides that a member state "shall not be obliged to 
extend [presumably to other member states] the preferences of another trading block" of 
which it is already a member at the time that the Protocol came into force. This last 
provision clearly covers both SACU and eOMESA. The problem with such a condition 
is that enforcement and administration of the divergent tariff regimes by member states 
will be extremely difficult, given the weakness of customs border controls within their 
territories. This applies to South Africa as welL Thomas suggests that it would have been 
better had member states attempted either to simplify their arrangements by rationing 
down or alternatively, give more consideration to mechanism for accommodating these 
arrangements.819 In our thesis, the latter suggestion -that is finding mechanisms for 
accommodating these arrangements is the preferred way forward. 820 
(b) Non-implementation of treaty pruvisions 
In spite of its diversity, emphasis on regional trade liberalisation remains the norm in 
regional integration. Like SADe the current eOMESA economic integration program 
lays too much emphasis on trade liberalisation through the removal of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers. It also urges the elimination of administrative and institutional barriers to 
trade flows and transits traffic facilitation. This mania for trade liberalisation is not 
sufficiently tempered with an industrial and investment policy, which it appropriately 
should. 
A major feature of African integration efforts is that very limited progress has been made 
in implementing integration policies, in particular harmonising tariff codes and 
classifications, and introducing positive integration policies. The harmonisation of 
agricultural, industrial, energy, fiscal, and monetary policies, which has been envisaged in 
some treaties and the Lagos Plan of Action, has not taken place.8ll 
818 Ernest, Trade Refonn and Regional Integration in Africa, at p. 439 
819 In line with the FDB's "variable speed, multiple geometry" approach to integration. See R. H. Thomas, 
'Regional Arrangements and the wro supra at p. 23 
820 See the discussion on intra-bloc co-operation below 
821 For example, the decision by ECOWAS to harmonise agricultural policies and adopt a common 
position during negotiations on international commodity agreements was disregarded during the 
wro negotiations. This trend can be attributed to the unwillingness of goverrunents to make 
regional objectives a priority. 
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The slow implementation of the tariff reduction program for the two blocs has meant 
that a number of countries have missed an oppornmity to facilitate trade.822 In 
recognition of the slow pace of the COMESA implementation schedule, the COMESA 
treaty now has an important innovation. The concept of multi speed or variable 
geometry provides for a group of countries to move faster in regional economic 
integration process than the slower-moving ones, which would otherwise default in 
implementing contracted programs.823 With co-operation, the two blocs stand to benefit 
immensely from this sustainable trade partnership. 
The result of the jumbled membership in the region is that the removal of non-tariff 
barriers is likely to proceed with difficulty. Indeed, the calculation of tariff equivalents is 
much easier in theory than in practice, and negotiations are likely to be complicated. In 
the SADC case, restrictive import licensing, administrative delays, bureaucratic 
contortions, stipulations of sources of supply, and prohibitions on importation of certain 
goods may prove to be serious challenges in this regard. In the area of co-operation, 
SADC would benefit by borrowing a leaf from the COMESA arrangement to implement 
a more practical approach to the reduction of non-tariff barriers. It is noteworthy that, in 
their recent meeting the two blocs have agreed to share experiences and harmonise their 
approach in dealing with this recurrent non-tariff barrier conundrum.824 
(c) Inadequate comp.nsation rrurhmisms 
Since most integration arrangements include countries with varying levels of economic 
development, the emphasis on trade integration means that gains from integration will be 
unevenly distributed. This requires that equity issues be dealt with effectively at the initial 
stages of the negotiations.825 It is obvious that the two blocs have not adequately 
822 The loss of this opportunity can be gleaned from examining the standard deviation of tariff rates, which 
measures the dispersion of rates around their mean value - the argument being that highly 
dispersed rates are evident of discriminatory tariffs that may distort production and consumption 
decisions. See Louis et al, Trade Refonn and Regional Integration Seminar, supra at p. 470 
S2} The same applies to the settlement of disputes arising from interpretation or in the course of 
implementation of the treaty. See Mwencha.]. E. 0: 1997, "COMESA; A Building Block for the 
African Economic Community, "AEC News Letter, voU, pp.17-18 See also Louis et al, Trade 
Refonn and Regional Integration Seminar, supra, at p. 471 
824 One of the issues that invariably hamper intra-regional trade is the Non-Tariff Barriers regime and we 
discussed this at great length. Some of the non-tariff barriers such as import/export permits and 
quotas are easy to eliminate. However, important measures such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary, 
standards, quality assurance and metrology can be used as a non-tariff barrier. See also Chapter 
three above 
825 For instance, in the European Union's integration experience, Germany, the undisputed economical 
power-house undertook to bankroll and thereby helped to assuage all distributional pressures 
which unfolded in the wake of this process. 
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addressed the potentially explosive question of distribution of gains. The inadequacy of 
the distributive measures arises from a fundamental uncertainty about whether the 
expected gains from integration will indeed materialise. 826 A failure, however, to address 
this pertinent issue is the vel)' antithesis to a successful integration framework. 
(d) String:m trade likralisation schemes 
Attempts to reduce the costs of regional trade liberalisation on member countries have 
resulted in stringent programs of trade liberalisation. The rules of origin that limit 
participation on the basis of value added and ownership of enterprises reduces the 
potential number of participants in trade liberalisation schemes. Even though the 
domestic manufacturing base is small, the trade liberalisation schemes of a number of 
countries in the region further restrict the proportion of output that can actually be 
exported to regional markets under the scheme.827 
(e) Absence 0/ strong supranational institutions 
The transformation of SADCC into SADC and the track record of the PTA/COMESA 
have highlighted the urgent need for institutional capacity building. SADC's institutions 
require the development of capacity to formulate, co-ordinate, harmonise, manage and 
implement capability of national structure adjustment program so as to make them 
responsive to the objectives of economic integration that are being pursued by member 
states.B28 COMESA has moved fast on the establishment of the PTA bank, PTA 
insurance, a Clearing-House and the COMESA Court of Justice. The viability of these 
institutions and their sustainability are matters yet to be tested.829 SADC has not achieved 
this level of institutional diversity as yet. 
826 Less economically endowed COMESA states fear that according trade preferences to all members 
would lead to an asymmetrical distribution of benefits which would mainly benefit Zimbabwe and 
Kenya, countries with stronger industrial base. Efforts by the COMESA Secretariat to convince 
countries that removal of tariffs represents an income transfer from government to the private 
sector met with limited success. Matters were not helped by the absence of an effective 
compensation mechanism. (See also Ernest, Trade Reform and Regional Integration, Seminar, 
supra at p.41l 
827 Ernest Trade Reform and Regional Integration, Seminar Report, supra at 412 
828 Supra at p.459 
829 Article 23 of the COMESA Treaty provides for the General Jurisdiction of the Court, which shall have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters that may be referred to it pursuant to the Treaty. Artide 
26 of the COMESA Treaty allows any person - be they natural or artificial- that is resident in a 
Member State to refer for determination by the Court the legality of any act, regulation, directive, 
or decision of the Council or of a Member State on the grounds that such act, directive, decision 
or regulation is unlawful or an infringement of the provisions of the Treaty. The caveat being that 
such person shall not refer the matter for determination to the court until they first exhaust the 
local remedies in the national courts or tribunals of the Member State. 
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In respect of the African approach to integration, Hettne830 argues that" ... judging from 
the results of integration, it is not the number of regional organisations that counts. He 
postulates that to the extent that one can speak of a new regionalism in the African 
context, the trend should rather be from single issue organisations to consolidate, 
multidimensional regions with some supranational authority, ranging from economic 
development to security".831 The recently launched AU initiative seems to fit well into 
Hettne's perspective. Our view is, however, that to nature intra-regional trade a lean and 
focused instrument like the Nepad is the way to go. 
No doubt, most operating regional institutions lack the legal backing to implement or 
enforce treaties and protocols.832 The result is a lack of transparency in the 
implementation of the treaties. The lack of supra-nationality allows the progress of the 
integration process to be captured by vested interests. If private economic agents have a 
complaint regarding the operation of the Protocol or article of the agreement, for 
example, this has to be made to a national government body. Such a body would in most 
cases be the one that sanctioned the policy that contravened the treaty in the severe 
storms that are normally generated by integration undercurrents. 833 
(f) Inadequate sanctioning autfxmty 
In the absence of credible supranational institutions, the treatles often do not have 
effective sanctions against member states pursuing policies that conflict with the articles 
of the agreement. Even where the penalties are spelled out834 the cost of not 
implementing the treaty may be perceived to be less than the benefits of doing so. This 
perception by member states is more likely where for instance in the case of SADC and 
COMESA members of the union not implementing the articles of the agreement.835 The 
risk of free riding is also too very real in these nascent regimes. 
830 B. Henne, "The New Regionalism: Implications for Development and Peace", in B. Henne and A. 
Inotai, Research for Action - The New R~' Implications for GIohd Deudopnent and lrUemt1lional 
Security, 1994, al p.30 
831 See also R. H. Thomas, 'Regional Arrangements and the wro supra at p. 26 
832 The ECOWAS secretariat, for example, has a few powers to force governments to implement trade 
Iiberalisation measures. See Earnest, infra 
83} Ernest Trade Reform and Regional Integration, Seminar, supra at p. 412 
834 As in the case of the revised ECOWAS Treaty 
83S For instance, most of the SADC countries have resolutely failed to heed the edict in their Trade 
Protocol to decamp from COMESA. In fact, one of the countries - Zambia - is happy to play 
host to COMESA's seat of Power whilst another core SADC member -Zimbabwe - has already 
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COMESA has a regional court, which is yet to prove itS mettle in deepening 
integration.836 Given the limited participation of the private sector concerns in the 
enforcement of treaty obligations, it is unlikely that this institution will live up to its 
mandate to deepen integration the same way the European Court has disciplined 
member states to adhere to covenanted treaty provisions. 
(g) Lack of politicd ammiJment 
Shaw has observed that the basic issue confronting regionalism in Africa is compatibility 
with established political economies and ruling classes.837 And when these are, like is the 
case for states in the region, outward-oriented towards extra-continental integration, 
intra-continental connections remain undeveloped and unimportant - our emphasis. He 
contends that regional leaders will adopt integration approaches that allow them to 
preserve their national interests completely. It is obvious that in this scenario, self-
preservation takes precedent over the overall regional good.838 1rus lack of seriousness is 
also reflected in the manner in which regional groupings are inaugurated.839 
Due to their colonial history and the subsequent unsevered umbilical cord of aid 
dependency manifested in the likes of the Cotonou840, all the regional players have 
structures that favour western markets for local products. The odd exception is South 
Africa, which exports a substantial quantity of its products to the region and the 
continent at large. Even then just fewer than 50 percent of its exports end up in the 
western market, in particular the European Union. This would explain, in part, why 
South Africa opted to join (he SADC instead of COMESA. 
The foregoing perceptions are further complicated by the proclivity of politicians and 
bureaucrats not to pay attention to economic considerations. Instead political expediency 
coupled with narrow national interests, that is defined by pressure groups from within is 
signed in on the COMESA free trade area disciplines that was recently launched. See also Ernest 
Trade Reform and Regional Integration, Seminar, supra at p. 412 
836 See the note on the COMESA court supra n. 103 
837 See Ernest, supra at p. 412 
838 See Ernest Trade Reform and Regional Integration, Seminar, supra at p. 412 
839 The PTA authority adopted recommendations to transform the PTA into COMESA in 1992. However, 
at the summit meeting of Heads of States of the three countries that had formerly been members 
of the EAC, it was agreed to reactivate co-operation of the three East African countries. The 
Heads of States ratified the recommendations of the council of ministers mapping out the form 
that the co-operation would take in November 1993. Subsequently, the protocol to establish the 
secretariat for East African Co-operation was signed in November 1994. See Ernest supra at p. 
412 
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allowed to take precedent'4l As it is, eOMESA is faced with tremendous difficulty in 
coping with a membership that has become more fractious, where many of the state 
parties show signs of nations in disintegration'" The SADC arrangement is not without 
blemish either. The institution is going through the vel)' same malaise that eOMESA has 
had to grapple with. Member states are beginning to default on their membership dues 
to particular SADe institutions.'" 
A major draw back to regional integration in the eOMESA area is that countries with 
few or no common interest have tried to integrate. Many of the countries have little trade 
among them and indeed have well established trading links with countries outside the 
region. For many countries, production structures that were developed during the 
colonial era have not changed and often do not favour intra-regional trade. Regional 
groups have been established with little regard paid to the requisite initial conditions for 
integration. This convoluted stated of affairs has not only diverted attention from the 
wider goal but in many cases has led to wasteful duplication of activities.'" 
(h) LcUk of trade lib?ralisation ro-ordinalion 
The inhibiting factors within the region aflse from the failure to co-ordinate trade 
liberalisation programs across countries. For example, a countl)' would reduce external 
tariffs faster than its neighbours would and this give way to internal pressure especially 
by manufacturers producing items subject to competition from imports. Such pressure 
would result in a policy reversal or slowdown in the process of liberalisation. Another 
possibility is the use of non-tariff barriers by neighbouring countries that inhibit the free 
flow of trade due retaliatol)' restrictions. There is, therefore, a need for enhanced co-
ordination among the two blocs member States to reinforce commitment to contracted 
trade liberalisation policies'45 
S.;oPreviously the Lome Convention 
841See discussion in McCarthy, "Regional Integration for Developing Countries at Different Levels of 
Economic Devdopment- Problems and Prospects" 4 Transitional Law and Contemporary 
Problems, No 1, spring 1994 at pp.1O-11. See also A. Hazelwood, "The end of the Easl Alrican 
Conununity: What are the lessons for regional integration schemes?" 18 Journal of Common 
Markel Slud. 1979, pp. 53-54 
8~2 For example, Bwundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire, and to some eXlent, Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
8~} At the Annual Consultative Conference in 1995, for example, the Executive Secretary reported financiaJ 
crisis within the agricultural research organisation - SACCAR, as a consequence of member states 
not paying their dues. 
844 Louis et al, supra at p. 480 
"5 Supra at p. 481 
289 
Both these arguments carry considerable measure of persuasive force. But they fail to 
address the current integration realities obtaining in the region. In addition, the 
experience of the European Union and North America has persuaded regional policy 
makers that the benefits from regional integration extend well beyond static welfare 
gains, to dynamic benefits that affect the development prospects of regional 
economies.846 But then, for the present, what is the obtaining reality? 
8.5.2 Acceptance of the obtaining reality 
It is not lost to keen observers that states in the east and southern Africa region, which 
form the bulk of the ACP membership, have been and still are unable to fully utilise 
quotas reserved for them under the Cotonou.847 The reason for the under-utilisation of 
this crucial facility has been traced to lack of export and production capacity. It is 
unlikely that a mere mechanical realignment of regional regimes would help cure these 
structural and capacity problems. The real problem resides, in the main, with individual 
states. These problems can only be addressed once states in the region fundamentally 
change their production structures and revamp the export portfolio to stimulate intra-
regional trade. This possibility resides, in the final analysis, within the borders and 
juridical competence of each member state. 
The common objectives of the two blocs as provided in their respective instruments, is 
to promote co-operation and development in all aspects of economic activity, particularly 
in trade, industry, transport, communication, agriculture, natural resources, and monetary 
affairs. 848 The two blocs have the overall aim of raising the standards of living for their 
people and of fostering closer relations among its member states. Importantly, the two 
blocs hope to eventually create a free trade area that would permit free movement of 
goods, capital and labour within the sub-region and contribute to the economic growth 
and development of the continent. Basically the two blocs are concerned not only with 
achieving trade integration, but also harmonisation of agricultural, industrial, 
846 Ernest Trade Reform and Regional Integration, Seminar, supra at p. 459 
S47 This facility has since expired and been replaced by the Cotonou which is a transitionary arrangement to 
allow for negotiation for a post-Lome dispensation - See chapter seven for a detailed discussion 
of the Cotonou 
848 The preamble to the SADc Protocol and that of the COMES A Treaty 
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transportation, energy, fiscal, and monetary policies.84? These multiple objectives find 
expression in the perception that integration would lead to greater self-reliance.8so 
The reality of the regional integration process in the east and southern Africa is that there 
are two blocs, which have co-existed alongside each other for a considerable length of 
time. One aspect that comes out clearly is the fact that South Africa's entry into the 
equation as a regional power broker has suddenly upset the balance of regional trade 
equation in the region. It is common knowledge that regional integration in southern 
Africa, with the exception of SACU, does not have an impressive track record. Despite 
this glaring fact, SADC is growing, and attempts to invigorate regional integration are 
being pursued, as the signing of the SADC Trade Protocol indicates. Factors 
contributing to this optimism include the new role South Africa is playing in the region, 
which despite misgivings on certain counts is expected to contribute to the development 
of the region.8s1 
The admission of South Africa as a member of SADC has seen the once moribund 
organisation suddenly reinvent itself to an economic entity with enough muscle to 
challenge COMESA's once dominant position. Sensing an eminent threat to its very 
existence that would have been engendered by a mass exodus of its members to SADC, 
COMESA has come out fighting. This is a natural reaction that is expected of a bloc that 
has dominated trade issues in the region for over two decades. One would want to 
inquire why all over a sudden COMESA is keen on admitting the LNS to its fold. These 
countries, save for South Africa, have been around all along. 
COMESA has gone out full blast to intensify and fast-track its integration activities with 
the aim of committing member states to obligations that would keep them fully 
preoccupied and therefore away from the beckoning SADC incentives. On its part, 
SADC has moved to urge its members that are in COMESA to reVIew their 
membership,8s2 Until recently, therefore, the reality of regional integration in southern 
849 Until its transformation, for example, SADC was the only large regional grouping that did not have 
trade integration as an objective. 
S50Ernest Trade Refonn and Regional Integration Seminar, supra at p.4l0 
851 Supra at p. 459 
852 Despite the express provisions of Article 27 of the SADC Protocol, some of the SADC members still 
maintain membership in the COMESA and there is no sign that Zimbabwe, Mauritius and 
Zambia, in particular, would review this position in the foreseeable future. The three are part of 
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Africa has been antagonistic as the two blocs fight it out to preserve the common pool of 
membership, which they share. 
Nothing exemplifies the intense rivalry between the two blocs more than their current 
pre-occupation to out-do each other in admitting as many new members as possible 
from the other bloc's ranks.853 Certainly, such expansion goes against the more rational 
view that deepening of regional integration alliances must first take place before 
enlargement. It is now trite in regional integration experience that the larger the number 
of members and the greater the economic diversity, the wider the Likelihood of problems 
with implementation.854 
Our thesis rests on the premises that the reality of double membership and therefore 
open antagonism should be acknowledged as a fast step to identifying ways and means of 
harnessing synergies in the two bloc's programs for co-operative approach.855 This point 
leads us to investigate what should be the way forward for the two blocs. It is not 
difficult to see that the two blocs have an overriding objective of paving the way for an 
Economic Community for Africa. The two blocs can and should easily harness areas of 
synergy in their programs so as to walk the path of co-operation that would spread out to 
other regions in the continent and climax into the desired goal of an Economic 
Community for Africa.856 
the recently launched COMESA free trade area and appear to have resigned to the reality of their 
double membership. 
853 Thomas laments that the co-existence berween the two blocs is becoming more ludicrous as SADC 
admits new members from the COMESA stable. Such a move was sanctioned by the agreement 
by SADC Heads of State in 1997 to admit both the ORC and the Seychelles to the SADC fold. 
She argues that it is only a matter of time before Madagascar, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda come 
knocking. According to Thomas, should this influx happen, SADC will then effectively have 
"swallowed" COMESA, and both RSA and Botswana would by default, have joined the 
organisation they have steadfastly rejected all these years. See Trade liberalisation Issues, Seminar 
Report supra at p. 45 
854 As Aryyeetey and Oduro have observed a small number of members to start with (as per the EU 
experience) who have a specific goal, may be the best way to approach integration efforts. See 
Aryyeetey and Oduro, (1996) " Regional Integration Efforts in Africa: An overview", in 
Regionalism and the Global Economy: The case of Africa; The Hague: FUNDAD ( See also R. 
H. Thomas Trade Liberalisation Issues, Seminar Report, supra at p. 45) 
855 Within the SACU negotiation rounds member states push to the furthest recesses of the agenda any 
discussion of relations within SADC and COMESA. This does not bode well for the 
development of sound policies and inter-linkages berween the diverse institutions and makes a 
mockery of the Abuja Treaty's call for building blocks to fuse together the Pan-Africanist vision 
for a continent-wide common market .. See R. H. Thomas; 'Regional Arrangements and the 
WTO, supra at p.26 
856 This is where the crucial question of regional co-operation and integration that is treated under Article 
28 of the Cotonou Agreement kicks in. Co-operation in this area would provide effective 
assistance to achieve the objectives and priorities which the ACP States have set for themselves in 
the context of regional and sub-regional co-operation and integration. 
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This strategy IS, of course, good riddance for the new kid on the bloc - the Nepad 
initiative. With the two blocs coalescing into joint ventures at policy synergy and 
spreading out to other regions, the Nepad initiative would find a smooth highway via 
which to roll out its economic growth programs for the benefit of this economically 
vanquished continent. Nepad is a scheme similar to the Marshall Plan. Its key focus is in 
getting African governments to work together to improve the continent's infrastructure 
by attracting $64 billion a year in investment.857 The germane question begging at this 
juncture is what, then are these areas of synergies upon which the two blocs would built 
co-operative approach to deepen the integration agenda. 
Areas of co-operation are many and self-evident. Before we unload some of them, let us 
first address the salient issue regarding the necessity for intra-bloc co-operation. Of 
course we have, in passing, stated several reasons as to why the thesis of collaborative 
approach is viable but for the avoidance of doubt, these issues deserve further 
clarification. This is, per force, an important hurdle to overcome before we qualify to 
cross the bridge of dilemma to the assured side of regional co-operation. This discourse 
would help explain the need for a co-operative strategy in deepening integration in the 
east and southern Africa region. 
857 President Wade of Senegal had developed the Omega Plan and President Mbeki of South Africa on the 
other hand developed the Millennium Action Programme (MAP). These two initiatives were 
coming out with a vision and a programme of action for Africa's economic recovery in this 
globalised world economy. The leaders realised the two documents were talking of more or less, 
the same thing and they were brought together into the new partnership. (See the East African 
Standard Online at http://www.eastandard.net on Saturday, June 29, 2002) Nepad protagonists 
have contended that this facility is an instrument to be used by the African Heads of State to 
attract donor funding and foreign investments in Africa. In this regard, they argue, it gives in 
wholesale to the neo-liberal view of the western world and Africa's subordinate position. The 
protagonists contend that the actions proposed in the various sectors of the African economy are 
therefore nothing but a shopping list for areas in which donor funds are needed and foreign 
investments to be attracted. Given the political conditions prevailing in Africa today, neither 
donor funds nor foreign investments will help change the situation for the majority of the African 
poor. Resources are likely to continue being wasted in useless internal wars, corruption, 
unproductive enterprises and flight of capital. On the other hand, a much more sympathetic 
reading of Nepad would contend that it makes an important step in the leaders' and governments' 
accepting that something is rotten in the state of politics in Africa. (A commentary by Prof. 
Anyang' Nyong'o, in the Daily Nation Online in the East Africa business section, at 
http://www.nationaudio.com on Monday, April 15, 2002. If you ask Mbeki, he will tell you that 
African partnership begins here in Africa and that is why Nepad is committed to regional 
integration. The Nepad puts a lot of emphasis on collective self-reliance for development of 
Africa. African economies in terms of global economic transactions are too small to go ir alone 
and under the current circumstances ir is very important rhar rhey maximise rheir domestic 
potentials for development. See also http://www.easrandard.ner on Sarurday, June 29, 2002 
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8.6.1 The Case for intra-bloc co-operation 
Mistry, pinpoints and correctly so in our view, the structural fundamentals that underpin 
economic growth in the current global dispensation.858 He posits that not so long ago, 
comparative advantage was used to explain patterns of international trade and the 
success of some countries over others in the world markets. He opines that more often 
than not, such advantage was seen to accrue mainly to countries which had natural 
resources, particular qualities of human capital, a surplus of financial capital, and an 
advanced economic infrastructure by way of functioning markets and institutions. 
Mistry contends further that the notion of static comparative advantage based on these 
endowments has given way to a different notion of more rapidly shifting dynamic 
competitive advantage which is based less on factors of production.859 He lists the new 
phenomenon as the possession of market share, global brands, and sophisticated process 
and information technology capabilities. He adds to this the ability to access and 
interpret knowledge and the systemic dexterity, which requires considerable flexibility in 
labour and factor markets and you sure have your edge on the global trade equation. In 
our view, fundamental as they are, these are distant attributes for the economically 
malnourished sub-Saharan African countries. 
In view of Mistry's seminal remarks, however, one thing becomes immediately crystal 
clear. That is to say, in addition to expanding the effective size of markets and improving 
access to expon markets and providing incentives for foreign direct investment the main 
challenge facing the two regional blocs is how to spur economic growth and investment 
through increased productivity. Increased productivity will require a restructuring and 
diversification of the productive base. Again the two blocs cannot compete in the global 
markets in terms of high productivity and high quality on the basis of low labour wages 
alone. Access to technology and technical know-how is critical. 
It is only through greater regional co-operatIOn and networking between domestic, 
regional and international partners, that the two blocs would be able to improve access to 
technology and other resources. This measure will enhance the two bloc's productivity 
858 P. S Mistry, " The New Regionalism: Impediments or Spur to future multilateralism?" In Teunissen,] 
(ed.), Regionalism the Global Economy: The case of the Latin America & the Caribbean, 1995, 
See also R Thomas in 'Regional Arrangements and the wro, supra at p. 28 
859 Ibid. 
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and competitiveness in the global marketplace.860 A common front on the international 
plane is also a formidable tool in bringing pressure to bear in the increasingly turbulent 
negotiations for the lucrative global market. 
A further problem that call for urgent redress is the inherent inconsistencies in the 
implementation of the COMESA free trade area, the proposed SADC free trade area and 
the CBI tariff reduction programme. This scenario may not, however, constitute a 
problem, de facto, as all COMESA countries abide by the agreed timetable of 
implementing a COMESA free trade area. Only two countries in SADC - South Africa 
and Botswana - will not have implemented the free trade area. This is, nonetheless, an 
area in which the COMESA Secretariat will need to work closely with its SADC 
counterpart to ensure that implementation of the respective free trade disciplines are not 
contradictory.861 
The CBI is a facility through which the two blocs' respective Secretariats would need to 
enlist the support of short-term technical assistance inputs to augment the process. This 
is an area where co-operation between the two blocs would engender immense intra-
regional trade spin-offs. The opposite route is one that leads to chaos and disharmony in 
the implementation of integration disciplines in the region.862 The latter option is entirely 
undesirable in the face of efforts to augment the momentum to regional prosperity. 
Related to the establishment of the free trade area are the removal of the non-tariff 
barriers and the simplification of the two bloc's Rules of Origin and Value Added 
Criteria.863 One particularly troublesome non-tariff barrier is the amount of 
documentation required to move goods between and amidst the two blocs markets. 
860 COMESA in brief, hup:! /www.comesa.int, at p.7 
861 Indeed on the Regional economic integration front, Article 29 of the Cotonou Agreement provides that 
co-operation shall support the development and strengthening of the capacities of regional 
integration institutions and organisations set up by the ACP States [0 promote regional co-
operation and integration. 
862 COMESA News & Publications: Statement by the Secretary-General on the Official opening of the 
COMESA/EU Forum - 26th October, 2000, see also hup:! /www.comesa.int at p.7 
863 COMESA has been working on levels of value-added content and COMESA Rules of Origin for some 
time now. The view of the Secretariat is that the Rules of Origin should not be based on an added 
value criterion alone. In fact firms will try to reduce added value, through reducing costs and 
becoming more efficient and so rules of origin based on just added value may be counter-
productive in promoting intra-regional trade. Added value rules are also arbitrary in nature, 
complex to apply and introduce a high risk of fraud. Given these drawbacks the rules of origin 
study proposed by the COMESA Secretariat is not [0 be limited [0 added value criteria only and 
will address other issues of regional trade. , http:! hvww.comesa.int, at p. 8 
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COMESA has addressed the problem of the multiplicity of customs documents, by 
designing the COMESA Customs Document, or COMESA-CD, which was scheduled 
for introduction by all COMESA member states by July 1997.864 
SADC would do well to borrow a leaf from this technological innovation to harmonise 
operations in this critical area of trade. Co-operative intervention in this vital trade 
liberalisation area would facilitate intra-regional trade thereby deepening the process of 
regional integration. We now undertake a broad examination of some of the fertile 
ground upon which a co-operative approach between the two blocs can and should be 
built. 
8.6.2 Co-operation overtures and the legal framework 
The foregoing discussion has made a strong case for greater co-operation between the 
two blocs in all aspects that would stimulate intra-regional trade.865 The reality of the co-
existence for the two blocs must be acknowledged and the strengths provided by 
diversity inured and exploited for the common good of the region. Our thesis is that 
common structure and basic features already exist in the jurisdiction of the two blocs to 
warrant a coalescence of effective harmonisation of development programs. A co-
operative approach would ensure that mutual avoidance that has been the malus opercmdi 
of the two blocs is turned into constant consultation and economic fence building. 866 
Indeed COMESA makes express provision for co-operation with organisation and 
NGOs in the region. One fails, therefore, to see why this vital collaborative networking is 
not extended to SADC - its neighbour per-excellence.867 
864 See also OJapter Six of the COMESA Treaty 
86S Article 179 of the COMESA Treaty states that "In the context of realising its regional integration 
objectives, the Common Market may enter into co-operation agreements with other regional 
communities. The co-operation referred to in par. 1 of this Article shall be subject to prior 
approval by the Council. See Article 27 of the SADC Trade Protocol which conveys similar 
provIsions 
866 Article 180 of the COMESA Treaty provides that Member States may be members of other regional or 
sub-regional organisations with other Member States or third countries for the purpose of 
strengthening co-operation among themselves. The Common Market is also mandated to 
maintain such continuous working relations with the Organisation of African Unity, the United 
Nations and such intergovernmental or governmental organisations as would assist the Common 
Market in the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. What is curious here, though, is the 
fact that among the many bodies that are specifically cited as co-operating partners with the 
COMESA, SADC is nowhere in the list. This is disturbing in view of the fact that a number of 
COMESA members double as SADC members. 
867 The Treaty provides further that COMESA would establish such continuous and close working 
relations with intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations in east and southern Africa 
with a view to strengthening the institutional capacity of the Common Market and assisting it in 
the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Other organisations specifically mentioned 
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It is noteworthy that in the recent past, the two blocs have taken deliberate steps to close 
ranks and work along synergies in the regional trade initiatives.868 In a recent press 
conference, the respective secretariats for the two blocs revealed that they had been 
meeting to continue the work they began in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001. 869 It was noted 
that these meetings are aimed at mapping out general principles and modalities of co-
operation.870 The two bloc's Secretariat explained that when they met in Lusaka an 
agreement was reached to concentrate efforts at the initial stage of co-operation on an 
audit of all projects and programmes being implemented by the two institutions, 
particularly in the trade and transport sectors. The two blocs shared experiences and 
information on progress made in the trade sector. 
It is encouraging to note that the Chairpersons of the two blocs have also recently agreed 
on a proposal to establish a Task Force at the level of the two Secretariats reporting to 
the appropriate institutional structures on the areas of co-operation and joint activities.871 
The proposed Task Force will be a framework for co-operation between the two 
organisations. It is proposed that the Task Force meet twice a year alternately between 
Gaborone and Lusaka with flexibility for extra-ordinary meetings as and when required. 
It is expected that once established, the Task Force would carry out an audit of all 
projects and programmes being implemented by the two institutions including those in 
the pipeline in order to identify areas of common interest.872 
for co-operation purposes under the provisions of Article 181 are the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank. 
868 On the Regional economic integration front, Article 29 of the Cotonou provides that co-operation shall 
support the development and strengthening of the capacities of regional integration institutions 
and organisations set up by the ACP States to promote regional co-operation and integration. The 
two blocs are set to benefit immensely from this enabling infrastructure 
869 Briefing note to the media by SADC Executive Secretary, Dr Prega Ramsamy and COMES A Secretary 
General, Mr Erastus Mwencha on the outcome of the second meeting of the SADC-CONrESA 
Task Force 23rd October, 2001 http://www.sadc.tnt!english!archive! mr02 1910700 1.lmnl 
870 This is where the crucial question of regional co-operation and integration that is treated under Article 
28 of the Cotonou Agreement kicks in. Co-operation in this area would provide effective 
assistance to achieve the objectives and priorities which the ACP States have set themselves upon 
the context of regional and sub-regional co-operation and integration. 
87 1 The proposal was agreed to at a meeting in Cairo, Egypt between the Chairperson of SADC, Dr Sam 
Nujoma, President of the Republic of Namibia and the Chairperson of COMESA, Sir Anerood 
Jugnauth, Prime Minister of the Republic of Mauritius. The meeting was also attended by Prof. 
Saitoti, the then Vice President of Kenya representing the CONrESA Rapporteur; and Mr Justin 
Malewezi, representing the Deputy Chairperson of SADC and the Chief Executives of the twO 
organisations, Dr Prega Ramsamy of SADC and Mr Erastus M wencha of COMESA. 
872 During the third Task Force meeting [he [wo ,ide, identified funher area, of coliaboralion which include: Hannonisalion of cuS\oms procedure, 
and legislation, as well as to develop regional code of ethics for CUStoms Officers and a Regional CuslOms !lond GuaraIllce Scheme. II wo.lS 
aI,o agreed to convene a joint technical meeting on non·tariff barriers with a view 10 developing a co·ordinaled programme for their 
eliminalion. II was funher agreed 10 develop a regional legal framework for murual recognilion and implemenWlion of Standard"~ quoli!y 
assurance, accreditalion and melrology. Again, Panic, agreed 10 design a regional programme on Ihe hannonis,,,ion of Sanitary and Phy\Q. 
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It is important to note that the two former protagonists have now chosen the logical 
path of a joint venture in place of wasteful belligerency. Of course, the few areas 
identified for co-operation do not take this partnership to the optimal level, as one wouJd 
have expected. The current effort must, however, be applauded for what it signifies. It 
must be credited as a good beginning that wouJd eventually usher in a new regional 
dispensation of rigorous co-operation for greater regional economic prosperity. Quite 
clearly, much ground still need to be covered in this novel co-operation exercise.873 
Ideally, one cannot talk of co-operation without first identifying the requisite econo-Iegal 
framework within which such a partnership wouJd be augmented. A collaborative 
initiative cannot exist in the vacuum. The preamble to each of the two blocs' trade 
instruments already gives credence to the co-operation exercise. The legal framework for 
this discourse is therefore appropriately in place to augment the process. A rtick 3 of the 
Treaty details the aims and objectives of the COMESA. The foremost aim is to attain 
sustainable growth and development of the Member States by promoting a more 
balanced and harmonious development of its production and marketing structures. It is 
also geared to promote joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint 
adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to raise the standard of living of 
its peoples and to foster closer relations among its Member States. 
Under COMESA's proposed Conunon Market, member states wouJd co-operate in the 
creation of an enabling environment for foreign, cross border and domestic investment 
including the joint promotion of research and adaptation of science and technology for 
development. SADC on the other hand aspires to similar objectives.874 The two blocs 
rightly take cognisance of the global imperatives underpinning regional trade hence 
undertake to co-operate in strengthening relations between the region and the rest of the 
world and the adoption of conunon positions in international fora. 
sanitary measures and co-<>pe ... ning in the preparation of an infrastructUre master plan for east and southern Africa. The other are., of 
pannership is to set up a joint CNS/A1M System implementation Task Force to audit the work SO far done by COMESA and SADC and 
make recommendations. See the task force repan at hnp://www.sadc.im/english/news/mr05_3C042C<J2.hunJ 
SlJIn fact COMESA is confident that this co-operation should be taken further afield. The Secretary-
General says that time is now ripe for COMESA to establish functional co-operation with 
ECOWAS and other regional groupings because business will always transcend poLticai 
envirorunent. The estabLshment of the Eastern and Southern Africa Business Organisation 
(ESABO) is highly instructive in this regard. See Statement by the Secretary General on the 
Occasion of the Extraordinary Summit to the Launch of the Free Trade Area - 31st October, 
2000 supra 
874 See Statement by the Secretary General on the Occasion of the Extraordinary Summit to the Launch of 
the Free Trade Area - 31st October, 2000 supra 
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The two blocs have in general more common objectives than diversity. There are clear 
areas of synergy in the two blocs' core aims that can and should be explored for greater 
economic growth in the region. Our thesis is, therefore, that these areas of synergy 
should be coalesced into a veritable tool of harmonisation to deepen integration in the 
region. We now move to review some of the specific areas of synergy that provide a 
fertile ground for co-operative work between the two blocs. There are many areas that 
display unmistakable commonality between the two blocs. 
8.7 Co-operation and the WTO compatibility 
(aJ Detection and inu:stigatian of dumping and subsidy pract:ices 
The two blocs could partner in the detection and investigation of dumping and subsidy 
practices and in imposing agreed measures to curb such practises.875 A specific remedy 
would be sought where there is evidence of dwnping or export of subsidised goods by a 
third country to the territory of a Member State that threatens or distorts competition in 
regional trade. 876 The affected Member States may request the Member State in whose 
territory the goods are being dwnped or exported to impose anti-dwnping duties or 
countervailing duties on those goods from the third country. 877 
In the crucial area of Competition policy the two blocs would agree that any practice 
which negates the objective of free and liberalised trade should be prohibited. To this 
end, the two blocs would take positive measures to prohibit any agreement between 
undertakings or concerted practice which has as its objective or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the region. 878 
875Article 54 of the Comesa Treaty deals with Co·operation in the Investigation of Dumping and Subsidies. 
To address the perennial problem of dumping, the Treaty allows a Member State to levy on an y 
dumped product an anti-dumping duty no greater in amount than the margin of dumping in 
respect of such product. Dumping from a third country into a Member State is expressly 
prohibited and any affected Member State may, pursuant to the provisions of par. 3 of the Article, 
levy an anti-dumping duty on any dumped products. The same measure applies to subsidies. 
Similar provisions can be found at Articles 18·20 of the SADC Trade Protocol 
876 Proceedings initiated pursuant to the provisions of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with 
anti-dumping regulations made by the Council. 
877 Article 51 adds the rider that this measure is only for the purposes of offsetting or preventing dumping, 
and subject to the provision of par. 4 of this Article. For the purposes of the Article, the margin 
of dumping is the price difference determined in accordance with the provisions of par. 2·(b) (it) 
of the Article. See also Article 18 of the SADC Trade Protocol 
878Article 52 of the COMESA Treaty provides that except as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any subsidy 
granted by a Member State or through state resources in any fonn whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between the Member States, be incompatible with the 
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(c) Most Fawured Nation TrWment 
To pay homage to the WTO's principal norm of the Most Favoured Nation879, the two 
blocs would undertake to accord the Membership of each other the most favoured 
nation treatment. To this end no obstacle should be placed in the way of Members from 
both divide in maintaining or entering into new preferential agreements with third 
countries provided such agreements do not impede or frustrate the objectives of either 
bloc. The only caveat being that any advantage, concession, privilege and/or favour 
granted to a third country under such agreements must be extended to either group's 
Member States on a reciprocal basis. This very same measure would be extended to the 
principle of National Treatment.88o The result would be that the two blocs prevail upon 
their respective members to refrain from enacting legislation or applying administrative 
measures which directly or indirectly discriminate against the same or like products of 
other Member States from within the region. 
(d) Standardisation and qualityassurcou:e 
The importance of standardisation and quality assurance recites in its coverage of almost 
all segments of trading activity. Among other things it gives an assurance in the 
promotion of health, the enhancement of the standard of living, and rationalisation in 
factors of production. It also ensures the reduction of unnecessary variety of products, 
the facilitation of inter-changeability of products, the promotion of trade and consumer 
protection. This regulation also promotes the creation of savings in government 
purchasing, improved productivity, the facilitation of information exchange as well as, of 
course, the protection of life, property, and the environment.881 
The two blocs should partner to evolve and apply a common policy with regard to the 
standardisation and quality assurance of goods produced and traded within the region. 
The two blocs would then align their membership's national standards bodies to regional, 
international and other organisations concerned with standardisation and quality 
Common Market. A Member State may, for the purposes of offsetting the effects of subsidies 
and subject to regulations made by the Council, levy countervailing duty on any product of any 
Member State imported into another Member State equal to the amount of the estimated subsidy 
determined to have been granted directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export 
of such products. Article 19 of the SADc Protocol makes similar provisions on subsidies and 
countervailing measures. 
879 Article 56 of the cOMESA Treaty deals with the principle of the Most Favoured Nation Treatment 
whilst its counterpart in SADc Trade Protocol is promulgated at Article 28 
880 Article 57 of the cOMESA Treaty deals with the principle of National Treatment whilst Article 11 of the 
SADc Trade Protocol makes similar provisions 
881 See O?apter 15 of the COMES A Treaty and Artide 17 of the SADC Trade Protocol 
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assurance and in the development of activities in standardisation and quality assurance 
for the achievement of the objective of facilitating intra-regional trade.882 
The other important area of partnership is the application of uniform standards and 
specifications for the inspection and testing of goods traded within the region, so that the 
results are easily interpreted and co-ordinated in a uniform manner. The two blocs would 
then adopt a regionally acceptable quality management systems, standards, and develop 
capacities for quality assurance of products that are traded in the region. This partnership 
would lead to the usage of a harmonised documentation for the evaluation of the quality 
of goods traded in the region and in conjunction with customs and other relevant 
authorities, provide for the ease of movement of samples meant for testing within the 
region.883 
The biggest obstacle to the harmonisation of standard is the huge disparity between 
South Africa's quality standards and that of its regional partners. It will not be easy to 
achieve uniformity where South Africa insists on the higher scale of standardisation. 
Were South Africa's standards to be adopted as the yardstick for regional quality 
assurance, many states would be driven out of intra-regional trade for want of capacity to 
meet such a high measure of standardisation. The spotlight, in this case, immediately 
turns on South Africa, which must look for ways and means to accommodate its less 
developed regional partners. No easy solutions can be prescribed in the short term. The 
surest way to overcome this obstacle is for South Africa to launch a concerted campaign 
aimed at ensuring that there is a fast track transfer of technology to the region in order to 
revamp regional production capacity. South Africa's established multinationals could 
partner with those in the region to improve on production quality. 
832 Further partnership in this sphere would be to encourage the establishment of national standards 
bodies, and develop their technical capacities so as to enable them to adequately carry out 
standardisation and quality assurance activities at the national level and to co-operate with other 
Member States. This would help to promote and enforce standards relating to public health and 
safety and the protection of the environment by applying appropriate standards for goods 
produced and traded within the region. 
88J The two blocs would consult one another through the Secretariat concerning their common training 
needs in the field of standardisation and quality assurance. Such information would form the basis 
for undertaking to co-ordinate among them the use of existing facilities with a view to making 
them accessible to other Member States. It is also important that the two blocs endeavour to 
make the activity of standardisation and quality assurance known to all concerned parties. This 
measure can be achieved through seminars, advertisements, publications, films, discussions, 
participation of the national standardisation institutions in trade fairs, special national awards and 
the creation of national quality associations within the Member States. 
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The two blocs would adopt and apply a harmonised scheme for the certification of 
goods manufactured and traded in the region and a harmonised scheme for the 
accreditation of laboratories used for the evaluation of goods produced and traded in the 
region. In the same breadth regional players would adopt common rules and procedures 
for the certification marks to be applied on goods produced and traded in the region and 
for the mutual recognition of each other member's national certification marks, as well as 
certification and laboratory accreditation schemes. 
(e) Rationalization of the Rules of Origin 
The controversial and often acrimonious field of origin rules is the foremost trouble area 
that exercised the wits of the two blocs in their maiden interaction. The two blocs have 
agreed on the need to streamline Rules of Origin and Customs Procedures and 
Documentation for the COMESA free trade area and the SADC Trade Protoco1.884 Co-
operation on the Rules of Origin, focussed on Certificates of Origin and procedures for 
their issuance and how products from Export Processing Zones (EPZs) should be 
treated in a free trade area.885 
The two blocs agreed on the need to harmonise Customs Regulations and procedures, 
including customs documentation and cross-border trade issues.886 Agreement was also 
reached on the development of a model law on national customs procedures and 
regulation. The two blocs have committed to work out modalities on how the SADC and 
COMESA customs documents could be harmonised for use with the ASYCUDA 
884 SADC launched the implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol in September 2000 and COMESA 
launched the Free Trade Area in October 2000 in which nine countries are actively participating. 
The SADC Protocol on Trade will lead to the creation of a Free Trade Area by 2008 
885 There are two schools of thought on this issue. On the one hand, there is an argument for extending 
FT A preferences to products from EPZs as long as they meet the Rules of Origin criteria. On the 
other hand, there are proponents for the exclusion of EPZs products from FT A preferences 
because the producers are given incentives, which are not availed, to those producers operating 
from outside the EPZ. At the same time the products from the EPZs are not allowed in the 
domestic market of the country where they are produced. 
886 Article 71 of the COMESA Treaty obligates Member States to undertake, where appropriate, to design 
and standardise their trade documents and the information required to be contained in such 
documents in accordance with internationally accepted standards, practices and guidelines. The 
Treaty provides that the simplification, harmonisation and standardisation of customs regulations, 
documents and procedures and their computerisation will be facilitated by the regional 
Automated System for Customs Data Centre at the Headquarters of the Common Market. Article 
17 of the SADC Trade Protocol obligates each Member State to use relevant international 
standards as a basis for its state-related measures, except where such standards would be an 
ineffective or inappropriate means to fulfIl its legitimate objectives. 
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software or any other compatible customs package. These measures are aimed at 
facilitating intra-regional trade between the two regional economic blocs.887 
(f) Customs administration 
The dismal performance of customs authorities in the region is a malignant malady that 
is well documented. The two blocs would reap immense benefits in ensuring that there 
is simplicity, harmony and standardisation of their respective member's customs 
regulations, procedures and documents888 • This measure would ensure the effective 
implementation of the provision of both the COMESA Treaty and the SADC Protocol 
and a reduction in the costs and facilitate the speedy movement of goods and services 
across regional frontiers. 
The two blocs would encourage Member States to extend co-operation in the field of 
trade liberalisation and customs administration.889 To this end co-operation would give 
way to the establishment of a customs union, abolish all non-tariff barriers to trade 
among themselves and in the long run establish a conunon external tariff. Co-operation 
would also be extended to the field of customs procedures and activities. The two blocs 
would then adopt a conunon customs bond guarantee scheme and concomitantly 
simplify and harmonise their trade documents and procedures.89o The two blocs would 
agree to adopt a uniform Code of Ethics for Customs Officers in both regions, and a 
joint program for training of customs officials in customs valuation and Exchange of 
Trade Information. 
887 Other areas of co-operation identified by the two blocs are the non-tariff barriers, customs, Exchange 
of information on trade statistics and harmonisation of trade facilitation measures. Access to 
outside markets and regional telecommunication is also marked for co·operative endeavour 
sss Artide 69 of the COMESA Treaty provides for the simplification and harmonisation of trade 
documents and procedures so as to facilitate trade in goods and services within the Common 
Market. The counterpart provisions in the SADC Trade Protocol are to be found at A rtide 14 as 
read together with Annex 111 
889 Under COMESA, there are special undertakings promulgated under Article 4 of the Treaty. These are 
meant to promote the achievement of the aims and objectives of the Common Market as sel out 
in Article 3 above. 
890 Other areas of endeavour under this rubric is the establishment of conditions regulating the re-export of 
goods from third countries within the Common Market and the establishment of origin rules of 
with respect to products originating in the Member States. In recognition of the unique situation 
of Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland within the context of the Common Market a temporary 
exemptions granted to these states from the full application of specified provisions of the Treaty 
provlSlons. 
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The two blocs would panner to ensure the Prevention, Investigation and Suppression of 
Customs Offences.891 In this regard the two blocs would exchange lists of goods and 
publications the importation of which is prohibited in their respective territories. The 
regional customs authorities would then exchange among themselves lists of goods 
known to be the subject of illicit traffic between their customs territories and maintain 
special surveillance over the movement of such goods. Apan from wide consultation, 
common border posts would be established and necessary steps taken to ensure that 
goods exported or imported through common frontiers pass through the competent and 
recognised Customs Offices and travel along approved routes.892 
It would be crucial for the two blocs to put systems in place to determine and monitor 
the goods that were granted preferential treatment on departure from the territory of the 
requesting Member State. This is for the simple reason that the goods declared as 
intended for home use in the other Member State, have been duly cleared for home use 
in that State. This determination should equally be made of goods imported into the 
territory of the requesting Member State to ensure that such goods have been lawfully 
exported from that of the exporting Member State.893 
To promote the regional export market, the two blocs would agree that re-exports bound 
for a receiving State shall be exempted from the payment of import or export duties in 
the importing State.894 However, the normal levying of administrative and service charges 
applicable to the import or export of similar goods in accordance with their customs laws 
and regulations should be exempted.895 This measure would increase the circulation of 
goods and factors of production in the region. As a result intra-regional trade would be 
given a major boast for expansion and growth. 
891 Article 66 of the COMESA Treaty deals with the Prevention, Investigation and Suppression of Customs 
offences. See also Annex II of the SADC Trade Protocol 
892 It is advisable in this regard to exchange among themselves lists of Customs Offices located along 
conunon frontiers, details of the powers of such offices, their working hours and any changes in 
these particulars for the effective operation of the provisions of sub-paragraph (d) of the Anicle. 
It is also of paramount importance to endeavour to correlate the powers and harmonise the 
working hours of their corresponding Customs Offices. 
893 Other areas of interest are to ascertain inter alia that goods exported from the territory of the requesting 
Member State have been lawfully imported into that of the importing Member States, and in 
accordance with the importer's declaration. Special documents, which should be, issued by the 
customs authorities of the exporting Member State for surrender to the customs authorities of the 
importing Member State in order that they may certify that the goods were lawfully exported. 
894 Article 67 of the COMESA Treaty. Also Annex I of the SAOC Trade Protocol deals comprehensively 
with the situation where products have acquired an originating status 
895 See Part three of the SADC Trade Protocol 
8.8:1 Trade liberalisation, promotion and development 
(a) Trade pmnotion 
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In this case, partnership would ensure that within the wider free trade area, customs 
duties and other charges of equivalent effect imposed on imports are eliminated. Non-
tariff barriers including quantitative or like restrictions or prohibitions and administrative 
obstacles to trade among the Member States shall also be removed. It is feasible that co-
operation in this area, if successful, would usher in a deeper level of integration. This 
development would in the long run give way to the establishment and maintenance of a 
common external tariff in respect of all goods imported into the region.896 
The expected heavy loss of revenue following the signing of the COMESA Treaty and 
the SADC Protocol is a matter of serious concern to states in the region. The two blocs 
can and should partner in this area so as to conclude a Protocol that would address this 
logjam to liberalisation. Such a Protocol should, inter-alia, determine the machinery and 
formula to be used in the practical trials of carrying out the remedial steps with respect to 
a member state, which have suffered substantial loss of revenue from import duties as a 
result of the liberalisation process. 
It is pertinently important that the two blocs endeavour to promote a harmonious and 
balanced development in the region and in particular the need for reducing the disparities 
among various areas in the region and paying attention to the special problems of each 
Member State. Particular attention should be directed to the least developed countries 
and economically depressed areas among their ranks. The two blocs should put in place 
specific measures designed to strengthen the capacities of this group of States to resolve 
these problems. 
Trade promotion is the WTO's refrain and is as important an endeavour to the two blocs 
in the region. The two blocs should partner to adopt measures designed to promote 
trade within the region. Partnership in this vein would, in the main, ensure the 
development and dissemination of market intelligence and trade information with a view 
to provide the widest possible knowledge-base for intra-regional trade opportunities. 
Measures would also be taken to encourage the development of export markets to meet 
896 Article 45 of the COMESA Treaty explains the Scope of Co-operation in Trade Liberalisation and 
Development. Likewise Article 26 of the SADC Protocol makes provision for Trade 
Development 
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the public and private procurement needs. The partnership would actively encourage the 
undertaking of supply and demand surveys, the organisation of buyers and sellers 
meetings and other multi-country contact promotion events in order to further identify, 
promote and exploit the potential for intra-regional trade. 
The partnership would go a long way to obtain an undertaking from member states to 
remove measures that have been identified during the market surveys, which restrict the 
flow of goods and services to their identified markets.897 The partnership would then 
strengthen and promote export-oriented joint ventures, by encouraging and facilitating 
enterprise-to-enterprise contacts and support privatisation endeavours through the 
introduction of trade services or improvement of the trade promotion infrastructure to 
meet the special requirements of privati sed companies. The partnership would encourage 
the improvement of services relating to trade such as export fmancing, quality control 
and standardisation, packaging and specification aspects, warehousing and storage 
operations, and others that will increase the flow of goods within the region.898 
(b) Prcxluction and export capacity building 
It is instructive that during one of their meetings, the two blocs discussed ways and 
means of ensuring maximum benefits for both regions from the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA). Other measures were also explored to assist member States 
to gain duty free access to the US market.899 This is, no doubt, a positive pro-active co-
operative strategy. More resources need to be marshalled to partner in capacitating 
member states to take full advantage of this potentially lucrative export facility. 
The two blocs should partner in increasing the awareness of intra and extra regional 
trade opportunities. They should also partner in the provision and exchange of 
computerised trade information in the region through the support of the sub-region-wide 
897 Article 70 of the eOMESA Treaty urges Member States to undertake to initiate trade facilitation 
programmes aimed at reducing the cost of documents and the volume of paper work required in 
respect of trade among the Member States. See also Article 14 of the SADe Trade Protocol. 
898 The two blocs could also partner in the exchange of infonnation on maners relating to customs and 
more particularly to the following: customs legislation, procedures, duties and commodities 
subject to import or export restrictions. Other areas are infonnation relating to the prevention, 
investigation and suppression of customs offences as provided for in Article 66 of the eOMESA 
Treaty and A nicle 13 of the SADC Trade Protocol. 
899 Briefing note to the media by SADC Executive Secretary, Dr Prega Ramsamy and eOMESA Secretary 
General, supra. Also cited at hnp:/ /www.sadc.int/english/arch.ive/mr02 19102001.html 
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Trade Information Network (TINET).900 Information should also flow on the provision 
of company data, export or import opportunities, tender invitations issued by national 
authorities for public procurement, statistical profiles of general and specific product 
groups. Other essential information that should freely circulate in the region is on 
restrictive trade practices non-tariff barriers and other related obstacles as stated in the 
TINET's region-wide standards.901 
The two blocs should as well partner in glVlIlg special consideration to the least 
developed countries and economically depressed areas of the region in the service sector. 
The two blocs would ideally undertake to maximise the use of the existing potential to 
respond to the needs of the sub-region and improve investment conditions for the 
service sector for nationals and foreigners from within the region.902 In their recent 
meeting, the two blocs agreed to explore possibilities of exchanging information 
particularly trade statistics through the Eurotrace system The two blocs undertook to 
invite each other to workshops and meetings on trade issues as well as co-operating in 
statistics training activities.903 
(c) Deudopment of the in/rastruaure 
The state of sub-Saharan Africa infrastructure is what one could term as its Achilles heels 
to regional economic growth. One of the major pre-requisites for sustainable economic 
growth for the least developed countries and economically depressed areas in the region 
is the development of adequate and reliable infrastructure, especially transport and 
communications.904 The absence of appropriate infrastructure remains one of the biggest 
obstacles to effective regional co-operation. Again, very little progress has been made in 
regional co-operation toward infrastructure development. 
900 See also Oxpter 20 of the COMESA Treaty 
901 These standards contain special TINET instructions, ad hoc requests, and standing practices, which are 
subject to change from time to time. 
902 Another option is to establish a special Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development for 
tackling the special problems of under-developed areas and other disadvantages arising from the 
integration process. 
903 Briefing note to the media by SAOC Executive Secretary, Dr Prega Ramsamy and COMESA Secretary 
General, supra also cited at http://www.sadc.int/ english/ archive/ mr02 19102001.html 
904 While addressing the ACP Summit, Commissioner Nielson urged that substantial regional funds 
should continue to be directed to the improvement of infrastructure links between Nrican 
countries. These links are physical, in terms of roads, railways and maritime transport but also 
increasingly focussed on communications technology and electronic media. Support to deepening 
regional economic integration and improving infrastructure and communications are 
complementary elements of the co-operation strategy in this area. Statement by Commissioner 
Nielson supra 
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The foremost disincentive to investor confidence in the region is the poor infrastructure 
in service provision. Robinson905 has observed that despite its 'win-win' characteristics, 
the level of regional co-operation in infrastructure and natural resources in the past has 
been disappointedly low. He notes that in the area of energy supply, very few intra-
regional supply arrangements exists even though the potential for intra-regional grid 
connections exists at non-prohibitive costs. 
The foregoing focus is certainly true for the SADC region where efforts are currently 
underway, driven largely by South Africa, to stimulate the development of both 
infrastructure in roads, rail, ports and harbours, telecommunications and electricity and 
export industries.906 Co-operation would widen coverage of this project to include the 
entire COMESA region. SADC's international Co-operating Partners, of whom the 
European Union (EU) is among the major ones, have also accepted the strategic role of 
transport and communications to sustainable development and to trade and investment 
in SADC.907 
The prime area in which the two blocs could strengthen co-operation is that of evolving 
co-ordinated and complementary transport and communications policies, to improve and 
expand the existing transport links and establish new ones as a means of furthering the 
physical cohesion of the Member States within the region. This venture would go along 
way to facilitate movement of inter-State traffic and to promote greater movement of 
persons, goods and services within the region.90s Co-operation in this regard would cover 
905 Robinson P 1996, ., Potential Gains from infrastructural and Natural Resources Investment Co-
ordination in Africa". In Teunissen J. (ed.): Regionalism & the Global Economy: The case of 
Africa: FUNDAD, The Hague 
906 Entitled the "Regional Industrial Location Strategy" or "RILS ", this initiative aim at identifying 
development corridors in all the mainland SADC countries. For obvious geographical reasons, 
Mauritius is not included in this study. The "Maputo Corridor" between Mozambique and South 
Africa and the proposed "Nacala Corridor" linking Malawi and Zambia are two example of this 
strategy. 
907 The sector has, therefore, received substantial support. In this regard, under the Lome III convention, 
out of a total envelope of ECU 141 million of the Regional Indicative Program (RIP), 
approximately ECU 56,4 million or 40% was allocated to transport and communications. Under 
the First financial Protocol of the Lome IV convention, out of a total allocation of ECU 128 
million of the RIP, approximately ECU 44,8 million or 35% went to transport and 
communications. The amount allocated to infrastructure under the Second financial Protocol of 
the Lome IV convention is approximately ECU 54,45 million or 45%. This however, includes 
and allocation to the Energy Sector. A WEPA Seminar Report supra at p.12 
908 SADC and COMESA have for a long time been working closely on issues pertaining to trade 
facilitation including Axle load and vehicle dimensions, Carrier license, Road transit charges, 
Third Party Motor Vehicle Insurance - the Yellow Card and Advance Cargo Information 
System/Rail Stock Tracking System. Parties have conunitted to continue co-operation on these 
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road, rail, air, maritime, radio and telecommunication, inland waterways and multimodal 
transport.909 
Partnership would foster such co-operation among the two blocs as would facilitate the 
production of goods and facilitate trade in goods and services and the movement of 
persons. The partnership would give way to the promulgation of regulations to facilitate 
transit trade within the region and adopt a Third Party Motor Vehicle Insurance Scheme. 
In their recent co-operation meeting, the two blocs noted that SADe has concentrated 
on putting in place the policy and regulatory framework for the telecommunications 
sector which has led to the continued liberalisation of this sector.910 On Its part, 
eOMESA has established eOMTEL whose objective is to achieve regional 
interconnectivity. The meeting agreed that these activities complement each other and 
therefore they should be co-ordinated in order to reduce transaction costs. This, in our 
considered view, is a resoundingly logical conclusion. 
8.8.2 Private sector and investment promotion 
(a) Primte Sector Deudopnmt 
It has time and again been reiterated that the private sector is the engine to any country's 
development. One can not begrudge this basic truism The private sector is arguably an 
effective force for the development, progression and reconstruction of the tattered 
regional economies. It is justifiable to opine that while the government provides the 
environment within which investment activities can thrive, the ultimate decision whether 
or not to invest is taken by the private investor. The two blocs should agree to provide 
an enabling environment within which the private sector can thrive and thereby exploit 
the vast opportunities offered by the regional market.91l 
issues to ensure as much harmony as possible between the two regions. SADC/COMESA joint 
media briefing supra 
909 The respective Member States shall collect and disseminate to the other Member States meteorological 
information in order to facilitate the efficient operation of air navigation, coastal shipping, inland 
water transport and the issuing of cyclone warnings and other adverse weather phenomena. To 
this end, the two blocs should further agree to establish a Regional Meteorological Centre. 
910 Briefing note to the media by SAOC Executive Secretary, Dr Prega Ramsamy and COMESA Secretary 
General, Mr Erastus Mwencha on the outcome of the second meeting of the SADC-COMESA 
Task Force 23rd October, 200l. 
911 Under Article 76 of the Cotonou Agreement provision is made for long-term financial resources, 
including risk capital, to assist in promoting growth in the private sector and help to mobilise 
domestic and foreign capital for this purpose. To this end, the EU in particular would make 
available grants for financial and technical assistance to support policy reforms, human resource 
development and institutional capacity building. 
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Partnership in this area would take the form of promotion of continuous dialogue with 
the private sector organs at the national and regional levels to help create an improved 
business environment for the implementation of agreed decisions in all economic 
sectors. An opportunity would then be created for entrepreneurs to actively participate in 
improving the policies, regulations and institutions that affect them so as to increase 
confidence in policy reforms, raise productivity and lower costs at enterprise level. 
To achieve this goal the two blocs should commit their members to move quickly in 
improving the business environment through the promotion of conducive investment 
codes, the protection of property and contract rights and the regularising of the informal 
sector. The rank and file of each bloc's members should undertake to stimulate market 
development through infrastructure linkages and the removal of barriers and constraints. 
Co-operation among the regional chambers of commerce and industry would provide up 
to date commercial intelligence on a regular basis to speed up market response.912 One of 
the Cotonou's ingenious innovations is its appeal for the extension of partnership 
arrangements to civil society, social partners, the private sector and local government.913 
The two blocs would collaborate with the regional chambers of commerce and industries 
to establish lending institutions that would primarily cater for the entrepreneurs, 
especially the small-scale ones. The latter category of enterprises is often met with 
insurmountable difficulties in their endeavour to obtain credit from commercial banks 
and finance institutions. Under COMESA a Consultative Committee of the Business 
Community and Other Interest Groups has been established to provide a link and 
facilitate dialogue between the business community and other interest groups.914 The 
912 These establislunents would also help encourage sourcing of purchases by governments and parastatals 
within the sub-region and facilitate and support the exchange of experience and pooling of 
resources through, inter alia, cross-border investments. Most importantly they would strengthen 
the role of chambers of commerce in national economic policy formulation. 
913 The Cotonou advocates for support to the private sector and its access to European Investment Bank 
(EIB) funds. Pillar II of the Cotonou Agreement sues for the promotion of participatory 
approaches. The Agreement envisages a substantial role for non-State actors in the design and 
implementation of development strategies and programmes, for example the private sector and 
economic and social partnerships. The role of civil society is particularly important whilst non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) should also be strengthened in order to guarantee a 
significant contribution to the development process. Further, the participation of these actors 
depends on certain criteria relating to management and form of organisation. See, for example, 
A nicle 21 of the Cotonou Agreement 
914 Under Anide 18 of the COMESA Treaty, and that goes for the Cotonou as well, provision is made for a 
greater and more vibrant private sector participation and even widens the scope to include the 
whole of civil society as development partners. Article 7 recognises the importance of 
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Committee is mandated to ensure that the interests of the business community and other 
interest groups in the Common Market are taken into consideration by the organs of the 
Common Market.915 The two blocs should move first in the exploitation of this 
important network to advance the corporate interests of the region's business 
community as a whole. 
(b) ImRStment prrmotim and protectirm 
In the challenging area of investment promotion and protection, the two blocs should 
partner to accord fair and equitable treatment to private investors and adopt a 
programme for the promotion of cross-border investment. 916 The two blocs are 
obligated to co-operate in the creation and maintenance of a predictable, transparent and 
secure investment climate in the region.9i7 For such a climate to mature the two blocs 
would co-operate in urging their respective Member States to remove administrative, 
fiscal and legal restrictions to intra-regional trade and investment.918 It would be helpful 
for both to exchange information on legislation for patents, trademarks and designs and 
industrial investment opportunities, processes, technology and other related information. 
The two blocs have a common meeting ground in the institution of the CBI. This facility 
is, no doubt, one veritable vehicle for deepening integration in the region. The CBI 
covers eastern and southern Africa and the Indian Ocean Islands and is an initiative co-
sponsored by the World Bank, IMF, ED and the African Development Bank (ADB). It 
supports the notion that 'given the on-going economic reform programs in these 
countries, a parallel set of policy and institutional reform could accelerate growth through 
regional integration, particularly by fostering efficient cross-border investment and trade 
strengthening community organisations and non-profit non-governmental organisations in all 
spheres of co-operation. This would enhance the contribution of civil society to development. 
915 The Committee would also be responsible for monitoring the implementation of specifically the 
provisions of OJapters 24 and 14 of the Treaty and make recommendations to the 
Intergovernmental Committee. 
916 Investment and the entire private sector development is addressed at Article 21 of the Cotonou 
Agreement which provides that co-operation in this area would be targeted to support the 
necessary economic and instirutional reforms and policies at national and/or regional level. 
917 Article 77 of the Cotonou Agreement makes provision for an increasing availability and use of risk 
insurance as a risk-mitigating mechanism in order to boost investor confidence in the ACP States. 
In this regard the EU has pledged to offer guarantees and assist with guarantee funds covering 
risks for qualified investment. 
918 In the same vein Member States should undertake to increase awareness of their investment incentives, 
opportunities, legislation, practices, and major events affecting investments and other relevant 
information through regular dissemination and other awareness promoting activities. Member 
States can also boast the investment climate by taking necessary measures to accede to multilateral 
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flows. 919 The European Commission has argued that this initiative results from" the 
desire to formulate a progranunatic way to promote more effective regional integration" 
in the east and southern Africa region.no 
The CBI emphasis is on outward onentatIon, particularly openness to the global 
commerce to ensure greater integration of the sub-region into the world economy. It also 
campaigns for the avoidance of new institutions and encourages direct involvement of 
the pnvate sector ill the formulation and implementation of a conducive 
poJjcy/institutional environment. It underpins the need for CBI to be driven by the 
participants to ensure ownership as a key to effective implementation.921 It is imperative 
for the two blocs to recognise the need for effective resource mobiJjsation, investment 
and the importance of encouraging increased flow of private sector investment into the 
region for economic development. 
The two blocs should agree to adopt harmonised macro-economic policies that would 
attract private sector investment into the region. Intra-bloc co-operation would promote 
cross-border investment, franchise and agency arrangements and joint venture 
operations. This partnership would in tum promote the transfer of technology and skills. 
It also contributes directly to the ongoing process of economic development in the 
region.922 
agreements on investment dispute resolution and guarantee arrangements as a means of creating a 
conducive climate for investment promotion. 
919 Some economic commentator, however, take the view that from an economic historical perspective, we 
cannot rely on direct foreign investment to develop Africa. This is because, they contend, even 
where direct foreign investment has gone in a big way like in Argentina, the final results have 
been a catastrophe. See http://www.eastandard.net on Saturday, June 29,2002 
920 W. Kennes, "The European Union's Support for regional Integration in ACP Countries" (Insert NO.5 5, 
Jwze 1994), Directorate General for Development. See also R H Thomas - Trade Liberalisation 
Issues, supra, at p.4S 
nl R H. Thomas, Trade Liberalisation Issues supra at p.4S 
922 For example tobacco farmers and other agricultural produce and marketing agencies in Malawi and 
Zambia can enhance their strategic links with processors in Zimbabwe. Similarly, textile 
producers in Mauritius are re-locating to more cost-effective production centres in Madagascar to 
improve the competitiveness of their goods. 
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8.9 Concluding Remarks 
There is no gainsaying the fact that the fundamental objective of regional integration in 
the east and southern Africa need to be clarified. In this connection, it has become 
abundantly clear that regional integration in the region could diven trade from cheaper 
international sources. We have demonstrated that this discourse would not enhance the 
welfare of the region. Quite clearly, we have instead proposed that regional industrial 
development supponed by co-operative infrastructure development and institutional 
capacity development deserves attention to manage the process of regional integration. 
We have also pointed out that regional integration should be seen as a component of a 
regional development strategy, complimented by coherent national policy initiatives. 
We have argued that the biggest challenge facing regionalism in the east and southern 
Africa region is the conflict between COMESA and SADe. We have pointed out that in 
this polarised scenario, the potential for conflict of interest is real and looms large like a 
colossus over the two blocs' integration initiative. The chapter has demonstrated that 
arriving at consensus necessary for the implementation of regional integration policies 
within the two blocs is often difficult. It is our thesis, therefore, that the proliferation and 
duplication of functions give rise, at regional level, to conflict over mandates and to a 
divided loyalty among governments. 
We have examined the motivation for multiple membership and have identified one 
notable strong persuasion for such inclination. We have argued that the motivation that 
succinctly captures the convoluted regionalism equation in east and southern Africa is 
the hope to get aboard the gravy train of donor funding. It is our thesis that most of 
these states maintain membership in numerous regional regimes not for purposes of 
promoting trade but with a hope of tapping into the gravy train of donor funding. We 
have opined that the sad reality of overlapping membership is that the SADC Trade 
Protocol will only effectively cover non-COMESA SAOC members. This reality, we 
have argued, is due mainly to the fact that importers would clearly choose to pay the 
lower rates of customs duties under the COMESA umbrella. It is our thesis that this 
jumbled scenario is needless to say inimical to the deepening of the integration process in 
the east and southern Africa region. 
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This chapter has illustrated the inevitable namely that it is possible for a jointer of the 
region's two well-grounded customs unions to layout the much-needed road map and 
act as a super-highway to greater and deeper integration in the region. We have opted for 
a cautious approach that there is certainly great wisdom in an attempt by the two blocs to 
commence their economic recovery program by moving from the known to the 
unknown. We have suggested that the SACU and the EAC experience offer far greater 
insights and lessons in the quest by the two blocs to take the nascent trade partnership to 
the deeper integration level of a common market. 
We have argued that the two blocs are in agreement in so far as the final objective of 
their integration process is concerned. The two blocs are desirous of contributing to the 
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic 
Community. Given this eventuality we have suggested that the two blocs would have to 
implement their respective trade disciplines with due consideration to the provisions of 
the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. 
We have taken the view that although it is a relatively rich country, South Africa cannot 
survive as an island that is surrounded by a sea of regional poverty. In our considered 
view, policy-makers must understand that the country's destiny is interwoven with that of 
the region. Consequently we have argued that it behoves South Africa to take the 
challenge of giving leadership on the way forward not only to its SADC flock but to the 
wider region and the continent as a whole. It is our thesis that South Africa can and 
should playa pivotal role in building bridges between the two blocs in order to spur 
intra-regional trade. 
We have examined areas of common weakness in the region that co-operation would 
seek to address. The chapter has demonstrated that in order to promote stable economic 
groupings, countries in the region should belong to the one economic group that fully 
represents their interests. We have reviewed arguments that propose that countries 
within COMESA should formalise into a sub-regional entity without dual membership. 
We have argued that this proposition, though portend, fail to address the teething 
problem of the dearth of intra-regional trade and the lustre flow of direct foreign 
investment in the region. Our thesis rests on the premises that the reality of double 
membership and therefore open antagonism should be acknowledged as a fast step to 
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identifying ways and means of harnessing synergies in the two bloc's programs for co-
operative integration partnership. 
The chapter has made a strong case for the necessity of a co-operative approach between 
the two blocs. We have argued that such partnership would give the regional integration 
initiative a new impetus to mature the process to greater harmonisation. We have further 
argued that with these fundamentals in place, a deepening of integration would result 
which in turn would have a spread effect to other regions throughout the continent. Our 
considered view is that this is the route to go if the ultimate goal of achieving unity in the 
pan-African Economic Union is to be actualised. 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion and Recommendations 
9.1 The findings 
The discussion in chapter two helped to highlight a number of features attributable to 
regional integration patterns. These features did replicate themselves in the subsequent 
chapters on specific regional integration regimes on the international plane and ultimately 
those straddling the eastern and southern Africa region. 
We have in the main established that regional integration consists of regimes that involve 
the voluntary linking in the economic and political domains of two or more states to the 
extent that authority over key areas of national policy is vested in the competence of a 
supranational body. We have traced the roots of regional integration to the early 
nineteenth century. We have identified two main broad categories of regional regimes -
that is free trade areas and customs unions. 
The thesis has demonstrated that regional regimes conglomerate together the so-called 
'like-minded' parties hence their agility in the facilitation of tariff phase-out progranunme 
on a regional basis. This exercise then eventuates into the totality of free trade world-
wide. We have also established that the spirit of regionalism resides in the promotion of 
trade through liberalization and rapid dismantling of trade barriers. This work has 
established that the effects of merely phasing out tariffs diminished since tariffs had 
already come down in subsequent WTO Rounds. Most importantly, though, the thesis 
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has shown the fact that many countries became used to lower tariffs in the framework of 
regional arrangements or through the General System of Preferences. 
We have established that besides trade liberalisation there are other factors which have 
fuelled the unending stampede to go the regional integration way. The discussion has, in 
particular, demonstrated that the main reasons for the regionalism fever are twofold. The 
slow pace that characterises the multilateral process and the conversion of the US from 
an ardent multilateralist to an active participant in regionalisation are the main reasons 
behind the renewed flurry of integration activity. 
This work has noted that in fact regional integration processes, where well structured, 
would facilitate progress in the multilateral talks. In the same breadth, the discussion has 
demonstrated that the impact resulting from the creation of one regional bloc 
reverberates across the trade regimes' borders and multiplies its effects into the global 
realm. This work has shown that regionalism, in spite of its many advantages, is not a 
smooth running affair and that it has its own muted challenges to contend with. 
This discussion has examined the difficult issue of econormc welfare benefits that 
integration processes bring forth. We have established that such welfare benefits are not 
easy to quantify and that only time would teJJ whether the new wave of regionalism has 
realised its free trade objective or is off the mark once again. 
We had the occasion to examme the validity of the charge that regionalism creates 
isolationist clubs of closed economies. In this regard we have noted, in fact, that 
regionalism has a great potential to spread preferences to third countries. This discussion 
has, nonetheless, demonstrated that whether the emergence of regional trading blocs 
leads to more or less effective global negotiations is an open question. Existing empirical 
evidence is limited with respect to coverage and thus inconclusive. 
What has come out clearly in this thesis is the indisputable fact that for the most part, 
external integration processes trigger the creation of regional regimes. Such processes 
tend to jolt regional partners into self-preservation counter measures. In this respect we 
have seen that trade blocs may perhaps be best understood as buffer zones in the 
turbulent process of emasculating competition that characterises global capitalism. This 
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thesis has shown that such buffer zones provide time and space for socio-political and 
economic adjustment for member nations inside the zone. We have seen that the security 
zone also helps members to co-ordinate policies in order to maximise their individual 
advantage in competition with third nations for the coveted global market share. 
Most importantly, this thesis has identified two characteristics that mark out a successful 
integration initiative. One of these elements is the availability of commitment institutions 
such as centralised monitoring and third party enforcement mechanisms. These 
institutions, we have noted, help to enhance the chances of sustained co-operation by 
acting as constrains on member states in circumstances where self-help measures alone 
are insufficient to prevent reneging on contractual obligations. The second central 
feature is the presence of an indisputable leader state among the group of countries 
seeking closer ties as a focal point in the co-ordination of rules, regulations, and policies. 
We have seen that such hegemony does help to ease distributional tension by assuming 
the role of regional paymaster - the focus area of this work. In the main, however, this 
work has clearly demonstrated that the challenges which integration efforts have had to 
grapple with elsewhere in the globe are replicated in the integration experience within the 
eastern and southern Africa region. 
We have noted that the WTO framework is premised on the rationale that an open and 
liberal trading system underpinned by mutually agreed and legally binding rules, is the 
sure recipe for the growth of the global economy. We have argued that the advent of the 
GATT /WTO system has infused fresh impetus to free trade commitments in the 
international trade arena. The agreement is the basis for a global rule based trading 
system. The thesis has established that one of the WTO's overriding preoccupation is the 
reduction of the level of protectionism. This work has shown that tariff concessions are 
linked to non-discrimination through the principle of Most Favoured National treatment. 
We have also seen that through a series of Rounds, the WTO has significantly 
contributed to the liberalisation of global commerce. 
We have averred that the new institutional system points to the importance of rule based 
framework to guide the international economic development in the 21 S! century. Quite 
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clearly the opposite of rules we have argued is a series of ad hoc protective measures that 
are clearly inimical to the desired goal of a global free market. 
The thesis has identified Article XXIV and the Enabling Gause as the jurisprudential 
basis for regional regimes within the WTO framework. We have established that the 
Enabling Gause and Article XXIV are the most fundamental exception to the MFN 
principle. This work has noted that although regional regimes offend not only the letter 
but also the spirit of the WTO's basic non-discrimination postulate, these regimes are 
nonetheless tolerated. We have explained that regional regimes are accommodated under 
the WTO framework due to the fact that they are considered, among other reasons, to 
be a veritable vehicle to expedite tariff and non-tariff barrier phase out programmrne. 
We have also noted that Article XXIV was drafted with the principal objective of closing 
all possible loopholes by which it could degenerate into a justification for preferential 
arrangements of less than 100 percent preferences. We have pointed out that regional 
partners should be seen as the inunediate beneficiary of this elaborate rule based 
international trade framework. It goes without saying, therefore, that regional 
arrangements in the eastern and southern Africa region are no exception in this regard. 
As for the Enabling Clause, the thesis has pointed out that this facility is intended to 
facilitate full integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system. We 
have postulated that this objective would be achieved by providing developing countries 
with additional flexibility to meet their WTO obligations. We have established that under 
this clause, arrangements that are exclusively among developing countries can be 
considered less restrictive, unless the arrangements contemplate the selective removal of 
non-tariff barriers, in which case approval by the WTO members is required. We have 
noted that the key caveat for the utility of the Enabling Gause is namely that any such 
arrangement be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and 
not to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for trade of the other Contracting 
Parties. 
We have noted that the express purpose for granting the exception to regional regimes is 
explained under par. 4 of Article XXIV as being, to facilitate trade between the 
constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other Contracting Parties. 
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We have discussed the controversy around the WTOs edict that regional regimes cover 
"substantially all trade" and have submitted that the apparent ambiguity in this provision 
is entirely undesirable. 
We have noted that differences of opinions on the interpretation of the 'substantially-all-
trade' requirement under Article XXIV has been the main reason for the subsisting 
stalemate on the critical question of compatibility with the wro by various trade 
instruments. The thesis has also identified another major constrain specifically placed on 
customs unions. This is that the eET and other trade measures imposed at the time of 
the formation of a customs union, must be set at a level that is not "on the whole" 
higher or more restrictive than was imposed by the constituent territories prior to its 
formation. We have discussed the controversy attending this provision and have 
submitted that its ambiguity has created a veritable loophole for countries bent on 
maintaining high tariff regimes against third countries. We have seen how the EU has 
manipulated this provision to perpetuate its offending CAP policy. 
This work has examined the dilemma encapsulating the wro discipline on reciprocity 
under Part IVof the GATT agreement. We have established that Part IV of the GATT 
did not permit discrimination against other developing countries, since it has endorsed 
special treatment in favour of all developing countries and not just a sub-group. 
The thesis has further established that there are presently no satisfactory multilateral rules 
that are comprehensive enough to govern the determination of rules of origin. The wro 
has however tried to harmonise disciplines on origin rules. These disciplines are that the 
rules applied by each country must be based on a positive standard namely on what 
confers origin not what does origin confer. We have argued that this attempt at 
harmonisation is feeble and therefore incomparable to the more comprehensive origin 
rules covered by regional regimes. 
We have established that both South Africa and the EU contracted the free trade area in 
order to bolster their external positions and to promote a stronger world trading system. 
We have noted that both parties will benefit from the expanded home base that the free 
trade area provides to improve the competitiveness of their respective local and 
multinational firms. In this work, we have demonstrated that the EU-SA Agreement 
(hereinafter 'the Agreement) contributes to the desired objective through significant trade 
319 
reforms and through the establishment of a bi-national framework of rules that provides 
greater stability and predictability for trade and investment by both countries. 
On the economic score, our thesis is that in signing the Agreement South Africa has 
accepted certain risks. We have opined that there are clearly no guarantees as to the 
Agreement's real purport for the fledgling South Africa's democratic institutions. We 
have noted that since 'the real eating is in the pudding', there is no definitive empirical 
evidence to indicate whether or not the Agreement is in the overall interest of South 
Africa. We have argued that given the huge imbalances between South Africa and the 
EU economies, any negative effects emanating from the Agreement would be felt far 
more keenly by South Africa than its counterparts in the ED. 
It is our thesis that although South Africa is not strictly speaking a developing country -
and is even considered a developed nation within the wro framework - the Agreement 
provides a kind of case study for new global dynamics. We have underscored the fact 
that it is the first real agreement between a developed and an emerging market economy 
that focuses on trade more than it does on aid. We have conceded that the implication of 
this Agreement on South Africa and its regional neighbours are difficult to predict at 
least in the short term. The Agreement will have to run some course before the actual 
implications can be quantified. This work has established that the Agreement makes 
provisions that are intended to stimulate intra-regional trade and the integration of the 
eastern and southern Africa region. 
We have, however, argued that the last few month into the Agreement have been a huge 
disappointment on the eagerly awaited flow of foreign direct investments to South 
Africa. We have noted that the Agreement has rolled out investor friendly incentives that 
should spur the flow of foreign direct investments. It therefore means that the negative 
performance of the economy must find an explanation outside the parameters of the 
Agreement. 
We have argued that as much as the global impact of the Agreement would be far much 
limited, the Agreement is indicative of a new trend in global thinking about relations 
between the developed and the developing world. We have noted that despite its 
attractions, the Agreement does, nonetheless, contain notable deficiencies. For instance, 
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basic energy remains immune to free trade, progress on labour and environmental issues 
proceed in half steps, and the accession clause is none existent. 
On a more optimistic note, we have argued that the Agreement is fairly comprehensive 
and one that covers not only trade and trade related issues, but also co-operation in 
economic, social and political matters. We have pointed out that the twin principles of 
asymmetry and differentiation that characterise the Agreement reflect the developmental 
status of the EU on the one hand and South Africa on the other. We have argued, 
however, that the asymmetrical and differential benefits emanating from the Agreement 
would be eroded by the EU's superior capacity to immediately take up increased 
production as well as defend their own markets. 
We have opined that the Agreement scores well on the WTO most favoured nation and 
national treatment fronts. We have noted that the Agreement commits the Parties to 
provide national treatment to investors from the partner countries. It is our thesis, 
however, that compared to WTO rules the energy security safeguards are sharply 
circumscribed. We have pointed out that other basic features on tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers including dumping and countervailing measures to a large extent replicate the 
WTO disciplines. 
We have noted that the provision for an elaborate dispute settlement mechanism is in 
clear conformity with the WTO disciplines. We have postulated that the Agreement does 
not preclude Parties from accessing the much-advanced WTO dispute settlement 
mechanisms should they choose to do so. It is our submission that this leeway is a clear 
acknowledgement of the superiority of the WTO framework over that of the preferential 
Agreement. 
We have established that the Agreement fails to address the question of accession based 
on the WTO procedures. We have noted that the WTO's procedure underpins the 
importance of a free trade agreement being open to third countries. In our considered 
view this omission renders the Agreement incompatible with the WTO's strategy to 
coalesce the world commerce into a global village through building blocs in regional 
integration schemes. We have cautioned that quite clearly the creation of an EU-SA 
exclusionist trade club does not augur well for the WTO refrain on a tariff free global 
commerce. 
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We have established that the main trade concessions in the Agreement are in the area of 
tariffs. We have also established that the more restrictive non-tariff barrier regime has 
been largely left undisturbed. We have argued that, in fact the ability of the ED to 
negotiate reductions in such barriers is seriously constrained by its own unwillingness to 
scrap the forbidding non-tariff barriers in such sensitive areas as textile and apparel and 
steel. 
One striking feature that has come out clearly in this thesis is the fact that the process of 
integration in the eastern and southern Africa region involves unequal developing and 
least developed countries. We have argued that this unequal economic landscape offers 
unique yet insurmountable challenges for the unfolding integration processes. 
We have seen that the main thrust of the SADC Trade Protocol is to facilitate regional 
economic growth and development through, among others, the creation of a free trade 
area in the SADC region. We have discussed the significance of the rider to the 
liberalization process in that it is linked to an industrialization strategy. This strategy, we 
have argued, is tailor made to improve SADC states' global competitiveness. 
The thesis has noted that before ratification of the Trade Protocol most SADC states 
had liberalized on a large scale under the World Bank and IMF engineered SAPS. We 
have argued that when one looks at the issue from this perspective, it then becomes 
abundantly clear that an expedited move to a free trade area would be more demanding 
in terms of adjustment on South Africa than would be for her SADC counterparts. 
We have demonstrated that the Trade Protocol is to a large extent compatible with the 
WTO disciplines save for some areas of ambiguity, which we have highlighted. It is not 
clear, for example, between the bilateral trade arrangements and the Protocol as to which 
one would take precedence in case of inconsistency. 
The thesis has alluded to the fact that provisions on trade in services have been made 
WTO compliant to avoid situations of conflict with the multilateral disciplines. We have 
pointed out that the service industry is already blossoming in the region only that it is a 
one way highway shooting from South Africa to the rest of the region. On the obverse 
side of the coin, however, we caution that with the liberalisation of the services and 
manufacturing sectors, most firms in the region have been exposed to outside 
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competition. We have argued that this wind of change has, unfortunately, come suddenly 
and thereby sweeped the regional firms off balance before they could put in place 
necessary structures to position themselves in order to be internationally competitive 
We have lauded the fact that the revised dispute settlement provisions strife to ensure 
certainty and predictability in the settlement of disputes arising under the Trade Protocol. 
We have noted that this remarkable feat has been achieved by clearly outlining the 
different phases in the settlement of disputes and linking them to clear cut time frames. 
We have also noted that the new provisions are based on the same principles 
underpinning the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO. 
This work has highlighted the difficulty created with respect to SACU's Lucus standi before 
the dispute settlement panel by its insistence on presenting a harmonised tariff regime 
within the SADC framework. We have argued that in this convoluted scenario, it is 
unlikely that SACU would be afforded with the requisite competence to gain audience 
before the panel. 
It is our thesis that SACU is the first casualty to suffer the effects of the Agreement. We 
have argued that the EU-SA Agreement would effectively transform the BLNS's non-
reciprocal status to reciprocal duty-free access with serious legal and economic 
ramifications. In respect of SADC, we fmd that while its position is not as critical as that 
of the SACU states, it nevertheless faces a similar dilemma. 
We have examined the provision under the EU-SA Agreement that purports to extent 
trade benefits to SADC member States. We have detailed the various SADC State's 
sectors that are in the firing line of the EU-SA Agreement. We have, in the main, argued 
that the principal handicap afflicting the SADC States is the endemic weakness in their 
supply side structures. We have argued that in view of this enduring handicap, it is 
inconceivable that these States would be in a position to compete with EU's products in 
the South African market. 
We have argued that the reality of supply side handicap remains true in spite of 'the 
SADC first' principle which the Agreement has internalised. We have argued, however, 
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that SADC stands to benefit immensely from the tedmology transfer opportunity, which 
the EU-SA partnership offers. 
We have noted that trade arrangements in eastern and southern Africa region have been 
intended as a mechanism for enhancing the competitiveness of national and regional 
economies of their member States. Indeed, the motivating force for regional trade 
arrangements extends beyond trade and encompasses other broader issues. We have 
noted that the Cotonou, like other regional instrument covers a wide spectrum of 
sectors. These sectors are technology, foreign direct investment, money and finance, 
services, labour markets, government procurement, environment and the competition 
policies. We have argued that this comprehensive coverage is within the much wider 
framework of integrating the region into the global economy. 
We have cautioned that in achieving a post-Lome replacement, the ACP States should 
guard against so easily foregoing the Special and Differential benefits allocated to them 
under the WTO framework. We have noted that these benefits were to a large extent 
acconunodated within Lome's no-reciprocal preferences. We have argued that the 
preference regime should be viewed as a strategic amenity in the quest to achieve long-
term economic development goals for developing countries. We have singled out the 
banana case to demonstrate the fact that there are inherent difficulties in trying to serve 
the interests of the ACP States while at the same time respecting trade agreements within 
the framework of the WTO disciplines. 
We have examined the body of the Cotonou Agreement and have noted that despite its 
transitional character it nonetheless replicates other regional regimes in item coverage. 
We have conunented that the Cotonou does well to unequivocally acknowledge the 
different needs and levels of development for the ACP countries and regions. It is our 
thesis that the Cotonou is crafted in a deliberate fashion in order to build on and 
strengthen integration process taking root in the eastern and southern Africa region in a 
coherent and efficient manner. 
We have noted that despite the Cotonou's comprehensive coverage on regional 
integration friendly features, the problem, however, resides with the absence of 
economies of scale. This concern is founded on the premise that states in the eastern and 
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southern Africa region, with the exception of South Africa, deal in primary exports only. 
We have argued that such an undiversified economic base severely constrains intra-
regional trade. We have established that the Cotonou's coverage of the services trade is 
more comprehensive than similar efforts undertaken in other regional instruments. We 
have pointed out that the services sector rolls out the road map to the economic growth 
infrastructure and hence deserve to be treated to more comprehensive disciplines. 
We have noted that the central theme of bringing the pnvate sector aboard the 
integration processes resonates in all the regional instruments. We have noted the 
unmistakable synergy in the treatment of the private sector in all the regional agreements. 
The Cotonou has nonetheless surpassed other instruments by making broader 
commitments on the private sector support and development. The Cotonou, for 
instance, pledges support for operations of an ACP-EU private sector business forum 
whose main objective would, among other things, be to facilitate dialogue within the 
ACP lEU private sector and the bodies established under the Agreement. We have noted 
that this important innovation will bring together all entrepreneurs in the region for the 
common good of investment promotion. 
We have further noted that strategically speaking, South Africa thus finds itself astride 
two trade regimes, which one might argue also characterise its state of development. We 
have then demonstrated how South Africa is strategically placed within the Cotonou 
framework to augment and ultimately actualise the deepening of integration processes in 
the region. 
This work has identified and explained what measure the Cotonou should contribute to 
integration processes in the eastern and southern Africa region. We have argued that 
SADC and COMESA would conduct, as they have indeed done for the last four decades, 
most of their international trade with the EU under the Cotonou. This option provides 
the greatest certainty and, consequently, the most reliable export stability for the 
preference recipients among all the EU trade regimes. 
We have argued that the biggest challenge facing regionalism in the eastern and southern 
Africa region is the conflict between COMESA and SADe. We have pointed out that in 
this polarised scenario, the potential for conflict of interest is real and has the unintended 
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effect of stifling the region's integration agenda. We have shown that it is already evident 
that arriving at consensus necessary for the implementation of regional integration 
policies within the two blocs is often difficult. It is our thesis, therefore, that the 
proliferation and duplication of functions give rise, at regional level, to conflict over 
mandates and to a divided loyalty among governments. 
We have examined the motivation for multiple membership and have identified one 
notable strong persuasion for such inclination. We have argued that the motivation that 
succinctly captures the convoluted regionalism equation in eastern and southern Africa is 
the hope to get aboard the gravy train of donor funding. It is our thesis that most of 
these states maintain membership in numerous regional regimes not for purposes of 
promoting trade but with a hope of tapping on the handy reservoir that is donor funding. 
We have opined that the unfortunate reality of overlapping membership is that the 
SADC Trade Protocol will only effectively cover non-COMESA SADC members. This 
reality, we have argued, is due mainly to the fact that importers would clearly choose to 
pay the lower rates of customs duties under the COMESA umbrella. It is our thesis that 
this jumbled scenario is needless to say inimical to the deepening of the integration 
process in the eastern and southern Africa region. 
No doubt the fundamental objective of regional integration in the east and southern 
Africa should be clarified. In this connection, it has become abundantly clear that 
regional integration in the region could divert trade from cheaper international sources. 
We have demonstrated why this measure would not enhance the welfare of the region. 
9.2 Suggested recommendations 
We argue for enhanced flexibility in the WTO framework to create space for more 
innovative arrangements between the north-south and south-south economic divide. 
This measure would enhance the ability of the struggling developing economies to be 
fully integrated in the world trading system hence fulfil the WTO agenda of a tariff free 
trade. There is urgent need to revisit Article XXIV - that is the enabling provision for 
regional agreements. The vagueness of this provision is the root cause of the current 
chaos in the character assumed by the different integration instruments vis-a.-vis the 
WTO disciplines. 
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The WTO rules on the twill principles of recIprocIty and differentiation call for 
clarification. We think there is need for more latitude on this principles in the WTO 
framework in order to augment the integration processes currently crowding the regional 
landscape. 
With regard to the EU-SA Agreement, it is our considered view that, more attention 
should be directed at South Africa's capacity, particularly in the short and medium terms. 
It is important to put the necessary systems in place to take up the export opportunities 
that would be opened up and hedge against the unwholesome trade effects that are likely 
to seep through the Agreement. It is thus imperative for the implementation of the 
Agreement that risks and negative effects are minimised while growth opportunities are 
maximised. 
It is imperative for the South African government in general and the business community 
in particular to relentlessly pursue the obvious potential benefits offered by the EU-SA 
Agreement for South Africa's market. More importantly South Africa must ultimately 
face up to the cumbersome challenge of adjusting its structures of commerce, production 
and marketing to the exigencies of the global economy, quite independently of this 
Agreement. South Africa must take an urgent audit in identifying sectors that are 
vulnerable to competition and encourage their restructuring. In the same vein South 
Africa must be appraised that for benefits to accrue from the Agreement it must move to 
scrupulous exploit and diversify its export market. 
In our considered view it would have been better, for the sake of harmonisation, that the 
SADC Trade Protocol overrides all the existing bilateral trade arrangements. We take the 
view that there are already numerous preferential trade agreements in the region and that 
therefore SADC should consolidate its gains rather than calling for more free trade 
agreements. In any case the existing integration regimes duplicate each other in the 
coverage of trade and development issues. 
In order to actualise the pnme goal of international competmveness, SADC and 
COMESA must reconfigure themselves on the basis of assertive, mutually sustained and 
beneficial relationships so that they can locate themselves, their neighbourhood, and the 
rest of the continent into the competitive global economy. 
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It would be prudent for the ACP member states to object to any further restriction on 
the already onerous rules of origin, which they have to fulfil in order to obtain 
preferential access to the EU market. Our view on this matter is that the Cotonou has , 
for obvious reasons performed dismally on its coverage of the origin rules. Again the 
Cotonou provisions on the dispute settlement disciplines are clearly inadequate. It is 
expedient for more work to be put into streamlining these measures to clarify 
outstanding questions as regards the efficacy and composition of this instrument. 
We have called for a jointer of the region's two well-grounded customs unions - that is 
SACU and the EAC - to layout the much-needed road map and act as a super-highway 
to greater and deeper integration in the region. In our considered view, there is certainly 
great wisdom in an attempt by COMESA and SADC to commence their economic 
recovery program by moving from the known to the unknown. We have suggested that 
the SACU and the EAC experience offer far greater insights and lessons in the quest by 
the two blocs to coalesce the integration processes in the region into the higher order of 
a common market. 
We have noted that both COMESA and SADC are in agreement in so far as the final 
objective of their integration process is concerned. The two blocs are desirous of 
contributing to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the 
African Economic Community. Given this unity of purpose we propose that the two 
blocs implement their respective trade disciplines with due consideration to the 
provisions of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. This they have 
not done. 
We take the view that although it is a relatively rich country - by African standards -
South Africa cannot survive as an island that is surrounded by a sea of regional poveny. 
In our considered view, policy-makers must understand that the country's destiny is 
intimately interwoven with that of the region. Consequently it is imperative for South 
Africa to take the challenge of giving leadership on the way forward not only to its 
SADC flock but to the wider region and the continent as a whole. It is our thesis that 
South Africa can and should playa pivotal role in building bridges between the two blocs 
in order to spur intra-regional trade. 
328 
We have noted common weakness that the proposed co-operation between eOMESA 
and SADe would seek to address in their integration agendas. In order to promote 
sustainable integration activities countries in the region should belong to the one 
economic group that fully represents their interests. It is imperative for regional players 
to address the teething problem of the dearth of intra-regional trade and the lustre flow 
of direct foreign investment in the region. This obstacle can only be overcome when 
regional partners tackle the cumbersome baggage of double membership within the 
region. One way of addressing this baggage is for regional players to identify ways and 
means of harnessing synergies in both eOMESA and SADe programs in order to pave 
way for a co-operative integration partnership. 
We, in particular make a strong case for the necessIty of a co-operative approach 
between the two main regional contenders - eOMESA and SADe. Such a partnership 
would give the regional integration initiative a new impetus to mature the process to 
greater harmonisation. With these fundamentals in place, a deepening of integration 
would result which in turn would have a spread effect to other regions throughout the 
continent. Our considered view is that this is the route to go if the ultimate goal of 
achieving unity in the pan-African Economic Union is to be actualised. 
9.3 The epilogue 
As countries in the eastern and southern Africa region undergo political and economic 
restructuring, the region itself is confronted by the challenges of globalisation. And yet 
on the global plane controversy still dogs the WTO as to the way forward as the 
experience at Seattle demonstrates. The world body is facing a barrage of accusations 
both on the content of trade agreements and for the negotiation process itself. Protestors 
point to the damaging impact of global trade especially to developing countries' 
economies. They urge for fair tenns of trade rather than the official line of free trade the 
WTO has adapted. 
One of the Key challenges for the eastern and southern Africa region is how to shape the 
process of regional economic integration to promote intra-regional trade and spar 
growth. To this end, it is encouraging to see the transformation that is slowly taking place 
in institutional arrangement to respond to and work to reshape the new regional 
economic realignment. 
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It must be underscore the fact that with the new regional econonuc dispensation 
complex problems and difficult choices are bound to intensify as the pace of 
globalisation picks speed whilst countries seek to become more internationally 
competitive. Admittedly, there are is no easy way forward yet a call for the return of 
protectionist economic policies and welfare state of the post war period hardly seems like 
an adequate intervention. Indeed the challenges that emanate from globalisation and the 
perpetuation of social and economic inequities have to be confronted and addressed. 
The mushrooming of regional arrangements is a direct upshot of the failings spurned by 
globalisation imperatives. Which is why the proliferation of integration processes in the 
eastern and southern Africa is not an isolated development. This work has helped to 
highlight some of the legal questions that beg for answers as a result of the said 
proliferation of regional integration regimes. 
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American Integration Association - LAIA 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba 
(1998), Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, Venezuela , 
i 
r------
Asunci6n Treaty, establishing the Southern Common 2911.91 05.03.92 Under 
Market - MERCOSUR Exarninario 
n 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
Cartagena Agreement, establishing the Andean Pact 25.05.88 12.10.92 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 
T ripanite Agreement 01.04.68 23.02.68 Report 
I Egypt, Inelia, Yugoslavia Adopted in 
1968 I 
~ 
Unified Economic Agreement among member states of 
cilC Gulf Co-operation Council - GeC 11.10.84 
Babrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa -
COMESA 
Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic 08.12.94 26.6.95 
of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
I Zinlbabwe I 
I 
West African Economic and Monetary Union - UEMOA 
127.10.99 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea 01.01.00 
, Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo I 
I 
, 
Bangladesh, India, Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Philippines, tbe Republic of Korea, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand 
Conunon Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 
Scheme for the ASEAN Free-Trade Area 
Laos/Thailand 
Soutb Pacific Regional Trade and Economic 
Co-operation Agreement - SPARTECA 
Australia and New Zealand and Cook Islands, 
Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Westem Samoa 
Melanesian Spearhead Group 
I Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu 
I Pm,owl reI,,,,, co T ".I, N'god,d= =00' 
Developing Countries 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Israel, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic 
of Korea, Romania, T urusia, Turkey, Uruguay 
and Yugoslavia 
































Regional Trade Agreements Notified LO the GAIT /"rro and in Force in November 1999 





Treaty of Rome, P1.01.58 ~4.04.57 examination concluded (1957) 
establishing the European 
Conununities - EC 1 
2 EC/ Algeria ,01.07.76 28.07.76 examination concluded (1977) 
3 EC/Andorra ,01.07.91 25.02.98 !under examination by CRT A 
4 ECiBulgaria P1.1293 ?3.12.94 !under examination by CRT A 
5 EClC;Y!'.rus ,01.06.73 13.06.73 bamination concluded (1974) 
6 EC/Czech Republic ,01.03.92 13.05.96 junder examination by CRT A 
7 EC/Egypt ,01.07.77 15.07.77 bamination concluded (1978) 
8 IEC/Estonia 01.01.95 30.06.95 junder examination by CRT A 
9 EC/Faroe Islands 01.01.97 19.02.97 "nder examination b~ CRT A 
I 
10 EC/Hungary ()1.03.92 03.04.92 !under examination b CRT A 
II EC/Iceland 01.04.73 24.11.72 examination concluded (1973) 
12 EC/Israel 01.07.75 03.07.75 examination concluded (1976) ! 
13 Ee/Jordan 01.07.77 15.07.77 'examination concluded (1978) i 
14 EC/Latvia 01.01.95 30.06.95 ~der examination b)' CRT A 
I 
15 EC/Lebanon 01.07.77 115.07.77 pamination concluded (1978) 
16 EC/Lithuania 01.01.95 26.09.95 examination not srarted 
i 
17 EC/Malla 01.04.71 24.03.71 examination concluded (1972) 
18 EC/Morocco 01.07.76 28.07.76 examination concluded (1977) 
19 EC/NorwaZ 01.07.73 13.07.73 examination concluded (1974) 
20 EC/Palestinian Authority 30.06.97 ~der examination by CRT A 
21 ECiPoiand 01.03.92 03.04.92 \mder examination by CRT A 
22 EC/Cenain Non-European 
Countries ,llld Territories 01.01.71 14.12.70 examination concluded (197~ 
I PTOM II) 
23 EC/Romania t2L05.93 23.12.94 under examination bZ CRT A 
24 EC/Slovak Republic ,01.03.92 13.05.96 under examinaLion b)' CRT A 
25 EC/Slovenia ,01.01.97 11.11.96 under examinatio~ by CRT A I 
26 EC/Switzerland and ,01.01.73 27.10.72 'examination concluded (1973) 
, 
I Liechtenstein ---j 27 Ee/Syria ,01.07.77 15.07.77 examination concluded (1978) 
~- EC/Tunisia ,01.03.98 123.03.99 under examination bZ CRT A I 
29 Ee/Turkey ,01.01.96 22.12.95 under examination by CRT A I 
30 Stockhohn Convention) 
!establishing the European fl3.05.60 14.11.59 examination concluded (1960) 
Free Trade Association -
,EFTA 
31 EFTA/Bulgaria ,01.07.93 30.06.93 under examinacion by CRT A 
32 EFT A/Czech Republic ,01.07.92 03.07.92 examination concluded (1994) 
3J EFT A/Slovak Republic ,01.07.92 0307.92 xamination concluded (1994) , 
34 EFTA/Estonia ,01.06.96 25.07.96 under examination by CRT A 
~5 EFTA/Hungary ,01.10.93 23.12.93 under examinalion by CRT A 
lV 
136 iI'FTA/Israel P1.01.93 01.12.92 under examina(ion by CRT A 
37 lEFT AlLatvia P1.06.96 25.07.96 under examination by CRT A 
38 EFT AlLithuania ~1.08.96 25.07.96 under examina(ion by CRT A I 
139 EFTAIPLO ~1.07.99 21.09.99 not yet transmitted to CRT A 
, 
140 !EFTA/Poland 15.11.93 20.10.93 under examination bz: CRTA 
41 EFT AlRomania ~1.05.93 24.05.93 !under examination by CRT A 
42 lEFT A/Slovenia 01.07.95 18.10.95 lunder examination by CRT A 
'43 EFTA/Turkey 01.04.92 06.03.92 examination concluded (1993) 
I 
44 Faroe Islands/Iceland 01.07.93 23.01.96 lunder examina(ion by CRT A 
45 Faroe Islands/Norway 01.07.93 13.03.96 lunder examina(ion bz: CRT A 
146 Ibroe Islands/Swi(zerland 01.03.95 08.03.96 lunder examina(ion by CRTA , 
'47 Faroe Islands/Estonia 01.12.98 09.12.98 examination nor started I' , 
'48 Croatia/Slovenia 01.01.98 25.03.98 lunder examination by CRT A 
~9 01.03.93 
, 
Central European Free Trade 30.06.94 Under examination by CRT A 
Area -CEFTA 
50 Czech Republic/Estonia 12.02.98 ~3.08.98 under examination by CRT A 
51 Czech Republic/Israel 01.12.97 30.03.98 under examination bz: CRT A 
,52 Czech Republic/Latvia 01.07.97 13.11.97 under examination by CRT A 
53 C~ch Republic/Lithuania 01.09.97 13.11.97 under examination by CRT A 
54 Czech Republic/Slovak P1.01.93 30.04.93 examination concluded (1994) 
Republic 
55 IH~gary /Israel P1.02.98 24.03.98 lunder examination by CRT A 
56 Israel/Poland ~1.03.98 18.12.98 ~xamination not started 
57 ~srael/Slovenia ~1.09.98 18.12.98 )examination not started 
58 ~oland/Faroe Islands ~1.06.99 29.09.99 ~xamination not started I 
59 Pol;U;d/Latvia P1.06.99 29.09.99 ~xamination nor started 
60 Poland/Lithuania P1.01.97 30.12.97 under examination by CRT A 
61 Ro~a/Moldova ~1.01.95 24.09.97 under examination by CRT A , 
62 Slovak Republic/Estonia 12.02.98 03.08.98 mder examination by CRT A 
63 Slovak Repu blic/Israel P1.01.97 30.03.98 under examination by CRT A 
64 ~lovak Republic/Latvia ~1.0797 14.11.97 under examination by CRT A 
65 Slovak Republic/Lithuania ~1.07.97 14.11.97 lunder examination by CRT A 
66 Slovenia/Estonia ~1.01.97 20.02.97 lunder examination by CRT A 
67 Slovenia/Latvia P1.08.96 20.02.97 lunder examination by CRT A 
68 Slovenia/Lithuania p1.03.97 20.02.97 Itrnder examination by CRT A 
69 Slovenia/Former Yugoslav P1.09.96 20.02.97 !examination not started 
ReElUblic of Macedonia 
70 :Estorua- Latvia-Lithuania] 01.04.94 15.06.99 )examination not starred 
,71 Turkey /BuIgaria ,01.01. 99 04.05.99 ~xamination not staned 
172 Turkey/Czech Republic ~1.09.98 12.01.99 lunder examina(ion bz: CRT A 
173 IT urkey/Estonia ~1.07.98 12.01.99 lunder examination bZ CRT A 
I 
174 'Turkey/Hungary P1.04.98 12.05.98 lunder examination by CRT A I 
175 (furkey/Israel P1.05.97 18.05.98 ~er examination by CRT A 
'76 , [Turkey/Lithuania P1.0398 ;08.0698 lunder examina(ion bZ CRT A 
77 [TurkezlRomania ~1.02.98 18.05.98 lunder examination by CRT A 
78 Turkey/Slovak Republic ~1.09.98 12.01.99 lunder examina(ion by CRT A 
79 Agreements on Customs p8.10.97 06.04.99 ~xamination not starred 
Union 
80 Kyrgyz Republic! Moldova 121.11.96 15.06.99 h~ation not staned 






























!Kyrgyz Republic/ Ukraine 19.01.98 15.06.99 ~xamination not started 
Kyrgyz Republic! ~0.03.98 15.06.99 'examination not started 
Uzbekistan 1 
!Kyrgyz Republic! ... 15.04.94 01.10.99 examination not started 
United States/Israel 19.08.85 13.09.85 examination concluded (1987) 
Canada/Chile 05.07.97 '26.08.97 under examination by CRTA 
Canada/Israel 01.01.97 23.01.97 mder examination by CRT A 
North American Free Trade P1.01.94 01.02.93 under examination by CRT A 
Aoreement - NAFTA 
ICentral American Common 12.10.61 24.02.61 examination concluded (1961) 
!Market - CACM 
Caribbean Community and 
fll.08.73 Common Market - 14.10.74 xamination concluded (1977) 
CARICOM 
PATCRA ~1.02.77 20.12.76 xamination concluded (1977) 
Closer Economic Relations ~Xamination concluded (1984) r rade Agreement - P1.01.83 14.04.83 
ANZCERTA , 
Source: finD:! I "'ww. Mo.orgl Mol englishltratop el region e/webrtas.htm 
Appendix 'C' 
Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the GATT IWTO and in Force in November 
1999 
B. Agreclncnb notifil.:d under ti lt." FIl:lhling Cbuse 
Agreement Date of En try fNotification !Examination Status 
into Force Date 
Montevideo Treaty (1980), 18.03.81 01.07.82 --
establishing the Latin 
American Integration 
Association - LAIA 
Asuncion Treaty - 9.11.91 p5.03.92 under examination by CRT A 
'MERCOSUR 
Cartagena Agreement - 25.05.88 12.10.92 --
Andean Group 
I ripartite -Agreement 01.04.68 123.02.68 examination concluded (1968) 
Unified Economic 11.10.84 --
Agreemem among Inember 
states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Ca,mcil - GeC 
,Common Market for Eastern 08.12.94 29.6.95 --
'and Southern Africa 
COMESA) 
Preferential Tariffs among 22.7.92 examination concluded (1992) 












101 South Asian Preferential --
Trade Arrangement - p7.12.95 25.04.97 
SAPTA 
102 Bangkok Agreement 17.06.76 02.11.76 lexamination concluded (1978) 
103 Agreement on ASEAN 
Vreferential Trade 31.08.77 01.11.77 ~xamination concluded (1979) 
Arrangements 
104 Laos/Thailand 20.06.91 29.11.91 --
lOS South Pacific Regional Trade 
and Economic Co-operation 01.01.81 20.02.81 ~xamination concluded (1981) 
Agreement - SPARTECA 
106 :Melanesian Spearhead Group 1984 07.10.99 --
107 "Protocol relating to Trade --
Negotiations among 11.02.73 09.11.71 
Developing Countries 
108 Global System of Trade 19.04.89 25.09.89 examination concluded (1989) 




Major Exports of the SADC Countries, 1993 
Country Commodities (% Primary Products & as % of I 
of Total Total Exports 
Exports 
, 
I Angola 95.4 Oil (86%), Coffee (4%), Diamonds (1.6%) 
I 
Botswana 98.0 Diamonds (88.2%), Copper! Nickel (7.5%), Beef (4.4%) 
! Malawi 93.4 Tobacco (75%), Sugar (6.1%) 
L--_ I 
Mozambique 76.3 Fish (27%), Cash-nuts, Sugar, Cotton 
, 
Coffee (24.8%), Cotton 22.9%), Cash-nuts (1.6%), Sisal (4.8%), , 
F'";' , 79.3 Manufactures (4.9%, Minerals (5.6%) I Tobacco (20.2%), Gold (5%), Ferrochrome (9%), Maize (6%), 
I Zimbabwe 56.9 Nickel (5.9%), Cotton (5%), Oothing/Textile (4.6%) 
, 
Zambia 90.0 Copper (84%), Cobalt (N/ A), Zinc (N/ A) 
, 
Uranium (24%), Diamonds (40%), Base Metals, Beef, Mutton, 
Namibia 95.0 I Lamb, Hides, Pelts, Karakul, % Fish (N/ A) 
Precious & Semi-precious Metals (12.7%), Base Metals (12.4%), 
Mineral products (10.6%), Chemical products (4.2%, Machinery 
South Africa 70.0 & Appliances (3.5%), Motor Vehicles & Parts (3.4%), 
Vegetable products (3%) 
Source: Mayer and Thomas, 1997, Table S,p.339 
Vlll 
Appendix E 
GDP per capita, Tariffs and Direction of Trade: Eight SADC Countries, 1995 
Countries GDPper Average pre- Average pre- SADC Shares SADC 
Capita SAP Tariffs (%) PTA Tariffs in Imports Shares in 
(US$) (%) Exports 
Angola 565 11.4 11.4 1.4 0.1 
Malawi 172 22.9 7.5 20.3 12.9 
Mauritius 2,527 15.3 11.6 8.2 0.9 
Mozambique 91 25.5 11.8 22.5 3.9 
SACU/RSA 2,661 9.5 8.1 1.6 7.8 
Tanzania 75 24.2 3.9 0.5 2.1 
Zambia 414 402 15.1 23.1 13.1 
Zimbabwe 466 9.7.3 11.3 30.3 39.9 
Average 1,033 15.1 9.3 4.7 6.4 
IX 
Appendix F 
Direction of SAOC Exports (1991 or Most Recent Data) 
Other 
Countries World $ Europe North Japan Developing Africa Developing 
Millions Amenc Countries Countries 
a 
! 
I Angola 3105.4 25.1 52 .6 0.1 20.8 1.5 14 
Malawi 454 .0 46.9 16.5 10.0 13.6 9.5 13.0 
I 
Mozambique 239.8 31.3 13.0 6.7 48.8 12.0 0.2 
South Africa 17052.0 55.2 12.4 10.8 15.3 6.1 6.3 
-
, 
Tanzania 404.0 59.4 4.5 4.5 30.7 7.1 0.9 
r zambia 
- , 
1347.5 34.5 1.6 29.1 21.8 11.9 13.0 
~ 
Zimbabwe 1467.6 44 .1 7.3 5.5 23.9 17.2 19.2 
All sub- 54657.2 51.2 22.1 5.6 15.4 7.5 5.7 
. Sahara Africa 
I 
I AU 708947.0 25.5 24.0 12.0 27.2 2.6 11.3 
DeVeloping 
Countries 
Source: Mayer and Thomas, 1997, Table 6 p.339 
